We can make a good prima facie case for the inconsistency of Reid's theory of perception with his rejection of the Ideal Theory. Most scholars believe Reid adopts a theory on which the immediate object of perception is a physical body. Reid is thought to do this in order to avoid problems generated by the veil of perception in the Ideal Theory, a conjunction of commitments Reid closely associates with Hume and Locke. Reid explains that the Ideal Theory "leans with (...) its whole weight upon a hypothesis...[t]hat nothing is perceived but what is in the mind which perceives it". Reid attributes to the Ideal Theory thesis. (shrink)

In his account of visual perception, Thomas Reid describes visible figure as both ‘real and external’ to the eye and as the ‘immediate object of sight’. These claims appear to conflict with Reid's direct realism, since if the ‘immediate’ object of vision is also its direct object, then sight would be perceptually indirect due to the role of visible figure as a perceptual intermediary. I argue that this apparent threat to Reid's direct realism may be resolved (...) by understanding visible figure as the set of geometrical properties that holds between an object's visible surfaces and some particular perspective or point of view. On this relational interpretation of visible figure, and once an ambiguity over the use of the term ‘object’ is resolved, Reid's account of vision is both epistemically and perceptually direct, as well as consistent with his account of the other senses and doctrine of signs. (shrink)

Reid maintained that the perceptions that we obtain from the senses of smell, taste, hearing, and touch are ‘suggested’ by corresponding sensations. However, he made an exception for the sense of vision. According to Reid, our perceptions of the real figure, position, and magnitude of bodies are suggested by their visible appearances, which are not sensations but objects of perception in their own right. These visible appearances have figure, position, and magnitude, as well as ‘colour,’ and (...) the standard view among Reid scholars has been that Reid maintained that our perceptions of visible figure, position, and magnitude are also not suggested by any sensation. They are instead suggested by the material impression on the retina. Gideon Yaffe challenges the standard interpretation. According to Yaffe, Reid believed that our perceptions of visible figure are suggested by corresponding sensations, by sensations of colour. We defend the standard interpretation of Reid. According to Reid, there is no “local sign” in our sensations of colour. The same colour sensation can be associated with different positions on the visual field, and different colour sensations can be associated to the same position on the visual field. According to Reid, we only have evidence for a correlation between the image on the retina and the perception of visible figure. (shrink)

Now available in English for the first time, The Visibility of the Image explores the development of an influential aesthetic tradition through the work of six figures. Analysing their contribution to the progress of formal aesthetics, from its origins in Germany in the 1880s to semiotic interpretations in America a century later, the six chapters cover: Robert Zimmermann (1824-1898), the first to separate aesthetics and metaphysics and approach aesthetics along the lines of formal logic, providing a purely syntactic way of (...) using signs, regardless of objective content; Alois Riegl (1858-1905), who went on to further develop aesthetics on the model of formal logic, creating a theory of style in response to Zimmermann's call for an aesthetics oriented toward formal logic; Heinrich Wölfflin (1864-1945), who represents a step toward an understanding of consciousness by using pictures as cognitive tools; Konrad Fiedler (1841-1895), the Saxon philosopher who considered the possibility that some kinds of images are made and viewed not for what they show, but for their visibility's sake alone; Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), responsible for taking up the connections between the problems of reducing the range of potential meanings and contexts of a given image down to just the picture surface; Charles William Morris (1901-1979), who set out to establish whether a picture with no objective reference, such as an abstract painting, still counts as a sign, and if so, in what sense. Bringing these thinkers together and interlinking their ideas, Lambert Wiesing presents an engaging history of formal aesthetics, while reconstructing the philosophical foundations for the appearance of new image forms in the 20th century, including the video-clip, abstract collage, digital simulation and virtual reality. Using this original approach, The Visibility of the Image introduces the rise of modern image theory and provides a valuable account of our engagement with pictures in the 21st century. (shrink)

In his 'Inquiry', Reid claims, against Berkeley, that there is a science of the perspectival shapes of objects ('visible figures'): they are geometrically equivalent to shapes projected onto the surfaces of spheres. This claim should be understood as asserting that for every theorem regarding visible figures there is a corresponding theorem regarding spherical projections; the proof of the theorem regarding spherical projections can be used to construct a proof of the theorem regarding visible figures, and vice versa. (...) I reconstruct Reid's argument for this claim, and expose its mathematical underpinnings: it is successful, and depends on no empirical assumptions to which he was not entitled about the workings of the human eye. I also argue that, although Reid may or may not have been aware of it, the geometry of spherical projections is not the only geometry of visible figure. (shrink)

In this paper, I want to argue for two main and related points. First, I want to defend Richard Wollheim’s well-known thesis that the twofold mental state of seeing-in is the distinctive pictorial experience that marks figurativity. Figurativity is what makes a representation pictorial, a depiction of its subject. Moreover, I want to show that insofar as it is a mark of figurativity, all seeing-in is inflected. That is to say, every mental state of seeing-in is such that the characterisation (...) of the properties by which a certain subject is seen in a given picture as having refers to the design properties of the picture’s vehicle, i.e., to the visible surface properties of that vehicle that are responsible for the fact that one such subject is seen in it, precisely taken in such a design role. Finally, I will try to show that seeing-in is qualified by inflection independently of whether it is conscious or unconscious seeing-in. (shrink)

