Dietrich von Hildebrand denominated the generation of new human life as the “superabundant end” of the spousal act not to deny but to refine the scholastic view that the child is the “end of the act,” simply. The act at the source of human generation is not straightforwardly generative; rather, its generativity is metaphysically grounded in it as a concrete act of union between the spouses. There are thus in some sense two finalities structuring the act, with a specific order (...) between them: union and the fruitfulness following superabundantly from it. In this essay I bring to evidence the framework underlying von Hildebrand’s position by examining love as the forma of the spousal act and the significance of sexuality as an embodied act. I will conclude with some thoughts on how the concept of superabundance accommodates certain truths about the spousal act more readily than does the simple notion of finality. (shrink)

A new era is at hand: the era of sustainable superabundance. In this era, the positive potential of humanity can develop in truly profound ways. It is time for transhumanists around the world to step up to the responsibility as catalysts of the forthcoming transformation.

While some argue that this German Catholic philosopher and theologian neglected the role of procreation in marriage, this book shows that von Hildebrand's writings on reverence and superabundant finality contribute to a contemporary understanding of the significance of procreation within marriage. Schemenauer analyzes von Hildebrand's integration of conjugal love and procreation, showing him to be an insightful and parallel voice to the that of John Paul II.

As necessary austerity measures make major inroads into western health services, this paper investigates the philology of austerity and finds that there are two subtly similar yet importantly different derivations from the Latin and the Greek. The Latin austerus is an abstract term meaning dry, harsh, sour; whereas the Greek austeros has a more embodied and literal meaning of making the tongue dry. What seems an initially subtle difference between the metaphorical and the metonymic plays out as involving seriously different (...) outcomes between harsh economic measures and the literal effects on the people suffering under measures that actually make the tongue dry. The paper argues that between the trope and the literal that which Wittgenstein described as ‘a language game’ ensues wherein the metaphorical through a sleight of grammar is passed off as being real while, the literal effects on real people is downplayed as metaphorical ‘collateral damage’. The paper further argues that within this grammar that forces itself upon us, the game of capital is played out through what the author terms an austerity bargain that is levelled by the financial elites: healthy capitalism equals a healthy society. The paper then examines the six elements of the social determinants of health and what actually contributes to a healthy society. Rather than being under an individual threat of exclusion from what Marx termed a superabundance, the paper considers the irreducible differences between the game of capital's individualism, and, the social determinants of health's social inclusion, legitimization and that which Habermas termed public authentication. The paper concludes that not only do necessary austerity measures need to be critiqued but that they radically undermine what determines a healthy society. It follows also that the social determinants of health, radically undermine the bargain inherent for the privileged few within the game of capital. (shrink)

I argue that we have good reason to reject Bernard Suits’ assertion that game-playing is the ideal of human existence, in the absence of a suitably robust account of utopian games. The chief motivating force behind this rejection rests in the fact that Suits begs the question that there exists some possible set of games-by-design in his utopia, such that the playing of its members would sustain an existentially meaningful existence for his utopians, in the event of a hypo-instrumental culture (...) of material superabundance obtaining. But the set of utopian games is unknown and unknowable. Thus any implications of Suits’ vision for the utilization of our leisure time in the present are vitiated by the collapse of his normative ideal: his ‘metaphysics of leisure’ misses its mark. (shrink)

This paper provides a detailed examination of Kit Fine’s sizeable contribution to the development of a neo‐Aristotelian alternative to standard mereology; I focus especially on the theory of ‘rigid’ and ‘variable embodiments’, as defended in Fine 1999. Section 2 briefly describes the system I call ‘standard mereology’. Section 3 lays out some of the main principles and consequences of Aristotle’s own mereology, in order to be able to compare Fine’s system with its historical precursor. Section 4 gives an exposition of (...) Fine’s theory of embodiments and goes on to isolate a number of potential concerns to which this account gives rise. In particular, I argue that Fine’s theory threatens to proliferate primitive sui generis relations of parthood and composition, whose characteristics must be stipulatively imposed on them, relative to particular domains; given its ‘superabundance’ of objects, Fine’s system far outstrips the already inflated ontological commitments of standard mereology; and there is a legitimate question as to why we should consider Fine’s primitive and sui generis relations of parthood and composition to be genuinely mereological at all, given their formal profile. These three objections lead me to conclude that we ought to explore other avenues that preserve the highly desirable, hylomorphic, features of Fine’s mereology, while avoiding its methodological and ontological excesses. (shrink)

