Conventional agency theory typically focuses on a unidirectional problem, in which an agent behaves opportunistically against the interests of a principal. Yet, this conceptualization is too limited to fully describe all aspects of principal–agent relationships. This article presents a more comprehensive framework explaining a potential three-directional problem—that is, agents behave opportunistically against the interests of principals, principals behave opportunistically against the interests of agents, and relationships between agents and principals representing confluence of interests affect (...) the interests of third-party stakeholders. The article provides evidence of these problems, describes their unique characteristics, and outlines implications for society. It concludes with a discussion focusing on the implications of the proposed framework for purported governance solutions, the ongoing debate between shareholder and stakeholder views of the firm, and business practices. (shrink)

This paper advances the Hunt–Vitell General Theory of Marketing Ethics as a framework for enriching current understanding of both long-term marketing relationships in general, and principal-agent associations specifically. Under economic models of agency theory, manufacturer-distributor relationships are conceptualized as principal-agent associations where both parties are assumed be motivated exclusively by short-term financial self-interest within the logical constraints of zero-sum game conditions. As a general model of ethical decision making and behavior in marketing, the Hunt–Vitell (...) theory illustrates how ethical decisions are predicated not only upon estimations of potential benefits or outcomes (using teleological criteria), but also deontological evaluations which invoke norms and values. Furthermore, the recent ideas advanced in "relationship marketing" perspectives suggest that distribution channel associations premised upon non-zero-sum or symbiotic assumptions may be more effective and more jointly profitable. Based upon the Hunt–Vitell model, propositions are formulated that complement the understanding of agency theory within the context of marketing channel relationships, and thus, may represent a basis for more effective agency selection and interaction in marketing practice. (shrink)

The Century between the death of Copernicus and the birth of Newton witnessed a major reshaping of traditional ways of viewing the universe. The Ptolemaic system was challenged by Copernican heliocentrism, the Aristotelian world was assailed by Galilean physics and revived atomism, and theology was troubled by the progressive distancing of God from the daily operation of His creation. Besides earning this era the title of ‘the Scientific Revolution’, the intellectual ferment of these times offered many world systems as successors (...) to the throne of crumbling Aristotelianism. (shrink)

The principal–principal perspective suggests that controlling shareholders have excessive influence on corporate philanthropy and may direct corporate funds to charitable causes to support their personal interests. Analysis of a sample of Chinese private firms listed on the Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchange between 2004 and 2011 shows that there is a significant and negative relationship between corporate giving and the share held by the largest shareholders, suggesting that controlling shareholders are opportunistic in directing corporate charitable contributions; there is (...) a significant and positive relationship between corporate giving and the political connections of the largest shareholders and their agents, suggesting compatibility between corporate contributions and the personal interests of the controlling shareholders; there is a stronger negative relationship between corporate giving and the share of the company held by the largest shareholders in politically connected firms, suggesting that political connections contribute to increased opportunistic corporate giving. Overall, our study provides important evidence for the “one dominant controlling shareholder” phenomenon by testing and extending the principal–principal framework and showing that the largest shareholders of Chinese firms appear to donate to charitable causes that ultimately serve their personal interests at the expense of minority shareholders. (shrink)

Our moral judgments are fallible, and we’re often uncertain what morality requires. I argue that, in the face of these challenges, it’s not only rational to use effective procedures for trying to be moral – we have a moral responsibility to do so, and being reckless when navigating moral uncertainty, is, itself, a form of moral wrongdoing. These strategic requirements present a large class of under-explored norms of morality. I use these norms to address moral and social questions concerning, for (...) example, interpersonal toleration, exceptions to moral rules in high-stakes cases, and principal-agent relationships (such as those between lawyers and clients). -/- (email for full text). (shrink)

