In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Edmund Husserl’s Influence on Karl Jaspers’s Phenomenology”Jean Naudin (bio) and Jean-Michel Azorin (bio)Keywordsphenomenology, intentionality, intuition, empathy, ambiguitySchwartz and Wiggins’s paper clearly shows that Jaspers’s comprehensive psychiatry draws mainly from Husserl’s phenomenology. This thesis enters a current debate opened by Chris Walker and German Berrios about the influence of Husserlian philosophy on Jaspers’s work. This debate, which emerged at the end of the so-called (...) decade of the brain, could be considered perfectly obsolete. But its topicality relies on taking up the challenge of the scientific bases of comprehension in psychiatric experience. Wiggins and Schwartz perfectly achieve this aim by opposing a theory of seeing and a theory of thinking. Works such as Walker’s are grounded on thinking; they are works about theory. They are not works about experience, but rather epistemological or historical works. In contrast, Wiggins and Schwartz suggest to see, as Jaspers did, and not to think, following Husserl by grounding their psychopathology on intuition and presuppositionlessness. They emphasize Jaspers’s method of “making present” by doing a perfect analysis of the issues of translation of vergegenwärtigung as a co-experiencing of mental processes as if they were directly given. These main principles of direct-givenness, presuppositionlessness, and making present pull the Jaspersian concepts to the Husserlian phenomenological reduction and seem like the foremost principle in Husserlian phenomenology: the intuition of the thing in itself. Whereas Jaspers refuted the principle of eidetic reduction, Wiggins and Schwartz clearly show how much he grounded on the basis of the concept of intentionality, discovered and enlightened during Husserl’s life within the horizon of phenomenological reduction. Actually, it seems that the authors take the side of Jaspers to better support their own vision of psychiatric experience, which they more explicitly argued in Husserlian terms of the later period in some other papers (Schwartz and Wiggins 1985; Wiggins and Schwartz 1988, 1991; Wiggins, Schwartz, and Northoff 1990). However, they take care here to struggle exclusively with the epistemological field of their opponents, considering only Jaspers’s own writings and the Husserlian texts that were accessible to Jaspers when he wrote his psychopathology. There is no room for Kant in Jaspers’s main [End Page 37] principles, and this assumption must lead us to consider the horizon opened by Jaspers, that is, the horizon of a science of meaning essentially built on the lived experiences and the bracketing of any kind of a priori. In contrast to the slight influence of Kant, one idea that emerges is that of the straight impact of Dilthey on both Jaspers and Husserl. We perfectly agree with Wiggins and Schwartz that Jaspers, grounding both on Husserl and Dilthey, arrives at a methodological principle that is all his own, by considering both the connections of the life-stories and the objectivity of symptoms. In other words, we can find the originality and maybe the astonishing modernity of Jaspers in his perfect description of the balance between comprehension and observation, between empathy and its limits, that are obviously found in psychotic processes.We thus focused our comments on the following critiques to Jaspers, although they were already well argued in the brief conclusion of Wiggins and Schwartz: (a) the issue of empathy, (b) the limits of Jaspersian phenomenology, and (c) the merits of its genuine ambiguity.The Issue of Empathy. Indeed we have no reliable scientific mean to guarantee the correctness of our intuitions of the other’s mental life, and this problem might lead one to globally reject the method. The discussion of this problem, classical in the Continental literature since the twenties, led the Continental psychiatrists to unfortunately abandon their own traditions. And it is surprising for a Continental psychiatrist to see this debate coming back into the English-speaking literature. When we address the issue of empathy, we have no easy means to abandon folk psychology. Using philosophical slang weakens the attempt to enlighten its foundations instead of describing its values. The suspicion regarding empathy is partially legitimated by the prejudices of Jaspers himself. As psychiatrists, we have to carry on the Jaspersian research by progressively abandoning it and coming back... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 8.4 (2001) 291-293 [Access article in PDF] Schizophrenia and the Void Jean Naudin and Jean-Michel Azorin It was Eugene Minkowski who, from the 1920s on, introduced the French to the work of Eugen Bleuler, whose student he had been. In the introduction to his first book, Schizophrenia: Psychopathology of Schizoids and Schizophrenics (Minkowski 1927), Minkowski nevertheless notes with regard to Bleuler (...) that he could not allow himself "to be restricted to this student's task." For Minkowski, Bleuler certainly enjoys the great merit of having substituted the notion of schizophrenia for that of dementia praecox and of having described autism with precision. But—Minkowski says—autism is badly defined when, relying upon the concept of Spaltung, Bleuler fails to break free of associationist psychology. Minkowski justifies his critical attitude by appealing, as does Binswanger, to Husserl and above all to Bergson. For Bergson, dissociation is a normal feature of thought. If, for Minkowski, it is important to pay attention to autism, it is because it attests not to a certain fragmentation of consciousness, but rather to an attitude whereby the subject seeks to preserve the precarious equilibrium of a personality that is threatened by a void.The article translated into English for this special issue of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology prefigures Schizophrenia and, like an earlier article on the theme of "morbid rationalism," already announces certain key concepts. Here these concepts are, so to speak, caught in their embryonic state, and one is forced to recognize with Tatossian (1993) how radically Minkowski differs from his master, Bleuler, in the choice of specific cases. By according exemplary significance to cases of "poor autism," Minkowski focuses on the reflexivity of the subjective experience of the patient rather than on the proliferation of the delusional state, which lends itself more readily to clinical observation. We must remember that Minkowski is above all a healer. If, like Bleuler, he is interested in the problem that generates the illness, it is only in order to be able to heal the patient. It is therefore not so much the isolated problem that interests him as the way the person tries to deal with it. So it should not come as a surprise that one of the essential themes of this article is what Minkowski calls "compensation." Like the psychoanalytical concepts to which Bleuler refers, compensation is a dynamic concept. But Minkowski takes care to distinguish the compensation that characterizes the interrogative attitude from motives of a more psychological kind aimed at meeting a lack by symbolically satisfying a desire. In the purely phenomenological sense in which Minkowski takes it, compensation does not refer to a hidden motive. It represents a way of getting around the void or sense of emptiness that results from the schizophrenic person's inability to project himself into the future by pursuing the practical goals of normal, daily life. In this case, the dynamic does not feed off the vicissitudes of drive but off the élan vital—or rather, off the decline of élan vital that such persons suffer. [End Page 291]Minkowski particularly insists upon the fact that Paul's interrogative attitude is not simple curiosity, even if Paul's questioning began with sexual curiosity. Confronted with incessant questioning reminiscent of a child, a psychoanalyst would be likely to invoke infantile curiosity concerning procreation and sexual difference. Minkowski, however, seeks to show that the prevailing motive in Paul's case is not so much desire for knowledge as the vital necessity of finding a way of—can one put it this way?—playing for time. In other words, the interrogatory attitude is a way of avoiding confrontation with the realm of practical concerns that, at bottom, makes the patient suffer. If this realm makes him suffer, it is because the absence of any vital attachment leaves him floating in a kind of void. The fundamental problem of schizophrenia is therefore identified as the loss of meaning going along with a deficiency in the individual's attachment to practical reality. Practical reality, or to put it otherwise, an orientation toward practical activity... (shrink)

