Most analysts view the United Nations as a positive stabilising force in international affairs. In this paper, I critically assess this opinion of the UN’s peace enforcement actions using the case studies of the Korean War and the Gulf War while relying on the non-aggression axiom of libertarian philosophy. In the process, I shed light on some of the moral considerations at play when deciding on UN-sanctioned military intervention.

Little raises many questions of international legality in addressing the finer concepts of peace enforcing, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace building. He accentuates the rule of law, democracy, and human rights as foundations for each of these stages towards a Just Peace. Looking towards collectively accepted international treaties for a concept of justice, Little taps into a notion of legal validity that is at least partially composed of a legitimacy that emanates from the people themselves. Although there are (...) valid reasons for questioning who has been allowed to participate in the process developing international law, protecting the human rights of all, and labelling it justice certainly does not seem to create an untenable starting point. In fact, this approach that looks to protect the rights of all can be quite constructive because, ultimately, it is the people involved in a conflict who will determine whether a peace is just, and therefore lasting. (shrink)

Justice is important, but so is peaceful cooperation. In this article, I argue that if one takes seriously the autonomy of individuals and groups and the fact of moral pluralism, a just system of cooperation cannot guarantee peaceful cooperation in a pluralistic world. As a response to this consideration, I develop a contractarian theory that can secure peace in a pluralistic world of autonomous agents, assuming that the agents who exist in this world expect that peaceful cooperation is the (...) most beneficial form of interaction for them in the long run. The theory specifies the restrictions on the behavior of autonomous individual and collective agents that are indispensable for peaceful cooperation in a pluralistic world. In particular, I argue for the need of (i) a globally valid rule of conflict resolution to settle all intra- and inter-group conflicts that cannot be resolved locally, (ii) a world court to apply this rule in cases where local group authorities are inadequate to do so, and to serve as a final court of appeal, and (iii) a world police to enforce the rule. (shrink)

This article analyses implementation of freedom of assembly within Lithuania and in some other States of the European Union. Attention is paid to the differences in the implementation practices for this freedom while analysing probability of restriction of freedom of assembly in the light of legal, political and social factors. The article aims to substantiate that the quality of decision while adopting spreading ideas and expressed views during peaceful meetings, or adopting them later, or dismissing in general, is determined by (...) the democratic society being formed in the state during a particular period. On the other hand, although physical restriction of diffusion of ideas while implementing freedom of assembly is legitimate, it should not become the main control tool, since the development of the state in this direction is absolutely opposite to the expansion of democratic ideas in the society. Legal education should become the priority area of the policy conducted by the state. Particularly since this priority provides the security for the spread of best practices in democratic states, thus laying the grounds for effective prevention of expression of illegal behaviour. Such illegal behaviour may occur in the form of incitement of hatred and aggression in respect of persons who have different faith, race, nation or sexual orientation. The article substantiates that the real challenge faced by the modern democracy is security for practical implementation rather than the formal recognition and regulation of rights and freedoms. It has been found in practice that the implementation of freedom of assembly can be faulty restricted by the procedural justice. After evaluating experience of the States of the European Union and the way in which their national legal system is structured, the recommendations are made enabling a timely dispute settlement concerning the right of assembly, i.e., in order to prevent decision making process from becoming an obstacle for the implementation of freedom of assembly. It is pointed out that settlement of the dispute concerning the permission to hold a peaceful assembly after the date of the assembly is pointless and denies social importance of right of the assembly. (shrink)

This essay discusses Immanuel Kant’s project of perpetual peace. Kant runs into several difficulties in this undertaking, a series of “political antinomies” such as the opposing goals of nature or providence and of individuals, and the competing models of a federation of states or a world state to enforce perpetual peace. I argue that cosmopolitan right is Kant’s answer to the inconsistencies of his political philosophy and of his philosophy of history. Cosmopolitanism brings the individual back into historical (...) development by merging the political rights each person enjoys within a state with the relentless progress of the human race as a whole. Further, it provides a transition from a federation of states to a global political system of rights. I contend that cosmopolitanism can be regarded as the political supplement to the categorical imperative that applies universally to all rational beings. (shrink)

What does peace mean in today’s world of endless wars? Why has the project of ‘universal peace’, so ardently hoped for by the drafters of the UN Charter in 1945, failed so profoundly? I reflect on these questions through three stories of peace. The first is told by a series of four stained-glass windows in the Peace Palace in The Hague; the second is of the world’s demilitarised zones; and the third of a peace community (...) in Colombia. These stories provide a springboard to reflect on how we might rethink peace in the context of today’s world, drawing on feminist, queer and postcolonial analyses. My discussion exposes the limits of the UN Charter’s approach to peace, and the impossibility of its methods ever achieving ‘universal peace’. The Charter’s reliance on militarism and collective enforcement, as well as its commitment to peace as an evolutionary process, maintain rather than dismantle global hierarchies of domination. I also question the dualism of war and peace, which obscures much of the violence of what we call peace. The task of rethinking peace is urgent. To do so we need to go beyond the worlds we know, beyond the confines of law and the inevitability of quotidian hierarchies of gender, sexuality and race, to invent new methods of peace-making, outside the ‘frames of war’. (shrink)

The main focus in the paper is the connection between trust and peace which makes predictability as a necessary condition of the normalcy of life possible, especially collective and communal life. Peace is defined as a specific articulation of the distribution of (political) power within a society. Peace defined in such a way requires a set of rules (norms, or laws) needed for the stability of the established social state of affairs. The main purpose of those norms, (...) laws, is to provide predictability without which stability of such a state of affairs is not possible. The role of trust in this scheme is crucial. However, trust precedes the peace (defined as a set of accepted set of laws), and cannot be obtained by enforcing such normative instruments as laws. Trust is so a component of freedom, the same which contains distrust as its possible component. In this sense peace should be taken as the power of control, first the control over ourselves, the power which makes status and existence of trust possible and feasible. (shrink)

