Comment aborder la souffrance conjugale dans la consultation de conseil conjugal et familial? Le couple qui pousse la porte du bureau d’une conseillère conjugale n’a pas d’a priori, il vient chercher une écoute, de l’aide. À travers quelques vignettes cliniques, l’auteur expose la spécificité de l’écoute et du soutien du conseiller conjugal.

Les technologies numériques facilitent de nombreuses manières nos interactions sociales — communication, échange, délégation, réputation, etc. Quel est l’impact de ces technologies sur les institutions qui sont le support et le cadre de nos vies sociales? Une réponse classique voit ces technologies comme des outils qui renforcent l’initiative individuelle et la possibilité de développer directement des relations en se passant de tiers de confiance. La transition numérique est alors comprise comme désintermédiation. L’article critique cette approche. En ce qui concerne (...) leurs conséquences sociales, les technologies numériques, les technologies numériques devraient elles–mêmes être traitées comme des intermédiaires sociaux spécifiques. Peut–on se fier à ces nouveaux niveaux d’intermédiation sociale? Trois raisons sont identifiées, pour lesquelles, en l’état actuel, ces institutions numériques ne méritent pas notre confiance. Des tentatives actuelles pour bâtir la fiabilité de ces intermédiaires sociaux sont présentées. (shrink)

Les technologies numériques facilitent de nombreuses manières nos interactions sociales — communication, échange, délégation, réputation, etc. Quel est l’impact de ces technologies sur les institutions qui sont le support et le cadre de nos vies sociales? Une réponse classique voit ces technologies comme des outils qui renforcent l’initiative individuelle et la possibilité de développer directement des relations en se passant de tiers de confiance. La transition numérique est alors comprise comme désintermédiation. L’article critique cette approche. En ce qui concerne (...) leurs conséquences sociales, les technologies numériques, les technologies numériques devraient elles–mêmes être traitées comme des intermédiaires sociaux spécifiques. Peut–on se fier à ces nouveaux niveaux d’intermédiation sociale? Trois raisons sont identifiées, pour lesquelles, en l’état actuel, ces institutions numériques ne méritent pas notre confiance. Des tentatives actuelles pour bâtir la fiabilité de ces intermédiaires sociaux sont présentées. (shrink)

A diagnosis of dementia often comes with difficulties in understanding a conversational context and expressing how one feels. So far, research on how to facilitate advance care planning for people with dementia focused on defining relevant themes and topics for conversations, or on how to formalize decisions made by surrogate decision makers, e.g., family members. The aim of this review is to provide a better scope of the existing research on practical communication aspects related to dementia in ACP conversations. In (...) November 2020, seven databases were searched to select papers for inclusion. This search was updated in December 2021. The search strategy consisted of three tiers, intersected by using the Boolean term “AND,” and resulted in 787 studies. Two researchers followed explicit criteria for two sequential levels of screening, based on titles and abstracts and full papers. A total of 22 studies were included for data analysis. Seven topics emerged clustered around two themes. This scoping review provides practical suggestions for healthcare professionals to improve ACP communication and uncovered gaps in research on communication aspects related to dementia in ACP conversations, such as non-verbal behavior, timing and implementation, and personal preferences. (shrink)

BackgroundThe Transparency and Openness Promotion Guidelines describe modular standards that journals can adopt to promote open science. The TOP Factor is a metric to describe the extent to which journals have adopted the TOP Guidelines in their policies. Systematic methods and rating instruments are needed to calculate the TOP Factor. Moreover, implementation of these open science policies depends on journal procedures and practices, for which TOP provides no standards or rating instruments.MethodsWe describe a process for assessing journal policies, procedures, and (...) practices according to the TOP Guidelines. We developed this process as part of the Transparency of Research Underpinning Social Intervention Tiers Initiative to advance open science in the social intervention research ecosystem. We also provide new instruments for rating journal instructions to authors, manuscript submission systems, and published articles according to standards in the TOP Guidelines. In addition, we describe how to determine the TOP Factor score for a journal, calculate reliability of journal ratings, and assess coherence among a journal’s policies, procedures, and practices. As a demonstration of this process, we describe a protocol for studying approximately 345 influential journals that have published research used to inform evidence-based policy.DiscussionThe TRUST Process includes systematic methods and rating instruments for assessing and facilitating implementation of the TOP Guidelines by journals across disciplines. Our study of journals publishing influential social intervention research will provide a comprehensive account of whether these journals have policies, procedures, and practices that are consistent with standards for open science and thereby facilitate the publication of trustworthy findings to inform evidence-based policy. Through this demonstration, we expect to identify ways to refine the TOP Guidelines and the TOP Factor. Refinements could include: improving templates for adoption in journal instructions to authors, manuscript submission systems, and published articles; revising explanatory guidance intended to enhance the use, understanding, and dissemination of the TOP Guidelines; and clarifying the distinctions among different levels of implementation.Research materials are available on the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/txyr3/. (shrink)

During the early Cambrian period metazoan life forms diverged at an accelerated rate to occupy multiple ecological niches on earth. A variety of explanations have been proposed to address this major evolutionary phenomenon termed the “Cambrian explosion.” While most hypotheses address environmental, developmental, and ecological factors that facilitated evolutionary innovations, the biological basis for accelerated emergence of species diversity in the Cambrian period remains largely conjectural. Herein, we posit that morphogenesis by self‐organization enables the uncoupling of genomic mutational landscape from (...) phenotypic diversification. Evidence is provided for a two‐tiered interpretation of genomic changes in metazoan animals wherein mutations not only impact upon function of individual cells, but also alter the self‐organization outcome during developmental morphogenesis. We provide evidence that the morphological impacts of mutations on self‐organization could remain repressed if associated with an unmet negative energetic cost. We posit that accelerated morphological diversification in transition to the Cambrian period has occurred by emergence of dormant (i.e., reserved) morphological novelties whose molecular underpinnings were seeded in the Precambrian period. (shrink)