Ce qui a fait naitre l'emerveillement des premiers penseurs grecs, c'est qu'il y a quelque chose plutot que rien, et c'est la ce qui a donne le coup d'envoi a cette pensee de l'etre qui s'est developpee de Parmenide a Aristote et qui constitue le fondement de la philosophie occidentale. On trouve cependant, deja dans la pensee grecque, une denegation de la possibilite d'un discours sur l'etre, d'abord chez Gorgias, contemporain de Socrate, puis chez le fondateur de l'ecole sceptique, Pyrrhon. (...) Et a l'epoque meme ou Parmenide ecrivait son poeme, une pensee de la vacuite et du neant commencait a se developper en Orient dans le cadre du bouddhisme, laquelle met profondement en question la notion meme d'ontologie. Or c'est precisement cette pensee du rien qui resurgit en Occident a la fin de l'age classique, avec ce premier philosophe veritablement moderne qu'est Kant, dans son Essai sur les grandeurs negatives et cette Table du Rien qui, dans La Critique de la raison pure, clot l'Analytique transcendantale. Et c'est le concept de negativite qui va former chez Hegel la matrice meme de la pensee dialectique, alors que celui du neant constituera le coeur de la critique du nihilisme qu'entreprendra Nietzsche, avant de redevenir, avec le Heidegger de Qu'est-ce que la metaphysique?, avec le Sartre de L'Etre et le neant, et avec le dernier Merleau-Ponty, auteur de ce livre inacheve qu'est Le Visible et l'Invisible, un theme fondamental de la pensee de l'apparaitre.Une telle pensee du neant et de la negation traversant la frontiere qui separe l'Orient de l'Occident, il s'agira donc, en prenant comme reference majeure la pensee heideggerienne, d'en interroger les diverses figures, d'abord chez Gorgias et Pyrrhon, puis chez Nagarjuna, le plus grand penseur du bouddhisme indien (ii-iiie siecle) et chez Nishida (1870-1945), representant fameux de l'ecole de Kyoto et du bouddhisme zen, avant d'en venir a l'idealisme allemand avec Kant et Hegel, a la question du nihilisme europeen avec Schopenhauer, Nietzsche et Heidegger, puis a la phenomenologie avec Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty et Maldiney. (shrink)

This essay offers a perspective on Thomas Demand's works. It argues that in Demand’s pictures, the procedures of figuration themselves acquire a visible figure.

Thomas Reid argued that the geometrical properties of visible figures equal the geometrical properties of their projections on the inside of a sphere centred around the eye. In recent scholarship there are only a few suggestions of which sources might have inspired Reid. I point to a widely ignored body of early eighteenth-century literature – introductions into projective geometry, the use of celestial globes and astronomy – in which the model of the eye in the centre of a sphere (...) was immensely popular. Moreover, I argue that Reid's account results naturally from some astronomical doctrines in conjunction with George Berkeley's theory of vision. (shrink)

Contemporary French philosophy is laying fresh claim to the human. Through a series of independent, simultaneous initiatives, arising in the writing of diverse current French thinkers, the figured of the human is being transformed and reworked. -/- Christopher Watkin draws out both the promises and perils inherent in these attempts to rethink humanity’s relation to ‘nature’ and ‘culture’, to the objects that surround us, to the possibility of social and political change, to ecology and even to our own brains. This (...) comparative assessment makes visible for the first time one of the most important trends in French thought today. (shrink)

The article explores the relationship between visual culture and the fight for visibility and attention in contemporary society. It draws on a concept of visual culture which not only sees the rising significance of the visual and the proliferation of images as its defining traits, but also the fact that, today, people are—to a much higher degree—both consumers as well as producers of images. Based on this definition, it is argued that in visually oriented communication and media societies, the anthropologically (...) fundamental need for attention manifests itself as a fight for visibility which takes on the form of ever more extreme forms of public self-display. Furthermore, a portrait of two social figures—the star and the voyeur—will serve as further analysis and description of the social trends which can be tied to the emergence of today's visual culture. The article will close by discussing attention and visibility in terms of inclusion and exclusion and by proposing an analytical model for differentiating four modes of existence in a visual culture. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Figurative Language and the “Face” in Levinas’s PhilosophyDiane PerpichThe value of images for philosophy lies in their position between two times and their ambiguity.—Levinas, "Reality and Its Shadow"Imagery... occupies the place of theory's impossible.—Le Doeuff, The Philosophical ImaginaryFor many readers, and perhaps above all for Levinas himself, there is something deeply dissatisfying about the account of the "face of the other" in Totality and Infinity and yet the importance (...) of this figure for the major ethical claims of the book can hardly be overstated. The fundamental thesis broached through the notion of the face is the difference between the way in which things are given to consciousness (the order of ontology) and the way in which human beings are encountered (the order of ethics). Whereas things are given to consciousness in sensible experience through the mediation of forms or concepts, the face is present, according to Levinas, in its "refusal to be contained" in a form (Levinas 1969, 194). A passage early in Totality and Infinity defines the face as follows: "The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name face. This mode does not consist in figuring as a theme under my gaze, in spreading itself forth as a set of qualities forming an image. The face of the Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me" (50–51, italics in original). A face is thus a very peculiar sort of "phenomenon." In effect, it is non-phenomenal; it does not appear as such and remains exterior to concepts.1 Rhetorically, the face is an image that represents the inadequacy of every image for representing alterity. That is, it represents the impossibility of its own representation and so the problems begin. [End Page 103]In "Violence and Metaphysics," Derrida suggests that Levinas's claim that the absolute alterity of the other refuses conceptualization is undermined from the outset since in order to have meaning as an other, to be recognized and respected as an other, the other must first of all appear: "it is impossible to encounter the alter ego..., impossible to respect it in experience and in language, if this other, in its alterity, does not appear for an ego (in general). One could neither speak, nor have any sense of the totally other, if there was not a phenomenon of the totally other, or evidence of the totally other as such" (Derrida 1978, 123). In what sense can we think or represent absolute alterity if, strictly speaking, it is unthinkable and unrepresentable? And, further, what are we to make of the performative contradiction insofar as Levinas's discourse doesprecisely what it says it is impossible to do? As Derrida notes, even if one cannot thematize the other, "this impossibility and this imperative themselves can be thematized" (123). The difficulty here is that if there "is" an alterity of the type that interests Levinas, then there is no way to represent or speak about it literally—in which case the question arises, in what sense is it? And if one can speak about it, then it is not unrepresentable and thus is not absolute in the sense Levinas says it is.A further contradiction in the notion of the absolute alterity of the face arises owing to the fact that insofar as Levinas's notion of an absolute other forbids us from assigning to the other any determinate predicate, it seems as if all unique, singular faces are the same. As Jean-Luc Marion formulates this problem: "how can one assign an identity to the origin of the appeal such that one can specify which face is involved each time, but without thereby reducing it to a visible phenomenon in the mode of a spectacle?" (Marion 2000, 226). Marion makes a virtue of this feature of Levinas's account, suggesting that "it belongs to the very sense of the appeal that it remain essentially anonymous, and not by default but by excess—the excess of alterity over what it alters" (240). Anonymity, on this view, belongs to the formal structure of interpellation and Marion therein... (shrink)