The current study examines the relationship between financialization, managers’ incentives, and the enterprise’s innovation. Based on the principal-agent and incentive theories, this study proposes a research model with two management incentives as moderating variables between financialization and the enterprise’s innovation. First, we analyze the direct relationship between financialization and the enterprise’s innovation. Second, we examine the moderating effect of managers’ equity incentive and compensation incentives on the relationship between entity financialization and the enterprise’s innovation in high-tech/non-high-tech enterprises and (...) state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. This study covers the most recent updated data from both A-share listed companies in the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchange in China from 2009 to 2019. This study’s finding indicates a significant negative impact of entity financialization and the enterprise’s innovation. It means that the entity financial has a significant “crowding-out” effect on the enterprise’s innovation. This study also confirms that management incentives cannot effectively suppress a “crowding-out” impact of entity financialization on firm innovation because of the principal-agent severe problem in financialization. Finally, considering the heterogeneities of property rights and degrees of dependence on the enterprise’s innovation, a “crowding-out” effect of entity financialization on the enterprise’s innovation is more significant in high-tech and state-owned enterprises. Managers’ equity incentive significantly affects the enterprise’s innovation in high-tech enterprises, while the managers’ compensation incentive affects the enterprise’s innovation in state-owned enterprises. Our study could help the enterprise to improve the company manager’s incentive and provide the optimal assets allocation to improve the enterprise’s innovation ability. Lastly, this study provides significant policies and recommendations for the public sector high-tech enterprise and private sector high-tech enterprises. Moreover, policies and recommendations are fruitful for the public sector non-high-tech enterprise and private sector non-high-tech enterprise. (shrink)

Increasingly organizations have dedicated systems and personnel (recipients) to receive and handle internal whistleblower reports. Yet, the complexity of handling whistleblower reports is often underestimated, and there is a dearth of literature that attempts to describe or analyse the challenges internal recipients face. This paper uses an agency theory inspired lens to provide insight into the complexity of internal whistleblowing, with the aim to identify focal points for improving internal whistleblowing processes. We conceive of internal recipients as agents of two (...) principals in the event of whistleblowing: owner/top management as well as whistleblowers. We identify sources of agency problems and agency costs within these double-agent relationships. We provide avenues for solving these problems and reducing the agency costs. We close by offering paths for future research. (shrink)

This article addresses some ambiguities and normative problems with the concept of mature care in professional relationships and in health care priorities. Mature care has recently been introduced in the literature on care ethics as an alternative to prevailing altruistic conceptions of care. The essence of mature care is an emphasis on reciprocity, where the mature agent has the ability to balance the concerns of self with those of others and act from a principle of not causing harm. (...) Our basic claim is that the prevailing concept of mature care does not capture the real nature of professional relationships and role obligations in health care. As the focus of attention in professional care is and must be the patient’s particular medical and care needs, such care must principally be altruistic. Furthermore, we argue that mature care cannot adequately address moral conflict in health care without accepting some more principle-based approaches and a richer notion of partiality. (shrink)

The health care sector is currently in a process of economization which, undoubtedly, has an impact on the relationship of physician and patient. In this article, elements of the new institutional economics are applied to the physician-patient-relationship in the sense of a descriptive heuristics. The authors find out that based on the principal-agent-theory paradoxical action settings ofthe physician can be located. 1t is necessary for policy makers involved in health care to consider these paradoxes. Furthermore, health literacy of (...) lay persans supported by widespread information technology lessens the information gap between physician and patient which changes their interaction with a Iasting effect. Based on this analysis the authors recommend not only to focus on individual ethics of the physician but rather to consider approaches of institutional ethics and incentive systems. (shrink)

This essay has two aims: The first is to demonstrate that the basic conceptual framework of principal/agent theory can be fruitfully applied to decisionmaking in health care and in such a way as to facilitate the more efficient pursuit of the moral values of individual well-being and autonomy which health care is supposed to promote. The second is to show that this application results in an enrichment of principal/agent theory itself, by removing some of the limitations (...) on the theory that are valid only for the more exclusively self-interested, commercial contexts to which the theory is usually applied. (shrink)