Photo ID 72893750 © Rawpixelimages|Dreamstime.com ABSTRACT Solidarity is a concept increasingly employed in bioethics whose application merits further clarity and explanation. Given how vital cooperation and community-level care are to mitigating communicable disease transmission, we use lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic to reveal how solidarity is a useful descriptive and analytical tool for public health scholars, practitioners, and policymakers. Drawing upon an influential framework of solidarity that highlights how solidarity arises from the ground up, we reveal how structural forces can (...) impact the cultivation of solidarity from the top down, particularly through ensuring robust access to important social determinants of health. Public health institutions can support solidarity movements among individuals and communities by adopting a lens of social justice when considering public health priorities and, in turn, promote health equity. INTRODUCTION Over the past two decades, scholars have invoked the concept of solidarity when assessing a wide range of topics in bioethics, from CRISPR-Cas9 technology to organ donation to structural racism.[1] However, the growing literature on solidarity has not fully examined the roles and responsibilities of institutions and governments in fostering solidarity, especially regarding public health measures that implicate entire populations. We argue that it remains unclear how public health institutions should engage with solidarity and how their engagement will affect public health and its ethics. We first take Prainsack and Buyx’ three-tiered framework as an analytical starting point.[2] We then explore how public health institutions can foster solidarity by carefully considering factors that may bolster it on an interpersonal, community, and national scale. We conclude that public health institutions should adopt a lens of social justice to promote solidarity at the interpersonal and community levels, thereby promoting equity in future public health efforts. BACKGROUND Calls for solidarity in bioethics raise longstanding normative questions about the nature and limits of our duties to one another and how to weigh autonomy over considerations of justice.[3] Though the term is diversely applied, Prainsack and Buyx propose a potentially unifying definition in the 2011 Nuffield Council report, “Solidarity: Reflections On An Emerging Concept in Bioethics.” The report defines solidarity as an activity involving “shared practices reflecting a collective commitment to carry financial, social, emotional, and or other ‘costs’ to assist others.” Their conceptualization also includes important features that distinguish solidarity from other values like empathy or altruism: solidarity emphasizes action rather than mere internal feeling and recognition of connection as motivation.[4] Bioethicists have since applied this conceptualization when analyzing issues in public and global health, given that population-level efforts need cooperation from individuals and communities. Prainsack and Buyx further note that solidarity is relevant in bioethics discourses about justice and equity, in support of providing aid to low- and middle-income countries, and as a value exemplified by European welfare states.[5] Other bioethicists have argued that promoting solidarity can contribute to community engagement, partnership with Tribal communities, and global health equity.[6] Most recently, scholars have applied solidarity as a lens to assess the COVID-19 pandemic, highlighting the pitfalls of national mitigation efforts and global disparities in disease outcomes.[7] I. Solidarity at Three Levels It seems impossible to foster solidarity in public health if we cannot identify it in general contexts. Prainsack and Buyx articulate three levels of solidarity: interpersonal solidarity, group solidarity, and legal or contractual codifications of solidarity.[8] They argue that each level inherently informs the one ‘above’ it in a unilateral direction. In other words, solidarity is fundamentally a bottom-up phenomenon. Solidarity among individuals influences group norms, which then have the potential to shape policy and institutional practice.[9] Within the Prainsack and Buyx framework, it would seem nonsensical to posit how solidarity might be expressed vertically or from the “top down.” It appears intuitively odd to imagine how a government entity might ‘be’ in solidarity with a person or group if solidarity requires some cognition about their condition per Prainsack and Buyx’ definition. Some have argued that solidarity does not seem like something that one can impose, as instances of it arise from agents recognizing and acting upon some bond rather than in response to a command. Indeed, people may be rightfully hesitant to engage in solidarity if the official messaging is overly paternalistic or coercive.[10] However, some authors have countered that governments can express solidarity through enacting structural and policy changes, though it is ambiguous how these actions are distinct from a justice-driven approach.[11] If a bottom-up approach is thus the most practical means of achieving policy that reflects solidarity, then it does not add much to public health. Institutions would be ineffective without the population’s initiation of the corresponding social norms. However, we find this conclusion overly pessimistic. Fostering a culture of solidarity to improve public health has potential merit. Prainsack and Buyx’ framework overlooks how public health actors can influence solidarity between individuals and across communities. To clarify, we agree with the view that solidarity is a bottom-up phenomenon. Solidarity may not be able to originate in a top-down fashion, but we suggest that public health institutions can take a more active role in providing the public with accurate information, promoting social justice, and intervening in the social determinants of health. II. The COVID-19 Pandemic as a Case Study Lessons learned from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic support our argument. The pandemic deepened socioeconomic disparities in the US and hindered access to vital resources such as food, housing, and healthcare.[12] Prainsack recently noted: “[n]ext to the immediate health effects of the virus, poverty and grave inequalities have been the root causes of human suffering during the pandemic.”[13] Prior to the pandemic, many rural and low-income populations lacked reliable access to the internet and devices like laptops or smartphones. This continued lack of access restricts the flow of information and prevents people from accessing telemedicine services.[14] Preexisting social, political, and health inequities worsened health outcomes among many marginalized racial and ethnic groups. It is well-documented that communities of color, including Black, American Indian or Alaska Native, and Latinx populations, had greater COVID-related mortality and morbidity due to the effects of structural racism.[15] Although federal US agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention enacted laws that provided safety nets (e.g., the Federal Eviction Moratorium), the majority of such programs have ended, leaving many with little assistance and the threat of further hardship.[16] These disparities are relevant because Prainsack, Buyx, and others note that solidarity arises from agents recognizing and acting on some perceived attainable collective goal(s). Income inequality and disparate access to food, education, and health care may lead people to consider public health goals unattainable. This could limit the desire to work toward those goals collectively.[17] The existing literature on collective action theory supports this intuition. It emphasizes that structural conditions, such as an absence of perceived hope for social change among a group, can lead to low ‘group efficacy’ and little willingness to cooperate, both within and across socioeconomic strata.[18] The pandemic spurred countless messages from public health agencies. The messaging did not recognize or attend to the different material realities and circumstances of the US population. How can people feel comfortable getting vaccinated if they deeply distrust the government, including public health institutions? How can people remain motivated to wear masks and distance themselves if they cannot afford basic necessities and work jobs without adequate pay and leave policies? We ask these questions to illustrate how socioeconomic disparities can marginalize people if they feel ignored, apathetic, or resentful of those better off or those in power whom they perceive to “not be doing enough.” This marginalization precludes the formation of solidarity. There are instances when a population has disparate access to resources and social capital, but solidarity may still emerge from a shared goal or vision for the future. For example, a heterogeneous population living in the same town may come together to protest an environmental injustice that impacts their water supply with the common goal of securing access to safe drinking water. However, many populations in the US failed to recognize shared goals of this kind during the COVID-19 pandemic. A significant minority of the US population was reluctant to acknowledge the severity of COVID-19 infection and thus refused to participate in efforts to mitigate its spread. Even between groups who shared the goal of slowing COVID-19 transmission, the methods were widely debated. Approximately 20 percent of the adult population eligible for vaccination remains unvaccinated.[19] Governmental bodies responsible for disseminating information, coordinating the allocation of resources, and establishing guidelines have a large role in mediating these disagreements and intervening in socioeconomic conditions that impact people's ability and willingness to engage in solidarity. III. Solidarity, Social Justice, and the Role of Public Health Institutions Adopting a lens of social justice provides further insights into how public health actors impact solidarity. Powers and Faden argue that the “foundational moral justification for the social institution of public health is social justice.”[20] Their theory of social justice has two aims. First, it ensures that everyone has a sufficient amount of the six core elements of well-being and that public health institutions are responsible for “adopting policies and creating environments” where all can flourish.[21] Second, public health institutions should distribute resources meant to promote well-being and focus on the “needs of those who are the most disadvantaged.”[22] Public health institutions should enact policies that address injustice. In doing so, public health institutions can seed the opportunity to build solidarity from the bottom up. Equipping individuals and communities with resources will foster cooperation and adherence to policies that require solidarity, such as masking and vaccination. This is consistent with arguments illustrating how institutions such as Tribal governments promote the conditions needed for their group, and especially its most vulnerable members, to flourish.