The feeling of being alive still constitutes a major blind spot of contemporary affective sciences research. The mainstream view accepts it as an ‘umbrella notion’ comprising different states, such as M. Ratcliffe’s «feelings of being», T. Fuchs’s «feeling of being alive», E.M. Engelen’s «Gefühl des Lebendigseins», etc. In contrast, I argue for an account of the feeling of being alive as a unique feeling that can be described in several ways. Empirical support for this view comes mainly from Carvalho and (...) Damasio’s hypothesis of the distinctiveness of the interoceptive system as the physiological underpinning of this feeling. This account is also in line with many other approaches recognizing the role of interoception proper in mind and subjectivity grounding, collected by Tsakiris and De Presteer. Over recent decades, Damasio’s organic descriptions have been widely acknowledged as neurophysiological counterparts of philosophical/psychological concepts. However, in my view they have been often misinterpreted, especially due to the mainstream Ratcliffian interpretation mediating his ideas amongst philosophers. Throughout the paper, a critical inquiry into Damasio’s conceptualization is provided, by means of conceptual analysis and an overall taxonomy of the several affective states he has proposed over the past few decades. Ultimately, a critical discussion of his own account of the feeling of being alive is offered from a philosophical viewpoint. (shrink)

Our interpretive resources enable us to make sense of, navigate, and communicate about our shared world. These resources not only carve the world up into categories, but also guide how we, individually and collectively, are oriented towards it. In this thesis, I examine how these resources, and the dispositions they guide, may be harmful. A vital kind of interpretive resources are frames, which equip us with unified perspectives on the world. Perspectives are suites of open-ended interpretive (inquisitive, attentional, inferential, evaluative, (...) and affective) dispositions. Frames thereby guide how we interpret, respond to, and navigate the world. I show that these perspectives are epistemically powerful and indispensable. I argue that flawed perspectives, and the distorting frames that produce them, are deeply pernicious and I examine their relationship to oppression. (shrink)

Ask a non-philosopher whether it’s rational to be moral, and she will likely think the answer is relatively clear: intuitively, what is moral is often at odds with what is rational. For example, although giving a dollar to a needy stranger would be a moral thing to do, the rational thing to do would be to keep it for yourself. Among professional philosophers, by contrast, the answer is not so obvious. Philosophers have subtle views of rationality and morality. Seldom, if (...) ever, do they understand norms of rationality as straightforwardly implying that we single-mindedly pursue our own self-interest, narrowly construed, and seldom, if ever, do they understand norms of morality as straightforwardly implying that we should always help others, regardless of our circumstances. -/- Among philosophers, then, the proposal that it is rationally permissible, or even required, to be moral, is not dismissed out of hand in light of apparent counterexamples. I propose that philosophers should take the same open-minded attitude to the proposal that virtue is compatible with, or even necessary for, well-being. Philosophers have sometimes denied that virtue is necessary for well-being on much the same grounds that our envisioned person on the street dismissed the possibility that morality may be rationally required: by pointing out apparent counterexamples (Haybron 2007: 5–11; see Chapter 15 by Besser-Jones, this volume). But, just like the question “is it rational to be moral?” the question “is virtue compatible with, or even required for, well-being?” cannot be dismissed so easily, because apparent counterexamples depend on only intuitive, commonsense, pre-theoretical understandings of virtue and well-being. -/- Any claim about the relationship between virtue and well-being must take the form of a con- ditional—for example: if this account of virtue and this account of well-being are correct, then virtue is necessary for (or compatible with, or the best bet for achieving, etc.) well-being.2 This point sets the structure for this chapter. In this chapter, I will (1) sketch an account of virtue, (2) develop a specific sense in which one might argue that virtue is necessary for well-being, and (3) explore the prospects for the proposal that virtue is necessary for well-being, discussing some of the main accounts of well-being in turn. I will argue that on some (though not all) accounts of well-being, there is reason to think that, when we more fully develop an account of the (fundamental, direct, intrinsic) contributors to well-being, we may discover that virtue is indeed necessary for well-being. (shrink)