Distortions in memory impose important bounds on rationality but have been largely disregarded in economics. While it is possible to learn, it is more difficult, and sometimes impossible, to unlearn. This retention effect lowers individual utility directly or via reduced productivity, and adds costs to principal-agent relationships. The engraving effect states that the more one tries to forget a piece of information the more vivid it stays in memory, leading to a paradoxical outcome. The effects are based (...) on, and are supported by, psychological experiments, and it is shown that they are relevant in many economic situations and beyond. (shrink)

This paper evaluates the current use of the Principal Agent Model (PAM) in accounting and finance, focusing on the agent'ss use of private information. The agent'ss behavioral norms in the the PAM deviate from commonly held ethical values in society, from models of man in conventional economic theory, and also from behavioral foundations of related business school fields like corporate strategy, business ethics, and human resource management. Still, it would be unwise to reject the PAM solely (...) because of its distasteful ethical assumptions. The model does appear to have predictive power, but its descriptive or normative qualities remain unexplored. The popularity of the PAM, with its extreme model of man, raises fundamental questions about the impact of this model on business school stakeholders and society at large. (shrink)

This essay articulates a crucial and neglected element of a general theory of the ethics of bureaucratic organizations, both private andpublic. The key to the approach developed here is the thesis that the distinctive ethical principles applicable to bureaucratic organizations are responses to the distinctive agency-risks that arise from the nature of bureaucratic organizations as complex webs of principal/agent relationships. It is argued that the most important and distinctive ethical principles for bureaucratic organizations express commitments on the (...) part of bureaucrats that function to reduce the agency risks that are inherent in such organizations. This approach to the ethics of bureaucratic organizations is shown to be more illuminating than those that concentrate exclusively or primarily on determining the conditions for corporate responsibility or on the idea that the ethical obligations distinctive of bureaucracies are role-derived. (shrink)

In this article, the authors attempt to build a bridge between economic theory and medical ethics to offer a new perspective to tackle ethical challenges in the physician–patient encounter. They apply elements of new institutional economics to the ethically relevant dimensions of the physician–patient relationship in a descriptive heuristic sense. The principal–agent theory can be used to analytically grasp existing action problems in the physician–patient relationship and as a basis for shaping recommendations at the institutional level. Furthermore, the (...) patients’ increased self-determination and modern opportunities for the medical laity to inform themselves lead to a less asymmetrical distribution of information between physician and patient and therefore require new interaction models. Based on the analysis presented here, the authors recommend that, apart from the physician’s necessary individual ethics, greater consideration should be given to approaches of institutional ethics and hence to incentive systems within medical ethics. (shrink)

This essay attempts to develop a new theoretical model for business ethics distinct from the two canonical business‐ethics theories, the stakeholder theory and the shareholder value theory. Milton Friedman argued that because managers are agents of the company's owners, their sole moral responsibility is to maximize owner returns. Thomas Pogge has recently suggested that such a view involves a kind of moral incoherence and that we should reject the efficacy of social arrangements like the principal‐agent relationship in altering (...) moral obligations. Both views fail to give proper account of the dispersal of moral responsibilities in business contexts. We must distinguish “minimal moral obligations” (stemming from justice and rights) from “maximal moral obligations” (stemming from all other moral considerations, including duties of aid, beneficence, and the virtues). Minimal obligations apply to all persons, but maximal obligations can be effected by social arrangements like the owner‐manager relationship. There may be moral obligations incumbent on owners that do not apply to managers. Understanding this distribution of responsibilities enables us to develop a new and attractive model of business ethics––“the ownership model”––which places greater emphasis on the rights and responsibilities of the owners of business than has been traditional in business ethics. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Some business ethicists view agency theory as a cautionary tale—a proof that it is impossible to carry out successful economic interactions in the absence of ethical behaviour. The cautionary-tale view presents a nuanced normative characterisation of agency, but itsunilateralfocus betrays a limited understanding of the structure of social interaction. This article moves beyond unilateralism by presenting a descriptive and normative argument for abilateralcautionary-tale view. Specifically, we discuss hat swaps and role dualism in asymmetric-information principal-agent relationships and argue (...) that the norm of reciprocity can function as a moral solution to agency risks in adverse-selection and moral-hazard problems. Our bilateral cautionary-tale formulation extends the normative boundaries of agency theory, while leaving the fundamental economic assumptions of agency theory intact. (shrink)