The article analyses enforcement of freedom of assembly, draws attention to faults of legal regulation of dispute settlement, and revises a possibility of restriction of freedom of assembly. The authors provide evidence that restriction of freedom of assembly by refusing to grant permission to hold a peaceful assembly, is not an effective measure, therefore, it is suggested to educate the public on legal issues in order to enlighten the society about detrimental effect of publicly expressed ideas that provoke national (...) or racial discord, to disclose actual intentions of people who instigate aggression, force and violence so that they do not attract and rally a sufficiently large part of the public. People usually believe that the society enjoys freedom of knowledge and the right to obtain all information, as well as all news that originate and spread across the market, as it creates a pre-requisite for strengthening the best and most useful culture projects resulting in the development of culture and, alongside, the law. (shrink)

Currently in Japan, it is extremely difficult to realize the basic wish of protecting personal dignity at the end of life. A patient’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment has not been substantially warranted, and advance directives have not been legally enforceable. Unfortunately, it is not until the patient is moribund that all concerned parties start to deliberate on whether or not death with dignity should be pursued. Medical intervention is often perceived as a worthwhile goal to not only preserve life, (...) but also provide psychological benefit to the family, regardless of its effect on the patient. To feel they are doing something, family members tend to act against the imperative “Do not inflict on others what you would not wish done to you,” and permit extraordinary measures they would not want themselves. Another complication in Japanese culture is the necessity of unanimous decisions for end-of-life care. If there is conflict between a patient and his/her family on accepting medical intervention, the view of the latter is more likely to prevail due to different perceptions of human dignity. As a result, incapacitated patients in Japanese clinical settings often suffer through extraneous medical procedures, particularly during end-of-life care. Patient dignity is in danger from a national refusal to accept major bioethical principles such as having respect for patient autonomy, serving the best interests of the patient, doing no harm, and ensuring fairness at the end of life. We argue that more education about human dignity and legislation for death with dignity are necessary. Peace of mind for patients during end-of-life care will never be achieved in this society unless drastic changes take place in medical ethics and law. (shrink)

Blasphemy law has become a central issue for the international community in various parts of the world in the last three decades. In almost every case involving the BL, especially in Muslim countries, such as Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia, they are always responded with violence or threats of attack that cause many victims, loss of homes, damage to places of worship, evictions, stigma of being heretical, severe punishments, or extra-judicial killings. When international human rights law and declaration of the right (...) to peace are adopted by the international community, at the same time, the number of violence related to the application of BL continues to increase. This paper aims to examine the ambiguity of the concept of the BL in Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and how its lead to the weak of enforcement that creates social injustice and inequality. Then, referring to Galtung’s theory of structural violence and other experts of peace studies, this paper argues that blasphemy law should be included as a form of structural violence. Therefore its challenges these States to reform their BL in which its provisions accommodate the state’s neutrality and content high legal standards. Thus, through guarantee the fully enjoyment of human rights for everyone may support the States to achieve sustainable peace. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the boundaries of political sovereignty, one key aspect of global political justice and an important background condition to the issues of global economic justice treated in the other papers of this volume. I first present an interpretive summary of the traditional arguments against and for intervention, stressing, to a greater extent than is usual, the consequentialist character of the ethics of intervention. It makes a difference whether we think that an intervention will do more good than (...) harm, and some of the factors that determine the outcome are matters of strategy and institutional choice. I then explore the significance of a key factor that makes for much of what is new in the new interventionism: the role of multilateral and particularly U.N. authorization and implementation. I argue that the more salient role of the United Nations should lead us to a more expansive tolerance of international intervention and that global standards of justice, both political and economic, can therefore be more widely enforced against claims to national autonomy. (shrink)

Peacekeeping, peace enforcement and 'stability operations' ask soldiers to use violence to create peace, defeat armed threats while having no enemies and uphold human rights without taking sides. The challenges that face peacekeepers cannot be easily reduced to traditional just war principles. Built on insights from care ethics, case studies including Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti and Liberia and scores of interviews with peacekeepers, trainers and planners in the field in Africa, India and more, (...) Daniel H. Levine sheds light on the challenges of peacekeeping. And he asserts that the traditional 'holy trinity' of peacekeeping principles "e; consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force "e; still provide the best moral guide for peacekeepers. (shrink)