Tom Regan holds that all subjects-of-a-life possess equal inherent value, and thus have an equal right to be treated with respect. In this chapter, I consider an apparent implication of Regan's principle: that we have an obligation to rescue prey from their predators. This apparent implication is counterintuitive to many people who otherwise accept Regan's principle, so it is worth considering whether it is indeed implied by Regan's principle. Regan argues that his principle does not imply we have an obligation (...) to rescue prey from their predators; I consider this argument, and show that it does not succeed. Instead, I offer a different argument, inspired by a eudaimonist approach, but compatible with Regan's rights-centered framework. (shrink)

There is growing interest in a category of domestic labour frequently termed ‘emotional labour’. I argue that this labour is, in fact, primarily a form of epistemic labour. I argue that domestic epistemic labour is the target of dual erasure. Firstly, as invisible domestic labour, it is underrecognized and undervalued. Secondly, it is not recognized as epistemic, due to women’s epistemic oppression. ‘Emotional labour’, as a catch-all for feminized labour, perpetuates the dominant ideological conception of emotion as feminine and anti-epistemic. (...) Consequently, popular usage of ‘emotional labour’ attempts to address the first layer of erasure but reinforces the second. (shrink)

The article analyzes the historical experience of creation and development of military medical aircraft in Ukraine from the 1920s. to the present. In particular, reviewed the activity of Design Bureaus of K. Kalinin and O. Antonov. Special attention is paid to the creation of military medical aircraft after Ukraine gained independence in 1991 and their application to evacuate the wounded during Armed conflict in the east of Ukraine in 2014-2016. The first attempt of creation a sanitary aircraft were made in (...) Ukraine back in the 1920s under the leadership of Konstantin Kalinin. In a qualitatively new level was realized military medical aircraft designed by bureau Oleg Antonov, created in the second half of 1970s aircraft emergency resuscitative-surgical care An-26M "Spasatel'" Accumulated experience allowed at the beginning of 2000s a similar purpose for the An-26 "Vita" for the Air Force of Ukraine. Over a longer time, he reminded to be the only one military medical aircraft in Ukraine. Plans of creating mixed air-transport unit air ambulance were not implemented. Successful use of the An-26 "Vita" to evacuate the wounded during repel of Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine helped to intensify work in the field of military medical aircraft.In2015 inmedical version were rebuilt two more An-26. One of them joined the Air Force, and the second - Natinal Service of Emergencies in Ukraine. All three aircrafts are different composition of medical equipment and ability to provide medical care. Their purpose is evacuation of the wounded from the airfield vicinity of the battle area to military medical institutions. (shrink)

_The Bounds of Reason: Habermas, Lyotard & Melanie Klein on Rationality_ is a highly original yet accessible study of the debate between modernity and postmodernity. Emilia Steuerman clearly explains the modernity/postmodernity dispute by examining the problem that has driven the whole debate: whether the use of reason is an emancipatory or enslaving force. Steuerman clearly sets out this debate by critically examining the arguments of two of its key proponents, Jurgen Habermas and Jean-François Lyotard. She clearly explains Habermas' defence (...) of modernity and his attempt to salvage Enlightenment ideas of truth, justice, and freedom through the use of reason. She contrasts this with Lyotard's postmodernism and his scepticism about the use of reason, and its claims to universalism and objectivity. Throughout, Steuerman contrasts the Habermas-Lyotard debate with important insights from psychoanalytic theory, and shows how Habermas' notions of intersubjectivity and a community of shared language users can be compared and contrasted with Melanie Klein's theory of object relations. (shrink)