Comment Bachelard, fils d'un cordonnier, professeur de physique et chimie, a-t-il pu devenir cet humaniste aussi savant que philosophe, aussi penseur que poète? Il n'a pas emprunté les chemins balisés, ceux des élites universitaires et culturelles. Il a contrarié les pronostics et les conventions. Il s'est adjugé contre vents et marées le droit de penser par lui-même en bousculant les frontières des savoirs et de la culture et en dérangeant les us et coutumes établis. "Un ouvrage aussi lumineux que la (...) destinée et l'oeuvre de Gaston Bachelard. Au plus près de sa vie et de sa pensée". (Philippe Meirieu). (shrink)

Original title : 「ドガの『舞姫』」『深田康算全集』[Œuvres complètes de Fukada Yasukazu]. Machida, Tamagawa Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1972–1973, 3 : 9–15.

En prenant l’initiative de ce volume de Corpus, nous avions choisi de procéder à un appel assez large, afin de faire le point sur des tendances actuelles des travaux sur corpus ancrés dans la textualité des faits de discours. En nous associant, nous pensions attirer des chercheurs d’horizons différents et notre attente n’a pas été déçue. Les propositions furent très nombreuses et de sélection en sélection, en regrettant quelques contributions abandonnées pour des raisons de délais de rédactio..

