Abstract

This paper advances the Hunt–Vitell General Theory of Marketing Ethics as a framework for enriching current understanding of both long-term marketing relationships in general, and principal-agent associations specifically. Under economic models of agency theory, manufacturer-distributor relationships are conceptualized as principal-agent associations where both parties are assumed be motivated exclusively by short-term financial self-interest within the logical constraints of zero-sum game conditions. As a general model of ethical decision making and behavior in marketing, the Hunt–Vitell theory illustrates how ethical decisions are predicated not only upon estimations of potential benefits or outcomes (using teleological criteria), but also deontological evaluations which invoke norms and values. Furthermore, the recent ideas advanced in "relationship marketing" perspectives suggest that distribution channel associations premised upon non-zero-sum or symbiotic assumptions may be more effective and more jointly profitable. Based upon the Hunt–Vitell model, propositions are formulated that complement the understanding of agency theory within the context of marketing channel relationships, and thus, may represent a basis for more effective agency selection and interaction in marketing practice.