'any service I may have rendered my countrymen in my active life I may also extend to them... now that I am at leisure'Marcus Tullius Cicero, Rome's greatest orator, had a career of intense activity in politics, the law courts and the administration, mostly in Rome. His fortunes, however, followed those of Rome, and he found himself driven into exile in 58 BC, only to return a year later to a city paralyzed by the domination of Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar. (...) Cicero, though a senior statesman, struggled to maintain his independence and it was during these years that, frustrated in public life, he first started to put his excess energy, stylistic brilliance, and superabundant vocabulary into writing these works of philosophy. The three dialogues collected here are the most accessible of Cicero's works, written to his friends Atticus and Brutus, with the intent of popularizing philosophy in Ancient Rome. They deal with the everyday problems of life; ethics in business, the experience of grief, and the difficulties of old age. (shrink)

After Husserl and Heidegger, phenomenology has attempted to push the reduction beyond the reference of objects to the performances effected by consciousness, or of beings to Being. First, a new level of the reduction comes forth in M. Henry's radical reduction of appearing to the appearing of appearing, and leads to the disclosure of a dimension in which no horizons are to be fulfilled because the superabundance of life holds sway. Secondly, according to H. Rombach, the phenomena decribed in (...) the first two levels are nothing but epiphenomena, and must be explained in terms of structures that emerge in a creative development. Reality brings forth something from itself, and we must take advantage of this contribution in order to obtain more than what is anticipated in our projects. Thirdly, J.-L. Marion advances a theory on saturated phenomena in order to account for phenomena that surpass the bounds outlined for them in the mere significational intentions because they show a surplus of intuition. The three trends lead respectively to an originary phenomenality, an outbreak of phenomena, and saturated phenomena. The article contends that they tend to come together because they link the third level of phenomenology to a reflection that turns on the duality between what appears and its appearing, and, in doing so, disclose a surplus with regard to three different aspects of the duality, i.e., appearing as such, the overall condition of what appears, or the appearing of some preeminent phenomena. Finally, some anticipations of these trends in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology are shown.Luego de Husserl y Heidegger, la fenomenología ha intentado llevar la reducción más allá de la referencia de los objetos a las operaciones efectuadas por la conciencia o de los entes al ser. En primer lugar, un nuevo nivel de reducción se manifiesta en la reducción radical propuesta por M. Henry para retroceder del aparecer al aparecer del aparecer, y conduce al descubrimiento de una dimensión en que no hay horizontes que puedan ser plenificados porque impera la sobreabundancia del la vida. En segundo lugar, según H. Rombach, los fenómenos descritos en los dos primeros niveles no son otra cosa que epifenómenos y tienen que ser explicados en términos de estructuras que emergen en un desarrollo creador. La realidad produce algo a partir de sí misma, y esta contribución debe ser aprovechada a fin de alcanzar más de lo anticipado en nuestros proyectos. En tercer lugar, J.-L. Marion presenta una teoría sobre los fenómenos saturados a fin de dar cuenta de aquellos casos que exceden los límites que les han sido delineados en las intenciones significativas vacías porque muestran una demasía de intuición. Las tres tendencias conducen respectivamente a una fenomenalidad originaria, a un estallido del fenómeno y a una saturación del fenómeno. El artículo sostiene que tienden a converger porque vinculan el tercer nivel de la fenomenología con una reflexión en torno de la dualidad entre lo que aparece y su aparecer, y que, al hacerlo, ponen de manifiesto una excedencia respecto de tres aspectos distintos de la dualidad, esto es, el aparecer en cuanto tal, la condición general de lo que aparece o la aparición de algunos fenómenos preeminentes. Finalmente, se indican algunas anticipaciones de estas tendencias en la fenomenología trascendental de Husserl. (shrink)

David Hume famously states, in his A Treatise of Human Nature, “that ’tis only from the selfishness and confin’d generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origin”.1 This is Hume’s summary of the conditions under which the very idea of rules of justice makes practical sense, and he effectively repeats it in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.2 To put it briefly at the outset, Hume’s point is simply (...) this: if there was either a superabundance or drastic scarcity of resources, or if everyone were either completely and unfailingly virtuous or completely and unfailingly wicked, we would not need rules. (shrink)