La question de la peinture n'appartient ni d'abord, ni uniquement aux peintres ou aux esthéticiens. Elle appartient à la visibilité elle-même, donc à tous. A dire vrai ou plus exactement à tous ceux pour qui voir ne va pas de soi. Et c'est sans doute pourquoi la philosophie ne peut que se trouver, quand il y va de la peinture, à demeure. En effet, la philosophie a pris aujourd'hui une figure essentielle, la phénoménologie ; or la phénoménologie ne prétend (...) revenir aux choses mêmes que parce qu'elle entreprend d'abord de voir ce qui se donne - ce que cela donne. La visibilité exceptionnelle du tableau devient alors un cas privilégié du phénomène, éventuellement une voie vers la phénoménalité en général. Mais la phénoménologie suffit-elle à cerner la visibilité et donc tous les tableaux possibles? Le tableau n'admet-il lui-même qu'un seul statut, ou ne ménage-t-il pas d'autres ressources? En passant de l'idole à l'icône, nous poursuivons certes des recherches antérieures, mais nous suivons surtout la nécessité de la chose même : le tableau, donc le visible par excellence, s'offre au dilemme de deux figures d'apparition, inverses, adverses et pourtant indispensables, inséparables. La théologie devient, dans cette situation, une instance irrécusable de toute théorie du tableau. Pour l'avoir parfois dénié, puis simplement oublié, la pensée esthétique s'est parfois empêtrée dans de longues apories. Le temps vient peut-être de s'en délivrer et de voir le visible en face, comme le don de l'apparaître. J.-L. M. (shrink)

This paper is the second part of the investigation. Chr. A. Crusius in the “Way to the Certainty and Adequacy of Human Knowledge” introduced the most developed alternative view to Wolffian position regarding symbolic and contemplating correlation. He preferred the contemplating cognition and tied its functioning with imagination. Kant in the “Critique of Pure Reason” brings about a terminology revolution and changes the style of the problem consideration. He turns the proceeding from F. Viet and G.W. Leibniz’s art “speciosa generalis”, (...) which was earlier thought as symbolic, into a priori figurative synthesis. Following the changes in the nature of sensibility and understanding treatment, Kant rejects the opposition of intuitive or contemplative and symbolic in favour of the following oppositions: intuitive is opposed to discursive, while the contemplation is opposed to the understanding concept. The figurative synthesis as a result of transcendental faculty of imagination instead of the former empirical imagery creates the schematic possibility of the empirical image per se. This well-developed Kant’s position unwittingly put aside Wolff’s program of reduction of the symbolic cognition to quasi-intuitive one. However, today this program can have a practical importance and enrich the problem of the cognition visibility. (shrink)

By providing symbolic (operates by means of signs) and intuitive (operates without signs) types of cognition, G.W. Leibniz in the “Reasoning about cognition, truth and ideas” laid the foundation for the problem of visibility discussions in 18th century. Proceeding from Leibniz’s ideas, Chr. Wolff in the “German metaphysics” built a detailed doctrine about figurative and contemplating cognition, giving priority in the field of application and the degree of clarity to the first type. Wolff’s doctrine almost immediately became classic and found (...) a lot of supporters. J.G. Darjes and G.F. Meier moved the metaphysical distinction of cognition distinctions to logic. A.G. Baumgarten in the “Metaphysics” offered a new criterion of symbolic and intuitive cognition distinction. J.N. Tetens scrutinized the opposition of symbolic and contemplating cognition from the point of a priori and a posteriori opposition. J.H. Lambert in the “New Organon” brings the interest back to the figurative cognition. (shrink)

In his latest book, Descola analyzes more than 150 graphic works from all over the world, among which are animal statuettes of the Koryaks, a people of the Kamchatka region of Russia. Those figurines always represent animals lying in wait, ready to jump or already running. Such representations, the anthropologist argues, incline us to pay attention to what motivates and what troubles the animals: “All those animals that we see undertaking an action manifestly intentional or properly responding to unexpected events (...) cannot but impose on the observers of their image the idea that they are moved by aims, that they have an interiority just like humans.” This type of animal figuration is especially common in peoples that in Descola's previous book, Beyond Nature and Culture, he referred to as “animist.”In that book, published in 2005, he described the animist ontology and three other modes of paying attention to continuities and differences between humans and animals: naturalism, analogism, and totemism. At the time, he focused exclusively on the description of those ontologies, as opposed to any study of their evolution. He begins his study of the genesis of ontologies in Les formes du visible by suggesting that each type of graphic work induces a different way of paying attention to psychological and physical continuities and differences. For instance, in contrast to a Koryak statuette, an anatomical plate (to use a simple example not covered in the book) depicts only the body of a dead and dissected specimen. By referring simultaneously to an anatomical description of the human body and to that of another mammal, we tend to see how similar our bodies are. Whereas the animist ontology emphasizes the psychological continuity of humans and animals, the naturalist ontology insists instead on their physical continuity. By producing and using repeatedly some kinds of graphic works, each society comes to favor one or another ontology, one or another way of paying attention to the world. (Descola never says so in these words, but what he seems to mean by ontologies are modes of attention).Descola's questions in this new book are engaging: What do images make us pay attention to? What modes of attention do images stimulate? Each case study selected by the author is, moreover, fascinating in itself: an Amerindian mask, an Aboriginal painting on a piece of bark, a sixteenth-century Mongolian drawing of an elephant. The answers offered for the questions asked are unfortunately always already canvassed by the theory of the four ontologies. In previous work, Descola built that theory based on discursive and ethnographic material; sometimes we are left with the impression that images (as opposed to spoken words) do not make any significant difference, since they did not motivate him to modify in any way his theory in his new book.In addition, Descola's framework brings him to focus only on a particular aspect of what images induce in our modes of attention: in his thinking, ontologies are defined solely by the way we notice (or do not notice) differences and continuities between beings on two levels, physical and psychological, which respectively he terms the exteriority and the interiority of beings. By combining these two pairs of opposing features (continuity/difference, interiority/exteriority), he constitutes his four ontologies. But depictions can produce more fine-grained ontologies by making us pay attention to, say, the separation or the blending of bodies, the stability or fluidity of souls, the equality or inequality of power between beings. Moment by moment, while reading Descola, we find ourselves tied to his four ontologies and indeed find it almost impossible to imagine ontologies other than the four he has set out. In a structuralist vein, he even presents that number as a necessary, logical, and cognitive limit to the construction of ontologies. Nevertheless, by opening the analysis of the modes of attention to more than just the double pair of features picked out by the anthropologist, we could well unearth more diversified ontologies, induced by images (and by other cultural and technical particulars). We could detect, in other words, more than four modes of paying attention to our environment and to our companion beings. (shrink)