This article is part of a Symposium that examines the legal and policy issues raised by the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll litigation, in which a Hollywood star-turned-governor sued under California's right of publicity laws and under federal copyright law to stop a small Ohio company from selling a bobblehead doll depicting Schwarzenegger in a business suit, with a bandolier of bullets, and brandishing an assault rifle. The article contends that defendants' unauthorized use of the Schwarzenegger image on dolls and their accompanying (...) packaging was permissible as First Amendment-protected free speech under California's right of publicity laws and also constituted fair use under federal copyright law. The article rejects the argument that a First Amendment defense to plaintiff's right of publicity claims was unavailable because a bobblehead doll is not a "traditional" medium of expression for ideas. The article recognizes that overly expansive assertions of rights of publicity and other intellectual property rights threaten to stifle creative expression and diminish the cultural commons. The article also calls for clearer and more consistent recognition of defenses to right of publicity claims, particularly for cases where a defendant's unauthorized appropriation of another's image or likeness is for purposes of caricature, parody, or satire¿especially where the image is that of a politician. It concludes that the settlement of the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll case illustrates how "strategic" assertions of even objectively non-meritorious rights of publicity can allow powerful plaintiffs to censor unflattering depictions of them and to unduly expand intellectual property rights without full adjudication on the merits of such claims.This insight is critical, because while other scholars have suggested that the "over-protection" of intellectual property rights (including rights of publicity) has a deleterious effect on freedom of expression and the public domain, these criticisms focus almost exclusively on published appellate cases. Yet, as this article reminds us, most cases settle and never become litigated cases, much less published appellate decisions. And most disputes - including intellectual property disputes - never result in formal litigation in the first instance. As with most other areas of the civil disputing process, intellectual property disputes are processed in the "shadow of the law", where repeat players have strategic advantages to shape the outcomes of disputes in their favor. Thus, if we want to know whether intellectual property rights are over-protected, we need to know what happens (and why) in the shadow of intellectual property law. This insight is the basis for the author's empirical research-in-progress focusing on "strategic intellectual property enforcement" by owners of trademarks, copyrights, and patents, including enforcement that never results in litigation and is thus under the radar of what most legal scholars in this area of law examine. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Weird John Brown: Divine Violence and the Limits of Ethics by Ted A. Smith, and: Bodies of Peace: Ecclesiology, Nonviolence, and Witness by Myles WerntzRyan Andrew NewsonWeird John Brown: Divine Violence and the Limits of Ethics Ted A. Smith Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015. 224pp. $22.95Bodies of Peace: Ecclesiology, Nonviolence, and Witness Myles Werntz Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014. 272pp. $44.00Arguments about the morality of violence (...) are currently being reinvigorated by a diverse group of theologians who are considering these questions for a world in which the nation-state no longer provides the sole context for political reflection. Both Ted Smith and Myles Werntz have contributed to this budding conversation by reframing the way theological ethicists might approach questions of violence and war.In Weird John Brown, Ted Smith provides an engaging account of the violent abolitionist, examining the theological significance of John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry, Virginia. Smith uses Brown to question the capacity of ethics as a discipline to assess the significance of every phenomenon. By “ethics,” Smith means those forms of moral reasoning that assume reality to be composed of a closed network of cause and effect. Ethics thus understood exerts a “strong gravitational pull” on the contemporary mind, privileging “universalizable moral obligations” that take precedence over goods like beauty or piety and resisting the suggestion that any act’s significance may lie beyond this-worldly relationships (4–5). In fighting for a just cause by violent, treasonous means, Brown problematizes the sufficiency of such ethical habits of description. [End Page 223]Neither crazed fundamentalist nor freedom fighter, Brown’s significance for Smith lies beyond ordinary ethical considerations. He is a “portent,” following W.E.B. Du Bois—a sign questioning the state’s presumed monopoly on legitimate violence (17), pronouncing judgment over a nation built on chattel slavery, and (perhaps) issuing hope for a new society to emerge in his wake (175). Only as “a flawed prophet who is caught up in a story of redemption that he cannot quite imagine” (88) does Brown’s significance come into view.For Smith, the state executing him is clearly not “less violent” than Brown. Indeed, Brown reveals the particular form of violence to which the “neutral” rule of law gives rise: violence reinforcing the legitimacy of state rule. Following Walter Benjamin, Smith describes a “mythic” cycle whereby an original violence that establishes a state, and the law that later legitimates that founding, reinforce one another (56, 70–71). Justice becomes equated with “law,” with no place for exceptions to law that might contribute to the overall health of the state (57). This cycle cannot be broken by moral imperatives articulated within the system; it is broken only by what Benjamin calls “divine violence”—necessarily exceptional interruptions to the cycle that challenge the system as such (73).Recognizing the possibility of such interruptions to the ethical does not eliminate the need for phronesis. Instead, it transposes practical wisdom to a key “marked by freedom and the love that freedom makes possible” (82); it stresses the importance of cultivating “the capacity for reasoning together about the form of a higher law” (109) that thereby relieves the law from being all in all. And while many fear that phrases like “higher law” only incite irrational, unchecked violence, Smith rightly sees that “mundane” politics can manifest a violence that is equally devastating, while concepts like “higher law” have checked violence as often as inspired it. To respond to violence done in the name of a higher law, we need better and deeper religious reasoning, “the kind that can imagine the higher law as something other than a code to be enforced and history as something more than an endless succession of homogeneous moments to be wrenched into conformity with the law” (88).Smith does not directly address the question of justified violence. His task is more difficult: to reset the parameters of such discussions so that they might continue without being restricted by “intramundane accounts of the good” (35). Smith thus challenges just warriors and pacifists alike not to argue on prudential grounds alone but to risk reasoning beyond the state’s... (shrink)

In spite of his post-World War II works on international law, which seems more purely juridical, Hans Kelsen continues to put forward in his vast body of work an implicit – and sometimes even explicit – juridical objectivism and pacifism. Especially before and during the second World War he makes – by means of many moral-political writings – an effort for a more effective assurance of international peace. The fact that Kelsen regards the law as the pre-eminent means to (...) achieve the end of peace, is – in view of the tradition running from Hobbes to Kant – still not very innovating. But the primary and central role he assigns to the judiciary in order to guarantee international peace is on the other hand really original. To bring out Kelsen’s juridical objectivism and pacifism, I restrict myself in this article to his plea before and during the second World War for the judicial primacy in the international legal order. In that plea, which is spread over many writings and founded by several arguments, I distinguish however three main convincing arguments – namely an evolutionary, a technical and a moral-political argument – for the establishment of an international court with compulsory jurisdiction as the ‘guardian of international peace’. The fact that Kelsen’s original plea is still relevant to our times, is already evident from the post-World War II UN-system of peace-enforcement, which still functions little satisfactorily and of which the existing plans of reform go no further than strengthening the position of the Security Council, the current hardly effective ‘maintainer of world peace’. (shrink)