En prenant l’initiative de ce volume de Corpus, nous avions choisi de procéder à un appel assez large, afin de faire le point sur des tendances actuelles des travaux sur corpus ancrés dans la textualité des faits de discours. En nous associant, nous pensions attirer des chercheurs d’horizons différents et notre attente n’a pas été déçue. Les propositions furent très nombreuses et de sélection en sélection, en regrettant quelques contributions abandonnées pour des raisons de délais de rédactio...

Résumé La linguistique du texte a pour tâche la théorisation et la description des opérations de segmentation qui délimitent des unités de rang et de longueur différentes, et la théorisation et la description des différents effets de continuité créés par les opérations de liage de ces unités. À la structuration phrastique-périodique par la morpho-syntaxe et la prosodie à l’oral, la ponctuation à l’écrit, le palier micro-textuel ajoute six facteurs de texture transphrastique : les liages référentiels et isotopiques, les liages du (...) signifiant, l’ensemble des phénomènes de connexion, les relations d’implicitation, la cohésion énonciative et la cohésion illocutoire. À partir de trois textes, cet article illustre systématiquement et détaille ces six formes de liage transphrastique des unités textuelles de base. (shrink)

Il est […] illusoire de vouloir affronter seul des problèmes qui appellent le dépassement des limites liées aux spécialisations disciplinaires et aux enjeux institutionnels. Après avoir lu l’ensemble des contributions au présent volume de Corela et m’être plongé dans un certain nombre de travaux cités dans ces articles, profitant du fait qu’Ingrid Mayeur et Marie-Anne Paveau ont eu l’élégance de me convier à un dialogue critique, je répondrai brièvement à cert...

Husserlian reduction is a rigorous method for describing the foundations of psychiatric experience. With Jaspers we consider three main principles inspired by phenomenological reduction: direct givenness, absence of presuppositions, re-presentation. But with Binswanger alone we refer to eidetic and transcendental reduction: to establish a critical epistemology; to directly investigate the constitutive processes of mental phenomena and their disturbances, freed from their nosological background; to question the constitution of our own experience when facing a person with mental illness. Regarding the last (...) item, we suggest a specific kind of reduction, typically intersubjective from the start, which we call the ‘looking-glass reduction'. The schizophrenic experience -- understood as a ‘loss of taken-for-grantedness’ implying the constitutions of the body, of the other, and of internal time -- is a real ‘epochal provocation’ for the psychiatrist. As the horizon it opens seems to be both corporeal and narrative, this ‘provoking’ of an epoche in the attitude of the psychiatrist himself and the resistances it implies raise important issues regarding the general constitution of human experience. (shrink)

We seem to be abandoning the codes that told previous generations who they should love. But now that many of us are free to choose whoever we want, nothing is less certain. The proliferation of divorces and separations reveal a dynamic we would rather not see: others sometimes reject us as passionately as we are attracted to them. Our desire makes us sick. The throes of rivalry are at the heart of our attraction to one another. This is the central (...) thesis of Jean-Michel Oughourlian's _The Genesis of Desire_, where the war of the sexes is finally given a scientific explanation. The discovery of mirror neurons corroborates his ideas, clarifying the phenomena of empathy and the mechanisms of violent reciprocity. How can a couple be saved when they have declared war on one another? By helping them realize that desire originates not in the self but in the other. There are strategies that can help, which Dr. Oughourlian has prescribed successfully to his patients. This work, alternating between case studies and more theoretical statements, convincingly defends the possibility that breakups need not be permanent. (shrink)

Despite its internal divisions and the uncertainty surrounding many of its foundations, there is a growing consensus that the on‐going search for an alternative model of the mind finds a minimal theoretical identity in the pursuit of an anti‐Cartesian conception of mental phenomena. Nevertheless, this anti‐Cartesianism remains more or less explicitly committed to the neo‐Brentanian idea that intentionality is an essential feature of the mental—an idea that has prevailed since the advent of modern cognitive science in the 1950s. An issue (...) of compatibility is thereby raised, as neo‐Brentanism arguably sides with cognitive Cartesianism. The main goal of the paper is to put into full light one specific aspect of this largely unperceived problem of compatibility by arguing that the neo‐Brentanian property of intentionality is an essentially representational one that runs counter to the salient anti‐representationalism of anti‐Cartesianism. And, that this representational essence confronts the search for alternative models of the mind of an anti‐Cartesian kind with the following theoretical issue: To what extent is it possible to devise a non‐Brentanian property of intentionality, particularly one that is fully dissociated from the property of representation? This issue is shown to be much deeper and more difficult than it looks once the nature of representation is properly apprehended; it seems to be still waiting for an answer in the current search for an alternative model of the mind, if only because it has not yet be set in fully adequate terms. (shrink)

