코로나 바이러스 감염증(COVID-19)의 유행으로 인하여 우리 삶은 기반 자체가 흔들리고 있으며, 질병으로 인한 고통 뿐 아니라 심각한 수준의 경제적 혼란 또한 야기되고 있다. 21세기의 과학 기술 문명의 성과에 안주하던 우리는 역사상 처음으로 인종, 지역, 세대, 계층을 막론한 인류 공통의 문제에 직면하게 되었다. 울리히 벡은 이같은 전염병의 유행, 자연 재해, 기후 변화 등 일상적인 위험들에 무고한 시민들이 노출되어 있는 현대 사회를 위험 사회라고 규정했다. 우리는 위험에 대한 두려움과 불안에 마주했을 때 thymos, 즉 분노라는 감정을 기반으로 행동할 수도 있고, eros, 즉 사랑이라는 (...) 감정을 기반으로 행동할 수도 있다. thymos는 이성을 도와 욕구에 맞서 싸우는 영혼의 부분으로, 부당하고 심각한 피해 상황에서 ‘이렇게는 가만히 있을 수 없다’라는 감정의 격동이다. 그러나 thymos는 그 자체로서 이성적인 판단 능력을 가지고 있지는 않기 때문에 판단에 오류나 실수가 있을 수 있고, 또 비이성적이고 맹목적인 ‘보복’에의 소망으로 이어질 수 있다는 점에서 위험성을 안고 있다. 반면 eros는 thymos와 달리 ‘선과 미’를 향한 ‘끌림’인데, 이는 선과 미가 어떤 것인지를 판단할 수 있는 이성적인 능력을 그 자체로서 갖추고 있다는 뜻이다. eros는 이미 일어난 피해에 집중하여 보복을 욕구하기 보다는, 똑같은 일이 다시는 반복되지 않을 방법을 모색하고, 사건 당사자들이 모두 조금 더 ‘선하고 아름다운’ 상황으로 나아갈 수 있기를 소망한다. 부모는 잘못된 행동을 한 자녀에게 그 잘못을 되갚아 줌으로써 보복하려고 하지 않는다. 그 행동이 왜 잘못되었는지 알려주고, 다시는 같은 잘못을 되풀이 하지 않도록 도와주고 이끌어준다. 인간의 힘으로 막을 수 없는 위험이 곳곳에 도사리는 현대 사회의 민주 시민들 간에는 이와 같은 사랑의 에너지가 필요하다. 이 논문에서는 thymos의 정체와 한계를 밝히면서 불의를 타파하는 궁극적인 해결 방안이 될 수 없음을 역설하고, 공감과 연대의 기반이 되는 eros를 위험 사회의 대안으로 삼아야 하는 이유를 소개할 것이다. 악의 순환 고리를 끊어 내고 지속적인 선을 향해 나아가기 위해서는 우리에게 분노가 아닌 사랑이 필요함을 증명하는 것이 이 논문의 목표이다. (shrink)

Most Sartrean scholarship attributed Sartre’s ontology of hostile intersubjectivity to Hegel’s theory of recognition, and a Sartrean politics of violence to Hegel’s master-slave dyad. This article sets out to examine Sartre and Hegel in three areas of their work: first, a reassessment of Sartre’s ontology which was commonly thought to be founded on Hegel’s thymos; second, a reconsideration of Fukuyama’s conceptualisation of democracy as the end of Hegel’s historical progress and Sartre’s critique of democracy based on a humanist version of (...) Marxism as philosophy of our time; and finally, a re-evaluation of the conceptualisation of freedom through Hegel’s universal will and Sartre’s principle of universal fraternity. (shrink)

This study attempts to explore the possible motivations, both obvious and problematic, behind the ritual suicide (seppuku) committed by the Japanese writer in the name of the Emperor at the Eastern Headquarters of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces in 1970. History does not seem to be a coherent or intelligible process, as man’s struggle for nourishment is most often replaced by thymos, the desire for others to recognize his value or the value system of the ideals or noble purposes he is ready (...) to sacrifice for, ignoring the basic instinct of self-conservation. Yukio Mishima was extremely pessimistic about pragmatic and materialistic contemporary Japan. History brought along increasing consumerism, thus disturbing the harmony of traditional Japanese spirituality. The technological ability to improve human existence seemed to alter inevitably the moral evolution of contemporary Japanese. Against this background of ruling “costs” and “benefits”, the Japanese writer seems to believe that it is only the thymotic man, the “man of anger”, who can fight for the recognition and salvation of the Japanese soul (yamato damashii). Believed for centuries to be the true art of dying, Yukio Mishima’s seppuku turned from a “beautiful” gesture into one of protest and accusation: the Japanese society had begun the transition from a closed society to an open one, governed by anxiety, in which individuals faced personal decisions. (shrink)

Francis Fukuyama nie potrzebuje specjalnej prezentacji, ponieważ ten amerykański filozof polityczny zasłynął w świecie tezą o „końcu historii”. Autor omawia w artykule koncepcję thymos Fukuyamy, która została skrytykowana. Według autora, Fukuyama upraszcza rzeczywistość, kiedy z koncepcji thymos wywodzi przechodzenie państw do demokracji, co jest nieuzasadnione.