The works of the Anglo-Indian artist Anish Kapoor challenge the intangibility of the real and the reality of the objects, the surrounding space, even the spectator himself. They make it appear as an illusion and point to an invisible reality located beyond or beneath, or even at the very heart of the visible. This essay explores the nature of this hidden realm, which the works allow us to see or at least to foresee. It interrogates also the phenomenological mechanisms (...) at play in the works, which induce the spectator into putting the real in doubt, to confront him or herself to the invisible and to name it. (shrink)

Comment Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, auteur d'ouvrages sur la philosophie allemande et la "mentalité primitive", peut-il éclairer les enjeux des sciences sociales aujourd'hui? Pour actualiser cette grande figure de la Troisième République, il faut repenser les liens entre le socialisme français et le système colonial à partir de l'affaire Dreyfus. Celle-ci mit à l'épreuve la thèse de Lucien Lévy-Bruhl sur la responsabilité et le conduisit à étudier les formes d'anticipation de l'avenir dans les sociétés sans État. À partir d'archives inédites et (...) d'une hypothèse théorique nouvelle, ce livre retrace les engagements de Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, du soutien des ouvriers au cours de la Première Guerre mondiale à l'aide aux exilés juifs dans les années 1930, et replace l'ethnologie parmi d'autres sciences de la vigilance, comme les statistiques et l'épidémiologie. Il montre ainsi que l'étude des sociétés éloignées permet à la nôtre de se préparer aux catastrophes à partir de l'observation des sentinelles."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

La notion de chair s’élabore chez Merleau-Ponty, à l’encontre du primat husserlien du toucher, dans l’articulation du toucher et du voir. C’est par cette articulation, ce recouvrement l’un par l’autre des champs sensoriels que Merleau-Ponty peut penser la chair comme chair du monde, élément de l’Être. L’auto-appréhension charnelle doit se comprendre d’abord selon une visibilité errante, dans la transitivité des regards qui se voient et s’échangent le paysage commun de leurs vues. Mais, remontant au cœur même de ce « transitivisme (...) », c’est dans la rencontre des corps, dans leur enlacement, que Le visible et l’invisible décrit au plus près l’opération de cette réversibilité. Naissance du monde dans la figure d’une scène primitive où les corps se donnant l’un à l’autre ouvrent un espacement originaire. Cette réflexivité essentiellement est inaccomplie, les corps ne se touchent que dans l’écart qui les unit. La chair, Merleau-Ponty y insiste, ne se rejoint que dans l’immi­nence d’une auto-affection toujours différée, par là elle est différenciée, polymorphe, et elle demeure ouverte. De cette ouverture de la chair naît l’expression. La voix s’élève dans une autre réflexivité, celle d’un sonore qui s’entend et, plus proprement, celle des voix qui s’écoutent. Incarnation sonore, la voix est la chair vive du sens. Entre la caresse et la voix, c’est à un même mouvement de réflexivité et d’expressivité charnelle que Merleau-Ponty nous fait donc assister, un même élan de la chair qui s’exhausse de son anonymat élémentaire pour naître à soi dans l’expression. (shrink)

In a recent article on Reid’s theory of single and double vision, James Van Cleve considers an argument against direct realism presented by Hume. Hume argues for the mind-dependent nature of the objects of our perception from the phenomenon of double vision. Reid does not address this particular argument, but Van Cleve considers possible answers Reid might have given to Hume. He finds fault with all these answers. Against Van Cleve, I argue that both appearances in double vision could be (...) considered visible figures of the object, and show how this solution might preserve Reid’s direct realism. However, this solution is not compatible with the single appearance of an object predicted by Reid’s theory of single and double vision. This consequence will appear evident once we consider the critique of Reid’s theory of single and double vision formulated by William Charles Wells (1757-1817). Wells argues that Reid’s theory is either incomplete or incompatible with other claims made by Reid. It is incomplete since it fails to specify the unique direction in which we the object in single vision; if it not incomplete and is compatible with the law of monocular direction given by Reid, then it is incompatible with Reid’s claim that we do not perceive immediately distance by sight. (shrink)

Drawing on work done by Helmholtz, I argue that Reid was in no position to infer that objects appear as if projected on the inner surface of a sphere, or that they have the geometric properties of such projections even though they do not look concave towards the eye. A careful consideration of the phenomena of visual experience, as further illuminated by the practice of visual artists, should have led him to conclude that the sides of visible appearances either (...) look straight, in which case their angles appear to approximate Euclidean measures, or their angles do not appear to approximate Euclidean measures for straight line figures, in which case their sides do not look straight. (shrink)

Résumé Années 1990. Nus sur scène, une poignée de danseurs explore en de surprenantes contorsions les possibilités du corps. Virtuoses de l’étrange, ils présentent un type de récit inattendu où la nudité, loin d’incarner un quelconque idéal, semble le révoquer pour proposer un ordre sensible sans précédent. L’idée? Échapper au figuratif, à la narration, aux formes directement lisibles, car prévisibles, pour mieux promouvoir les formes iconoclastes maintenues en puissance dans le visible. Au delà des cadres de l’usuel et des (...) clôtures où nichent les images idéales et univoques de la corporéité, ces peaux exhibées font l’éloge du multiple, de l’instable et du mouvant. (shrink)

Pragmatic Critical Realism has been acclaimed by several scholars as one of the most versatile, application friendly and philosophically consistent paradigms for the social sciences, especially management research (Fleetwood and Ackroyd 2004). One of the more visible methodological offshoots of this epistemological school, being the case study, which has been extensively deployed as a dominant method in strategic management, organizational studies and marketing literatures. Until recently, there was some consternation in the academic world about the insufficiency of recourses available (...) to aggregate individual case studies and extract more generalizable learnings within delimited boundaries. However, the development of the QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis) by Ragin (2000; 2014) has changed that perception. In this paper, we argue that all of these case study-based methods, especially as they relate to Norbert Elias’ conception of figurations, and all of which fall under the broader heading of the Abduction methodology; are especially suited to gaining marketing insights in emerging market economies for a host of reasons. This is the issue that we seek to explore through theoretical argumentation and to establish with a review of the methods literature. (shrink)