_The Bounds of Reason: Habermas, Lyotard & Melanie Klein on Rationality_ is a highly original yet accessible study of the debate between modernity and postmodernity. Emilia Steuerman clearly explains the modernity/postmodernity dispute by examining the problem that has driven the whole debate: whether the use of reason is an emancipatory or enslaving force. Steuerman clearly sets out this debate by critically examining the arguments of two of its key proponents, Jurgen Habermas and Jean-François Lyotard. She clearly explains Habermas' defence (...) of modernity and his attempt to salvage Enlightenment ideas of truth, justice, and freedom through the use of reason. She contrasts this with Lyotard's postmodernism and his scepticism about the use of reason, and its claims to universalism and objectivity. Throughout, Steuerman contrasts the Habermas-Lyotard debate with important insights from psychoanalytic theory, and shows how Habermas' notions of intersubjectivity and a community of shared language users can be compared and contrasted with Melanie Klein's theory of object relations. (shrink)

Is medicalization always harmful? When does medicine overstep its proper boundaries? The aim of this article is to outline the pragmatic criteria for distinguishing between medicalization and over-medicalization. The consequences of considering a phenomenon to be a medical problem may take radically different forms depending on whether the problem in question is correctly or incorrectly perceived as a medical issue. Neither indiscriminate acceptance of medicalization of subsequent areas of human existence, nor criticizing new medicalization cases just because they are medicalization (...) can be justified. The article: (i) identifies various consequences of both well-founded medicalization and over-medicalization; (ii) demonstrates that the issue of defining appropriate limits of medicine cannot be solved by creating an optimum model of health; (iii) proposes four guiding questions to help distinguish medicalization from over-medicalization. The article should foster a normative analysis of the phenomenon of medicalization and contribute to the bioethical reflection on the boundaries of medicine. (shrink)

In this article, I will consider whether, and in what way, doxastic states can harm. I’ll first consider whether, and in what way, a person’s doxastic state can harm her, before turning to the question of whether, and in what way, it can harm someone else.

The block universe is generally considered as the metaphysical position that best accommodates the outcomes of relativistic physics. Its most consistent formulation postulates a static universe where change is not admitted. However, some of its advocates try to reconcile its basic adynamical commitments as to the nature of physical reality with certain aspects of dynamism that arise, for instance, within human experience. In this article, I first examine how some block viewers try to reconcile dynamism and adynamism. I then go (...) on to discuss the problems that emerge while trying to make room for dynamism within the block. To this end, I clarify the meaning of adynamism and explains what it takes to eradicate dynamism through the implementation of the so-called “Langrangian schema”. Based on this analysis, I juxtapose two resolute attempts at the formulation of a thoroughly adynamical project. The first, named relational block world, aims to make the block view totally static. The second, Barbour’s early works on the implementation of a neo-Machian relational strategy, makes the point that a complete adynamism cannot be achieved within relativity and its metaphysical counterpart. The article in conclusion argues that, by dismissing four-dimensionalism and embracing three-dimensionalism, Barbour proves better at promoting an utterly static physics. (shrink)

We believe with the publication of our Lexicon Spinozanum, that we are meeting a need in Spinoza historiography which has been pointed out by scholars, but has never before been satisfied. In the intro duction of his Spinozas philosophische Terminologie (Leipzig, 1913), G. T. Richter promised "a Spinozistic Lexicon in which the meaning of each term is set out on an historical basis in alphabetical order". In 1924, in the Report, i.e., Nachbericht, of his four volume edition of the complete (...) works of Spinoza (Heidelberg), C. Gebhardt promised a complementary volume comprising, among other things, a general index. However, neither the one nor the other were ever published. The hope of seeing this gap quickly filled has been reiterated recently by Di Vona: "The compilation of a Spinozistic index is a task of the history of philosophy, the execution of which would gratify all scholars". (Di V on a, Studi suIt' ontologia di Spinoza, Florence, 1960). We do not know how closely our Lexicon Spinozanum corresponds to what Richter and Gebhardt projected. We believe, however, that there are common requirements at the basis of works of this sort. In our procedure and in the delimitation of our scope, we have set for ourselves two main criteria: that of clarity and that of completeness. We hope we hav:e not deviated from them too much. (shrink)

In the present paper we would like to investigate the concept of mythothought as defined by two philosophers, Ernst Cassirer and Lucian Blaga, and the way in which the term may be applied to a chosen corpus of poetry from Romania, Wales and Ireland.