Whit the aim of clariflying what exactly is the human phenomenon of akrasía or incontinence in the fullest sense, in Nicomachean Ethics VII.4-10 Aristotle introduces a type of incontinence by analogy, that is, incontinence due to thymós or courage. Despite his intentions, the explanation of the latter only complicates understanding the former, and the reader ends up without a clear understandingof either. The purpose of this article is to shed some light on the subject of akrasía due to (...) class='Hi'>thymós, trying, specifically, to answer three questions: what exactly is this passion? Who are worse, those who get carried away by their appetites or those who get carried away by their anger, and why? Finally, are we responsible for the mistakes we make in a fit of anger? (shrink)

L’ouvrage d’O. Renaut enquête sur le rôle des émotions dans la pensée platonicienne, prenant pour fil conducteur la notion de θυμός. Cet objet en quelque sorte double permet une traversée à la fois diachronique – des premiers dia­logues dits socratiques jusqu’aux Lois – et synchronique de l’œuvre platonicienne, en en articulant les différents pans (psychologie, éthique, pédagogie, politique). L’intérêt de cette étude tient d’abord dans l’ampleur de la prise de vue qu’elle fournit, non seuleme...

Heraclitus is generally recognised as the first of the Greek thinkers to develop a psychology, but the understanding of his psychology is held back by the assumptions that his soul is a life-principle and is ‘comprehensive’ of the various faculties we regard as psychological. The fragment that best displays the revolutionary character of Heraclitus’ soul doctrine, from a properly psychological viewpoint, is B 85. I offer an extended analysis of this fragment in order to bear out the claims, firstly, that (...) psyche or ‘soul’ for Heraclitus is the intelligence alone, divine in origin, and secondly that thumos (primarily as the seat of desire) is a better candidate for his biological life-principle, whose exigencies are at odds with those of soul. I also offer some reflections on why, despite Heraclitus’ multifaceted influence on fifth-century thought, and despite the coherence of his psychology, this ‘revolution’ never quite took hold. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie i analiza kształtowania się pojęcia woli w starożytnej filozofii pogańskiej. W kontekście poglądów Sokratesa, Platona i Arystotelesa autor przedstawia wiele greckich intuicji dotyczących psychologii aktów moralnych i ludzkiego działania. Po pierwsze artykuł przedstawia doktrynę intelektualizmu etycznego, przypisywaną Sokratesowi, według której kognitywne elementy są głównym motywem naszych działań. Z tego powodu trudno znaleźć pojęcie wolnej woli w sokratejskiej antropologii. Po drugie artykuł prezentuje interpretację platońskiej antropologii, według której sferę thymos można nazwać proto-wolą. Ostatecznie autor ukazuje, jak trudno (...) jest znaleźć pojęcie woli w arystotelesowskiej etyce i antropologii, pomimo że Arystoteles bardzo szczegółowo wyjaśniał relacje między przekonaniami, pragnieniami i działaniem. Ani pro- airesis, ani boulesis nie mogą pełnić funkcji woli, szczególnie gdy wola ma być władzą, która pragnie, może wybierać ijest samodeterminującą się władzą. (shrink)

This paper examines the tension between the mainstream belief in international law as a source of objectivity distinct from politics and its new stream critics that question the validity of such a distinction. It is argued that, as a type of language, international law is not distinct from politics as a function of objectivity, but rather by the fact that it serves the international community’s thymos. The phenomena of global administrative law and NATO’s use of force in Kosovo are analyzed (...) as examples of how the thymos drives international law. Building on feminist theories of international law, the article sets forth a vision of international law as the primary communicative device for the international community’s thymos. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to verify a thesis Fukuyama once advanced: the forthcoming end of history is related to the replacing of human need for appreciation by equality and mutual appreciation last men achieve in liberal democracies. I also analyze the conception of human nature which Fukuyama takes for granted and treats as the base for defining the essence of the last man. Another question I consider concerns the role of Platon’s thymos and can be stated as follows: (...) is it justified to draw such far reaching conclusions from the notion as Fukuyama does in The Las Man? To answer the question I confront Fukuyama’s reflections concerning thymos with Hobbes’ and Rousseau’s understanding of the notion, and the idea of the end of history with the idea of generation proposed by Jose Ortega y Gasset. (shrink)