Based on a multivariate analysis of the involvement of post-Soviet republics in UN and NATO peacekeeping operations, the author explores the integration of New Independent States into UN and NATO international organizations. Chronology of some peace-support and peace-enforcement operations is given. Of special focus is participation of special units of armed forces in such operations. Logical sequence of intrastate agreement on engagement of the military of independent Ukraine in international operations under the mandate of the United Nations (...) Security Council is traced. A respective decision-making process of the Lithuanian Parliament is examined for comparison purposes. Specific laws of Ukraine, which regulate such decisions, are indicated. The author offers concrete examples and describes the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in implementation of the UN peace-support mission. The paper cites Russian legislation governing cooperation with the UN and NATO in peacekeeping operations. By the example of formation of interstate military units between Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania ('Ukrpolitbat'), the Baltic Republics (the 'Baltic Battalion') and Central Asian Republics ('Kazbat'), the author shows the initiative of post-Communism republics in preservation of peace and stability in the world. Specific examples of involvement of the armed units of such post-Soviet republics as Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kirgizia in UN international operations are given. The paper describes the operations in Kosovo (1999), the Mediterranean Sea (2001), Turkey (2003), Iraq (2004), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996-2004) as well as Sudan (2005). Attention is drawn to reorientation of the NATO from the collective defence strategy to that of common security and execution of mostly international operations with domination of police functions, technical assistance in the postwar period and coping with technogenic catastrophes. (shrink)

This collection of essays on policing and the use of force, while written over the course of the last twenty-five years, remains relevant and timely. Although issues in policing and questions about excessive force and brutality have been addressed by criminologists, sociologists, philosophers, and criminal justice ethicists, only a handful of theological ethicists treat this pressing matter. While the Christian moral tradition has a voluminous record of theological attention to violence and nonviolence, war and peace, there is a dearth (...) of references to policing. And most considerations of criminal justice issues by Christians and their churches concentrate on prison reform, or abolition, and the death penalty, but not policing. These essays, authored by a theological ethicist possessing professional experience in law enforcement, seek to fill this curious gap. They offer a framework for moral reasoning concerning the justification for police use of force and the just application of such force, and they propose just policing as a model that is consonant with promoting a just peace in communities and society. In addition, they explore the implications of such an approach for wider, international questions about just war, terrorism, the responsibility to protect, and post-war justice. (shrink)

This article demonstrates that ritual plays an ambivalent role in the interaction between religion and violence. Ritual triggers and gives meaning to violence, or it enforces peace and coexistence. The first part of the article defines the ambivalence of ritual in the context of violence. The second part surveys standard rituals of peace and violence from Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The third part focuses on the ambivalent nature of Orthodox Christian rituals.

Since the beginning of UN peace operations, there has been discussion as to exactly how they should be carried out. Thus far, a just theory of UN peacekeeping operations has not yet been formed, in the way a Theory of Just War for waging war or a theory of police ethics for law enforcement in a peace context had been formed. The article discusses what a justified risk distribution between UN peacekeepers and local civilians should be. One (...) of the points of criticism of UN peacekeeping missions is the lack of protection of the local population in the course of an escalating situation. Familiar examples are the traumas of Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995). Discussing differences between UN peacekeeping missions, warfare, and law enforcement, it appears that peacekeepers have more in common with law enforcers than with combatants during wartime. Through the method of analogy and by applying some typically military ethics principles, the moral status of the UN peacekeepers is analyzed. Finally, a risk distribution analysis between UN peacekeepers and the local population is carried out, by offering a concise overview by philosophers of arguments for and against taking fewer risks by peacekeepers. The analysis reveals important deontological and consequentialist arguments. Taking also into consideration that transferring more risk to the peacekeeping troops alone does not mandatory lead to less exposure to risk of the vulnerable and innocent local civilians, it can be concluded that a more practical, virtuous, responsible risk calculation will be necessary at that point to find the best risk distribution. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant is recognized as one of the first philosophers who wrote systematically about global justice and world peace. In the current debate on global justice he is mostly appealed to by critics of extensive duties of global justice. However, I show in this paper that an analysis of Kant’s late work on rights and justice provides ample resources for disagreeing with those who take Kant to call for only modest changes in global politics. Kant’s comments in the Doctrine (...) of Right clarify that he thinks we need a coercively enforced global civil condition. But his work also contains ideas that imply that within such a global legal order there must be no extreme forms of poverty and inequality, and that the current holdings of states are by no means conclusive possessions without confirmation by the global legal order we have a duty to establish. Thus, this paper challenges the prevailing interpretation of Kant as a conservative thinker about global justice that is held, for instance, by the leading contemporary liberal thinkers such as John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, and Ronald Dworkin. (shrink)

This article asks how military ethics should respond to adversaries deliberately conducting hostilities below the threshold of war. Three options are considered: a novel, limited force paradigm; an expanded hostilities paradigm, i.e., within the law of armed conflict; and an international law enforcement paradigm derived primarily from human rights law. None is problem-free. Mindful of under-deployed classic just war reasoning arguments for discrimination between vices opposed to peace, this article argues against an expanded hostilities paradigm and shows that (...) the retributive, ‘equilibrium of justice’ test used sometimes to support such an expansion is necessary but not sufficient. It explains the need for further examination of whether/how Aquinas and his interpreters can/should conceive of actions under the paradigm of war occurring against non-state actors. (shrink)

In the Western tradition citizenship is part of the good life, but can never be enforced on people. Some modern views see liberty as only a consumer or private ‘good’ detached from civic obligations. However, an education that creates a disposition to active citizenship is a necessary condition of free societies. Education is training and learning towards freedom, and freedom is closely linked to an understanding of the concept of the political as a matter of peaceful compromises of values and (...) interests. Understanding of general concepts fortified by practical activity is essential. It is suggested that any democratic political education (as in the present UK Government proposals) presupposes five ‘procedural values’: freedom, toleration, fairness, respect for truth, respect for reasoning. (shrink)

In the Western tradition citizenship is part of the good life, but can never be enforced on people. Some modern views see liberty as only a consumer or private ‘good’ detached from civic obligations. However, an education that creates a disposition to active citizenship is a necessary condition of free societies. Education is training and learning towards freedom, and freedom is closely linked to an understanding of the concept of the political as a matter of peaceful compromises of values and (...) interests. Understanding of general concepts fortified by practical activity is essential. It is suggested that any democratic political education (as in the present UK Government proposals) presupposes five ‘procedural values’: freedom, toleration, fairness, respect for truth, respect for reasoning. (shrink)