Este artículo reseña: Ángeles SOLANES CORELLA, ¿Castigar o premiar? Las sanciones positivas,Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 2023, 320 pp.

Gilbert Simondon ’s work is devoted to the act of knowledge as a specific human experience, common to all the specialized fields. It is a departure toward infinity, an opening to nature, which emerged as soon as philosophy was discovered in Greece. This movement of individuation is rooted in the pre-individual, in the flux of life.

The aim of this article is to explore how metaphor is mobilized to frame and describe the lived experience of dementia in a corpus of illness narratives compiled from 10 blogs initiated and maintained by individuals diagnosed with early-onset dementia. The article is set against the background of contemporary healthcare practices and discourse around chronic illness and focuses on the metaphors that patients use to communicate about their dementia experience in relation to three basic psychological needs: autonomy, competence and relatedness, (...) which are essential for human well-being and are heavily challenged in complex medical situations. Results are discussed in terms of the framing metaphors provide of the emotional, psychological impact of dementia and their implications for patient-centered care. This study expands prior work by researching metaphors used for a condition that has been scarcely explored from this point of view and by focusing on the patient’s perspective exclusively. (shrink)

Rise of populist politics in the 21s century calls scholars and politicians alike to reflect upon the question of how politics and democracy have been understood. Drawing on the theory of hegemony, this article establishes a distinction between democracy and ‘demography’ as a key line of conceptualization in politics. It highlights a central misunderstanding at the core of the demonization of populism: For radical democratic theory, ‘the people’ is not a demographic, socio-economic, or historically sedimented category tied to some characteristics, (...) but a performative process of ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ ‘the people’ as a self-consciously enacted polity. This statement challenges the taken-for-granted status of subjectivities of political struggle and links this approach to other contemporary discussions of politics, democracy, and populism. After discussing how anti, neo and post-foundational theoretical accounts on populism reveal a dimension of politics and representation, this article emphasizes action and performativity over static categories and models characteristic of political realism and political system approaches. (shrink)

Eudaimonists deny that eudaimonism is objectionably egoistic, but the way in which they do so commits them to eschewing an important insight that has been a central motivation for eudaimonism: the idea that an individual must, in the end, organize her life in such a way that it is good for her. In this paper I argue that the egoism objection prods eudaimonists to make a choice between (what we might roughly call) welfare-prior and excellence-prior eudaimonism, and I make some (...) preliminary remarks on behalf of welfare-prior eudaimonism. (shrink)

We could ask: how national could be a culture or another? The modernist or postmodernist perspectives seems to be unilateral here. Could be transmodernism the right sollution? The distictions between modernism, postmodernism and transmodernism are actually a pretext to set into discussion again the old dispute between Culture, regarded as a humanity universal feature and national cultures, perceived as a human community tradition symbol (community that claims a territory, a language, a religious belief and a certain government form).

As one of the characteristics of the nowadays postmodernism, the multiculturalism and the globalization seems to be profoundly related to the heterogenity and to the heteronomy. Globalization is going with the multiculturalism, but in an opposite direction: globalization towards the standardization and multiculturalismtowards fragmentation. Is the Global Village also the Postmodern Village?

Axiomatic classes of algebras of a given type which are closed with respect to direct limits are studied in this paper.