In Heraclitus’ time, thymos and psyche carried highly similar or even identical meanings, because both could refer to life, courage, personality, emotions, and reason. Heraclitus probably worked with all of these meanings. He may have been partly inspired by Homer and post-Homeric literature, where the two terms were likewise placed side by side and often used interchangeably. In Heraclitus, thymos and psyche are not opposites in terms of signification. Oftentimes, they can be “swapped,” and their meaning and “costs” exchanged. The (...) source and cause of this special exchange is desiring or wanting (thelein), which connects all these senses but is also the source of conflict and fighting. Desire—regardless of what it is and what is desired—is simultaneously the acquisition of the desired object or person and a way of paying for it. This struggle for the desired object is difficult not only because of its consequences (the price), but also because it is not possible to permanently stop desiring, which is why this struggle cannot be brought to an end. (shrink)

The just person controls his appetites by virtue of an alliance between his rational and spirited parts: while the first determines the object of the action, the second gives stability and strength to the prescription of reason. This essay aims to show that the spirited part can give strength to reason’s orders, only if it also receives value (i.e. the restoration of the individual’s damaged image). From this, I argue that the spirited part (i) always takes the side of reason (...) in the conflict with appetites (as enemies of the individual’s freedom) and, nevertheless, (ii) it can oppose [to] reason when the appetitive part is not at stake (and the claim of restoration, i.e. revenge, is repressed by reason). (shrink)

While ancient civilizations worshipped strong, active emotions, modern societies have favored more peaceful attitudes, especially within the democratic process. We have largely forgotten the struggle to make use of _thymos_, the part of the soul that, following Plato, contains spirit, pride, and indignation. Rather, Christianity and psychoanalysis have promoted mutual understanding to overcome conflict. Through unique examples, Peter Sloterdijk, the preeminent posthumanist, argues exactly the opposite, showing how the history of Western civilization can be read as a suppression and return (...) of rage. By way of reinterpreting the _Iliad_, Alexandre Dumas's _Count of Monte Cristo_, and recent Islamic political riots in Paris, Sloterdijk proves the fallacy that rage is an emotion capable of control. Global terrorism and economic frustrations have rendered strong emotions visibly resurgent, and the consequences of violent outbursts will determine international relations for decades to come. To better respond to rage and its complexity, Sloterdijk daringly breaks with entrenched dogma and contructs a new theory for confronting conflict. His approach acknowledges and respects the proper place of rage and channels it into productive political struggle. (shrink)

Today, in a Western secular context, the affective phenomenon of religious zeal is often associated, or even identified, with religious intolerance, violence, and fanaticism. Even if the zealots’ devotion remains restricted to their private lives, “we” as Western secularists still suspect them of a lack of reason, rationality, and autonomy. However, closer consideration reveals that religious zeal is an ethically and politically ambiguous phenomenon. In this article, I explore the question of how this ambiguity can be explained. I do so (...) by drawing on Paul Ricœur’s theory of affective fragility and tracing back the ambiguity of religious zeal to a dialectic inherent to human affectivity and existence itself. According to Ricœur, human affectivity is constituted by the two poles of vital and spiritual desires which are mediated by the thymos. As I show, this theory helps us to understand that religious zeal as a spiritual desire is neither plainly good nor plainly bad, but ambiguous. Moreover, it enables us to acknowledge the entanglement of abstraction and concretion that is inherent to the phenomenon of religious zeal. Finally, this theory helps us to understand why religious zeal, as one possible expression of the human quest for the infinite, is both a promise and a threat. In conclusion, human existence is tragic not in that we necessarily fail, but in that no matter which path we take with regard to our spiritual desires—that of affirmation, rejection, or moderation—we are and remain fallible. (shrink)