What do we know about war crimes and justice? What are the discursive practices through which the dominant images of war crimes, atrocity and justice are understood? In this wide ranging text, Michael J. Shapiro contrasts the justice-related imagery of the war crimes trial with?literary justice?: representations in literature, film, and biographical testimony, raising questions about atrocities and justice that juridical proceedings exclude. By engaging with the ambiguities exposed by the artistic and experiential genres, reading them alongside policy and archival (...) documentation and critical theoretical discourses, Shapiro?s War Crimes, Atrocity, and Justice challenges traditional notions of?responsibility? in juridical settings. His comparative readings instead encourage a focus on the conditions of possibility for war crimes as they arise from the actions of states, non-state agencies and individuals involved in arms trading, peace keeping, sex trafficking, and law enforcement and adjudication. Theory springs to life as Shapiro draws on examples from legal discourse, literature, media, film, and television, to build a nuanced picture of politics and the problem of justice. It will be of great interest to students of film and media, literature, cultural studies, contemporary philosophy and political science. (shrink)

This article contributes to the debate among just war theorists about the ethics of using armed drones in the war on terror. If violence of this kind is to be effectively restrained, it is necessary first to establish an understanding of its nature. Because it is difficult to conceptualize drone-based violence as war, there is concern that such violence is thus not captured by the traditional jus ad bellum framework. Drone strikes probably do not constitute a law enforcement practice, (...) so the peacetime ethics of criminal justice do not apply either. One possible solution is to develop and apply a legitimization framework of jus ad vim in which vim is “force short of war,” although this depends upon a vim–bellum distinction being a sustainable one. Moving beyond discussion of these three alternative concepts of drone-based violence, the article suggests a fourth—vis perpetua —and explores the ethical implications thereof. As a form of violence that presents no physical risk to individual users of force, a program of drone strikes poses a moral problem if it is intended to continue indefinitely, leading to the systematic endangerment of innocents without the eventual promise of peace. (shrink)

I finished the first draft of this lecture just before the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia began — a campaign that provides, I think, a prime example of the failure of international society. A double failure in this case: its political agencies were not able to respond in a timely fashion to the disaster of the former Yugoslavia, and then they were not able to find a more effective form of military intervention. The problem both times wasn't one of organization (...) but of political will, and I am afraid that I won't have much to say in this lecture about how to solve it. No doubt there are organizational structures that lend themselves to swift and strong action in a crisis.But these structures can as easily produce reckless and cruel acts as wise ones, and so we need to limit their powers. And then, properly limited, they may not act at all. This dilemma is an old one, and my way of dealing with it — which, as you will see, is to multiply structures and agents in the hope that somewhere, somehow, someone will do the right thing — will certainly seem inadequate. I concede immediately that I cannot produce an organizational chart showing how a decision to act rightly in international society would be deliberated, and decided, and then resolutely carried out. There is no such procedural or organizational solution; we have to think instead of a political strategy for coping with crises and for creating the sorts of agents that might cope successfully. That's my goal. It doesn't answer to the urgency of the daily news, but these days nothing could answer.I imagine the possible political arrangements of international society as if they were laid out along a continuum marked off according to the degree of centralization. Obviously, there are alternative markings: the recognition and enforcement of human rights could also be measured along a continuum, as could democratization, economic laissez-faire, welfare provision, pluralism, and so on. But I think that focusing on centralization is the best way of opening a discussion of international politics and the quickest way to reach all the other political and moral questions, above all the classical question: what is the best or the best possible regime? What constitutional goals should we set ourselves in an age of globalization?My plan is to present seven possible regimes or constitutions or political arrangements. I will do this discursively, without providing a list in advance, but I do want to list the criteria against which the seven arrangements have to be evaluated: these are their capacity to promote peace, distributive justice, cultural pluralism, and individual freedom. Obviously, within the scope of a single lecture, I will have to deal much too briefly and summarily with some of the arrangements and some of the criteria. This is especially regrettable since the criteria turn out to be inconsistent with, or at least in tension with, one another. So my argument will be complicated, and could be, probably should be, much more so. (shrink)

In this essay, I propose an interpretation of John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples that puts the stability of liberal societies as the central organizing idea of its principles. I start by critically examining other interpretations currently found in the literature. I observe two characteristics of Rawls’s conception of stability from his political turn: stability for the right reasons and in the right way. In the main body of the essay, I argue that the absence of a global egalitarian principle (...) is compatible with the stability of liberal peoples, that the toleration of decent peoples is conducive to the stability of liberal peoples, and that the universal enforcement of human rights and assistance to burdened societies are rationally required for the stability of liberal peoples. I clarify the meaning of the centrality of peace and stability, and explain why it is not conspicuous but still unsurprising given Rawls’s personal history and the development of his theory of international justice. I conclude by suggesting how the stability interpretation paves the way for further extensions of Rawls’s theory of justice and assessing the practical value of The Law of Peoples. (shrink)

Kant’s theory of international politics and his right of hospitality are commonly associated with expansive projects of securing human rights or cosmopolitan governance beyond state borders. This article shows how this view misunderstands Kant’s criticism of the law of nations tradition as handed down into the eighteenth century as well as the logic of his radical alternative, which was designed to explain the conditions of possibility of global peace as a solution to the Hobbesian problem of a war of (...) all against all in the state of nature. I resolve longstanding confusion over the meaning and justification of Kant’s right of “hospitality” by showing how it functions not as a freestanding positive claim demanding enforcement but as a way of ruling out specious justifications for war against those the traditional law of nations permitted one to label “enemies.” This poses important questions for contemporary theories of global justice. (shrink)