Com o objetivo de ressaltar a importancia da fabulaç áo , como meio de expressáo do exercicio filosofico, em Plat áo , reconstituem-se inicialmente, neste artigo, os principais passos do Teeteto, cujo final aporético decorreria da n áo exploraç áo pelos interlocutores das hipoteses da Reminiscencia e das Ideias, as quais n áo se restringem ao logos mais estrito nem se dissociam do relato mitico. Em seguida, evidencia-se que, sobretudo a partir dos dialogos da maturidade, a recriaç áo poetica da (...) tradiç áo constitui um suporte doutrindrio indispensável.  . (shrink)

The relationship between self- and informant reports of personality using psychometric instruments is constantly the focus of attention for researchers in the field of clinical assessment in psychology. The research shows weak agreement between clinicians and patients’ assessments of personality disorders (PDs). The current study aimed at the convergence of measurement of PDs using the Shedler-Westen Assessment Procedure (SWAP-200), the self-report Character Styles Questionnaire-R (CSQ-R) and Borderline Personality Inventory (BPI). Paper-pencil questionnaires were administered to 102 inpatients (88.2% female, aged 18-64, (...) M = 38.4) in a voivodeship hospital and outpatient health care centre. The SWAP-200 allowed us to gather expert (clinician) personality ratings basing on the intensive contact with patients. Results show that only a few SWAP-200 PD scales showed low positive correlations with corresponding self-reported PD scales from the CSQ-R. With the canonical correlation analysis, we identified two functions (borderline and internalising) that described similarities between the SWAP-200 and CSQ-R. SWAP-200 Obsessive-Compulsive PD correlated negatively with BPI scales. Consistent with previous studies, the self-report and the clinical assessment were only marginally convergent. Furthermore, OCPD stands out from other disorders in that it correlates positively with health indicators and negatively with some of the other personality disorders. The highest agreement was observed in the description of Borderline PD. (shrink)

In the contemporary virtue ethics literature, eudaimonia is discussed far more often than it is defined or fully articulated. It was introduced into the contemporary virtue ethics literature by philosophers who work in ancient philosophy, and who are familiar with the work of ancient eudaimonists (where the ancient eudaimonists are typically thought to include Plato, the Stoics, and (especially) Aristotle). Yet, predictably, among philosophers who study ancient philosophy, there is not consensus, but rather lively debate, about what eudaimonia is: how (...) the various ancient eudaimonists understood it, the role it played in their theories, and so on.2 In this chapter, I will discuss the role of eudaimonia in contemporary virtue ethics, and especially contemporary eudaimonist virtue ethics. (shrink)

Despite recent efforts by the Artificial Intelligence (AI) community to move towards standardised procedures for documenting models, methods, systems or datasets, there is currently no methodology focused on use cases aligned with the risk-based approach of the European AI Act (AI Act). In this paper, we propose a new framework for the documentation of use cases that we call use case cards, based on the use case modelling included in the Unified Markup Language (UML) standard. Unlike other documentation methodologies, we (...) focus on the intended purpose and operational use of an AI system. It consists of two main parts: firstly, a UML-based template, tailored to allow implicitly assessing the risk level of the AI system and defining relevant requirements, and secondly, a supporting UML diagram designed to provide information about the system-user interactions and relationships. The proposed framework is the result of a co-design process involving a relevant team of EU policy experts and scientists. We have validated our proposal with 11 experts with different backgrounds and a reasonable knowledge of the AI Act as a prerequisite. We provide the 5 use case cards used in the co-design and validation process. Use case cards allows framing and contextualising use cases in an effective way, and we hope this methodology can be a useful tool for policy makers and providers for documenting use cases, assessing the risk level, adapting the different requirements and building a catalogue of existing usages of AI. (shrink)