Hermias of Alexandria wrote down the lectures given on the Phaedrus by his teacher Syrianus, Head of the Neoplatonic School of Athens. In the preserved text the Platonic distinction of madness is presented in a Neoplatonic way. In the first section of the article we discuss Hermias’ treatment of possession. The philosopher examines four topics in his effort to present a Neoplatonic doctrine concerning possession. As he holds that divine possession is evident in all parts of the soul, he first (...) argues that it is primarily applied to the one-in-the-soul. Secondly, he explains that possession is also applied to reason, opinion, imagination, thymos and desire, all the above being distinctive parts of the human soul, but not as important as the one-in-the-soul. The third issue he discusses is whether all causes of possession are identical to the divine. Then, Hermias examines the fact that possession is to be traced not only in the human soul but also in the statues. In the second section of the article Hermias’ analysis of the four kinds of Platonic madness is presented. The philosopher first analyzes the interdependence between all four divine kinds of madness and then describes their function on two levels, inside and outside the soul. The function within the soul is richer and is realized in four fields: the restoration of the soul after its fall, the restoration of the human being as a whole, the Pythagorean mathematical system and the logic processes. The function outside the soul deals with the manifestations of the soul in human society. Under this perspective, Hermias clearly proposes an original classification of the kinds of madness, on the basis of which we encounter poetic madness. After that follow the madness of the seer, the telestic madness, and the madness of love. The whole analysis incorporates Platonic, Aristotelian, Pythagorean and theurgic elements that cover the fields of psychology, logic and metaphysics. (shrink)

Conminado por su deseo apetitivo de mirar unos cadáveres en descomposición, Leoncio no puede resistir y, encolerizado, cede a la tentación (República 439e-440a). El episodio pretende mostrar que la impulsividad y el apetito constituyen dos partes distintas del alma. La pregunta es: si no hay intervención de la racionalidad, ¿según qué parámetro el thymós considera que mirar los cadáveres es algo que no se debe hacer? Si, como creen algunos especialistas, el thymós actúa según un marco axiológico aportado (...) por lo logistikón, entonces Leoncio sería un incontinente. En el presente artículo intentaremos mostrar, apelando a diversos pasajes de los libros VIII y IX de la República, que Leoncio no es un incontinente, sino que la parte impulsiva del alma no se opone al apetito según parámetros vinculados con la racionalidad, sino propios. Forced by his appetitive desire to look at some corpses, Leontius can not resist and, furiously, yields to the temptation and looks at them (Republic 439e-440a). The episode tries to show that the spirited and the appetitive are two different parts of the soul. If there is no intervention of rationality, the question is: according to which parameter the thymós considers that looking at the corpses is something that must not be done? If, like some scholars believe, thymós is guided by values given by the logistikón, then Leontius would be an incontinent agent. In this paper we shall try to show that, according to several passages of books VIII and IX of the Republic, Leontius is not an incontinent agent since the spirited part of his soul challenges the appetitive part not because of rational principles but because the values it defends on itself. (shrink)

헤겔의 윤리학 내지 사회 · 정치철학에서 아주 많이 거론되고 있는 핵심문제들 가운데 하나가 바로 인정(認定) 내지 승인(承認)의 문제다. 그리고 많은 연구자들은 이 문제를 논의할 때 헤겔의 『정신현상학』(Phänomenologie des Geistes, 1807)을 그 중심 텍스트로 삼고 있다. 물론, 사회 속에서 발생하는 인간 상호간의 인정(승인)문제는 실로 중요한 문제가 아닐 수 없다. 사소한 다툼에서부터, 죽음을 초래하기까지 하는 전쟁에 이르기까지의 거의 모든 투쟁의 배경 내지 근저에는 바로 인간 상호간의 인정 내지 무시(無視)가 깔려있기 때문이다. 그러나 적어도 헤겔이 정신현상학에서 말하고 있는 생사를 건 인정투쟁은, 국가가 성립하기 이전의 (...) 자연상태에서 일어나는 현상이지, 결코 국가 속에서 발생하는 사건이 아니라는 점을 간과해서는 안 된다. 헤겔은 후자의 상태(조건)에서 발생하는 투쟁을 결코 ‘인정투쟁’이라고 부르지 않고 ‘결투’라고 불렀다. 이 점을 많은 사람들이 혼동하고 있다. 헤겔이 말하는 맥락을 떠난 의미의 ‘인정투쟁’이 국가 속에서 일어나고 있다고 말할 수 있지만, 그것은 결코 헤겔이 말하는 바가 아니다. 이 점을 입증하기 위해 필자는『정신현상학』이전의 헤겔의 저술들인 『인륜의 체계』(System der Sittlichkeit, 1802/03)와 『예나체계기획』(Jenenser Systementwürfe, 1803/04; 1805/06)에 나타난 인정 및 인정투쟁의 문제를 함께 검토한다. 이 글에서는 후쿠야마의 경우를 예로 들어, 원 저자가 사용한 용어의 본래 의미를 벗어나 자의적(恣意的)으로 용어를 사용하는 오류를 지적하고자 한다. 아울러, 인정투쟁의 결과로 발생하는 주인과 노예와 관련된 그의 이해의 문제점, 플라톤의 혼 3분설에 대한 그의 해석과 관련된 인간본성에 대한 이해의 오류, 특히 ‘패기’[thymos]에 대한 이해의 문제점 등을 지적함으로써 그의 주장이 철학의 고전적인 텍스트들에 대한 깊이 있는 독서 및 정확한 이해를 결여하고 있음을 드러낸다. 이 글의 성격상, ‘역사의 종말’에 대한 그의 이해가 지니고 있는 문제점들에 관해서는 글의 주제와 관련해서만 언급된다. (shrink)