In a multilateral bargaining game where a proposer and responders can set up a “principal–agent” relationship by means of binding cash-offer contracts, we show that there is a Markov SPE with a delay in reaching an agreement. We also show that all the individually rational and efficient payoffs can be supported by SPE.

When a member of an organization has to make a decision or act in a way that may benefit some stakeholders at the expense of others, ethical dilemmas may arise. This paper examines ethical sensitivity regarding the duties to clients and owners (principals), employees (agents), and responsibilities to society (third parties). Within this framework, ethical perceptions of male and female managers are compared between the U.S. and Turkey – two countries that differ on power distance as well as the individualism/collectivism (...) dimensions. Our results show that ethical sensitivity varies depending upon whether the interests of principals, agents, or third parties are affected by a given ethical dilemma. We also find that, contingent upon the principal-agent–society relationships, the nationality and gender of the decision-maker influences ethical sensitivity. (shrink)

The paper presents a logical framework for the representation of interactions between institutional agents, human agents and software agents. A case study is used to analyze how obligations on institutional agents are “propagated” to human and software agents, and how actions performed by these agents count as actions that satisfy the obligations imposed to institutional agents. It is shown that the relationship between the different kinds of obligations and actions can be represented in terms of the concept of “count as” (...) proposed by Searle, of role and of causality. The logical framework focus on those three concepts. (shrink)

Algorithm Decision Making (ADM) systems designed to augment or automate human decision-making have the potential to produce better decisions while also freeing up human time and attention for other pursuits. For this potential to be realised, however, algorithmic decisions must be sufficiently aligned with human goals and interests. We take a Principal-Agent (P-A) approach to the questions of ADM alignment and trust. In a broad sense, ADM is beneficial if and only if human principals can trust algorithmic agents (...) to act faithfully on their behalf. This mirrors the challenge of facilitating P-A relationships among humans, but the peculiar nature of human-machine interaction also raises unique issues. The problem of asymmetric information is omnipresent but takes a different form in the context of ADM. Although the decision-making machinery of an algorithmic agent can in principle be laid bare for all to see, the sheer complexity of ADM systems based on deep learning models prevents straightforward monitoring. We draw on literature from economics and political science to argue that the problem of trust in ADM systems should be addressed at the level of institutions. Although the dyadic relationship between human principals and algorithmic agents is our ultimate concern, cooperation at this level must rest against an institutional environment which allows humans to effectively evaluate and choose among algorithmic alternatives. (shrink)

The British Columbian Members of the Canadian Guidance and Counselling Association were surveyed to explore their attitudes regarding dual relationships. Of 529 deliverable surveys, 206 usable returns yielded a response rate of 39%. The survey instrument collected data regarding respondents' characteristics and ethicality ratings of 39 dual relationship activity items. An exploratory principal components analysis was performed on responses, resulting in a 4-factor equation, which accounted for 44% of the total variance. The results suggest that, although conceptual considerations (...) of dual relationship typology do underlay the resultant factors, the relative ethicality of each item is also influential. (shrink)