The relationship between love/care and justice was one of the key tensions from which care ethics originated; to this very day it is subject of debate between various streams of thought within care ethics. With some exceptions most approaches have in common the belief that care and justice are mutually exclusive concepts, or at least as so different that their application is situated on different levels. Hence, both are complementary, but distinct, so that there is no real interaction. This paper (...) aims to investigate whether, and if so, how, a deeper understanding of Ricoeur’s thoughts on this matter enriches the relationship between care and justice with respect to care ethics. This connection suggests itself from Ricoeur’s interpretation of the relationship as a dialectical one in which the logic of superabundance and the logic of equivalence meet. Care enables people to see the face and individuality of the one, ‘le chacun,’ within the anonymous structures of justice that tend to reduce all human beings to the anonymous each, ‘le on’; justice in its turn is the precondition for love to become incarnated and made real. What may this view—of care and justice standing in close connection, in which they correct and strengthen each other—add to the understanding of concrete practices of care? (shrink)

It is widely held among philosophers that the conservation of energy is true and important, and widely held among philosophers of science that conservation laws and symmetries are tied together by Noether's first theorem. However, beneath the surface of such consensus lie two slights to Noether's first theorem. First, there is a 325+-year controversy about mind-body interaction in relation to the conservation of energy and momentum, with occasional reversals of opinion. The currently popular Leibnizian view, dominant since the late 19th (...) century, claims to find an objection to broadly Cartesian views in their implication of energy non-conservation. Here energy conservation is viewed as an oracle, an unchallengeable black box. But Noether's first theorem and its converse show that conservation and symmetry of the laws stand or fall together. Absent some basis for expecting conservation in brains that has a claim on the Cartesian, the objection is circular. An empirically based argument is possible, but is a different argument with little force except insofar as it is rooted in neuroscience. Second, General Relativity has a 100+-year-long controversy about whether gravitational energy exists and is objectively localized. The usual view is that gravitational energy exists but is not objectively localized, though some deny its existence. Without positive answers to both questions, generally applicable conservation laws do not exist: energy is not conserved. This conclusion is startling in itself and a problem for conserved quantity theories of causation. Yet Noether's first theorem applies to General Relativity, which has uncountably many symmetries of its laws and so has conservation laws, indeed uncountably many of them. Many authors downplay these laws due to their quirky properties; some authors even attempt to explain the laws' supposed nonexistence in terms of an absence of symmetries of the geometry, which is a distraction. Thus Noether's first theorem is widely ignored, left uninterpreted, or distorted in relation to General Relativity. Taking the theorem seriously seems possible, however, restoring the conservation of energy, or rather, energies. How do these controversies relate? One sometimes finds claims that General Relativity's supposed lack of conservation laws answers Leibniz on behalf of Descartes. Taking seriously the superabundance of formal conservation laws in General Relativity, however, suggests that General Relativity resists mind-to-body causation. This conclusion can be proven apart from interpretive controversies. The resistance is, however, finite and tends to be swamped by larger world-view considerations. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the act of forgiveness understood as an act which involves the recognition of injustice. Its goal is to answer to Arendt, who equates the realm of forgiveness with the possibility of punishment, to Derrida, who limits forgiveness to the unforgivable actions in order to highlight its unconditionality, and to Jankélévitch, who insists that the culprit’s repentance is an indispensable condition to forgiveness. By contrasting forgiveness, retaliation, and resignation, I emphasize that forgiveness implies attributing blame for injustice, (...) but I distinguish this from the sphere of punishment. Secondly, by showing how self-esteem is necessary for the victim and the offender, I underline the significance of the culprit’s avowal. These two elements lead to the distinction between inner forgiveness, which entails a superabundant act and an element of unconditionality, and integral forgiveness, which requires the culprit’s repentance in order to be exchanged by two people. (shrink)

The Digital Revolution is transforming the way in which we interact with one another and relate to experience. The superabundance and superfluity of the virtual world, the fleeting moment and instantaneous pleasure it provides, begin to prevail as a cultural value and determine an attitude of detachment and indifference that extends to all aspects of our life. For Søren Kierkegaard this is a “demoniacal temptation” that leads to a life devoid of spiritual depth. In the midst of the undeniable (...) bounties of technology, reflection on this paradoxical nature of the technological in our lives becomes an urgent task. (shrink)