[23] Addressing social determinants of health with a social justice lens will create the circumstances under which more individuals and groups can find common causes and foster solidarity. In the long run, such efforts may result in the establishment of values and practices from the bottom up. There are societal and public health preconditions required before institutions can expect their audience to act in solidarity with one another. Through their great influence over information and resources, public institutions do have the power to impact what values are most widespread. Furthermore, public health may foster trust and hope, which are important psychosocial factors that influence collective action,[24] if policies increase access to resources that promote well-being. Messaging efficacy also depends on the context of public trust, education, and whether the institutions meet one’s basic needs. Disparate messaging across different public institutions may confuse or disillusion individuals. To apply our theory of solidarity to the decision to vaccinate, a policy would be to foster conditions that facilitate access to vaccines and information about vaccine efficacy instead of imposing a top-down mandate without first eliciting public trust. IV. Counterargument Some argue that discordant public health messaging, ineffective government, and inadequate social programs can also bring people together under pressure and foster solidarity. One may argue that the most powerful motivators towards solidarity are strife and disparity, as evidenced throughout history. During the pandemic alone, political struggle and personal hardship inspired solidarity in the US, from individual neighbors helping each other to mutual aid groups forming across communities. We thus do not claim that solidarity is possible only when our government programs and public health institutions are most effective. We instead point out that solidarity can be further hindered when people feel alienated, hopeless, and pitted against each other. CONCLUSION Many competing conceptualizations of solidarity persist in the bioethics literature, and Prainsack and Buyx offer one compelling framework that public health ethicists continue to draw upon.[25] However, their framework fails to acknowledge how public health institutions impact interpersonal and group solidarity. Public health institutions can foster solidarity through actions other than mere messaging, invoking catchphrases like “we are all in this together.” Efforts to address socioeconomic preconditions and alleviate health disparities can cultivate group solidarity. As we saw during the pandemic, cooperation and solidarity go hand-in-hand with disease mitigation efforts; solidarity has clear intrinsic value.[26] As this relationship becomes more apparent, we will continue to see attempts from public health institutions to foster or invoke solidarity. Therefore, public health institutions would be remiss to ignore their role in addressing the social determinants of health. Adopting a social justice lens when planning public health interventions will clarify and strengthen their role in facilitating solidarity. Ultimately, if health disparities continue to persist or widen, it is very hard to imagine how group solidarity can ever be achieved. The widescale adoption of many public health measures needed to promote health and well-being would be conducive to solidarity. - Disclaimer: The opinions expressed are the authors’ and do not represent the views of the NIH, DHHS, or the U.S. government. Funding Disclosure: This work was supported in part by the Intramural Program of the National Institutes of Health Clinical Center. - [1] John J Mulvihill et al., “Ethical Issues of CRISPR Technology and Gene Editing through the Lens of Solidarity,” British Medical Bulletin 122 (2017): 17–29, https://doi.org/10.1093/bmb/ldx002; Ben Saunders, “Altruism or Solidarity? The Motives for Organ Donation and Two Proposals,” Bioethics 26, no. 7 (September 2012): 376–81, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2012.01989.x; -Vanessa Y Hiratsuka, “SPECIAL REPORT: A Critical Moment in Bioethics: Reckoning with Anti-Black Racism through Intergenerational Dialogue A Call for Solidarity in Bioethics: Confronting Anti-Black Racism Together,” 2022, https://doi.org/10.1002/hast.1380. [2] Prainsack and Buyx, Solidarity: Reflections on an Emerging Concept in Bioethics London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011; Prainsack and Buyx, “Solidarity in Contemporary Bioethics--towards a New Approach.” Bioethics 26, no. 7 (September 2012): 343–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1467-8519.2012.01987.X. [3] Bob Simpson, “A ‘We’ Problem for Bioethics and the Social Sciences: A Response to Barbara Prainsack,” Science, Technology, & Human Values 43, no. 1 (January 12, 2018): 45–55, https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243917735899. [4] Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx, Solidarity: Reflections on an Emerging Concept in Bioethics (London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011). [5] Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx, “Solidarity in Contemporary Bioethics--towards a New Approach,” Bioethics 26, no. 7 (September 2012): 343–50, https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1467-8519.2012.01987.X. [6] Bridget Pratt, Phaik Yeong Cheah, and Vicki Marsh, “Solidarity and Community Engagement in Global Health Research,” The American Journal of Bioethics : AJOB 20, no. 5 (May 3, 2020): 43–56, https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2020.1745930; Sara Chandros Hull, F. Leah Nez (Diné), and Juliana M. Blome, “Solidarity as an Aspirational Basis for Partnership with Tribal Communities,” The American Journal of Bioethics 21, no. 10 (October 3, 2021): 14–17, https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2021.1965258; Mbih J. Tosam et al., “Global Health Inequalities and the Need for Solidarity: A View from the Global South,” Developing World Bioethics 18, no. 3 (September 1, 2018): 241–49, https://doi.org/10.1111/DEWB.12182. [7] Peter West-Oram, “Solidarity Is for Other People: Identifying Derelictions of Solidarity in Responses to COVID-19,” Journal of Medical Ethics 47, no. 2 (February 1, 2021): 65–68, https://doi.org/10.1136/MEDETHICS-2020-106522; Barbara Prainsack, “Solidarity in Times of Pandemics,” Democratic Theory 7, no. 2 (December 1, 2020): 124–33, https://doi.org/10.3167/DT.2020.070215; F. Marijn Stok et al., “Social Inequality and Solidarity in Times of COVID-19,” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 18, no. 12 (June 2, 2021), https://doi.org/10.3390/IJERPH18126339; Ming Jui Yeh, “Solidarity in Pandemics, Mandatory Vaccination, and Public Health Ethics,” American Journal of Public Health 112, no. 2 (February 1, 2022): 255–61, https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2021.306578; Barbara Prainsack, “Beyond Vaccination Mandates: Solidarity and Freedom During COVID-19.,” Am J Public Health 112, no. 2 (February 1, 2022): 232–33, https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2021.306619. [8] Prainsack and Buyx, Solidarity: Reflections on an Emerging Concept in Bioethics London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011; Prainsack and Buyx, “Solidarity in Contemporary Bioethics--towards a New Approach.” Bioethics 26, no. 7 (September 2012): 343–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1467-8519.2012.01987.X. [9] Prainsack and Buyx, Solidarity: Reflections on an Emerging Concept in Bioethics London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011; Prainsack and Buyx, “Solidarity in Contemporary Bioethics--towards a New Approach.” Bioethics 26, no. 7 (September 2012): 343–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1467-8519.2012.01987.X. [10] Yeh, “Solidarity in Pandemics, Mandatory Vaccination, and Public Health Ethics”; Prainsack, “Beyond Vaccination Mandates: Solidarity and Freedom During COVID-19.” [11] Ho, Anita, and Iulia Dascalu. "Relational solidarity and COVID-19: an ethical approach to disrupt the global health disparity pathway." Global Bioethics 32, no. 1 (2021): 34-50; West-Oram, Peter. "Solidarity is for other people: identifying derelictions of solidarity in responses to COVID-19." Journal of Medical Ethics 47, no. 2 (2021): 65-68. [12] Monica Webb Hooper, Anna María Nápoles, and Eliseo J. Pérez-Stable, “COVID-19 and Racial/Ethnic Disparities,” JAMA 323, no. 24 (June 23, 2020): 2466, https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.8598. [13] Prainsack, Barbara. “Beyond Vaccination Mandates: Solidarity and Freedom During COVID-19.” Am J Public Health 112, no. 2 (February 1, 2022): 232–33. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2021.306619. [14] Camille A Clare, “Telehealth and the Digital Divide as a Social Determinant of Health during the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Network Modeling Analysis in Health Informatics and Bioinformatics 10 (2021): 26, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13721-021-00300-y. [15] Patrick Nana-Sinkam et al., “Health Disparities and Equity in the Era of COVID-19,” Journal of Clinical and Translational Science 5, no. 1 (March 16, 2021): e99, https://doi.org/10.1017/cts.2021.23. [16] Kathryn M Leifheit et al., “Expiring Eviction Moratoriums and COVID-19 Incidence and Mortality,” American Journal of Epidemiology 190, no. 12 (December 1, 2021): 2503–10, https://doi.org/10.1093/aje/kwab196. [17] Barbara Prainsack, “Solidarity in Times of Pandemics,” Democratic Theory 7, no. 2 (December 1, 2020): 124–33, https://doi.org/10.3167/DT.2020.070215 [18] Maximilian Agostini and Martijn van Zomeren, “Toward a Comprehensive and Potentially Cross-Cultural Model of Why People Engage in Collective Action: A Quantitative Research Synthesis of Four Motivations and Structural Constraints.,” Psychological Bulletin 147, no. 7 (July 2021): 667–700, https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000256. [19] Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (HHS/CDC), “COVID Data Tracker,” 2023, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker. [20] Powers, Madison, and Ruth Faden. Social Justice: The Moral Foundation of Public Health and Health Policy. 1st editio. New York: Oxford Press, 2006, p. 9 and Chapter 4 [21] Powers and Faden, Social Justice: The Moral Foundation of Public Health and Health Policy; Madison Powers and Ruth Faden, Structural Injustice: Power, Advantage, and Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019). [22] Powers, Madison, and Ruth Faden. Social Justice: The Moral Foundation of Public Health and Health Policy. 1st editio. New York: Oxford Press, 2006, p. 10 [23] Bobby Saunkeah et al., “Extending Research Protections to Tribal Communities,” The American Journal of Bioethics 21, no. 10 (October 3, 2021): 5–12, https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2020.1865477. [24] Agostini and van Zomeren, “Toward a Comprehensive and Potentially Cross-Cultural Model of Why People Engage in Collective Action: A Quantitative Research Synthesis of Four Motivations and Structural Constraints.” [25] Prainsack and Buyx, Solidarity: Reflections on an Emerging Concept in Bioethics. [26] Ruth Chadwick, “COVID‐19 and the Possibility of Solidarity,” Bioethics 34, no. 7 (September 8, 2020): 637–637, https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12813. (shrink)