Given terrorism and the rise of military 'peace' operations, I argue for a pragmatic approach to justice and war. My argument results in three amendments to the received view of the war and justice model. I claim that Rules of Engagement (ROE) concerning self-defense for deploying forces in counter-terrorism or peace operations should be at least consistent with self-defense ROE employed by law enforcement officials operating domestically. Policymakers in determining deployments in support of such operations must therefore (...) deliberately decide, as part of their own ad bellum procedure, whether or not military ROE will be consistent with such a law enforcement baseline. I also argue that peace and counter-terrorism operations require an explicit acknowledgment of both the commanders' moral responsibility for force protection and the military members' moral justification to defend themselves fully. The method I employ in making my case is a detailed analysis of moral principle operative within three US realms of law--US Constitutional law, international law, and ROE--and through a close consideration of several recent US military operations. (shrink)

This study investigates what professional caregivers working in nursing homes consider to be a good life for residents suffering from dementia. Ten caregivers were interviewed; special attention was paid to the way in which they deal with conflicting values. Transcripts of the interviews were analysed qualitatively according to the method of grounded theory. The results were compared with those from a similar, earlier study on ideals found in mission statements of nursing homes. The concepts that were mentioned by most interviewed (...) participants as important for a good life were ‘peace and quiet’, ‘going along with subjective experience’ and ‘no enforcement: the way the resident wants it’. A considerable overlap was found between the interviews and the mission statements; however, when compared with the mission statements, the interviews put less emphasis on individuality and on giving meaning, and more on offering residents pleasant activities. When faced with conflicting values, caregivers tend to make pragmatic and more or less intuitive decisions. Although this has its merits, it may be desirable to stimulate conscious reflection regarding conflict between different values. (shrink)

International law has one principal mechanism for settling the legality of humanitarian interventions, the United Nations Security Council's power to authorise coercion. However, this is hardly satisfactory in practice and has failed to provide a more secure juridical basis for determining significant conflicts among states over when humanitarian force is justified. This article argues that, in spite of Immanuel Kant's limited analysis of intervention, and his silence on humanitarian intervention, his political theory provides the elements of a compelling analysis on (...) this topic. Five components of Kant's roadmap towards perpetual peace and an eventual world republic give conditional support for humanitarian intervention even in imperfect juridical conditions. This support is conditional on the achievement of juridical progress within and among states and has implications for the development of cosmopolitan citizenship. From Kant we learn that, ultimately, humanitarian intervention should become a matter of coercive law enforcement rather than an ethical question of ‘saving strangers’. (shrink)

The article defends the claim that if some laws are (or would be) widely accepted, this provides pro tanto moral reasons to support these laws and not to support otherwise better laws that are not widely accepted. In that sense the value of having widely accepted laws provides moral reasons to make compromises in politics, and it justifies a modest and qualified status quo bias. Widely accepted laws are valuable because they reduce enforcement costs, have symbolic value, help to (...) maintain peace, and realize the value of non-subjugation. (shrink)

On 25 May 1993 the United Nations Security Council took the extraordinary and unprecedented step of deciding to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as a mechanism for the restoration and maintenance of international peace and security. This was an extremely significant innovation in the use of mandatory enforcement powers by the Security Council, and the manifestation of an explicit link between peace and justice - politics and law. The establishment of ad hoc tribunals (...) for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda was followed by the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC in July 1998, the arrest of General Augusto Pinochet in London in October 1998, and the establishment of ad hoc tribunals in Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and East Timor, all of which pointed to an emerging norm of international criminal justice. The key to understanding this is the relationship between the political mandate and the judicial function. The Tribunal was established as a tool of politics, but it was a judicial, not a political tool.This book provides a systematic examination of the Tribunal, what it is, why it was established, how it functions, and where its significance lies. The central question is whether an international judicial institution, such as the Tribunal, can operate in a highly politicized context and fulfill an explicit political purpose, without the judicial process becoming politicized. Separate chapters chart the origins of the court, the process of establishment, jurisdiction, procedure, state co-operation, including obtaining custody of accused, and the role and function of the Chief Prosecutor. This last element is the key to the Tribunal's success in maintaining a delicate balancing act so that its external political function does not impinge on its impartial judicial status, and instead enhances its effectiveness. The book concludes with an assessment of the conduct of the Milosevic case to date. (shrink)

In this review essay, I offer reflections on three themes. I begin by exploring Alejandro Chehtman’s expressed methodological commitments. I argue that his views move him closer to Lon Fuller and away from the thin accounts offered by HLA Hart and Joseph Raz. Moreover, to make sense of his views, he must offer a more normatively robust theory of law. Second, I turn to his use of Raz’s theory of authority. I argue that Chehtman fails to distinguish between Raz’s views (...) and his own, but more importantly, I maintain that his discussion of Raz is superfluous: in the course of “unpacking” Raz’s views, he leads us back to his own core theses. Finally, I explore Chehtman’s ability to deal with perennial worries that plague any attempt to offer a justification for International Criminal Law in general, and the International Criminal Court in particular (i.e., “victor’s justice”, “show trials”, “peace vs. justice”). I argue that unless Chehtman is able to demonstrate that the enforcement of International Criminal Law is able to impart dignity and security on the most vulnerable, his account will be significantly weakened. (shrink)