The theological revivification of the concept of gift and gift exchange in the last two decades has provoked questions on how notions of divine superabundance can be translated into economics. In this article, I relate the thinking of Paul Ricoeur, John Milbank, Philip Goodchild and Albino Barrera to a specific economic reform that entails seeing land enclosure as inimical to the stability and fairness of an economy. I refer to the political economy of Henry George which takes land value (...) taxation to be its centrally defining principle for a just economy. (shrink)

In three respects, ethics can be marked by the category of the ‘priceless’. Its key reference point, ‘human dignity’, was described by Kant as the exact opposite to what can be priced in equivalents. As an enterprise, ethics is ‘priceless’ as a commitment of the human spirit which goes beyond and against the attitude of success calculation. Yet, an understanding of ethics as unconditional recognition and the anticipatory, asymmetric, innovative praxis (Helmut Peukert) that expresses it have a cost. Where does (...) the motivation to forego, for example, ethically problematic therapies, originate? How can respect for what is priceless be sustained in the face of the relentless spread of market categories diagnosed, among others, by Jürgen Habermas and Paul Ricoeur, against which religions may raise a delaying veto? Only a Christology that can adequately conceptualise the experience of the graciousness and superabundance of God’s gift is able to support the increasingly counter-cultural conviction of something beyond our disposition. (shrink)

An expression apophatic philosophy can be understood as an appropriate synonym for a more traditional expression apophatic theology. Traditional philosophical views on the mystery of God created besides its mere rational reflection also thought which is over-rational but definitely not antirational. It can be found in texts in the field of mysticism, both religious and philosophical. Classical Greek culture joined with Christian faith. Therefore, we cannot talk about it as an individual entity being separated by these two worlds. Athens can (...) be recognized in Jerusalem – to use expression of Leo Shestov. A symbol joins the mind. Can anybody still follow its directness? Slovenian philosophical field has developed specific understanding for Christian mystical tradition in its high theoretical expression. Most credit can be given to the thought of Gorazd Kocijančič (born 1964), a philosopher, poet, translator and publisher since it confirms axiomatics of the reality of a spiritual world, which does not correspond to any other reality. Radical denial or negation (apo-fasko) as a modus vivendi of philosophy represents at the same time a relationship of a radical openness between mysteries of God and human being. This contribution will mostly focus on Kocijančič’s synthesis from his philosophical trilogy: Razbitje: Sedem radikalnih esejev [Being broken apart: seven radical essays] (2009), Erotika, politika itn. Trije poskusi o duši [Erotics, politics etc.: three essays on the soul] (2011), O nekaterih drugih: Štirje eseji o preobilju [On some others: four essays on superabundance] (2016) and mainly on his relationship towards phenomenological thinking. As he stresses in his preface to his translation of Levinas’ Le temps et l’autre, apophatics goes beyond the phenomenology. (shrink)

The article focuses on radiation dosimetry, which made use of the photographic film known as Type 2 Monitoring Film (Kodak) to detect and measure harmful ionizing radiation. It explores the implications of the demise of this technology in relation to Henri Van Lier's critique of photographic indexicality in his paper "Towards a Philosophy Instigated by Photography". It notes that the demise of indexical theories of photographic film can be aligned to the demise of the personal monitoring film. It states that (...) dosimetry reveals the limitation of energetic effects in a superabundant field. (shrink)

In the first part of the paper, I describe the role labour, under conditions no longer existent, played for the perfection of individuals in Locke′s political philosophy. Or to use a more up-to-date term, I describe labour′s emancipatory role. In the second part, I examine the conditions for realizing Locke′s aim of a society of autonomous individuals with a minimum of state power and market coercion, starting from a society whose members are becoming increasingly economically superabundant.

In a world where media exist in superabundance, media theorist Siegfried Zielinski argues for an increased sensitivity to 'deep-time' orientations towards understanding the past not "as a collection of retrievable facts, but as a collection of possibilities" and renewed investment in the value of criticisms that exist on the periphery, not in the center, of established discourses, fashions, and orders.

