This study examines the impact of trust and a national culture of secretiveness on the number of bank relationships per firm. We hypothesize that the degree of openness of a firm and trust between economic agents may influence the willingness of the firm to release sensitive information to its lenders, as well as the decision between maintaining single or multiple bank relationships. Using a sample of over 8000 non-financial firms operating in 12 countries from the eurozone we provide evidence that (...) a national culture of secrecy enhances the number of bank relationships, while trust has the opposite effect. Results are robust to the use of various estimation techniques, alternative definitions of secrecy and trust, controls for firm-level and country-level characteristics, and instrumental variables. The main implication of this finding is that the financial decisions of firms cannot be effectively examined without considering deep-rooted national cultural elements. We also find that the results are mainly driven by small and medium enterprises, implying that the higher informational opaqueness of these firms enhances the role of secrecy and trust. (shrink)

This paper examines the impact of three culturally endorsed leadership prototypes on bank lending corruption. We bring together studies that approach the corruption of bank lending officers from the perspective of a principal-agent problem and studies from the leadership literature, suggesting leadership as an alternative to contractual solutions to agency problems. We hypothesize, based on these views, that culturally endorsed leadership styles that improve (worsen) the leader-subordinate relationships have a negative (positive) effect on bank lending corruption. Using a sample of (...) around 3,500 firms from 36 countries, we find that the prosocial leadership prototype and the nonautonomous leadership prototype do not matter, whereas the self-serving leadership prototype has a positive and statistically significant effect on bank lending corruption. These findings are robust to the inclusion of various control variables in the regressions, and alternative estimation approaches, including ones that account for endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, we find that the power of bank regulators and the age of the credit information sharing mechanism play a moderating role in the relationship between the self-serving leadership prototype and bank lending corruption. (shrink)

We study the impact of social capital and perceptions about corporate ethical behaviour on the use of collateral in corporate borrowing. Using a dataset of more than 17,500 firms operating in over 100 transition and developing countries, we find evidence that country-level social capital and better perceptions about corporate ethical behaviour are negatively associated with the likelihood to pledge collateral. In addition, these country-level characteristics influence the value of collateral relative to the loan value.

We study the impact of social capital and perceptions about corporate ethical behaviour on the use of collateral in corporate borrowing. Using a dataset of more than 17,500 firms operating in over 100 transition and developing countries, we find evidence that country-level social capital and better perceptions about corporate ethical behaviour are negatively associated with the likelihood to pledge collateral. In addition, these country-level characteristics influence the value of collateral relative to the loan value.