Defenders of pragmatic encroachment in epistemology hold that practical factors have implications for a belief’s epistemic status. Paradigm defenders of pragmatic encroachment have held—to state their positions roughly— that whether someone’s belief that p constitutes knowledge depends on the practical reasons that she has (Stanley 2005), that knowing p is necessary and sufficient for treating p as a reason for action (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008), or that knowing p is sufficient for reasonably acting as if p (Fantl and McGrath 2009: (...) 66). Although their defenders may not always pose their theses in the language of practical reasons, the idea of a practical reason is central to each of these views. Yet there remain issues concerning the nature and basis of practical reasons on which defenders of pragmatic encroachment have not taken a position, including—as I will explain—the issue of whether internalism or externalism about reasons is true. It may be thought that the position the defender of pragmatic encroachment takes on this does not make a difference to the truth or falsity of her main thesis. In this chapter, I will show that it does matter, in the sense that her view will generate different verdicts about cases depending on whether she endorses internal- ism or externalism about reasons. Given the role of cases in providing intui- tive support for or against the theory, this, in turn, makes a difference to the plausibility of pragmatic encroachment. (shrink)

Dans l'espace spirituel de la civilisation occidentale contemporaine il s'opere un croisement entre deux paradigmes mentaux selon lesquels le rapport entre le transcendant et le phenomenologique est percu d'une maniere fondamentalement differente: il est question des paradigmes de pre-renaissance et de la modernite. Dans le paradigme pre-renaissant, l'univers est percu comme etant ontologiquement divise en deux realites subordonnees, ce qui introduit le Transcendant dans le monde. Avec les progres des sciences, le paradigme mental se bätit sur l'idee principale de l'unidimensionnalite (...) du reel. Or. le monde se retrouve ainsi depourvu de sa dimension transcendante. La solution proposee dans l'expose serait la formation d'un nouveau paradigme mental qui assurerait ä l'homme une presence spirituelle dans le monde. (shrink)

AimThe aim was to explore the various associations between subjective well-being and internet use among older adults in two regions in Finland and Sweden.MethodsThe data was collected through a population-based survey as part of the GERDA project conducted in 2016. The connection between subjective well-being and internet use was studied by conducting binary regression analyses, calculating odds ratios with 95% confidence intervals. The analyses also controlled for key subjective well-being covariates.ResultsStatistically significant associations were found between perceived life meaningfulness and internet (...) use. When looking into the specific internet-based activities under study, activities related to leisure and entertainment showed statistically significant associations to perceived meaningfulness as well as perceived happiness, also after controlling for potential covariates. However, internet use and the different internet activities failed to show statistical significant associations to life satisfaction in the adjusted regression model.ConclusionThe things we do on the internet as well as how we conceptualize and measure subjective well-being in this type of research studies seem to matter when it comes to the relationship between subjective well-being and internet use in later life. Internet use and internet activities displayed various connections to the subjective well-being proxies used in this study. Therefore, the complexity and multidimensionality of both subjective well-being and internet use and related links need to be carefully explored in order to deepen our understanding of experienced well-being among older adults in a digitized world. (shrink)

En el presente artículo me concentraré en el estudio filosófico de los delirios, como un caso ejemplificador del vínculo que pueden establecer la filosofía de la mente y la psiquiatría. Frente a versiones radicalmente naturalistas, que proponen variantes reduccionistas o eliminativistas para la explicación de ciertos fenómenos mentales y sus variantes “anormales”, defenderé una versión moderada de la perspectiva naturalista. Al respecto, señalaré que retener algún grado de simpatía hacia el naturalismo en las investigaciones filosóficas sobre los delirios es necesario (...) para desarrollar teorías sobre las creencias empíricamente informadas que no resulten contradictorias con los desarrollos actuales en psicología cognitiva y neurociencias. No obstante, afirmaré también que una perspectiva exclusivamente naturalista -tanto por parte de la filosofía como de la psiquiatría misma- es incapaz de dar cuenta del contexto normativo en donde juegan las creencias. Los criterios normativos, especialmente externos que se emplean para clasificar ciertas creencias como delirantes no resultan inteligibles bajo una explicación puramente natural. Por el contrario, para comprender las creencias delirantes qua delirantes, será preciso acercarnos a un abordaje híbrido que pueda contemplar las causas naturales del fenómeno así como su evaluación normativa. (shrink)