Thus Plotinus (what is his status in the history of metaphysics and in the "Platonic" era, if one follows Heidegger's reading?), who speaks of presence, that is, also of morphē, as the trace of nonpresence, as the amorphous (to gar ikhnos tou amorphous morphē). A trace which is neither absence nor presence, nor, in whatever modality, a secondary modality.In his reading of Heidegger in his 2003 seminar, published as The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida is particularly troubled by one particular (...) aspect of Heidegger: Heidegger's "superabundant use" of the language of Walten.1 "As you see," Derrida writes of Heidegger's use of Walten, "late in my life of reading Heidegger, I have just discovered a word that seems to .. (shrink)

In the Early Modern era of encyclopedias, the Bible functioned as a tool for managing and organizing the superabundance of information. From Johann Alsted to Johann Scheuchzer, this paper traces the use of the Biblical encyclopedia and the ways that the Bible was deployed to control the data that flooded the world of Early Modern scholarship. In a variety of contexts, the Bible served as a structure for generating meaningful statements from informational noise. In turn, the use of the (...) Bible as a principle of organization would have profound implications for the status of the Bible in Early Modern scholarly culture. (shrink)

"It is difficult not to notice a curious unrest in the philosophic atmosphere of the time, a loosening of old landmarks, a softening of oppositions, a mutual borrowing from one another on the part of systems anciently closed, and an interest in new suggestions, however vague, as if the one thing sure were the inadequacy of extant school-solutions. The dissatisfactions with these seems due for the most part to a feeling that they are too abstract and academic. Life is confused (...) and superabundant, and what the younger generation appears to crave is more of the temperament of life in its philosophy, even though it were at some cost of logical rigor and formal purity." - William James (1904). -/- Abstract: The study of model-based reasoning (MBR) is one of the most interesting recent developments at the intersection of psychology and the philosophy of science. Although a broad and eclectic area of inquiry, one central axis by which MBR connects these disciplines is anchored at one end in theories of internal reasoning (in cognitive science), and at the other, in C.S. Peirce’s semiotics (in philosophy). In this paper, we attempt to show that Peirce’s semiotics actually has more natural affinity on the psychological side with ecological psychology, as originated by James J. Gibson and especially Egon Brunswik, than it does with non-interactionist approaches to cognitive science. In particular, we highlight the strong ties we believe to exist between the triarchic structure of semiotics as conceived by Peirce, and the similar triarchic stucture of Brunswik’s lens model of organismic achievement in irreducibly uncertain ecologies. The lens model, considered as a theory of creative abduction, provides a concrete instantiation of at least one, albeit limited, interpretation of Peirce’s semiotics, one that we believe could be quite fruitful in future theoretical and empirical investigations of MBR in both science an philosophy. (shrink)

I would like to show here that Varela, besides being a scientist and a Buddhist practitioner, also has the stature of a philosopher. In order to do so, I chose to illuminate his thought in the light of a concept that he did not use much, at least at the beginning, but which constitutes the cornerstone of his philosophy. It is the concept of surprise. I will show first how surprise is at the core of what I call his 'Valence' (...) article; time, affect, and intersubjectivity being the main coordinates of surprise. Then I will prove how the structural concepts of autopoiesis, enaction, and co-generativity are all supported by surprise as a dynamic model. In parallel, I will indicate how some seemingly side concepts (I call 'operative'), such as creation, novelty, unpredictibility, openness, and otherness, are actually key candidates for demonstrating the relevance of Varela as a philosopher of surprise....the nature of the self is precisely its non-findability. There is nothing to grasp that would make persons and phenomena what they are (Sanscrit: anatman; Tibetan: bdag med gnyis)... The usual translation of anatman is 'non-self', or 'emptiness of self'. However, this is again too close to the original Buddhist language... For the practitioner, anatman is manifest, experienced as superabundant: it is a nonknowledge that holds a host of surprises. (Varela, 2000/2017, p. 134). (shrink)

Tacitus' portrayal of the emperor Tiberius has called forth a superabundance of comment. This note, therefore, will be brief and directed to a single question, provoked by some of this recent work; namely, how far are we entitled to draw conclusions as to Tacitus' powers of psychological analysis or as to his philosophical outlook on the basis of this portrayal? A generation ago Marsh concluded that Tacitus' psychology was superficial: ‘That a man could successfully conceal his real character till (...) he was nearing seventy and then throw off the disguise did not seem to Tacitus in any way improbable.’ Arruntius, he concluded, must be regarded ‘a better psychologist than Tacitus’ in view of his different judgement of Tiberius as recorded by the latter. (shrink)

We behold the face of nature bright with gladness, we often see superabundance of food; we do not see, or we forget, that the birds which are idly singing round us... are ... constantly destroying life; or we forget how largely these songsters, or their eggs, or their nestlings are destroyed by birds and beasts of prey...