To demonstrate that courage is tempered by reason and has no need of anger, that denounces weakness of mind, Plutarch (coh. ira 458E) cites the custom of the Spartans to arouse thymos before the fight with the sound of flutes and at the same time to sacrifice to the Muses, so that in the soul of the fighters remains the reason to regulate the judgments. If this is the sense of the passage, confirmed by the comparison with the loci similes, (...) it is necessary to emend the text transmitted by the Mss. (άφαιροῠσι τὸν θυμὸν…> έπαίρουσι τὸν θυμὸν …). (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie i analiza kształtowania się pojęcia woli w starożytnej filozofii pogańskiej. W kontekście poglądów Sokratesa, Platona i Arystotelesa autor przedstawia wiele greckich intuicji dotyczących psychologii aktów moralnych i ludzkiego działania. Po pierwsze artykuł przedstawia doktrynę intelektualizmu etycznego, przypisywaną Sokratesowi, według której kognitywne elementy są głównym motywem naszych działań. Z tego powodu trudno znaleźć pojęcie wolnej woli w sokratejskiej antropologii. Po drugie artykuł prezentuje interpretację platońskiej antropologii, według której sferę thymos można nazwać proto-wolą. Ostatecznie autor ukazuje, jak trudno (...) jest znaleźć pojęcie woli w arystotelesowskiej etyce i antropologii, pomimo że Arystoteles bardzo szczegółowo wyjaśniał relacje między przekonaniami, pragnieniami i działaniem. Ani pro- airesis, ani boulesis nie mogą pełnić funkcji woli, szczególnie gdy wola ma być władzą, która pragnie, może wybierać ijest samodeterminującą się władzą. (shrink)

La introducción al ensayo relaciona la escritura y la supervivencia en Unamuno y en Lledó -en el primero como voluntad multidimensional y en el segundo como memoria viva colectiva- y después compendia la vida y la obra de Emilio Lledó El ensayo comenta varios textos de la obra de Lledó Memoria de la ética acerca de la muerte y de la existencia extendida en la época clásica de la cultura y la filosofía griegas. Como conclusión, y a partir del epicureísmo (...) de Lledó, se reafirma una cierta distinción entre las propuestas de una teoría de la vida post-mortem basada en la pervivencia por la memoria y otra que apunta a la vida perdurable por el impulso del ánimo o thymós. (shrink)

¿En qué consiste el sentimiento de lo sublime? ¿Cual es su naturaleza, su estatuto? ¿Qué tipo de relaciones teje con la imaginación y la intuición intelectual del “elemento de lo inteligible”? ¿Cómo están presentes allí afectividad y Gemüt? ¿Cómo entender su relación con los afectos, lo afectivo, el sentir y el sentimiento? Las respuestas a estas cuestiones son empren didas por Richir en este corto texto en el que comenta y analiza detalladamente algunos de los parágrafos más notables de la (...) Crítica del discernimiento de Kant; se detiene magistralmente en la “Observación general sobre la exposición de los juicios estéticos reflexionantes”, con la que Kant cierra la “Analítica de lo sublime”, para concluir con tres observaciones que no sólo constituyen una visión general del texto sino, también, los trazos generales de su propia pro puesta: i) los afectos como sensaciones, temporalizados en presente y situados en relación al espacio y al Leib, son siempre acogidos por el Gemüt, no como una “señal” física, sino como algo ya incorpóreo y capaz de constituir, en los actos intencionales, la hylé fenomenológica (por lo demás inmaterial); ii) las afecciones son, en el Gemüt, aquello en lo que éste experimenta sus movimientos, de suyo ajenos al presente y al espacio, y que se despliegan sin trayectoria en un “elemento” que no es el elemento de lo inteligible, aunque no es ajeno a él. iii) finalmente, el Gemüt, que tiene relación con la afectividad, con el alma e incluso con el espíritu, es algo así como la raíz, “la fuente de todo”, una de cuyas dimensiones es la afectividad, primordial o ar caica, el corazón (thymos) o la intimidad que puede resonar con el elemento de lo inteligible por ser lo radicalmente externo (aunque de una exterioridad no espacial), y esto, por la mediación del esquematismo y de su interrupción. Estas tres posiciones llevarán a Richir muy cerca de la definición Kantiana del Gemüt: “el ánimo es por sí solo; es todo vida, el mismo principio de la vida”. (shrink)