Delivered at the Collège de France between January and March 1980, the lectures entitled On the Government of the Living (Du gouvernement des vivants) seem to be the missing piece in the Foucauldian puzzle. Still unpublished, those eleven lectures were intended to set the theoretical foundation for the book announced as the fourth and last volume of the History of Sexuality, under the title Confessions of the Flesh (Les aveux de la chair). This book, however, was never published, despite the (...) fact that his editor described it as the keystone for the entire History of Sexuality.1 The value of Michel…. (shrink)

Jean-Michel Vienne; IX*—Locke on Real Essence and Internal Constitution1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 93, Issue 1, 1 June 1993, Pages 139–15.

La pensée du cinéma ne rencontre d'ordinaire Jean-François Lyotard, dans ses textes sur le cinéma ou non, que par le biais de deux activateurs : l'acinéma et le figurai. Ces deux activateurs, au demeurant, sont fortement représentatifs de la position paradoxale de Lyotard pour les études cinématographiques : si l'acinéma a été le plus souvent critiqué pour sa radicalité voire son sectarisme, n'ayant de fait guère de postérité, il en va tout autrement du figurai, lequel a trouvé dans les (...) films un terrain fertile d'investigation. Tout autant représentative est la méconnaissance en théorie du cinéma de nombreux autres textes de Lyotard portant sur le cinéma ou sur des films, et dont on ne parle jamais, ainsi que de sa philosophie postérieure à sa période libidinale, qui ne semble pas avoir encore trouvé d'échos particuliers en régime filmique. Le présent ouvrage fait précisément le pari de ces deux directions. A partir d'un autre Lyotard, ou du même mais envisagé très différemment, se dessinera progressivement une possibilité de penser le cinéma qui ne devra plus rien au figurai, à l'abstrait ou à l'expérimental, dont Lyotard le premier a fini par revenir, mais qui, singulièrement, ouvrira à une originale théorie du cinéma figuratif. " Méfiance envers les figuratifs quand ils ont de l'âme ", peut-on lire dans Que peindre?... (shrink)

Michèle Stanton-Jean | : Le bien commun est un concept fréquemment utilisé pour aborder la question du vivre ensemble. Rarement défini, on l’utilise pour le critiquer comme le fruit d’une vision occidentale et chrétienne non applicable sur le plan universel ou encore pour en proposer une vision moderne affranchie de sa rigidité traditionnelle. Le texte qui suit se base sur une thèse qui a examiné les principes et les valeurs qui pourraient fonder une vision renouvelée du bien commun, susceptible (...) d’être utilisée dans tous les contextes culturels et historiques, en prenant comme exemple l’élaboration de la Déclaration universelle sur la bioéthique et les droits de l’homme adoptée à la conférence générale de l’UNESCO en 2005. | : Common good is frequently mentioned to discuss how we can live together. Rarely defined, it is often described as a concept based on a Western and Christian vision that cannot be applied universally, or as a concept that could be revisited to develop a modern and non-rigid vision of it. The following text is based on a PhD thesis that studied what principles and values could contribute to the development of a renewed vision of common good that could be used in every cultural and historical context, taking as an example the elaboration of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights adopted at the General Conference of UNESCO in 2005. (shrink)

Jean-Michel Vienne; IX*—Locke on Real Essence and Internal Constitution1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 93, Issue 1, 1 June 1993, Pages 139–15.

En prenant en compte l’article de Freud sur le Moïse de Michel-Ange et son dernier ouvrage L’homme Moïse et le monothéisme, il est possible de montrer comment le renoncement pulsionnel ouvre la voie à la sublimation et à la réalité spirituelle.