Enhancing teacher leadership is not only one of the approaches to improving teaching and learning, but it is also essential to the success of education reform. Based on leader-member exchange theory, 294 preschool teachers in China were surveyed, and a structural equation model was established to explore the relationship between the participating teachers' principal leadership style, teacher leadership and psychological capital. The findings revealed a significant positive correlation between transformational and transactional leadership styles and preschool teacher leadership. The laissez-faire (...) leadership style had no correlation with preschool teacher leadership. The transformational leadership style and transactional leadership style were significantly and positively correlated with psychological capital, while the laissez-faire leadership style was significantly and negatively correlated with psychological capital. The transformational leadership style can positively influence preschool teacher leadership directly and indirectly through psychological capital; and the transactional leadership style can only positively influence preschool teacher leadership indirectly through the mediating role of psychological capital. Preschool teachers' leadership can neither be directly influenced by a laissez-faire leadership style nor be indirectly influenced through the mediating role of psychological capital. (shrink)

We investigate experimentally the relationship between risk and incentives in a principal–agent setting. In contrast to the existing empirical literature that describes such relationship as ‘tenuous’ or inconclusive, we find a clear negative relationship—supporting the prediction of the standard theoretical model. Specifically, we find that principals reduce the size of the offered piece rates with an increase in risk and instead provide positive fixed wages. Furthermore, we find no relationship between the variance in the performance and the effort (...) choice of the agent, and a strong positive relationship between the effort choice of the agents and the offered piece rates as well as fixed wage, suggesting positive reciprocity. Finally, we find evidence of social projection by the principals regarding the agents’ degree of risk aversion. (shrink)

With the rapid development of society, all walks of life need the support of the Internet of Things, and the financial industry is no exception. This article integrates blockchain technology with supply chain finance and builds a supply chain financial alliance architecture based on blockchain technology and an underlying model of the Ethereum blockchain system suitable for supply chain finance. We innovated new supply chain finance models and operating mechanisms and proposed business scenarios for supply chain finance from the perspective (...) of blockchain. Taking into account the actual operation of the blockchain supply chain financial platform, the principal-agent model and the incentive theory are applied, and the supply chain financial accounts receivable model is taken as an example in the case of complete information and incomplete information. The incentive mechanism between the service provider of the chain supply chain financial platform and the core enterprise promotes the better implementation of blockchain technology and supply chain finance. Based on the existing theoretical research, this paper identifies the key influencing factors of the supply chain’s cross-enterprise incentive mechanism. These influencing factors system includes two dimensions: transaction factors and relationship factors. Transaction factors include resource dependence, uncertainty, and cooperation experience; relationship factors include corporate reputation, trust level, and relationship commitment. Based on the nature of the incentive mechanism, information sharing and revenue sharing are extracted as the measurement dimensions of the supply chain’s cross-enterprise incentive mechanism. On this basis, this article draws on the existing enterprise life cycle division method and constructs a hypothetical model of the influencing factors of the incentive mechanism in the incubation period, the growth period, and the maturity period. Relevant data was collected through questionnaires, and SPSS and AMOS software were used to perform statistical analysis, reliability analysis, exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, and structural equation hypothesis testing on the data. The performance of each influencing factor in different stages of the enterprise’s life cycle and the importance of each influencing factor in the same life cycle stage are obtained. (shrink)

External regulatory and normative pressures from both the Chinese central environmental protection inspection (CEPI) program and public participation can act together to influence corporate environmental governance behavior. This research uses the multiperiod Difference-In-Differences method to test the compound impact of CEPI and public participation on corporate environmental governance strategies and investigate the underlying influence mechanisms. The results show that CEPI and public participation have a positive compound effect on the corporate “source-control” strategy. A reasonable reduction in pollution charges and increased (...) environmental subsidies are essential to stimulate the green innovation potential of heavily polluting firms. Our research helps clarify the game relationship between the central and the local governments and analyzes how the relationship between the government, the public, and corporates affects environmental governance, thereby advancing principal-agent theory and expanding the current research on institutional pressures and corporate environmental governance. (shrink)

We applaud Sedlakova and Trachsel’s work and their description of conversational artificial intelligence (CAI) as possessing a hybrid nature with features of both a tool and an agent (Sedlakova and...