In the article I focus on a few philosophical issues which are characteristic for Fukuyama’s theory, such as: historicalness, idea of common history, freedom, human nature and thymos, being the component of human mentality propelling the course of history, according to Fukuyama’s reading of Plato. We are also able to take a look at the role of natural science in the development of history process and specific mechanism propelling human actions. The mechanism is Hegelian attitude of the struggle for recognition (...) in which an individual goes beyond its biological needs and base motives of actions, at the same time heading for the accomplishment of higher objectives. Reporting Fukuyama’s ideas I also try to verify his hypothesis concerning the end of history which has been approaching since the establishment of liberal democracy; in the further part of the article I try to verify how different his views on human nature are from those of such philosophers as Hobbes, Rousseau, finally Kant and Hegel. (shrink)

While ancient civilizations worshipped strong, active emotions, modern societies have favored more peaceful attitudes, especially within the democratic process. We have largely forgotten the struggle to make use of _thymos_, the part of the soul that, following Plato, contains spirit, pride, and indignation. Rather, Christianity and psychoanalysis have promoted mutual understanding to overcome conflict. Through unique examples, Peter Sloterdijk, the preeminent posthumanist, argues exactly the opposite, showing how the history of Western civilization can be read as a suppression and return (...) of rage. By way of reinterpreting the _Iliad_, Alexandre Dumas's _Count of Monte Cristo_, and recent Islamic political riots in Paris, Sloterdijk proves the fallacy that rage is an emotion capable of control. Global terrorism and economic frustrations have rendered strong emotions visibly resurgent, and the consequences of violent outbursts will determine international relations for decades to come. To better respond to rage and its complexity, Sloterdijk daringly breaks with entrenched dogma and contructs a new theory for confronting conflict. His approach acknowledges and respects the proper place of rage and channels it into productive political struggle. (shrink)

In the present work, I will review how Aristotle understood the connection between reason and emotion - particularly, angry actions - in order to demonstrate that it is due to the presence of intellectual factors that emotions become ethically relevant and not merely an uncontrolled reaction. Then, I will summarize Aristotle's repeated analogies between reason as the master and anger as the slave to explain their connection. My specific contribution to the topic will be to reverse this analogy and, instead (...) of using it as an example of the _lógos-thymós_ connection, make the latter an example of the _despótes-doûlos_ connection as described in Politics I. If my hypothesis is plausible, establishing the actions and virtues of a slave will help shed light on the type of morality inherent in angry actions. (shrink)

Beyond the terms used by the various pre-Socratic thinkers (thymós, kardia, eros, etc.) and beyond also the different settings adopted in their discussion,it is possible to find the reference to a reality which is susceptiblebut to be described in the three essential characteristics of desire:1) The change of a previous situation, which is almost always understood as an exit from one reality to another.2) The push, placed at the origin of this exit, which appears as opposition or attraction about (...) another reality. 3) Finally the achievement of a new situation, equal or very similar to the previous situation. (shrink)

This study provides an integrated analysis of ϑυμός. A psychosomatic concept, found in Greek epics and medicine, θυμός designates courage as a “vital force around the chest”. Later, its meaning has been specified in two fields: 1) ϑυμός, thymós, the irascible soul, parallel to the concupiscible soul and opposite to the rational one, according to Plato’s tripartition; 2) ϑύμος, thymus, a cardiac gland of the vascular system. Today, the idea that θυμός, courage, and ϑύμος, cardiac gland, could have a (...) common semantic root – θύειν “to sacrifice by blowing and burning” – seems almost impossible. Our aim is to reconstitute the concept of ϑυμός, demonstrating how it has been reduced to a polarisation rational/irrational, and marginalised. We will examine the notion of ϑυμός in Greek tradition and describe one of its widespread manifestations, tattooing, both as a painful solicitation of interiority and for how the tattooed pictures reflect the personality of their wearers. (shrink)

