Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (4):511-535 (2013)

Anne Baril
Washington University in St. Louis
Eudaimonists deny that eudaimonism is objectionably egoistic, but the way in which they do so commits them to eschewing an important insight that has been a central motivation for eudaimonism: the idea that an individual must, in the end, organize her life in such a way that it is good for her. In this paper I argue that the egoism objection prods eudaimonists to make a choice between (what we might roughly call) welfare-prior and excellence-prior eudaimonism, and I make some preliminary remarks on behalf of welfare-prior eudaimonism
Keywords eudaimonism  eudaimonia  virtue ethics  egosim  good for  conditionality  dependence
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DOI 10.1111/sjp.12042
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References found in this work BETA

On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Intelligent Virtue.Julia Annas - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Natural Goodness.Philippa Foot - 2001 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Agency, Patiency, and The Good Life: The Passivities Objection to Eudaimonism.Micah Lott - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):773-786.
Constructing a Good Life.Micah Lott - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (3):363-375.
Excellence‐Prior Eudaimonism.Jennifer A. Herdt - 2019 - Journal of Religious Ethics 47 (1):68-93.
Altruistic Eudaimonism and the Self-Absorption Objection.Jeff D’Souza - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 55 (3):475-490.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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