Il devient difficile de rendre compte des livres ou même des articles publiés ces dernières années sur la Cappadoce, du moins si on tient à faire un compte-rendu qui ne soit pas simplement un résumé sommairement commenté du livre et impliquant, au contraire, une prise de position personnelle sur les problèmes débattus. En effet, sur la plupart des questions encore disputées sur les églises byzantines de Cappadoce, on constate des prises de positions tranchées et contradictoires, souvent d'ailleurs appuyées sur des (...) arguments qui paraissent intéressants et ne peuvent pas être écartés facilement, mais qui, si l'on regarde de près, ne prennent pas en compte toutes les données possibles et ne suffisent pas à démontrer que les opinions contraires sont erronées. Peut-être d'ailleurs, faudra-t-il un jour admettre que la nature de la documentation ne permet pas, dans certains cas, de dépasser l'intime conviction des uns et des autres, mais, pour l'instant, la réflexion doit continuer à se développer. Cette réflexion ne peut qu'être facilitée par les livres parus ces dernières années sur la Cappadoce qui permettent à la fois à leurs auteurs de développer de manière plus systématique leurs points de vue et de retrouver plus facilement une bibliographie largement dispersée en attendant que les instruments de travail électroniques soient autant au point dans les études byzantines que dans des domaines voisins. (shrink)

The financial sector likes to call itself a "service industry". As such, its role is to guarantee the fluidity of transactions which are essential to economic activity by ensuring the best possible use of available capital. If finance is a service activity, it is important to specify what services it renders, to whom, in return for what, and for what purpose. In the absence of such clarification, finance may slide out of control and be left at the mercy of mass (...) enthusiasm or hysteria. This document, which is the result of work by people who hold senior positions in Geneva's financial sector or are external observers of the financial world identifies the issues and suggests some avenues for possible solutions. (shrink)

L'attaque terroriste du 11 septembre n'a pas simplement bouleversé l'équilibre géopolitique de la planète, elle a également révélé les causes profondes de la crise d'identité que traversent actuellement les démocraties. L'idéal d'une société fondée sur la raison instrumentale tel que l'ont défini les Lumières, s'avère aujourd'hui impuissant pour redonner aux populations du monde libre le sentiment d'appartenance et de solidarité nécessaire à leur cohésion. Spirituellement castré par la pléthore des choses et des images, n'ayant plus assez d'énergie intérieure pour affirmer (...) ce que Tocqueville appelle la " volonté d'avenir ", l'individu consumériste est une proie rêvée pour la fureur barbare. En examinant les effets socialement mortifères de la pragmatisation et de la massification des consciences à l'âge de la révolution informatique, cet essai explore les conditions d'une renaissance culturelle basée sur la pratique communautaire de la réflexion et le débat d'idées qui permettrait aux sociétés " ouvertes " de renouer avec les valeurs éthico-politiques qui les ont vu naître. (shrink)

L'epoque est troublee: les mutations anthropologiques sont si contraignantes qu'un nouveau concept juridique, la dignite humaine, a fait son apparition. Si le droit en fait un usage intensif, c'est dans la mesure ou face aux exces des Etats criminels comme aux avancees des biotechnologies, il a besoin de fixer les limites entre l'humain et ce qui ne le serait plus. Chacun pressent que la dignite n'est pas une notion objective. Son invention est nouee aux religions monotheistes et aux inflexions que (...) la philosophie d'abord, la psychanalyse ensuite, lui font subir. L'aspect psychanalytique de la dignite humaine sera ici privilegie. Comment la dignite serait-elle compatible avec la sauvagerie de la vie psychique? L'auteur met en tension les travaux de Freud, sur la religion et la culture, avec les ecrits d'Etty Hillesum qui, dans les trois annees precedant son extermination a Auschwitz, se livre a une reflexion, au bord de l'abime, sur la destructivite liee au destin de masse. Grace a la revolution psychique qu'elle effectue, il devient possible de resister en tant qu'individu singulier a l'emprise des masses sur l'esprit, de construire l'humain en chaque homme, rien n'etant acquis a cet egard par la seule appartenance a l'espece humaine. (shrink)

This paper praises Martin Hägglund for his general take on Derrida, while objecting to a certain rigidity in the use of the concept of survival. This concept allowed Hägglund to reject the temptation of a ‘religious’ Derrida in Radical Atheism, but in Dying for Time, it leads to a hurried reading of psychoanalysis. My objections revolve around several forms: the role of gods for Plato and Greek thought; the reductive reading of Diotima's speech in the Sympoisum, and an all too (...) rapid rejection of the idea of the Todestrieb in Freud and Lacan. I go back to Derrida's reading of Freud in The Postcard to point out that he too had misread Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Finally, I argue that there can be something like a non-proper or improper immortality. (shrink)

Jacques Lacan is renowned as a theoretician of psychoanalysis whose work is still influential in many countries. He refashioned psychoanalysis in the name of philosophy and linguistics at a time when it faced certain intellectual decline. Focusing on key terms in Lacan's often difficult, idiosyncratic development of psychoanalysis, this volume brings new perspectives to the work of an intimidating influential thinker.