There has been extensive discussion in research ethics literature surrounding the appropriate form of informed consent for biobanking, whether with adapted content, or adapted forms such as broad or tiered consent. These discussions presuppose that it is possible to disclose adequate information at the outset to facilitate an informed choice to donate to a biobank. I will argue that informed consent cannot be achieved because in the biobanking context, we are either consenting to an enterprise that is not research or (...) to future research. Nor is the solution to abandon the idea that informed consent ethically requires the disclosure of a certain minimal amount of information to make an informed choice by misleadingly identifying broad, blanket or even tiered consent as forms of ‘informed’ consent. Rather, we should abandon the idea that informed consent for research can be adapted to the type of endeavor that biobanking is, and understand the goal as to develop alternatives not as alternative forms of informed consent, but rather alternatives to informed consent. (shrink)

L’analyse des réseaux sociaux est menée dans le domaine des sciences sociales depuis les années 1930. Le premier enjeu pour réaliser ces analyses se situe dans la collecte de l’information sur la structure de ces réseaux et sur leurs activités. Avec l’avènement du Web 2.0 et des technologies du Web sémantique, plusieurs mécanismes de collecte d’information sont désormais envisageables. Cependant, très peu d’utilisateurs sont conscients des facilités d’atteinte et de manipulation de leurs traces d’activités et de leurs données personnelles de (...) plus en plus rendus publics sur les réseaux socionumériques en particulier. Dans cet article, nous étudions les différentes approches permettant l’accès aux données dans les réseaux socionumériques, en nous intéressant − dans le cas précis de Facebook − à la qualité et la quantité de l’information accessible, et par conséquent, aux risques potentiels d’atteinte et de manipulation des données personnelles des utilisateurs par des tiers. Une expérimentation menée via l’API Facebook démontre l’accessibilité à un nombre important d’informations pouvant permettre de reconstruire automatiquement le réseau réel d’un utilisateur à partir de son profil.Social networks have been an object of analysis by the social sciences since the 1930s. The first challenge in performing these analyses is to gather information on the structure of these networks and on their activities. With the advent of Web 2.0 and semantic Web technologies, several different mechanisms can be used for this. However, few users are aware of how easy it is to access and manipulate the traces left by their activities and, especially on the social networks, by their personal data, which is becoming increasingly public. In this article, we look into the different ways of accessing data on the social networks, and – on Facebook in particular – into the quality and quantity of the information available and therefore the potential risks of users finding that third parties are accessing and manipulating their personal information. An experiment conducted via API Facebook shows that a great deal of information is accessible that can be used to automatically reconstruct a user’s actual network from their profile. (shrink)

Despite the fact that corporate law firms attract some of the most intelligent and productive minds in business today, they have failed to cultivate a workplace that facilitates healthy and balanced lives for their practitioners. Workplace stress in the sector is manifest in a culture which continues to sanction 'rite of passage' work practices which bolster earnings for those at the apex but are proving sickening to many. This culture inhibits basic ethical human interaction based on decency and respect and (...) cultivates oppression through fear of failure. Not surprisingly then, bullying is tolerated and lawyer attrition is rife, particularly for junior women lawyers. This article considers the impact of bullying in Australian corporate law firms. Foucauldian thought is utilised in order to better understand first, how the organisational culture in major law firms continues to authorise practices which prove injurious to practitioners' health and secondly, the resulting lawyer attrition. It is argued that the 'disciplinary technologies' being adopted by management function to assure an economy of power relations which not only facilitates conformity with the values and imperatives of the firm but also, the quelling of subversion and resistance to its effects. Standpoint theory is adopted to examine the workplace harms being borne by junior lawyers through a narrative 'Snapshot' of the experience of a female, mature-aged, junior lawyer working as a solicitor at a top tier Australian corporate law firm. Her detailed account illuminates recent quantitative empirical research into the experiences of Australian women lawyers and lays bare the culture of fear and workings of power, violence and marginalisation within the firm. (shrink)

Heightened concern with global issues has led to shifts in corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. To capture the distinct nature of this global focus, researchers have developed a three-generation CSR typology. In this paper, we first evaluate the usefulness of this typology for understanding corporate approaches to CSR by examining how several companies position themselves thematically in CEO introductions to sustainability reports. On the basis of this, we then evaluate the practical value of this typology for assisting those who work (...) with CSR strategy. The analysis revealed expressions of all three CSR generations, with third-generation thinking being apparent, but not dominant. It also verified that the three-generation CSR typology can be an instructive means of both evaluating as well as framing a company's approach to sustainability, though with modifications. On the basis of the identified strengths and weaknesses of the typology, we develop a practitioner-focused, three-tiered model that can strategically guide the development of CSR programs. (shrink)

Pour envisager notre société, il y a deux positions majeures : le libéralisme qui affirme la liberté de l’individu comme principe politique suprême, et le communautarisme qui privilégie l’intérêt de la communauté sur celui des individus qui la composent. Chaque approche a sa légitimité, mais en même temps sa difficulté : la première, prenant la société pour la limitation ou plutôt l’expansion de la liberté de l’individu, ne peut traiter que négativement notre rapport aux faibles ; la seconde, concevant la (...) communauté comme « donnée », risque de négliger la manière dont l’individu y adhère. Dans sa réflexion sur le « tiers », Levinas a frayé une troisième voie qui nous délivre de cette antinomie. En refusant de prendre la liberté de l’individu ou la communauté pour « données » et d’accorder à l’une ou l’autre la priorité absolue, Levinas aborde la société à partir de la relation avec autrui, laquelle « précède » la communauté ou la loi universelle mais aussi la « conditionne ». (shrink)