A Defence of Chemical Warfare J B S Haldane Originally published in 1925 "Mr Haldane’s brilliant study." Times Leading Article "A book to be read by every intelligent adult." Spectator. This volume discusses the use of chemical weapons during the Second World War from the scientific viewpoint of the eminent bio-chemist, J B S Haldane and attempts to predict their use in conflicts of the future. 84pp Paris or the Future of War B H Liddell Hart Originally published in 1925. (...) "…a gem of close-thinking and deduction." Observer Liddell Hart was one of the twentieth century’s most respected military historians. In this volume he analyzes the causes of war, and the future of war, as well as examining the air, naval and army weapon and the evolution of "New Model Armies". 84pp. Janus: The Conquest of War A Psychological Inquiry William McDougall Originally published in 1927 "Among all the volumes in this series, none, I think is so weighty and impressive as this…" Evening Standard This volume covers lessons of the Great War, the Causes of War, Preventives of War, League to Enforce Peace, and International Air Force as a Prevention of War. 132pp Sinon Or the Future of Politics Edgar Ansel Mowrer Originally published in 1930 A striking analysis of politics and their future from a national and international standpoint. 86pp Typhoeus Or the Future of Socialism Arthur Shadwell Originally published in 1929 "Invaluable, a miracle of compression and illumination."Yorkshire Post This volume provides an analysis of the aims and prospects of Socialism, both in its political and economic aspects. 112pp. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that liberal democratic communities are justified in regulating the activities of their members because of the inevitable existence of conflicting conceptions of what is considered as morally right. This will often lead to tension and disputes, and in such circumstances, reliance on peaceful or orderly co‐existence will not normally suffice. In such pluralistic societies, the boundary between permissible and impermissible activities will be unclear; and this becomes a particular concern in controversial issues which raise specific (...) anxieties and uncertainty. One context that has repeatedly raised issues in this regard is that of biotechnology and, in particular, the recent stem cell debate, on which this paper concentrates. While such developments have the potential to make significant improvements to therapeutic progress, we should also be sceptical because predicting the impact of these developments remains uncertain and complex.For the sake of socio‐political stability, it will therefore be necessary to enact and enforce rules which limit these competing claims in public policy but which may not be compatible with what individual moral commitments ideally permit. One way to achieve this is to establish procedural frameworks to resolve potential disputes in the public sphere about what is right, wrong, or permissible conduct. I argue that for one to commit to authoritative regulation, an idea of harm prevention through state intervention is necessary; and that this requires optimum mechanisms of procedure which allow the individual the opportunity to compromise and yet to continue to oppose or fight for changes as demanded by his or her moral position. (shrink)

Criticisms of how police exercise their authority are neither new nor uncommon. Police officers have considerable power, and they often must draw on that power in complex and pressing circumstances. This collection of essays by fifteen leading specialists in ethics and criminal justice examines the nature of police discretion and its many varieties. The essays explore the kinds of judgment calls police officers frequently must make: When should they get involved? Whom should they watch? What constitutes a 'disturbance of the (...) peace'? What resources should be devoted to a situation? Does social welfare take precedence over law enforcement? Under what conditions, if any, may police officers engage in selective enforcement of the law? Each essay or pair of essays is followed by a response, making Handled with Discretion an excellent text for stimulating discussion in the classroom. (shrink)

Basedon several official pronouncements of the leading organs of the German Evangelical Church in the past decade on the ethical and internationallegal implications of the use of force either as collective action under the authority ofthe United Nations or by individual states, the article critically reviews the positions taken by the Church with regard to their consistency over time. In the early 1990s the Council of the German Evangelical Church clearly stated that peaceful means of conflict resolution generally take priority (...) over forceful means. However, in particular circumstances the use of force as ultima ratio cannot be ruled out. Recently, under the impact of the Iraq crisis, the positions taken were less strict. Due to a lack of a clear distinction between unilateral uses of force and enforcement action by the United Nations it remains unclear whether the Church still unequivocally holds on to its earlier ultima ratio stance. The paper argues that in view of the new challenges posed by global terrorism all social and political forces, including the churches, have to support the United Nations as the central institution for the maintenance of international peace and security which- inter aliis- requires the acceptance of the UN's competence to use enforcement measures in cases of grave breaches of peace including massive human rights violations as ethically and legally legitimate, provided the UN itself stays within the Iimits of the law. (shrink)

The Athenian expedition led against Macedonia by Archestratos, son of Lykomedes, early in 432 was not diverted from its destination by the revolt of Poteidaia. Archestratos had received additional instructions to enforce the Poteidaia ultimatum if he could, but, this being already impossible, he continued with the real object of his mission, the attack on Perdikkas II of Macedon. The widespread revolt among the Chalkidians had deprived the Athenians of the bases for this attack on which they might have reckoned, (...) and Archestratos had at the outset to make good this loss by recapturing Therme, at the head of the gulf to which it gave its name. Therme, or Serme, had been a tributary member of the Delian League since 450/449:2 it need not necessarily be said that it lay within Macedonia, as Poppo and Bergk inferred from Thucydides 1. 61. 2, but it is at least likely that it lay on the boundary, as it was handed over to Perdikkas under the agreement of 431 .3 However, that the Athenians could include in their Empire a city within Macedonian territory is shown from the position of Berge , and is likely in other cases, e.g. Haison. From Therme, Archestratos moved on to Pydna, presumably by sea, and laid siege to it. Here he was joined by substantial reinforcements, while at the same time the situation in Chalkidike became increasingly embarrassing, so that a peace and a reinsurance alliance were seen by both sides to be ‘imperative’ . When these had been concluded, the Athenians moved against Poteidaia. (shrink)

On September 30, the third anniversary of the military coup that overthrew the elected government of Haiti in 1991, jubilant crowds marched peacefully to celebrate the restoration of democracy, encouraged by the official U.S. declaration that the right of peaceful demonstration would be protected by the 20,000 troops who had entered Haiti on September 19 under an agreement between former President Jimmy Carter and General Raoul Cedras. That was, in fact, one of the major goals of the U.S. intervention to (...) restore democracy, the press reported. The demonstrators were attacked, beaten bloody, and scattered by armed gunmen. "The bodies of dead Haitians keep piling up," one Western diplomat said, just as they had the day before when a grenade exploded at a celebration of the return of the elected mayor of Port-au-Prince. U.S. officials complained "that Haitian police could no longer be trusted to enforce law and order," the press reported, "but would not say if US forces would assume responsibility." "It would be very difficult to rely on the police to provide security given the fact they haven't provided any security so far," U.S. Embassy spokesman Stanley Schrager said, apparently surprised that the U.S.-trained police are acting as they have always done in the past. (shrink)