This study investigated whether some Japanese intransitive verbs, called agent-implying intransitive verbs, are processed differently from other ordinary intransitive verbs. These verbs are special in that they denote agentive events, but they are intransitive verbs, which only allow the patient/theme to be the only nominatively marked argument. The priming experiment was designed based on the situation model theory, assuming that verbs with an agentive semantic structure (e.g., ordinary transitive verbs) has a shorter causal inferential distance than those with a (...) non-agentive semantic structure (e.g., ordinary intransitive verb). In the experiment, participants were instructed to read two sentences that formed a story, of which the second sentence was either a transitive or intransitive sentence. The participants then answered a related question about general knowledge, and their response times were measured. The results show that, whereas the mean response time in the ordinary intransitive condition was significantly longer than that in the ordinary transitive condition, the mean response time in the agent-implying intransitive condition was not significantly different from that of the corresponding transitive condition, suggesting that agent-implying intransitive verbs are interpreted as agentive. The findings suggest that agent-implying intransitive verbs instantly evoke agentivity, whereas ordinary intransitive verbs do not. The theoretical implications of the findings are discussed. (shrink)

The paper takes thePrincipal Principle to be a norm demanding that subjective degrees of belief of a Bayesian agent be equal to the objective probabilities once the agent has conditionalized his subjective degrees of beliefs on the values of the objective probabilities, where the objective probabilities can be not only chances but any other quantities determined objectively. Weak and strong consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle are defined in terms of classical probability measure spaces. It is proved (...) that the Abstract Principal Principle is weakly consistent and that it is strongly consistent in the category of probability measure spaces where the Boolean algebra representing the objective random events is finite. It is argued that it is desirable to strengthen the Abstract Principal Principle by adding a stability requirement to it. Weak and strong consistency of the resulting Stable Abstract Principal Principle are defined, and the strong consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle is interpreted as necessary for a non-omniscient Bayesian agent to be able to have rational degrees of belief in all epistemic situations. It is shown that the Stable Abstract Principal Principle is weakly consistent, but the strong consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal principle remains an open question. We conclude that we do not yet have proof that Bayesian agents can have rational degrees of belief in every epistemic situation. (shrink)

This paper examines the impact of three culturally endorsed leadership prototypes on bank lending corruption. We bring together studies that approach the corruption of bank lending officers from the perspective of a principal-agent problem and studies from the leadership literature, suggesting leadership as an alternative to contractual solutions to agency problems. We hypothesize, based on these views, that culturally endorsed leadership styles that improve (worsen) the leader-subordinate relationships have a negative (positive) effect on bank lending corruption. Using (...) a sample of around 3,500 firms from 36 countries, we find that the prosocial leadership prototype and the nonautonomous leadership prototype do not matter, whereas the self-serving leadership prototype has a positive and statistically significant effect on bank lending corruption. These findings are robust to the inclusion of various control variables in the regressions, and alternative estimation approaches, including ones that account for endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, we find that the power of bank regulators and the age of the credit information sharing mechanism play a moderating role in the relationship between the self-serving leadership prototype and bank lending corruption. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In contemporary societies, governance is becoming governance by experts or under expert advice. This paper offers a survey of the basic conceptual schema that underlies some legal and political uses of knowledge, which has been traditionally based on a two-fold principle of distribution of epistemic labour between public officials and experts. Building on the example of the European system of comitology and, particularly, on the European experiences in the field of nanotechnology regulation, where expert advice has proved to be (...) particularly controversial, I will argue that the principal-agent logic that has been conventionally placed at the core of the relationship between public authorities and experts must be enhanced or specified. Facing situations of qualified uncertainty, when epistemic privilege of experts tends to decline because of the absence of conclusive evidence, the standard division of epistemic labour becomes blurred and crucial questions of justice come to the fore. Moreover, I will show that, at that point, the demand for lay people participation becomes increasingly compelling. The underlying context of this discussion is the understanding that both politics of knowledge and politics of ignorance are already playing a crucial role in the governance of our increasingly ungovernable democracies. (shrink)

