Convinced that anthropology constitutes the nucleus of K. Wojtyla's thought, the author attempts to discover what kind of anthropology is at the basis of Wojtyla's philosophical writings and the implications of that anthropology. The analysis of the basic structures of Wojtyla's anthropology (the experience of that which occurs and that of action, the structure of the person-act, the transcendence of the person in truth, gift, etc.) leads the author to hold that Wojtyla's philosophy can be considered a coherent metaphysics of (...) the person since the person who acts is not just the method (the conscience of the action), but also the object of study and, above all, the end, that is, to know and to make known to the person his special dignity. Regarding the contribution of Wojytla's anthropology, the author identifies two central themes: the relationship between person and act, and relationality. Regarding the former, Wojtyla effects a synthesis of metaphysics of being and phenomenology: the person is not relative to his acts, because he is a suppositum; nonetheless, the person is in close relationship to his acts. If it were not for these acts the person could not even know himself as subject and could not perfect himself as a person. Regarding the latter, Wojtyla sustains that the person is not person in the singular but in the plural, since each person is in relation with all the others, and this is shown from the phenomena of participation, solidarity, and, above all, donation. The author concludes by sustaining that the multiplicity and the original relationality of the person is one of the aspects of Wojtyla's anthropology that would be worthy of further study. (shrink)

Is it possible to think of the gift philosophically? How should we think of the gift in a world that seems to be regulated only with economic rules? These are two of the main questions that are treated in this essay. In order to deal with them, the author analyzes Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of the gift and Jean-Luc Marion’s notion of givenness. Derrida and Marion are in agreement in refusing intentionality as an essential element of the logic of gift because (...) for them intentionality is always connected with economy. But they conceive economics in different ways and, as a consequence, their conceptions of gift are different. For Derrida, economics means credit and debit, while for Marion it means causality. This difference is the reason why Derrida thinks of the gift as either impossible or a moment of madness that overcomes credit and debit, while Marion thinks of it as a pure decision that comes from its givenness. As a result, for neither author does the gift have any element of need, motivation, or cause. The author argues that excess and decision cannot be the essence of the gift, but only reciprocity. This reciprocity is not an economic relation of giving and receiving but an asymmetrical reciprocity. (shrink)

This volume explores the potential of employing a relational paradigm for the purposes of interdisciplinary exchange. Bringing together scholars from the social sciences, philosophy and theology, it seeks to bridge the gap between subject areas by focusing on real phenomena.Although these phenomena are studied by different disciplines, the editors demonstrate that it is also possible to study them from a common relational perspective that connects the different languages, theories and perspectives which characterize each discipline, by going beyond their differences to (...) the core of reality itself. As an experimental collection that highlights the potential that exists for cross-disciplinary work, this volume will appeal to scholars across a range of field concerned with critical realist approaches to research, collaborative work across subjects and the manner in which disciplines can offer one another new insights. (shrink)

In Cartesian philosophy the study of emotion has great importance, because its only existence constitutes a real problem. In fact, through the passions, Descartes is located in front of the obscure and confused perceptions that, despite their not intellectual evidence, appear as manifestations of a third idea: the substantial union between res extensa and res cogitans. What is the type of evidence that underpin passions? How can you reach this evidence? These are some of the questions that the author tries (...) to answer. (shrink)

L'analisi particolareggiata della morale cartesiana rileva il ruolo essenziale che la volontà riveste tanto nella morale provvisoria quanto nella cosiddetta morale definitiva o scientifica. Nella morale provvisoria l'influenza della volontà si rispecchia sulle due logiche opposte che vi convivono: quella pragmatica e quella intellettualista. Apparentemente, l'etica provvisoria ottiene di rendere compatibili le due logiche perché l'azione che momentaneamente è sufficiente a se stessa, nel futuro sarà subordinata alle verità teoriche scoperte; in realtà, è soltanto la volontà a far sì che (...) le due logiche siano possibili allo stesso tempo. (shrink)

Se analizziamo la posizione dell’uomo nel Cosmo osserviamo che il modo di abitare la Terra e di essere in relazione con le altre realtà manifesta una trascendenza non solo nei confronti del proprio pianeta, ma anche dell’intero Universo. C’è bisogno, di un’analisi dell’uomo sia nella sua struttura materiale, organica e vivente, sia nelle sue relazioni con le altre realtà. Attraverso l’analisi dell’uomo, questo saggio tenta dunque non soltanto di confrontare le proprietà dei diversi esseri nel mondo, in modo particolare i (...) viventi, ma soprattutto di stabilire qual è l’essenza dell’esistenza umana. (shrink)

Zubirian reflection on feeling is aimed at elucidating the essence of aesthetic feeling through three successive steps: first, to establish what is a feeling; Second, to indicate what is the relationship between feeling and reality; third and last one, to approach in what the aesthetic feeling consists. In our study we will limit ourselves to the first two stages, since it seems to us that, despite his penetrating intuitions, Zubiri has not revealed the essence of feeling for lack of a (...) third question that should be added to the first two: why does the feeling imply a relationship with reality? The answer to this question will be the objective of this brief essay. (shrink)