Das wachsende wissenschaftliche Interesse an Tieren, ihren Fähigkeiten und Interaktionen mit den Menschen sowie verhaltensbiologische Erkenntnisse und tierphilosophische Einsichten führen zu einer Neubewertung der Mensch-Tier-Beziehung. Dies bleibt nicht ohne Konsequenzen für die Theologie. Sie muss nach den philosophischen und theologischen Ursachen für ihre weitgehende „Tiervergessenheit“ fragen sowie die Potenziale entfalten, die zum Beispiel die Heilige Schrift und die Schöpfungsspiritualität für die Gestaltung der Beziehung zu den Tieren bieten. Dabei balanciert sie auf dem schmalen Grat, den Mensch-Tier-Differentialismus zu überwinden, ohne das (...) je Eigene von Menschen und Tieren zu verwischen. Dieser Band leistet eine interdisziplinäre Annäherung an eine christliche Tierethik, die sich nicht als isolierte binnenphilosophische oder -theologische Bereichsethik versteht, sondern Antworten sucht auf gesamtgesellschaftliche Auseinandersetzungen mit Fragen der Mensch-Tier-Beziehung. Mit Beiträgen von Andreas Aigner, Heike Baranzke, Martina Besler, Julia Blanc, Katharina Ebner, Matthias Eggel, Julia Enxing, Matthias Gauly, Herwig Grimm, Anita Idel, Kurt Kotrschal, Peter Kunzmann, Martin M. Lintner, Susana Monsó, Ute Neumann-Gorsolke, Jakob Ohm, Christina Potschka, Kurt Remele, Michael Rosenberger, Markus Vogt und Markus Wild. (shrink)

We spend our lives protecting an elusive self - but does the self actually exist? Drawing on literature from Western philosophy, neuroscience and Buddhism (interpreted), the author argues that there is no self. The self - as unified owner and thinker of thoughts - is an illusion created by two tiers. A tier of naturally unified consciousness (notably absent in standard bundle-theory accounts) merges with a tier of desire-driven thoughts and emotions to yield the impression of a self. So (...) while the self, if real, would think up the thoughts, the thoughts, in reality, think up the self. (shrink)

Im FolgendenKonsumvon Tieren soll das Nutzen von nicht-menschlichen Tieren sowie deren Produkte, Körperteile und Fähigkeiten durch uns Menschen zwecks Nahrungsmittel und Konsumgut aus ethischer Perspektive betrachtet werden. Die Ethik kann in drei Bereiche eingeteilt werden wovon zwei für das vorliegende Thema wichtig sind. Erstens kann mithilfe der Werttheorie gefragt werden, wie es bei der Nutzung um das tierische Wohlergehen gestellt ist. Zweitens kann im Rahmen der Frage nach normativen Handlungsgründen untersucht werden ob es gerechtfertigt ist Tiere zu nutzen. Im Folgenden (...) sollen gängige Positionen zu beiden Fragen angerissen werden. (Die Metaethik, als dritter Bereich der Ethik, soll hier außen vor bleiben.). (shrink)

Technische Innovationen der Fotografie erlaubten Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts, Wildtiere nicht mehr nur als Kadaver und Beute oder in Studio und Gehege abzulichten, sondern ihnen in ihrem natürlichen Habitat nachzuspüren. Die frühe Wildtierfotografie bediente damit ein populäres Interesse an der als lokal, national oder kolonial geschätzten Fauna, lieferte wichtige Beiträge zur zoologischen Forschung und verstand sich häufig als Vorkämpfer des Naturschutzes. Ganz neu stellte sich damit aber auch die Frage, wie man Tiere richtig fotografiert: technisch, ästhetisch, ethisch. ​Der Band beantwortet (...) diese Fragen in historischer Perspektive und erschließt damit das Forschungsfeld der Wildtierfotografie. (shrink)

In diesem Aufsatz, werde ich die Frage des Naturalismus in Plessners Philosophie des organischen Lebens und seiner amerikanischen Rezeption, in besonders die philosophischen-biologischen Schriften von Marjorie Grene, untersuchen. Die amerikanische Philosophin Grene war die Hauptvertreterin Plessners im Englischen Sprachraum in 20sten Jahrhundert, die Plessners anthropologischen Argumentation in ihren Schriften zur Philosophie der Biologie aufgenommen und verwendet hat. Grene kritisierte in ihren frühen Schriften Heidegger, Sartre, und die Existenzphilosophie, die das menschliche Dasein von der Natur radikal absondert und die negative Affekte (...) wie Angst hervorhebt, in Vergleich mit Plessners weiterem Blick der Leibhaften, Sinnlichen, Tierischen Entwicklung des menschlichen Lebens. Die menschliche Existenz kann nicht dualistisch, wo „keine Brücke über den Abgrund zwischen Mensch und Tier führt,“ sondern nur biologisch-lebensphilosophisch oder ökologisch verstanden werden. Plessner und Grene setzen sich mit dem Reduktionismus des modernen Naturalismus auseinander und zeigen, wie das Natürliche weiter und ergänzt gedacht werden muss, weil der Naturalismus keine ausreichenden Begriffe für die Auslegung der Erscheinungen und Ausdrucksformen des organischen Lebens besitzt. Die Unterscheidung zwischen der "zentrischen Positionalität" des Tiers und der "exzentrischen Positionalität" des menschlichen Tiers ermöglicht eine holistisch aber differenzierte Beschreibung der Natur und Kultur, insbesondere die natürlichen Künstlichkeit, die der Kultur und das des gesellschaftlichen Lebens. Diese sind Grundlage für die geschichtliche und soziale Bildung, Aufbau, und Strukturierung der natürlichen Spontaneität, Produktivität, und Expressivität des Lebens und ermöglichen die dezentrierte, utopische, und persönliche Individuation der einzelnen Menschen im Lebenszusammenhang, was wichtige soziologische und auch ethische und politische Konsequenzen für Plessner und Grene hat: Der Mensch ist ein natürliches biologisches Individuum, das durchaus fähig ist, eine verantwortliche Person zu werden , und zwar durch die umfassende Beteiligung an (oder als ein einzigartiger Ausdruck) einer Kultur. (shrink)

After acquiring knowledge of the neuroscience of learning, memory, stress and emotions, teachers incorporate more cognitive engagement and student-centered practices into their lessons. However, the role understanding neuroscience plays in teachers own affective and motivational competencies has not yet been investigated. The goal of this study was to investigate how learning neuroscience effected teachers’ self-efficacy, beliefs in their ability to teach effectively, self-responsibility and other components of teacher motivation. A pilot training-of-trainers program was designed and delivered in Liberia combining basic (...) neuroscience with information on social, emotional, behavioral and mental health issues faced by students. Tier I of the professional development was a 2 weeks workshop led by a visiting neuroscientist. A subset of the 24 Tier I secondary science teachers formed a Leadership Team who adapted the content to the Liberian context and subsequently led additional workshops and follow-up sessions for the Tier II secondary science teachers. Science teachers in both tiers completed the affective-motivational scales from the internationally vetted, multiscale Innovative Teaching for Effective Learning Teacher Knowledge Survey from the OECD. Tier II teachers completed the survey in a pre-post-delayed post design. Tier I teachers completed the survey after the workshop with their attitudes at that time and separately with retrospective projections of their pre-workshop attitudes. Ten of the 92 Tier II teachers participated in structured interviews at follow-up. Statistical analysis of survey data demonstrated improved teacher self-efficacy, self-responsibility for student outcomes, and motivation to teach. Qualitatively, teachers expressed more confidence in their ability to motivate students, engage them through active learning, and manage the class through positive rather than negative reinforcement. Teachers’ own self-regulation improved as they made efforts to build supporting relationships with students. Together, these results demonstrated that (i) teacher affective-motivational attitudes can be altered with professional development, (ii) basic neuroscience, as knowledge of how students learn, can improve teacher competency, and (iii) a training-of-trainers model can be effective in a low and middle income country for disseminating neuroscience knowledge, increasing teachers’ knowledge of students’ social and emotional needs, and promoting educational improvement. (shrink)