This paper engages with Italo Calvino’s lecture on Visibility, included in his last—and testamentary—volume Six Memos, by understanding it in an educational and pedagogical key. While the question of pedagogy is expressly addressed by Calvino himself in his lecture, the interpretation here provided is not merely an application of his tenets but an elaboration on and an autonomous development of them. In particular, in the spotlight there is the intimate bond image-cum-writing which seems to preside over Calvino’s insights and is (...) here suggested as key to tackling the challenges of the contemporary mediascape and the “tautological vision” dominating therein. While a part of the educational discourse invokes “homeostatic” pedagogical solutions, namely the (ultimately confrontational) deployment of writing to compensate for the iconic ruling regime, this paper explores the possibility of a specific kind of visual education (instantiated by comics and Otto Neurath’s Isotype), which combines the role of the image with some features traditionally attributed to the pedagogy of writing (e.g. the cultivation of abilities of abstraction, of reflection etc.). A pedagogy of figuration is, accordingly, proposed as an interruption of the tautological vision of the new media and as conducive to educating readers of the unwritten world and of the world of digital images, Mr. Palomar—the hero of Calvino’s last novel—possibly being the archetype of this kind of (new?) readership. By referring to two influential notions in the contemporary debate in educational philosophy and theory, this pedagogy is finally interpreted in term of (visual) thing-centredness rather than (visual) subjectification. (shrink)

Friedrich Nietzsche's reference to Ernst Chladni in ‘On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense’ (1873) could easily be overlooked as a casual analogy. Yet it emerges from a systematic engagement with the nascent field of acoustics. Chladni was among the discipline's founding fathers, having honed the application of rigorous empirical testing to sound and music. His name is most enduringly associated with the discovery of the 'sound figures', which rendered sound visible for the first time. To produce them, (...) Chladni scattered sand onto a metal sheet. A note was then emitted by playing a violin bow against its side. The resulting oscillations prompted the sand to settle in a range of symmetrical patterns. The natural beauty of the shapes made them quite famous. Yet they also represented a mystery. Though the formula for calculating the oscillation of single strings was reliable, it could not easily be reconciled with oscillation in two dimensions. In lieu of an explanation, the sound figures became the object of speculative attention. Their existence posed a difficulty for the quantitative ontology of rationalist metaphysics. The inheritors of Schelling, for example, saw in the sound figures an undeciphered language of nature. But Nietzsche was implacably opposed to this position: for him, nature contains no inherent meaning, no rational order, and no divine teleology. The ‘book of nature’ was at best an anthropomorphic projection, and at worst a theological dogma. Thus reframed, Chladni's sound figures confront us not with the infinite mystery of nature, but our own cognitive impotence. The following essay therefore elaborates the provenance of Nietzsche's sound figure analogy: a rare intersection of scientific experiment and speculative philosophy. (shrink)

In his lectures from 1987, Deleuze draws an analogy between Michelangelo's figures and Leibnizian substances by claiming that neither are essences but rather sources of modifications or manners of being. The best way to explore this analogy, I argue, is by focusing on Michelangelo's preference for serpentine shapes. By putting key passages from The Logic of Sensation, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque and What is Philosophy? in resonance with the Leibnizian accounts of corporeal aggregates and possible worlds on the (...) one hand and art history on the other, I will try to develop a Deleuzian concept for the typically Mannerist ideal of the serpentine figure. Although Deleuze usually prefers to speak in musical terms of refrains and counterpoints by which various blocs of sensation resonate with each other, in the visual arts it is the serpentine figure that renders visible sensory becoming as a rhythmic counter-positioning of possible worlds within a single body without organs. (shrink)

Rajiv Kaushik’s Art, Language and Figure in Merleau-Ponty continues the work begun last year in Art and Institution by exploring the ontological grounds upon whichMerleau-Ponty locates the continuity of philosophy with the visual arts. The mission and the privilege of art are to allow the invisible to appear in its own terms. As such, artpossesses the potential of completing the endeavors of philosophy by bringing the world to expression without abusively bringing it to visibility. Kaushik’s analyses of Merleau-Ponty’s concept (...) of “figural philosophy,” of the relevance of Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Saussure for his philosophy of art, and of the dynamic and ontological potential contained in the tracing of a line are profound and each makes decisive contributions to the study of Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics. In addition to these, Kaushik’s analysis of artworks and artists such as Cy Twombly allow him to make this more than a book about Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy or a book about art; it is a book that enacts their continuity as it describes it, in true hyper-dialectical fashion. (shrink)

"Cover"--"Title Page"--"Copyright" -- "Contents" -- "Introduction: At the Scene of Inscription" -- "1. Savage Marks: Subjection and the Specters of Anthropology" -- "2. Impact Erasure: Psychoanalysis and the Multiplication of Trauma" -- "3. Stings of Visibility: Picture Theories and Visual Contact" -- "4. Out of the Groove: Aural Traces and the Mediation of Sound" -- "Conclusion: Against Inscription?" -- "Acknowledgments" -- "Notes" -- "Works Cited.

We owe our first graphic experiences to Neanderthal Man, who introduced to the cultural baggage of the genus Homo two metaphorical behaviors that are fundamental in terms of their innovation: one concerns the preservation of the bodies of the dead through burial, the other is the making of signs, which in this stage of evolution do not yet represent recognizable subjects but only lines. This attests to the creation of a graphical tool that materializes and makes visible that which (...) exists in the mind, something that is other than itself, thus providing signs of a communication that unfortunately today we cannot define semantically. We cannot say whether these linear marks are a sort of «brand» or if they are carriers of meanings, however, we can observe that, with the Neanderthals, a conceptual, projectual plan exists that enables the measurement of space and the configuration of a regular rhythm, creating an original condition of movement and an association of potentially dynamic lines. (shrink)

Dans une société où le vêtement doit rendre visibles toutes les hiérarchies sociales, le port par les femmes de tout ou partie du costume masculin, a longtemps été considéré comme une atteinte grave aux commandements divins, avant d’être condamné par la loi civile et la morale dominante. Pour celles qui osèrent s’habiller en hommes, le transvestisme fut d’abord un moyen de survie : déguisement des persécutées et des amoureuses, habillement commode des pauvresses et des patriotes. Il leur permit aussi de (...) rendre visibles des revendications de liberté physique, d’égalité économique et de dépassement du cadre binaire des relations de sexe. Images de subversion politique et/ou d’affirmation d’une identité sexuelle non conforme. (shrink)