La méthode réflexive caractérise une psychologie, métaphysique du sujet, qui n’imite pas les sciences d’objet et par laquelle la philosophie dépasse la simple conscience de soi déjà éveillée au monde et à soi, redoublant ainsi cet éveil pour accomplir l’homme en l’homme. Lagneau remonte à la source de l’évidence et rien n’est plus difficile, parce qu’alors la pensée ne peut plus compter sur l’évidence pour se comprendre. La philosophie ainsi pratiquée n’est rien en dehors de la réflexion en acte, jamais (...) elle ne se fige en doctrine. C’est pourquoi il n’y a pas ce qu’on pourrait appeler une philosophie de Lagneau, mais seulement ses cours pieusement transcrits par des élèves. Cette idée de la philosophie fonde une pratique de la lecture des grands philosophes qui les met en dialogue et ainsi leur redonne vie, les libérant des préjugés qui trop souvent les caricaturent. (shrink)

The paper discusses analogies between the way in which infinity is understood and dealt with in mathematics and in Jewish tradition. It begins with recalling the classical debate about infinity in the field of the foundations of mathematics. Reading an important paper by A. Robinson, we come to the conclusion that mathematicians work “as if” infinite totalities existed. They do so by following the rules of their formalized discourse which, at least if it refers to anything at all, also refers (...) to such totalities. The paper describes how, according to Jewish tradition, infinity is also not theological: instead of thinking that they own some infinite being or relate to it, observant Jews follow Jewish law. The analogy is then extended to what is called ‘epistemological infinity’. The paper shows that both in mathematics and in Judaism, we get some epistemological experience of infinity, as far as both Talmudic knowledge and contemporary mathematical encyclopedia are experienced as inexhaustible sources of new thoughts, structures, ideas, developments. (shrink)

Over the past twenty years, Husserlian phenomenology has increasingly drawn the attention of the cognitive community, thereby leading to the emergence of what might be called a phenomenological trend within contemporary cognitive studies. What this phenomenological trend really amounts to is however a matter of debate. The reason is that it embodies, in fact, a multifaceted reflection about the relevance of Husserlian phenomenology to the current efforts towards a scientific theory of cognition, and, to a lesser degree, about the reciprocal (...) relevance of these efforts to the fate of the Husserlian tradition. Indeed, it covers a wide array of perspectives on these questions, ranging from tentative demonstrations of the cognitively misleading character of Husserl's ideas, inasmuch as they would incarnate the same foundational errors as cognitivism (Hall and Dreyfus 1982), to diametrically opposed views arguing that the naturalist bent of contemporary cognitive science is ill-conceived, and that only the brand of transcendentalism defended by Husserl can provide it with adequate foundations (cf., for instance, Villela-Petit 1999). (shrink)

Comment comprendre que nous puissions avoir conscience de notre vie affective? Si l’on prend au sérieux les analyses de Michel Henry, cette expérience commune devrait être impossible. Si c’est la vie et l’expérience qui doivent nous servir de guides, alors il faut intégrer les acquis incontournables de la phénoménologie matérielle et la dépasser.

This paper is an attempt to clarify and assess Dennett’s opinion about the relevance of the phenomenological tradition to contemporary cognitive science, focussing on the very idea of a phenomenological investigation. Dennett can be credited with four major claims on this topic: (1) Two kinds of phenomenological investigations must be carefully distinguished: autophenomenology and heterophenomenology; (2) autophenomenology is wrong, because it fails to overcome what might be called the problem of phenomenological scepticism; (3) the phenomenological tradition mainly derived from Husserl (...) is based on an autophenomenological conception of phenomenology, and, consequently, can be of no help to contemporary cognitive science; (4) however, heterophenomenology is indispensable for obtaining an adequate theory of consciousness. In response to Dennett’s analysis, the paper develops two main counterclaims: (1) Although the traditional conception of phenomenology does indeed fit Dennett’s notion of autophenomenology, his sceptical arguments fail to rule out at least the possibility of a modified version of this traditional conception, such as the one defended in Roy et al. (Naturalizing Phenomenology, 1999); (2) the distinction between autophenomenology and heterophenomenology is at any rate misconceived, because, upon closer analysis, heterophenomenology proves to include the essential characteristics of autophenomenology. (shrink)