Les « tiers-lieux » ont été à l’origine définis comme des lieux de sociabilité, là où on se réunit pour la joie d’être ensemble. Les entreprises mondialisées (grandes marques commerciales, constructeurs automobiles, promoteurs immobiliers et même… musées) ont récupéré le concept dans leurs stratégies marketing : il devient une opportunité commerciale. Ces firmes offrent des lieux permettant de réinventer l’expérience des consommateurs en leur donnant un sentiment de communauté, sous couvert de valeurs d’inclusion. Les tiers-lieux connaissent un devenir-marchandise. (...) Mais, l’urgence provoquée par la pandémie de la Covid-19 a révélé des solidarités qui ne pouvaient se construire ailleurs que dans des tiers-lieux. Ils ont constitué le laboratoire de réseaux d’entraide, de chaînes téléphoniques d’attention, de distribution alimentaire, de fabrication artisanale de matériel médical. Ils connaissent une réappropriation et un devenir-politique. (shrink)

Tiere haben erstaunliche kognitive Fähigkeiten, ein diesen Fähigkeiten entsprechendes Bewußtsein und Formen des Selbstbewußtseins. Das Denken in diskreten Einheiten von Urteilen scheint ihnen jedoch nicht zugänglich zu sein, damit auch nicht die Unterscheidung von Bejahung und Verneinung und von wahr und falsch. Wie ist das Denken und damit das objektive Erkennen beim Menschen entstanden? Welche Rolle spielt das Gehirn bei Mensch und Tier? Wir Menschen leben in zwei Welten, die paradoxerweise zugleich eine ist. Das Tageslicht, Gerüche, die Hauswand, an der (...) wir entlanggehen und die wir nicht durchschreiten können diese unsere Lebenswelt unterscheidet sich zunächst nicht von der des Hundes, der uns begleitet. Tiere nehmen sinnlich wahr wie wir, sie erschrecken wie wir bei einem lauten Geräusch, sie zeigen dieselbe freudige Erregung wie wir. Zugleich gibt es für uns eine andere, wiewohl identische Welt, von der die Tiere offenbar nichts wissen: Wir Menschen machen die Dinge zu Objekten der Erkenntnis; dieselbe Sonne, die uns blendet und die sich im Tageslauf langsam von Osten nach Westen bewegt, steht, so erkennen wir, fest im Zentrum des Planetensystems. Wir spüren die Kälte, aber wir erkennen in ihr zugleich die Ursache der Eisbildung; kein Tier weiß, was eine Ursache ist, kein Tier kann sich wundern, und auch denken kann es nicht. These: Natürlich können Tiere denken. "Ach, Sie werden es nicht glauben, aber unser Leo versteht jedes Wort." Gegenthese: Natürlich können Tiere nicht denken. Es fehlen ihnen vor allem zwei Voraussetzungen des Urteilens und Denkens: Sie verfügen über keine geeigneten Begriffe, und sie kennen keine gemeinsame Öffentlichkeit, die durch das Zeigen geschaffen und im Urteil vertieft wird. (shrink)

It is clearly unethical for the NHS to tell people that they will die sooner unless they pay for private treatment, and then to tell them that if they pay for private treatment they will have to pay the NHS for its insufficient service. This is all the more true if people in other parts of the country are receiving all the drugs they need for the same condition on the NHS. Patients who discover that the NHS care that they (...) have paid for will not keep them alive should be able to supplement their care privately if they can afford it, without the added burden and insult of being told their independently inadequate NHS care will cease unless they pay for it too. Mired in self-contradiction as it is, the NHS’ "anti-two-tier" policy must change. (shrink)

This article describes the emergence of a new category of actors in the social arbitration field, namely third-party financiers, with a focus on the possible ethical implications for investment arbitration proceedings. Third-party financiers are actors-service providers specialized in the financing of procedures in which they are associated with the result and the redemption of arbitral awards which they ensure the execution. The emerging phenomenon of third-party financing in the social field of international arbitration raises various ethical concerns, which have not (...) been regulated by the legal framework of most arbitral institutions. By exploring the various interactions between third-party funders and other actors in the social field of international arbitration, the article intends to highlight the ethical implications that the phenomenon of third-party funding may have on both the lawyer-client relationship and the independence and impartiality of arbitrators. It is argued that the introduction of the new phenomenon of third-party funding into the dispute may disrupt the arbitral process. Third-party funding is particularly likely to lead to situations of conflict of interest for arbitrators, which may affect the final award and exacerbate the crisis of legitimacy of the arbitral process. This article explores the various ethical concerns that it raises, and proposes some thoughts on the need for precise regulation of this emerging phenomenon in the contemporary arbitration panorama. It argues that, for ethics to prevail, disclosure of the identity of the third-party funder and the funding agreement should be encouraged in certain circumstances. This is the way to preserve the integrity of the proceedings and the impartiality and independence of the arbitrators. (shrink)

I survey the syntactic technique of tiering which can be used to restrict the power of a recursion scheme. I show how various results can be obtained entirely proof theoretically without the use of a model of computation.

Ralph Johnson argues that mathematical proofs lack a dialectical tier, and thereby do not qualify as arguments. This paper argues that, despite this disavowal, Johnson’s account provides a compelling model of mathematical proof. The illative core of mathematical arguments is held to strict standards of rigour. However, compliance with these standards is itself a matter of argument, and susceptible to challenge. Hence much actual mathematical practice takes place in the dialectical tier.

The first part of this essay argues that the specification of rationality operating in Manifest Rationality does not allow for the inclusion of the dialectical tier as a necessary component of a rational product. It next considers Perelman's conception of "reasonableness" as an alternative to Johnson's structural sense of rationality. Adopting a contextually rich conception of rationality, like that of Perelman, allows Johnson to insist that a rational product must consist of both an illative core and a dialectical tier.

This Article proposes a thought-experiment with regard to the administration of class actions. It is almost axiomatic that class actions are determined through a single “certification.” However, class actions can be certified through a tiered certification, e.g., a preliminary certification on a more lenient standard, followed by a full certification. Flattening the certification process allows a richer set of solutions to familiar dilemmas. Currently, a noncertified class does not bar subsequent certification attempts. Focusing on this problem, this Article demonstrates that (...) tiered certification is a superior solution — members of a class that passed the first certification but not the second receive at least minimal procedural protection and thus could be precluded from serial certification attempts. More generally, tiered certification can better handle several species of collective litigation, which can be referred to as semi-class actions. Collective proceedings, whose certification costs are greater than their social benefit, do not justify a comprehensive class treatment. But to the extent that these cases entail some modest social value, they deserve to pass a less onerous, preliminary certification. The Article discusses cases that fit this pattern, for instance prospective, class-wide relief for technical regulatory violations. (shrink)