Dans une société où le vêtement doit rendre visibles toutes les hiérarchies sociales, le port par les femmes de tout ou partie du costume masculin, a longtemps été considéré comme une atteinte grave aux commandements divins, avant d’être condamné par la loi civile et la morale dominante. Pour celles qui osèrent s’habiller en hommes, le transvestisme fut d’abord un moyen de survie : déguisement des persécutées et des amoureuses, habillement commode des pauvresses et des patriotes. Il leur permit aussi de (...) rendre visibles des revendications de liberté physique, d’égalité économique et de dépassement du cadre binaire des relations de sexe. Images de subversion politique et/ou d’affirmation d’une identité sexuelle non conforme. (shrink)

This paper summarises the main claims I have made in a series of publications on depiction. Having described six features of depiction that any account should explain, I sketch an account that does this. The account understands depiction in terms of the experience to which it gives rise, and construes that experience as one of resemblance. The property in respect of which resemblance is experienced was identified by Thomas Reid, in his account of ‘visible figure’. I defend the (...) account against certain criticisms, and compare it to some of its main rivals, in particular the views offered by Goodman, Wollheim and Dominic Lopes. (shrink)

This paper explores the complex relationship between the plant evolutionist G. Ledyard Stebbins and the animal evolutionist Theodosius Dobzhansky. The manner in which the plant evolution was brought into line, synthesized, or rendered consistent with the understanding of animal evolution (and especially insect evolution) is explored, especially as it culminated with the publication of Stebbins's 1950 book Variation and Evolution in Plants. The paper explores the multi-directional traffic of influence between Stebbins and Dobzhansky, but also their social and professional networks (...) that linked plant evolutionists like Stebbins with Edgar Anderson, Carl Epling, and the 'Carnegie team' of Jens Clausen, David Keck, and William Hiesey with collaborators on the animal side like I. Michael Lerner, Sewall Wright and L.C. Dunn and other 'architects' of the synthesis like Ernst Mayr, Julian Huxley and George Gaylord Simpson. The compatibility in training, work styles, methodologies, goals, field sites, levels of analysis, and even choice of organismic systems is explored between Stebbins and Dobzhansky. Finally, the extent to which coevolution between plants and insects is reflected in the relationship is explored, as is the power dynamic in the relationship between two of the most visible figures associated with the evolutionary synthesis. (shrink)

Thomas Reid presented a two-dimensional geometry of the visual field in his Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764). The axioms of this geometry are different from those of Euclidean plane geometry. The ‘geometry of visibles’ is the same as the geometry of the surface of the sphere, described without reference to points and lines outside the surface itself. In a recent article, James Van Cleve has argued that Reid can secure a non-Euclidean geometry of visibles only at the cost of (...) abandoning his direct realist theory of perception, and reintroducing sense-data. The question will be reexamined by considering two aspects of Reid’s theory of vision: the claim that we do not directly perceive distance by sight and Reid’s characterization of visible figure as a partial notion of an external object. (shrink)

There are issues in Reid scholarship as well as the primary texts that seem to suggest that Reid is not a direct realist about visual perception. In this paper, I examine two key issues ? colour perception and visible figure ? and attempt to defend the direct realism of Reid's theory through an interpretation of ?directness? as well as what Reid calls ?acquired perception?, which is ?mediate? in that it requires prior perception of signs, but nonetheless constitutes direct (...) perception. (shrink)

One does not just live in a crisis: a crisis calls for action. Etymologically, from the Greek krisis, it is a turning point or a moment of decision. It not only alters perception; it alters the demands for living. It stands out from the everyday. If we follow Gail Weiss (2008), we could say that a crisis is a moment when the ground called “ordinary life” is interrupted in such a way that it no longer functions as an out-of-awareness backdrop (...) but itself becomes the visible figure. But what happens when the ground is already permeated by crises, large and small? How should we think about crisis when we cannot call upon a simple binary—times of crisis and somehow livable normal times? How to think, conceptually, about those communities who live with what is variously termed “slow death” (Berlant 2011), “slow violence,” (Nixon 2011) or “chronic crisis” (Vigh 2008) that make the everyday a source of such continual threat that crisis and non-crisis shade into one another? I ask these questions in the context of my twenty-year history of research in African American communities in which families are caring for children with disabilities and chronic illnesses. (shrink)

George Berkeley argues that vision is a language of God, that the immediate objects of vision are arbitrary signs for tactile objects and that there is no necessary connection between what we see and what we touch. Thomas Reid, on the other hand, aims to establish a geometrical connection between visible and tactile figures. Consequently, although Reid and Berkeley's theories of vision share important elements, Reid explicitly rejects Berkeley's idea that visible figures are merely arbitrary signs for tangible (...) bodies. But is he right in doing so? I show that many passages in Berkeley's work on vision suggest that he acknowledges a geometrical connection between visibles and tangibles. So the opposition between the arbitrariness Berkeley defends and a geometrical connection cannot be as universal as Reid thinks. This paper seeks to offer a plausible reading of Berkeley's theory of vision in this regard and an explanation of why Reid interprets Berkeley differently. (shrink)

What is special about picturing according to the rules of perspectival drawing systems? My answer is at once both radical and conciliatory. I think that depiction essentially involves a distinctive experience, an experience of resemblance. More precisely, the picture must be seen as preserving what Thomas Reid (Enquiry 1764) called the "visible figure" of what is represented. It follows from this, and from some other plausible premises, that if a picture is to depict detailed spatial arrangements, rather than (...) simply to represent them in some other, non-pictorial, way, it must conform to perspectival rules. Hence the radicalism. Perspective does not provide uniquely accurate or realistic ways to depict things, but, for certain aspects of the world, the only way to depict them at all. What of the conciliatory aspect of my view? My account of depiction in no way implies that only perspectival pictures can depict anything at all. Indeed, it is quite consistent with a good deal of variation in the marks which might, in the right context, depict a given content. But better still, the factors determining what we see a picture as resembling, and hence partially determining what it depicts, are just those factors emphasized by those who take perspective to be a matter of convention. They include, for instance, the nature of the subject's perceptual environment, and the sorts of pictures to which he has previously been exposed. Thus, even given the radical claim, the variety in ways of depicting a given thing is neither incomprehensible nor indicative of some kind of failure. We can understand perspective's special status without denigrating the alternatives. (shrink)