Macrobius devotes almost the whole morning of the third day in his Saturnalia to Virgil. Eustathius, in response to a question from Euangelus, examines what Virgil drew from the Greeks and from Homer in particular. In chapter 11 of Book 5, the expositor quotes and comments on some loci similes, judging in favour of the Roman poet. At the start of the chapter, he compares the bee simile in Aeneid 1.430–6 with a passage from Homer, Iliad 2.87–93: Et haec quidem (...) iudicio legentium relinquenda sunt, ut ipsi aestiment quid debeant de utriusque collatione sentire. Si tamen me consulas, non negabo nonnumquam Vergilium in transferendo densius excoluisse, ut in hoc loco:Qualis apes aestate noua per florea ruraexercet sub sole labor, cum gentis adultoseducunt fetos, aut cum liquentia mellastipant et dulces distendunt nectare cellas,aut onera accipiunt uenientum aut agmine factoignauum, fucos, pecus a praesepibus arcent.feruet opus, redolentque thymo fraglantia mella. (shrink)

This essay intends to reveal the contribution of some Aristotelian concepts – such as “just measure” (metron, meson) and “lack of measure” (alloiosis) as well as some other connected pathological affections (pathe) of the human volitive part of the soul (thymos), caused by certain changes of the humoral mixtures, especially the ones of the black bile, a humoral substance that was considered largely responsible for the severe alterations of the normal rational activity of the human soul (logismos). – to the (...) definition of melancholy as a natural/pathological condition. This type of analysis could be useful for wider cultural studies in which certain medical traditions would have a significant contribution and would help us understand better the holistic thought of the ancient and medievalEuropean culture. (shrink)

Depuis Homère, les penseurs de l’antiquité se sont intéressés à la nature, à l’usage et au contrôle de la colère. Cet article porte sur le plus ancien ouvrage sur le sujet qui ait survécu de l’antiquité jusqu’à nous, à savoir le traité Sur la Colère de Philodème, un important philosophe épicurien, actif en Italie du Sud au ier siècle av. J.-C. De façon générale, il s’agit dans cet article de présenter, du point de vue historique, sémantique et méthodologique, le contexte (...) de l’analyse par Philodème de la colère, ainsi que de reconstruire l’essentiel de son argumentation contre différents adversaires. La question comporte un débat sur la bonne façon de traiter la colère ; l’explication que donne Philodème de la nature, des symptômes et des conséquences de cette émotion ; la distinction qu’il opère entre colère naturelle (orge) et non naturelle (thymos), ainsi que son affirmation, que le sage peut à l’occasion resssentir la première, mais jamais la seconde ; enfin, sa réfutation de trois arguments en forme d’epilogismos qui soutiennent que le sage ne sera pas moins sujet à la colère que n’importe qui. (shrink)

This article examines the interpretation of Parmenides’ prologue (28 B 1, 1-30 DK) in Sextus’ account of the Criterion of Truth (M. vii 49-260). It proceeds by three ap- proaches, each telling part of the story regarding Sextus’ sources. The rst identi es two sets of source-material by means of the ideas and language. Here basic features of the interpre- tation of the prologue emerge. The second discusses why 28 B 1, 1-30 and 28 B 7, 2-B 8, 2 DK (...) are treated as one continuous whole, showing the kind of interpretation involved in a deliberate decision: making 28 B 8, 1-2 DK into a natural conclusion, referring to a path and to ambition (thymos) as 28 B 1, 1-2 DK had done. The third compares the prologue’s tech- nique of interpretation with the rst of two interpretations of Xenophanes, the interpretation of Pythagorean verse, and the rst of two interpretations of Empedocles, showing how these contrast sharply with the interpretation of Parmenides 28 B 7, 2-B 8, 2 DK and material linked with the briefer source. The amalgamation had originally helped assimilate Parmenides to Plato. Hence the amalgamator is seen as a Platonist with strong literary interests and skilled in the use of quotation. It is no accident that the discursive source is linked with the tradition of Timaeus-interpretation. (shrink)

In a 1961 interview, Beckett warded off philosophical interpretations of his work: ‘I’m no intellectual. All I am is feeling’. Despite the emotional intensity of Beckett’s post-war writing, Beckett criticism has tended to ignore this claim, preferring the kinds of philosophical readings that Beckett here rejects. In particular, Beckett criticism underestimates the element of rage in his work. This paper argues that Beckett’s post-war breakthrough is enabled by a radical reconsideration of the nature of feeling and of rage in particular. (...) It involves the rejection of the idea of rage as pathological and the embrace of a positive conception of rage as drive or compulsion, a locus of energy and even pleasure.This paper reads the ‘Moran’ section of Molloy as a kind of ‘rage fable’, drawing on the ancient Greek concept of thymos, of anger as a virtue. It draws on Alfred Adler’s theory of the ‘masculine protest’, with which Beckett was familiar from his extensive note-taking on Adler in 1934-5, and Sianne Ngai’s discussion of the distinction between irritation and rage. According to this reading, Moran’s report charts a narrative of thymotic liberation from the irritations of servitude, prefiguring the Unnamable’s abandonment to impersonal affective intensities. It ends by suggesting that the prose of the Trilogy might be better understood, not as a ‘syntax of weakness’ but as a ‘syntax of rage’, a stylistic correlative of the imperious drive of thymos. We might then begin to understand the Trilogy as the epic of a heroic, impersonal, implacable and liberated rage. (shrink)