The philosophical origins of the concept of supererogation can be found in medieval discussions of actions that deserve extraordinary merit. These discussions focus primarily on the evangelical counsels of celibacy, poverty, and obedience, which Christian tradition has recognized as non-obligatory and especially efficacious ways of reaching perfection and salvation, ever since its early centuries. This chapter will provide a history of supererogation and the related counsels, primarily within the context of the Roman Catholic Church. It starts with the New Testament, (...) where the counsels first appear, and the commendation of the counsels by the early Church Fathers. It then moves to St. Thomas Aquinas and discusses the main features of his understanding of supererogation, keeping an eye on how Aquinas’ account relates to important theological challenges of his times. The chapter concludes by examining the Protestant rejection of the idea that some actions can possess superabundant merit, the Catholic response to this rejection, and the moral philosophical developments that came as a result. (shrink)

This article presents Paul Ricoeur's ideas about translation in view of giving some guidelines for the interpretation of cultures. Ricoeur's `hermeneutics of the self', which stresses the creativity of capable human being, has its source in a conviction of the superabundance of sense over the abundance of nonsense. It is the problem of the transmission of meaning from one language to another, from one culture to another that gives impetus to his preoccupation with translation. Ricoeur's radical astonishment before the (...) plurality of languages and cultures and his deep conviction about `communication' among human beings made him realize the urgent `task of translation' that is accompanied by a `task of morning'. If translation is the paradigm of all exchanges, its practice can provide us some guidelines in the dialogue of cultures. First, one must courageously open oneself to the `test' of the Other, to welcome difference and respect it as unsurpassable. Second, one must wager on the possibility of an `equivalence without identity', to take a non-hierarchical view of cultures. Third, one must undertake the `task of mourning', to learn to narrate otherwise, to interpret otherwise. (shrink)

Absent within Jean-Luc Marion’s theory of selfhood is an account of psychosis that displaces standard phenomenological and psychoanalytic models. Working primarily with Book V of Being Given, my paper sketches the formal possibilities exhibited in a self who cannot manage the superabundance of the given and, swept away by an uncontrollable flood of givenness, thereby falls into a hysteria of self-experience and loses its ipseity. Then, contrasting psychosis with positive figures of the self, I explore the dynamic relationship between (...) givenness and the gifted highlighted by the phenomenological diremption and effacement of selfhood displayed in both. (shrink)

Absent within Jean-Luc Marion’s theory of selfhood is an account of psychosis that displaces standard phenomenological and psychoanalytic models. Working primarily with Book V of Being Given, my paper sketches the formal possibilities exhibited in a self who cannot manage the superabundance of the given and, swept away by an uncontrollable flood of givenness, thereby falls into a hysteria of self-experience and loses its ipseity. Then, contrasting psychosis with positive figures of the self, I explore the dynamic relationship between (...) givenness and the gifted highlighted by the phenomenological diremption and effacement of selfhood displayed in both. (shrink)