Beyond the terms used by the various pre-Socratic thinkers (thymós, kardia, eros, etc.) and beyond also the different settings adopted in their discussion,it is possible to find the reference to a reality which is susceptiblebut to be described in the three essential characteristics of desire:1) The change of a previous situation, which is almost always understood as an exit from one reality to another.2) The push, placed at the origin of this exit, which appears as opposition or attraction about another (...) reality. 3) Finally the achievement of a new situation, equal or very similar to the previous situation. (shrink)

This essay pretends just to try out the relationship between these realities, seemingly so distant and in reality so close, because - and this is the central thesis - the origin and destiny of human person is in his/her relationship with others. To support this thesis the author uses some data that sciences and humanities offer to anthropological reflection. Psychology, neuroscience and sociology are some of the disciplines from which to take inspiration to deepen this paradoxical relationship present in human (...) condition between the possibilities and limitations of the person, on the one hand, and the character of transcendental opening of human freedom, on the other. (shrink)

The subject we are discussing in this article is very complex, because it involves important questions about the method and the subject of Anthropology: what is the status of Anthropology as a philosophical discipline, that is, what is its place within philosophical knowledge, especially metaphysics, theory of knowledge and ethics? What is the most appropriate method for access to the study of the human person?

This essay examines the anthropological character of human sexuality. For this purpose there is, first, a review of the two most current ways of understanding sexuality: naturalistic and constructivist. Afterwards, the author shows how both ways reduce the anthropological significance of human sexuality, that should not be understood neither as something completely given nor as the result of a social construction or of an arbitrary choice, but as a structure composed of a plurality of elements that are to be integrated, (...) that is, the sexual condition. In addition to the body, the psyche and the spirit, the sexual condition takes account of generation, the experience of childhood with its periods of identification and differentiation respect to parental figures, interpersonal relationships, especially with persons belonging to the 'other sexual condition', and the call to self-giving in marriage and in celibacy. Therefore, the sexual condition is presented here as a key that allows us to understand the different phenomena related to human sexuality. In order to demonstrate this thesis, the author examines in detail the sexual desire, that contains implicitly the different elements that make up the sexual condition. (shrink)

It seems that the subject around which Wojtyla's philosophical always turns is the person, for whom one could speak of his philosophy as a coherent personalism. This consistency does not depend on the continuity of the same subject, but on the convergence between method, object of study and aim or end of the research. In fact, the person who acts is not only the method (the consciousness of the action), but also the object of study (the agent subject), and above (...) all the goal (to know and make known to the person his special dignity). (shrink)

Although Aristotle attributes to metaphor - as an instrument that makes poetic imitation possible to the highest degree - an important function, he does not arrive at the conclusion that the essence of poetics is the metaphor. This is due, on the one hand, to the almost total identification of the poem with the tragedy, showing little interest in what we consider lyric poetry; on the other hand, for the little attention given to religious poetry. If the Stagirite had analyzed (...) these genres, he would have discovered that both have in common the attempt to express the ineffable. Metaphor is the privileged tool to talk about something that we can not conceptualize, because it is partially unknown to us - subjectivity - or because this reality (the divine) transcends all kinds of sensible experience. Hence, the metaphor becomes not only an analogical knowledge of sensible reality, but also communication of ineffable realities. (shrink)

The present review is a critical reflection on Kenny’s book ’What I believe’. The author tries to understand why Kenny is neither a theist nor an atheist, but an agnostic. He thinks that Kenny is not a theist because arguments for the existence of God always have for him logical weaknesses. According to the author, in this point appears Kenny’s "central belief", namely that human logic makes reality to be true. Nevertheless, the author shows that Kenny is closer to the (...) theist position, and that his conceptions of both the unity of the human being and of virtue are very similar to Christian moral teaching. The author also adds the comments on this review that Kenny has sent to him. (shrink)

To access to the emotion we have a two-way: the internal experience that allows us to analyze and evaluate the feeling, and the external one that allows us to observe the outside manifestations. Both experiencies, despite their usefulness, cannot be used separated; they have to be together. However, the connection between these two experiences must not be explained in terms of efficient cause, but in terms of intentionality and affection: an affection that is intentional and intention that is affective.

The article traces a history of what the author calls the cognitive theory of emotions. According to him, the overwhelming majority of cognitivists (from Aristotle to Lyons, passing by Arnold) argue that the object of emotion corresponds to the evaluation of a reality. Despite the careful cognitive analysis of the elements that constitute passion and emotion, they lack an adequate answer to the two central questions of every theory on emotion: what is the origin and function of evaluation? Why do (...) we judge the object in a positive or negative way? (shrink)