Introduction.--Illustrations of manuscripts and printed books.--Pettas, W. Notes on English translations of Phaedrus.--Lee, P. On the wings of Thymós.--Blaisdell, G. A nobler seduction.--Appendix: The Parmenides fragments.

What would Christianity be like without the soul? While most people would expect the Christian bible to reveal a highly traditional opposition of matter and spirit, the spirit forces of the Old and New Testaments are often surprisingly physical, dynamic, and practical, a matter of energy as much as ethics. The Secret History of the Soul examines the forgotten or suppressed models of body, soul, and human consciousness found in the literature, philosophy and scripture of the ancient and classical worlds. (...) It shows how the spirit forces of Homer, Plato, Aristotle, and the Old and New Testaments tended to be quantities not entities, and to be closely bound up with the dynamic physical flux of the human body, rather than cleanly abstracted in some absolute immaterial realm. Forces such as menos and thymos, nephesh, pneuma and dynamis not only blurred the line between body and soul, but were potent and transferable, being used, in New Testament culture, to effect magical cures or bestow magical power. Related to this surprising lack of body-soul dualism is a lack of dualistic afterlife in either Homer or Hebrew scripture, where Hades and Sheol are the sole post-mortem destinations. The Secret History of the Soul restores the living strangeness of a spirit world filled with potent energy and practical magic, in cultures which had not yet glimpsed the abstracted soul of later Christianity. (shrink)

The paper focuses on a neglected instance of the Platonic reception of Heraclitus in the Republic, trying to show that it’s likely that Plato’s passage makes an allusion to Heraclitus’ B97 and B85. The main claim is that Plato’s use of the image of dogs looks back to Heraclitus, which invites an exploration of the possibility that at least some elements of Plato’s kallipolis might derive from Heraclitus – particularly from some ethical and political fragments. A brief survey of these (...) suggests a deep philosophical affinity among the two authors in several important areas, and questions the commonplace traditional interpretation of Heraclitus as a defender of aristocratic morality. (shrink)

An attempt to understand a problem fundamental to Plato's thought, and in a way which avoids the pitfalls of modern opinion, the author's expressed intention is to understand Plato as he understood himself. Though not indicated by the table of contents, her expository procedure is to present a sequential interpretation of the dialogues in relation to one another. As a result, the book does not relate in any systematic detail what might be the similarities and differences within the family of (...) Platonic terms related to desire; horme, himeros, boulesthai, eros, epithymia, thymos, and philia. The author's procedure might be readily understandable insofar as the dialogue form requires contextual interpretation. But it is puzzling insofar as her reflections on the hermeneutic problem posed by the dialogue are limited to a brief footnote remark : "Ce n'est pas seulement en vertu de son génie littéraire que la forme s'est imposée à l'oeuvre, au sens de l'oeuvre; sans le recours au moindre artifice, les Dlalogues sont une éducation en train de se faire.". (shrink)

El siglo XXI ha estado marcado por innumerables protestas callejeras en diferentes regiones del mundo desatadas a su vez por disímiles coyunturas políticas. El artículo tiene dos objetivos: primero, proponer las emociones políticas de la rabia, el resentimiento y el deseo de reconocimiento como categorías interpretativas de las expresiones de inconformidad ciudadanas frente a la política contemporánea. Segundo, advertir que la incapacidad de las democracias liberales para domesticar la violencia constituye uno de los mayores fracasos de la modernidad política. Así, (...) a partir de la lectura crítica de los filósofos políticos contemporáneos más relevantes en el ámbito occidental, ambos objetivos mostrarán que la crisis de las democracias liberales y del capitalismo tiene raíces estructurales y que demandan la reinvención del paradigma triunfante en 1989 conocido como el Fin de la Historia. (shrink)

This review tries to show that even if Plato ties the soul in the later dialogues more to the body, he still adheres in the Timaeus to the separation of the soul from the body as far as it is possible for humans, and in the Laws to the soul as a separated entity whose union with the body is in no way better than separation.