American health care reformers face a number of ethical issues, including familiar debates over the merits of a single-payer system and publicly provided universal health insurance. No matter how these debates are resolved, a further ethical question must be addressed. Both universal coverage and a single-payer system are compatible with permitting some patients to pay more for faster, better, or more health care choices. Should the United States continue to have a two-tier health care system in which wealth grants some (...) patients access to medical services that others with the same needs cannot obtain? Critical evaluation of both principled objections to inequalities and practical objections to anticipated social and medical consequences of a two-tier health care system are needed. (shrink)

Equine-Facilitated Psychotherapy is widely used, and the uses to which it can be put are still being developed. However, existing knowledge about this field is insufficient, and most of the research suffers from methodological problems that compromise its rigor. This review will explore research into the linked fields of Animal-Assisted Therapy and Equine-Assisted Activities/Therapies related to physical health. Existing knowledge of mental, emotional, and social applications of EAA/T is presented. Evaluation studies in the subfield suggest that people benefit from interventions (...) with horses. However, these studies suffer from fundamental problems, such as small sample size and lack of control groups. Naturalistic inquiry about theoretical aspects highlights the fundamental role that human-horse relations play in EAA/T, but these studies exhibit deficiencies in theory development. A multimethod approach could promote knowledge development for EFP. Suggestions for future research concern methodological solutions to improve evaluation studies, use of grounded theory method to develop theory, as well as applying attachment theory to the human-horse context, which may offer insight about the underlying processes for change. (shrink)

Among those who know Yehuda's work, the term “two-tier thinking” is usually associated with a problematic relativist position. But “two-tier thinking” is not a name for a philosophical argument; it is best understood, I think, as a term designating certain conditions of knowledge: universal, or modern, or perhaps only postmodern conditions, but in any case, they are generalizations derived from anthropological and psychological observations on matters of facts. This is how things actually work in the sphere of knowledge: Western intellectuals (...) and scientists tend to acknowledge that their truth claims and certainly their normative claims are incompatible with other claims that stem from other belief systems, frameworks of thought or genres of discourses, and there is no final, impartial instance of judgment to adjudicate between the incompatible claims and the conflicting systems. Lack of “final,” impartial judgment does not hinder people from taking their truth claims seriously and acting as realists within the world constituted by their particular belief systems — tier 1. But when they come to reflect upon it, as some of them do, sometimes, they acknowledge the context-dependence of this realism and the fact that there is no way to make good on its claim to universality; theirs, they know, is but one particular “belief system,” or “genre of discourse,” among many. (shrink)

Academic integrity is a vital pedagogical responsibility that educational institutions should explicitly address. One of the best ways to uphold academic integrity is to create a culture of academic integrity throughout the school. This is especially imperative at high schools where students develop their moral identity because students who act dishonestly at high school will likely behave accordingly in post-secondary education and ultimately be dishonest in familial and professional settings. Creating a culture of academic integrity is a challenging, long and (...) multifaceted journey. In this respect, this exploratory case study set out to create a culture of academic integrity at a high school in Türkiye and explore what facilitates and impedes the process. We followed Stephens’ (2016) Multilevel Intervention Model and implemented a School-Wide Education program to guide us through the process. We conducted various activities throughout one academic year, from seminars to competitions. At the end of the term, we conducted individual and focus group interviews with the members of the school community and analyzed the interview data to identify facilitators and barriers of the process. The analysis yielded five facilitators (1) creating buy-in, (2) administrative embracement and support, (3) activities that promote student involvement, (4) external expert and school collaboration as praxis, and (5) policy as the blueprint and five barriers (1) deficiencies in responding academic misconduct, (2) prioritization of academic success over academic integrity, (3) teacher resistance against change, (4) exam-based assessment design, and (5) timing of the activities. Each theme was discussed in detail, and recommendations were made for high schools which set out on a journey of creating academic integrity culture. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn dem Beitrag wird die These vertreten, dass die für Deutschland typische „biologische Perspektive“ (Lynn Nyhart) mit ihrem Interesse am lebenden Tier nicht nur die naturkundliche Praxis während der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts in vielfältiger Weise beeinflusste, sondern auch die Illustrationen der populären Zoologie, wie etwa in Brehms Thierleben, prägte: Die Zeichner bevorzugten als Modelle nun lebende Tiere, die sie in den zoologischen Gärten studierten; dabei stellten sie diese häufig in ihrer natürlichen Umgebung dar, die sie aus Mangel an (...) eigener Kenntnis aber imaginieren mussten. Ein weiteres beliebtes Genre in der populären Zoologie waren die Darstellungen von kämpfenden Tieren, die nicht zuletzt durch ihre Dramatik ins Auge fielen. Die ersten Tierfotografen orientierten sich an diesen Merkmalen der zoologischen Illustrationen und gaben ihren Aufnahmen mit Hilfe von Manipulationen, Inszenierungen und Retuschen den Eindruck von natürlicher Umgebung und Dramatik. Dennoch betonten sowohl Zeichner als auch Fotografen die Naturtreue und – darauf beruhend – den wissenschaftlichen Wert ihrer Abbildungen. Sie prägten damit eine „biologische“ Tierfotografie, die es nach der Jahrhundertwende engagierten Amateuren ermöglichte ein populäres Werk der heimischen Tierwelt zu schaffen, das breite Anerkennung fand. (shrink)

To build a culture of integrity in a HE institution, innovative approaches are needed to enhance education of research ethics and integrity. In addition to educating students, understanding is needed on how to facilitate for those who lead others. The focus is on early-career researchers as future REI leaders. The current study sheds light on how learning and REI leadership competencies evolve during scaffolded collaborative research ethics training for this target group. The study combines new instruments as part of holistic (...) DBR. Data was collected from 3 groups of experienced researchers attending 3 training sessions in the form of written group reports and group discussion recordings. Qualitative deductive analysis was utilised for monitoring the learning process, scaffolding patterns, and display of REI leadership principles. Also, quantitative analysis was applied to group discussion data, displaying the nature of collaboration. Results imply that collaborative case-based role play format is effective in training future REI leaders. All groups displayed high levels of understanding. Combining ECRs and researchers with leadership experience supported knowledge building in the groups by bringing in various perspectives. Even though groups required different amounts of scaffolding, the nature was similar: maintaining goal orientation, highlighting critical features and redirecting learners. Learning analytics of collaboration indicated that the person with leadership experience was not necessarily the most active participant nor took the role of a ‘group leader’. Still, it was mostly that person who displayed leadership competencies thus supporting other group members to develop leadership aspects. (shrink)

By the start of the twenty-first century, the notion of ‘the sublime’ had come to seem incoherent. In the last ten years or so considerable light has been shed by empirical psychologists on a related notion of ‘awe’, and a fruitful dialogue between aestheticians and empirical psychologists has ensued. It is the aim of this paper to synthesize these advances and to offer what I call a ‘two-tiered’ theory of the sublime that shows it to be a coherent aesthetic category. (...) On this theory, sublime experiences begin in an ‘awe response’ (the ‘thin sublime’) and might, with the additional element of temporally-extended reflection, turn into a ‘thick sublime’ response. Building on accounts of the sublime as a species of ‘aesthetic awe’ (Clewis, 2019a and 2019b; Arcangeli, et al., 2020) I aim to show that this two-tiered theory helps to explain why sublime experiences seem to have a basic, primordial core, but also seem to be historically and culturally quite variable (as Nicolson, 1963 [1959]; Battersby, 2007; and McMahon, 2017 have stressed). On this model, the cultural and historical variability comes in largely at the point of the temporally-extended reflection characteristic of the thick sublime, due to the cognitive stock that the subject brings to the encounter. Thus, sublime experiences really lend themselves to being interpreted quite variously by the subject (as well as by the theorist) of these experiences, as, for example, affording insight into the Divine, our moral vocation, or our metaphysical unity with the entire universe, among other lofty thoughts. (shrink)