In this article we intend to present a hermeneutical proposal for the study of the Latin work of Meister Eckhart. Thus, we consider that three “moments” can be identified within God “superabundant”, “in all his expression” –which represents reality as such: God in “his first aspect”, as cause; God in “his second aspect”, as effect; and God in “his third aspect”, as creature. The exposition of these “moments” tends to express the movement of identity and difference that it is constitutive (...) of the Divinity, hence allowing it being everything, and nothing of everything. This line of interpretation points out clearly the Neoplatonic inheritance of Eckhart. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink: Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology, 1928–1938Nicolas de WarrenRonald Bruzina. Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink: Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology, 1928–1938. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. Pp. xxvii + 627. Cloth, $45.00.Edmund Husserl defined a new field and method of philosophical research that required the employment of students in the pursuit of a rigorous and elusive science called transcendental phenomenology. Husserl's most famous (...) student, Heidegger, quickly proved a disappointment to the phenomenological cause, and it is in the shadow of Heidegger's waywardness that Eugen Fink, known primarily as the author of spirited defenses of Husserl's thinking, developed a close intellectual relationship with Husserl as his assistant from 1928 until 1938. Fink's collaboration with Husserl and his metaphysical recasting of phenomenology are the principal themes of Bruzina's scrupulously researched study, largely based on Fink's unpublished writings.A first chapter presents a narrative of Fink's significant influence on Husserl's thinking and writing. In chapter two, "Orientation I: Phenomenology Beyond the Preliminary," Bruzina details how Fink further developed Husserl's phenomenology in a systematic and self-critical direction. Whereas Husserl cautiously argued that the noetic-noematic schema "runs through all levels of constitution," including the seemingly intractable level of absolute time-consciousness, Fink—under the influence of Heidegger—rejects the universality of the "apriori-correlation" and its attending "philosophy of reflection." Working out the "being of transcendental subjectivity" and its distinctive temporality is, for Fink, the "remaining task of phenomenology." Bruzina pursues the confrontation between Husserl and Heidegger in Fink's thinking in chapter three, "Orientation II: Whose Phenomenology?" According to Fink, Husserl remains "blind to transcendence," yet Heidegger remains blind to "constitution" (132). What emerges from this chapter, however, is the significance of Hegel as Fink recasts the difference between Husserl and Heidegger into a difference between a philosophy of reflection and a philosophy of Being. Against this backdrop, Bruzina signals Fink's proposal to re-think the concept of origin in a speculative register of the "meontic," that is, as "non-being."Before launching directly into Fink's "meontic" recasting of metaphysics, Bruzina presents three thematically defined chapters. In chapter four, "Fundamental Thematics I: The World," Bruzina discusses Fink's sublimation of Husserl's "natural attitude" into the concept of "world-captivation" and his charge that Husserl presupposes the horizon of the world as a whole. Chapter five, "Fundamental Thematics II: Time," examines Fink's writings on time-consciousness. A first set of writings speaks to the task of rendering Husserl's "Bernau Manuscripts" into a publishable form; a second set reflects Fink's intention to complete his own larger work on "Time and Temporalization." Both projects were abandoned, the later manuscript destroyed by Fink himself. Fink emphasizes the "special character of retention-protention intentionality as depresencing (Entgegenwärtigung), providing therein the basic consideration for addressing the question of finiteness in the stream of consciousness" (261). This insight allows Fink to propose a critique of Husserl's "presentialism" and his own thesis that "the Absolute is origin" in both a temporal and non-temporal sense, as the "excess/superabundance (Überschwang) of depresencing," further characterized the Plotinian idea of "emanation" (273). "Life" and "Spirit" are the final set of fundamental themes discussed by Bruzina in chapter six. For Fink, the essence of life is conceived as the "play of being," which he understands with a Nietzschean emphasis on "creation" (333). The "self-realization" of life in its creative self-performance delivers a "meontic" definition of the absolute; subjectivity is displaced (entstellt) in its self-performance such that it remains incomplete, a "metaphysical gap in the cosmos" (341).In chapter seven, we arrive at the "critical-systematic core" of Fink's "meontic" speculations. Here, much of Fink's pronouncements are a heady mixture of Heidegger and Plotinus. Bruzina admits that Fink "freely draws" from the traditions of Neo-Platonism and Gnosticism; yet a quick attempt to distance Fink from his sources remains unconvincing. The "radical difference between the One of ultimate origin and all else" (448) that Bruzina takes as the exceptional focus of Fink's thinking is also of metaphysical concern in... (shrink)

This paper focuses on the act of forgiveness understood as an act which involves the recognition of injustice. Its goal is to answer to Arendt, who equates the realm of forgiveness with the possibility of punishment, to Derrida, who limits forgiveness to the unforgivable actions in order to highlight its unconditionality, and to Jankélévitch, who insists that the culprit’s repentance is an indispensable condition to forgiveness. By contrasting forgiveness, retaliation, and resignation, I emphasize that forgiveness implies attributing blame for injustice, (...) but I distinguish this from the sphere of punishment. Secondly, by showing how self-esteem is necessary for the victim and the offender, I underline the significance of the culprit’s avowal. These two elements lead to the distinction between inner forgiveness, which entails a superabundant act and an element of unconditionality, and integral forgiveness, which requires the culprit’s repentance in order to be exchanged by two people. (shrink)

This article explores the dream of the universal library in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s Theodicy, Jorge Luis Borges’s “The Library of Babel,” and Wim Wenders’s Wings of Desire. This is a story that, though often mentioned, is underexplored in both literary and intellectual histories. Scholars have overlooked the dream of the total library perhaps because this theme appears in works that transcend literary, aesthetic, and philosophical genres. I argue that the dream of the total library morphs from Leibniz’s assured hierarchy of (...) knowledge in which God is at the apex to Borges’s and Wenders’s more anxious post-enlightened epistemic regimes in which knowledge, decentered and leveled, becomes data, or worse, noise. The fantasies of textual omniscience can change our understanding of our European genealogies of knowledge and information theory more broadly. Taken together, their dreams of a total library constitute a central episode in the great romance of the pursuit of encyclopedic knowledge. In a world awash in a superabundance of signs and symbols and systems, they ask: How does the human mind orient itself? What Ariadne’s thread can it grasp? What possibilities of free will lie therein its imaginary infinite stacks? (shrink)