Berkeley holds that vision, in isolation, presents only color and light. He also claims that typical perceivers experience distance, figure, magnitude, and situation visually. The question posed in New Theory is how we perceive by sight spatial features that are not, strictly speaking, visible. Berkeley’s answer is “that the proper objects of vision constitute an universal language of the Author of nature.” For typical humans, this language of vision comes naturally. Berkeley identifies two sorts of objects of vision: (...) primary (light and colors) and secondary (distance, figure, magnitude, and situation). Berkeley also appeals to a third class of a different sort: visible figure, magnitude, and situation, constituting the vocabulary of the language of vision. By considering two perceivers who lack this vocabulary we may better understand this third category and the difference between those who must learn the language of vision and those for whom it is a natural endowment. (shrink)

Reid’s rejection of the “theory of ideas” implies that sensations are not copies of external qualities such as extension and figure. Reid also says that not even the order of sensations is spatial. However, in his early manuscripts Reid did not deny that sensations are arranged spatially. He simply denied that our ideas of extension and figure are copied from any single atomic sensation. Only subsequently did Reid explicitly reject the view that sensations are arranged spatially. The question (...) of the spatiality of color sensation was a central concern of early interpreters of Reid, like Dugald Stewart, John Fearn, and William Hamilton. In particular, John Fearn thought that the denial of the spatiality of color sensations is the result of Reid’s commitment to the immateriality of the soul. Against Reid’s view, Fearn argued that the perception of visible figure necessarily implies the spatiality of color sensations. (shrink)

Reid’s discussion of Molyneux’s question has been neglected. The Inquiry discusses the question twice, offering opposing answers. The first discussion treats the underlying issue as concerning common perceptibles of touch and vision, and in particular whether in vision we originally perceive depth. Although it is tempting to treat the second discussion as doing the same, this would render pointless various novel features Reid introduces in reformulating Molyneux’s question. Rather, the issue now is whether the blind can form a reasonable conception (...) of visual appearances, a conception that would allow them to perform Molyneux’s task. In explaining why Reid thought they can, I draw on his account of primary quality concepts as independent of sensation; of concept possession as ability, not acquaintance with sensation; and of visual appearance itself as in key part a matter of the perception of a primary quality, visible figure. Thus the issue does not concern cross-modality, what vision has in common with touch; but how even what is central in vision is amodal, able to be grasped independently of any sensory mode. Reid’s second Molyneux discussion thereby forms a focus for the Inquiry’s central claims, and the rejection of the Ideal Theory they entail. (shrink)

According to Reid, color sensations are not extended nor are they arranged in figured patterns. Reid further claimed that ‘there is no sensation appropriated to visible figure.’ Reid justified these controversial claims by appeal to Cheselden's report of the experiences of a young man affected by severe cataracts, and by appeal to cases of perception of visible figure without color. While holding fast to the principle that sensations are not extended, Dugald Stewart tried to show that (...) ‘a variety of colour sensations is a necessary means for the perception of visible figure.’ According to John Fearn, two motives appear to be central to Reid's views about color sensations and extension: his commitment to the Cartesian doctrine of the immateriality of the soul, and his attempt to evade ‘Hume's dilemma’ about the existence and immateriality of the soul. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 558-559 [Access article in PDF] Stephen Gaukroger. Descartes' System of Natural Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. viii + 258. Cloth, $60.00. Paper, $22.00. Stephen Gaukroger, author of a definitive biography of Descartes, has now written an excellent account of Descartes's natural philosophy as presented in his Principia philosophiae. Gaukroger claims that the roots of modernity lay in the (...) philosophies of Francis Bacon and René Descartes, both of whom regarded natural philosophy, rather than either moral philosophy or metaphysics, as the core of the philosophical enterprise. Whereas Bacon developed his ideas from a background steeped in the writings of the Renaissance humanists who emphasized moral philosophy, Descartes developed his ideas in the context of Scholastic philosophy, particularly the textbooks of the Jesuits that he had encountered at La Flèche and that located the foundations of philosophy in metaphysics.Regarding the unpublished early works, Le monde and L'homme, as suppressed parts of Descartes's mature project and taking seriously Descartes's stated intention of dealing with living things and humans along with the physical world in his natural philosophy, Gaukroger presents a detailed account of this "complete" version of the Principia philosophiae. In a series of six chapters, he explicates Descartes's views on the principles of knowledge, the principles of material objects, the visible universe, the Earth, living things, and man. In addition to Le monde and L'homme, Gaukroger draws on Les Passions de l'âme as an important source for Descartes's views on human nature.Gaukroger situates Descartes's natural philosophy in the context of the Scholastic textbook tradition in a chapter preceding his account of the Principa philosophiae. He delves into the history of medieval universities, the place of natural philosophy in the medieval curriculum, and the changing relationship between metaphysics and natural philosophy, particularly after the Condemnations of 1277. Difficulties in reconciling Aristotelian natural philosophy and Christian theology, which had been formulated in terms of Aristotelian metaphysics, continued into the sixteenth century and provided the immediate background to the Jesuit commentaries and textbooks to which Descartes was exposed as a student. In these works, Jesuit philosophers attempted to derive a coherently unified Christian Aristotelianism from first principles. Gaukroger reminds us that Descartes's Principia philosophiae was a deliberate attempt to replace these Jesuit textbooks with one based on mechanistic principles.Despite the strength of Gaukroger's book as a contextualized study of a major philosophical figure who is frequently treated in an entirely ahistorical way, the book is not without its problems. The main problem is one that plagues many studies of Descartes (and other canonical figures in the history of philosophy), to wit, the presumption that he is somehow unique. For example, Gaukroger writes at length about Descartes's views about the differences between animals and humans with regard to cognition, arguing that Descartes did not consider animals to be automata because they lack rational souls but rather that they actually experience some but not all of the more abstract or reflexive forms of cognition usually ascribed to humans. Gaukroger does not mention the fact that many other early modern philosophers held a view like this. For example, Descartes's contemporary and fellow mechanical philosopher Pierre Gassendi claimed that animals could know universals, as when a dog recognizes that it is a human that is approaching, but differ from humans in not being capable of contemplating the nature of universality per se. Descartes was part of a community of thinkers concerned with similar problems, and his natural philosophy can be illuminated by viewing him in that context as well as against the backdrop of Scholasticism.Gaukroger underplays the significance of theology for Descartes's philosophy. Although he discusses how God's attributes, especially immutability, provide the basis for Descartes's laws of motion, he does not explore the specific aspects of Descartes's theological presuppositions and the way they influenced his entire natural philosophical project. Gaukroger repeats the received view that "One of the principal tasks of a mechanistic natural philosophy... (shrink)