In “Consensus, Clinical Decision Making, and Unsettled Cases,” David M. Adams and William J. Winslade make multiple references to both editions of the American Society of Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation in their discussion of two assumptions that are supposed to be at the heart of the facilitated consensus model’s inability to handle unsettled cases; that is, that:1. Consultants “should maintain a kind of moral impartiality or neutrality throughout the process,” “explicitly condemn[ing] anything resembling a (...) substantive ‘ethics’ recommendation,” and2. “What counts as the proper set of allowable options among which the parties are to deliberate will itself always be clearly discernible.”Herein, I argue that neither of these assumptions is required by ASBH’s ethics facilitation approach. I then conclude by suggesting that, despite their fundamentally mistaken interpretation of the ASBH approach—perhaps even because of it—Adams and Winslade have made two important contributions to the ethics consultation literature. (shrink)

Ralph Johnson has proposed a “two tiered” conception of argument, comprising of the illative core and the dialectical tier. This paper's two-part thesis is that (i) the dialectical tier is best understood as an epistemic requirement for argument, and (ii) once understood epistemically, the dialectical tier requirement can be defended against the leading objections.

Die meisten Tiere unterhalten soziale Beziehungen, aber nicht alle Tiere sind soziale Tiere. Soziale Tiere interagieren jenseits der Reproduktion auf vielfältige Weise mit ihren Artgenossen. Manche soziale Tiere leben in dauerhaften Gemeinschaften, wobei einige dieser Tiere komplexe und dynamische Gemeinschaften bilden. In sogenannten ›Fission-fusion-Gemeinschaften‹ wechseln Größe und Zusammensetzung der Gruppen je nach Tätigkeit. So trennen sich die Tiere zur Nahrungssuche oder sind in Kleingruppen unterwegs, um z. B. für den Schlaf wieder zusammenzukommen. Bei Elefanten, Affen, Delfinen und Raubtieren können Individuen (...) zeitlich stabile soziale Beziehungen unterhalten, obwohl sie in Fission-fusion-Gemeinschaften leben. So leben Bechsteinfledermäuse in solchen Gesellschaften und unterhalten stabile individuelle Beziehungen unabhängig von Alter, Größe, Reproduktionserfolg und Verwandtschaftsgrad; in großen Fledermauskolonien können sich stabile Untergruppen bilden, wobei der zeitlich stabile Kontakt zwischen diesen Untergruppen durch ältere Fledermäuse hergestellt wird. Wie können soziale Verhaltensmuster wie die Bildung von Fission-fusion-Gemeinschaften bzw. zeitlich stabile Relationen zwischen Individuen biologisch erklärt werden? Offenbar hat das Leben in Gruppen ökologische Vorteile, indem es z. B. das Risiko verringert zur Raubtierbeute zu werden. Allerdings hat die Bildung von Gruppen auch soziale Vorteile, indem sie zum Beispiel die Möglichkeit für Reproduktion erhöht. (shrink)

In this paper I explore Ralph Johnson's proposal that in addition to premises and conclusion every argument should have a dialectical tier in which the arguer addresses objections to the argument, and considers alternative positions. After exploring several reasons for thinking that Johnson's proposal is a good one, I then raise a number of objections against it and move ahead to respond to those objections, which I do by distinguishing making out a case for a conclusion from offering an argument (...) for it, and distinguishing supplementary arguments from one's main argument. I contend that it is not realistic to see arguers as having an obligation to respond to all objections and to address all alternative positions; we must somehow discriminate those which need and merit a reply from those which do not. (shrink)

Ralf Stoecker hat argumentiert, dass allein Menschen im strengen Sinne handeln könnten, weil sie allein fähig seien, etwas aus Gründen zu tun und über diese Gründe Rechenschaft abzulegen. In einem weniger strengen Sinn könnten auch Tiere handeln. Ich werde in diesem Beitrag zunächst Stoeckers Begründung seiner zweigeteilten These rekapitulieren (1) und dann zwei Rückfragen dazu stellen: (a) Warum soll es gerade die Praxis des logon didonai sein, die Verhalten zu Handlungen im engen Sinne macht? (b) Warum soll es genau zwei (...) Sinne von ,handeln' geben, einen engen und einen weiten? Handlungsfähigkeit könnte ja auch eine Sache des Grades sein (2). Schon Aristoteles hat einen engen Handlungsbegriff für Menschen reserviert und einen weiteren auf andere Tiere angewandt. Stoecker geht auf Aristoteles nicht ein, doch gibt es interessante Parallelen zwischen beider Ausführungen dazu, welche Fähigkeiten allein Menschen besitzen und warum (3). Im Rest des Beitrags weite ich den Blick und stelle zunächst eigene Überlegungen dazu an, welches die Vorzüge eines gradualistischen Verständnisses von Fähigkeiten sind und welche Rolle die Vagheit fähigkeitszuschreibender Ausdrücke spielt (4). Dann skizziere ich die These, dass die je artspezifischen Fähigkeitsprofile von Menschen und anderen Tieren durch „Realisierungslücken“ voneinander getrennt sind (5). Der Beitrag mündet in Metaüberlegungen zum Streit über die „anthropologische Differenz“: Die zwischen „Assimilationisten“ und „Differentialisten“ umstrittene Frage, ob sich Menschen und andere Tiere in ihren mentalen Fähigkeiten qualitativ oder bloß quantitativ unterscheiden, ist schlecht definiert und unfruchtbar. Sie sollte zugunsten gehaltvollerer Fragen zu den Akten gelegt werden (6). (shrink)

The increasing need for innovative research driven by rapid global changes gives doctoral supervisors of early-stage researchers a significant role in facilitating the ethical conduct of qualitative research. In the context of European Commission funding, the demands of research ethics and integrity place a tremendous responsibility on the supervisors of early-stage researchers involved in cross-national projects. This document study seeks to illuminate the role of the supervisors in facilitating research ethics in these projects. Specifically, we describe and discuss the supervisor (...) role associated with five approaches to doctoral supervision of qualitative research, namely those described as ‘Functional’, ‘Enculturation’, ‘Critical thinking’, ‘Emancipation’ and ‘Developing a quality relationship’. The main challenges for supervisors of cross-national research projects are the cultural and linguistic mobilisation of ethical principles in qualitative research processes and the management of the future use of open data. The results from this study have implications for planning and conducting cross-national studies within research involving human participants. These results can guide supervisors in the codification and mobilisation of ethical qualitative research in practice. (shrink)

A moral code consists of principles that assign moral status to individual actions – principles that evaluate acts as right or wrong, prohibited or obligatory, permissible or supererogatory. Many theorists have held that such principles must serve two distinct functions. On the one hand, they serve a theoretical function, insofar as they specify the characteristics in virtue of which acts possess their moral status. On the other hand, they serve a practical function, insofar as they provide an action-guide: a standard (...) by reference to which a person can choose which acts to perform and which not. Although the theoretical and practical functions of moral principles are closely linked, it is not at all obvious that what enables a principle to fill one of these roles automatically equips it to fill the other. In this paper I shall briefly examine some of the reasons why a moral principle might fail to fill its practical role, i.e., be incapable of guiding decisions. I shall then sketch three common responses to this kind of failure, and examine in some detail the adequacy of one of the most popular of these responses. (shrink)