The culmination of a lifetime’s preoccupation with crucial human concerns too often curiously marginalized by the history of philosophy, The Expansion of Metaphysics sheds new light on freedom and the will by making the phenomenon of novelty philosophically intelligible. The a priori synthesis of Kant is joined to Judeo-Christian themes (the kenosis of Christ in the incarnation and the tzimtzum of God in the creation) in order to develop a doctrine of “superabundance” (freedom and love) and “singularity” (with the (...) Work of Art and the Child as paradigms). Space and time are reanalyzed as structural forms of human existence as Vető guides the reader into the depths and heights of reality, climaxing in a metaphysics of good and evil. (shrink)

Para lá da dívida que Claude Bruaire reconhece em relação a Blondel, o presente artigo parte do suposto de que existe um parentesco manifesto entre asfilosofias destes dois autores. Nas suas últimas obras, Bruaire desenvolve uma metafísica decidida, tal como Blondel na sua Trilogia. Mas se o élan pneumatológico predomina em Blondel, onde o finito busca continuamente a sua adequação ao Infinito, a veia noética é mais sensível em Bruaire: revendicando o direito do conceito e o seu valor ontológico, ela (...) situa-se mais francamente ainda que a de Blondel na senda de uma meditação do Absoluto. Este é explicitado numa filosofia do dom, da superabundância - ou da Ressurreição - em que o finito se descobre incluído e transfigurado no Infinito. Segundo o autor do artigo, estamos aqui perante um progresso decisivo no seio da própria philosophia perennis. /// Recognizing the debt that Bruaire owes to Blondel, there is a manifest relationship between what the two philosophers propose in their respective works. In his last works, Bruaire develops a metaphysical project, rather like the one advanced by Blondel in his trilogy. The pneumatic élan in Blondel's work underscores the finite as persistently seeking the infinite as its adequate objective. For Bruaire's part, the noetic aspect is more accentuated; he defends the rights of the concept in relation to its ontological value, placing even greater emphasis on the Absolute than did Blondel. The Absolute is explicated in terms of a philosophy of gift, of superabundance - or of the Resurrection - where the finite discovers itself included and transfigured in the infinite. This constitutes a decisive progress in what is considered philosophia perennis. (shrink)

The structure of Chiodi's book is based on Vuillemin's important hermeneutical thesis that existentialism is one more step in the program of the romantics to give an absolute foundation to finite reality through the establishment of necessary relations between subjectivity and being. These relations, once revealed, would dispel the facticity and contingency in which the natural world is enshrouded. The role of Heidegger in this tradition involves one further dialectical twist, since Heidegger centers all Western Philosophy, including his own, around (...) the problem of ground in the manner proposed by the romantics. The suggested dialectical twist is then Heidegger's Kehre, a step beyond the radical contingency of Dasein in Sein und Zeit. Indeed, this contingency, once reached, shows unequivocally the failure of the romantic program. The ground cannot be ontologically connected with any object nor with the subject; it is rather the necessary history of the ground that determines all categorial differentiations in the world, including the reflective differentiation of subject-objects. Thus it becomes important to distinguish Heidegger from Hegel since, in both, history and necessity are characteristics of the ground. Chiodi gets to the bottom of this matter by pointing to the transfer of negativity from the process of history to the end of history. For Heidegger what is necessary is the repeated withdrawal of the ground so that it may never be confused with that which is known in any revelation or through all of them. This move, though clear, would still leave a fundamental ambiguity in the later philosophy of Heidegger: language, which acts as messenger from the ground to the world, must reflect the superabundance of Being from the standpoint of the ground while it only reflects possibilities of being from the standpoint of the world. This is an ambiguity that Heidegger would want to maintain. Chiodi's interpretation of Heidegger as a neo-platonist totally destroys this ambiguity and with it the very delicate balance created by Heidegger between infinite meaning and the ability of finite words to dwell upon it.--A. de L. M. (shrink)