Previous research has identified several factors (such as remuneration, workload, negative perceptions of criminal defendants) which may lead to a barrister not acting in the defendant's best interests, when advising on plea or engaging in plea bargaining. This article applies aspects of the principal – agent problem to the relationship between defence barristers and defendants in England and Wales in order to analyse the extent to which incentives can align the interests of the agent (the barrister) with (...) those of the principal (the defendant) in order to prevent moral hazard caused by the agent's competing interests. Coercive, material and moral incentives are considered, and the role of the solicitor and the significance of the barrister's reputation are also discussed. It is argued that none of the forms of incentive which would traditionally reduce the risk of moral hazard do so to any great extent in the barrister – defendant relationship, and that this is due in part to the complexity of the overlapping principal – agent dynamics within which the barrister – defendant relationship lies. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:The distinction between what I call nonelective obligations and discretionary obligations, a distinction that focuses on one particular thread of the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, helps us to identify the obligations that carry over from principals to agents. Clarity on this issue is necessary to identify the moral obligations within “shareholder primacy”, which conceives of managers as agents of shareholders. My main claim is that the principal-agent relation requires agents to fulfill nonelective obligations, but it does (...) not always require discharging discretionary obligations. I show that the requirement to fulfill nonelective obligations is more far-reaching than has been acknowledged by most defenders and critics of shareholder primacy. But I also show that managers are not bound by certain discretionary obligations like charity, showing that their moral obligations are more circumscribed than the obligations that apply to human beings in general. (shrink)

The present study critically evaluates whether school leadership influences student learning homogenously regardless of school contexts. It examined relationships between four principal leadership variables (envisioning, instructional management, promoting professional development, empowerment) and two types of student outcomes (enjoyment in learning science, science achievement,) in different school contexts (in terms of the availability of science resources, quality of science teachers, and school socioeconomic status (SES)). The sample comprised 248,620 students and 9,370 principals in 35 developed countries who participated in (...) the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2015. Latent profile analysis (LPA) showed that schools operated in three types of school contexts with different levels of science resources, proportion of quality science teachers, and school SES. There were also differences in the pattern of leadership practices across the three types of school contexts. Three-level hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) showed that among the four leadership variables, only instructional management was positively associated with students’ enjoyment of science in schools with less science resources and quality science teachers. Therefore, instructional management had compensatory effects for students in less-endowed schools. In contrast, principal leadership related to envisioning, teacher professional development, and empowerment was not positively related to students’ science learning in all three school contexts. (shrink)

I show that centered propositions—also called de se propositions, and usually modeled as sets of centered worlds—pose a serious problem for various versions of Lewis's Principal Principle. The problem, put roughly, is that in scenarios like Elga's `Sleeping Beauty' case, those principles imply that rational agents ought to have obviously irrational credences. To solve the problem, I propose a centered version of the Principal Principle. My version allows centered propositions to be objectively chancy.

Scholars who favor shareholder primacy usually claim either that managers should not fulfill corporate duties of beneficence or that, if they are required to fulfill them, they do so by going against their obligations to shareholders. Distinguishing between structurally different types of duties of beneficence and recognizing the full force of the normative demands imposed on managers reveal that this view needs to be qualified. Although it is correct to think that managers, when acting on behalf of shareholders, are not (...) required to fulfill wide duties of charity, they are nevertheless required to fulfill a variety of narrow duties of beneficence. What is more, the obligation to fulfill these duties arises precisely because they are acting on behalf of shareholders. As such, this article 1) refines our understanding of the duties of corporate beneficence and 2) helps to identify which duties of beneficence are imposed on managers when they are acting on behalf of shareholders. (shrink)