Epistemological realists have long struggled to explain perceptual error without introducing a tertium quid between perceivers and physical objects. Two leading realist philosophers, Thomas Reid and Everett Hall, agreed in denying that mental entities are the immediate objects of perceptions of the external world, but each relied upon strange metaphysical entities of his own in the construction of a realist philosophy of perception. Reid added ‘visible figures’ to sensory impressions and specific sorts of mental events, while Hall utilized an (...) array of ways that he maintained properties may participate in the world. This paper assesses each realist's attempt to explain perceptual relativity and illusion without contradicting either the science of his time or the structure of common sense. (shrink)

This paper investigates Hume's theory of the perception of spatial magnitude or size as developed in the _Treatise<D>, as well as its relation to his concepts of space and geometry. The central focus of the discussion is Hume's espousal of the 'composite' hypothesis, which holds that perceptions of spatial magnitude are composed of indivisible sensible points, such that the total magnitude of a visible figure is a derived by-product of its component parts. Overall, it will be argued that (...) a straightforward reading of this hypothesis fails to do full justice to the complexity of Hume's theory of spatial perception and geometry, and that a more adequate treatment must also admit an important role for the more direct process of spatial magnitude perception which he dubs 'intuition'. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Metaphysics of Dante’s ComedyGiuliana CarugatiChristian Moevs. The Metaphysics of Dante’s Comedy. American Academy of Religion, Reflection and Theory in the Study of Religion Series. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. xii + 308. Cloth, $49.95Having for a long time insisted on a newly "mystical," as well as a radically contemporary, reading of Dante's Commedia, this reviewer cannot but deeply appreciate Moev's intelligent and well-written book, which (...) addresses the question of the "truth" of the poem, and solves it by pointing in the direction of "self-knowledge, the self-experience of what is" (9). In other words, the poem represents "how... the human soul or intelligence comes to experience itself as divine, all-encompassing, and (one with) the ultimate principle of all being" (58). At a time when reading the Commedia as a "mystical" project is considered by much of Dante criticism as, at best, harmlessly eccentric, this book, in its meticulous use of metaphysical categories, might persuade skeptical medievalists that a lot can be gained by exploring both classic literary texts, and perhaps the entire philosophical tradition, from this perspective.To illustrate how the immensely complex text of the Commedia is organized around the ultimate goal of "divine" self-knowledge, Moevs, relying on a tradition that has its roots in classical antiquity, turns to the cosmological make-up of the poet's universe. The Empyrean, which is the last stop of pilgrim Dante, is the Christian addition to the nine Aristotelian-Ptolemaic concentric spheres of which the universe is comprised, and in the Commedia it represents an "absolutely immaterial and uncreated" quid, the ground of being, the divine mind itself (21). Moevs concentrates on the so-called Primo Mobile, or the ninth of the concentric spheres of the universe, seeing it as the intermediary between the contingent and the absolute, between dispersion and unity: "The Primo Mobile embodies an apparent metaphysical paradox: it is self-sufficient divine awareness and power projected into pure motion and desire, and material reality become featureless extension... and exalted, living potentiality" (38).To see this sphere as one of the avatars of the Platonic world's soul is certainly a wonderful acquisition, although at times Moevs' wording suggests an uneasy shifting of registers from the metaphorical/textual to the "metaphysical": "without the nexus or bridge of the Primo Mobile, there could be no "transhumanizing" (trasumanar), no Incarnation, no revelation, no redemption, no journey... no translation of being into contingent or finite experience, and hence no space-time and no Comedy" (8). Is this simply a general reflection on the ultimate necessity of a divine world? Or does this mean that the peculiar construct that pre-exists the text of the Commedia is what makes the poem possible? Or that 'Primo Mobile' is the poet's own chosen metaphor for the balancing of the finite into the infinite? Is this particular notion centrally important in the poetics of the Commedia? After all, Dante has been trying to define 'deification' all along, from the Vita nuova to the great canzoni to the Convivio. There is one much more visible figure which is invested with "translation [End Page 474] of being into contingent or finite experience," or with significance as "intermediary": the word 'trasumanar' appears in Paradiso 1, where the passing from human to divine is empowered by Beatrice.In his definition of 'experience of the divine,' Moevs insists on distinguishing "pagan" from "Christian" Neoplatonism. A generic Neoplatonic One, described as "above being or existence in any sense, and therefore above the divine mind," is thus opposed to a "Christian thought, both Augustinian and Aristotelian," which "tends to identify the divine mind with pure being" (33). One could perhaps observe that the "above" of, say, Plotinus, can only be seen as pointing to the irreducibility of language to no-thing; as for Christian thought, one would have to forget the gospel of John, and its Word become flesh.From the same "christianizing" perspective, the book insists, a lot more than the Commedia itself, on the sacrificial aspect of salvation: "love is the universal form of the 'knot' that writes and binds the scattered pages of... (shrink)

Comment figurer visuellement les effets des bouleversements qui marquent notre entrée collective dans l’Anthropocène? Comment saisir l’imminence de ces transformations, sans verser dans une forme de voyeurisme de la catastrophe qui, en se soumettant aux formes du spectaculaire, stérilise toute forme d’action efficace au lieu de la favoriser? Peut-être en cherchant des images en creux, des images inquiètes, incomplètes, qui suscitent l’interrogation et l’exercice projectif de la pensée et de l’imagination : des images qui ne représentent pas les effets des (...) bouleversements, mais les laissent flotter à la lisière de la représentation. On voudrait ainsi définir les contours possibles d’un iconotexte de l’effondrement qui constitue un nouveau régime d’articulation du visible et du lisible, propre à l’imminence des transformations qui nous guettent. (shrink)