Many individuals domestically and internationally who strive for peace and justice are concerned about the new National Security Strategy issued by the George W. Bush Administration in September 2002. 1 William Galston, for example, writes in a recent issue of Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly: A global strategy based on the new Bush doctrine of preemption means the end of the system of international institutions, laws and norms that we have worked to build for more than a half a (...) century. To his credit, Kissinger recognizes this; he labels Bush’s new approach “revolutionary” and declares, “Regime change as a goal for military intervention challenges the international system.” 2 Does the new Bush doctrine end the international legal system? Is the new Bush doctrine making policy declarations that are unprecedented in United States history? While I share many of the concerns critics are expressing about the new national security strategy, I contend that the more serious issue is not the ways in which this strategy represents a departure from those of prior United States presidential administrations but the actual practices of the Bush administration that appeal to this strategy. I will indicate how this new national security strategy does not represent much of a shift in policy, capability, or practice. Instead, this strategy Bush is using the strategy as an enabling device for a disturbing resurgence of United States global imperialism that serves interests that are actually opposed to the political rhetoric of the value of nations aiming for democracy and a market economy. I conclude by commenting on pursuing genuinely democratic values. I suggest that if the United States were truly committed to democratic values, then any military interventions would require the prior consent of the people. Otherwise what the United States refer to as “bringing democracy” to a people will be more like a militarily enforced authoritarianism that too closely resembles old-style exploitive imperialism. (shrink)

"Get a behind-the-scenes glimpse of what it takes to change the world in this comprehensive biography that tells the complete life story of internationally renowned peacemaker Nelson Mandela. Civil rights activist. World leader. Writer. Throughout his life, Nelson Mandela took on many roles, all in the pursuit of peace. Born in 1918 in South Africa, he grew up in a culture of government-enforced racism and became involved in the anti-apartheid movement at a young age. Deeply committed to nonviolent activism, (...) Mandela directed a peaceful campaign against the racist policies of his South African government, and spent twenty-seven years in prison as a result. In the years following his emergence as a free man, he continued his efforts to dismantle the country's apartheid system and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize alongside South African President F.W. de Klerk. In 1994 he was inaugurated as South Africa's first black president and served until his retirement from active politics in 1999 at the age of eighty-one. He continued to promote global peace until his death in 2013, and his legacy lives on. From Nelson Mandela's childhood to his monumental impact on race relations and nonviolent activism, this comprehensive biography shares the truth about the man behind the iconic smile: his struggles, his triumphs, and the sacrifices along the way"--. (shrink)

This Paper suggests that the answer to the question “what is domestic labor law for?”—commonly regarded as securing “justice against markets” or a justified tax on market activity—has informed the search for the answer for the question “what is international labor law for.” This is reflected in what this Paper refers to as P2, which provides that “the failure of any country to adopt humane conditions of labor is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve (...) the conditions in their own countries.” P2 envisions a “race to the bottom” by rational states trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The author maintains that this cannot be the objective of ILO which cannot stop “the race” given its deficient enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance. This Paper suggests an alternative raison d’etre for the ILO, which is called P1, namely social justice: “universal peace can only be established if it is based upon social justice.” P1 reflects what states actually seek to achieve. Following Sen, this Paper suggests that there is no tradeoff between social justice and economic efficiency. Therefore the promotion of labor rights by the ILO will contribute both to social justice and to economic success. Thus the ILO should promote international labor law so as to lead member states to pursue their self-interest which is consistent with the collective goal of humanity. (shrink)

Ordered social life requires rules of conduct that help generate and preserve peaceful and cooperative interactions among individuals. The problem is that these social rules impose costs. They prohibit us from doing some things we might see as important and they require us to do other things that we might otherwise not do. The question for the contractarian is whether the costs of these social rules can be rationally justified. I argue that traditional contract theories have tended to underestimate the (...) importance of evaluating the cost of enforcement and compliance in the contract procedure. In addition, the social contract has been understood narrowly as a method of justifying specifically moral or political rules. I defend a broader version of contractarianism as a justificatory model that can be used to evaluate any set of social rules or institutions that impose costson agents. In so doing, I argue that contractarianism is a general method of evaluating and justifying the rules that order the structure of social life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhism and the Idea of Human Rights:Resonances and Dissonances1Perry Schmidt-LeukelIn 1991 L.P.N. Perera, Professor of Pāli and Buddhist Studies in Sri Lanka, published a Buddhist commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this commentary Perera tries to show that, in the Pāli canon, i.e. the canonical scripture of Theravāda Buddhism, for every single article of the Human Rights Declaration a substantial parallel or at least a statement (...) with a similar tendency can be found. Indeed, says Perera, Article 1, which affirms the dignity and rights of all humans, "is in complete accord with Buddhist thought, and may be said to be nothing new to Buddhism in conception" (Perera 1991:21). In contrast, the Buddhist Peter Junger, Professor of Law at the University of Cleveland, Ohio, judged in 1995 that... though followers of Buddhist traditions do value most, if not all, of the interests underlying the rhetoric of human rights, they may not have much use for the label itself, which is, after all, a product of the traditions of Western Europe and the parochial histories of that region.(Junger 1998: 56)Junger goes on to say that "the concept of human rights is not likely to be useful in...following the Buddha Dharma" (Junger 1998: 55).Thus Perera and Junger agree that the content of the various human rights is acceptable for Buddhists. However, they disagree strongly in their evaluation of the idea of human rights in itself. In this respect Damien Keown has rightly argued that the crucial question on 'Buddhism and Human Rights' is not so much whether Buddhism can accept any particular human right but rather whether the idea of human rights as such can find a philosophical justification within the "overall Buddhist vision of individual and social good" (Keown 1998: 24).It is this problem that I would like to pursue in this paper. In the first part I will sketch some basic characteristics of the idea of human rights. In the second part I will point out what resonances this idea finds in Buddhism or by which Buddhist concepts the human rights idea can be justified. And finally, in the third part, I will deal [End Page 33] with the question of potential dissonances between the idea of human rights and Buddhist concepts.On the Nature of Human RightsWith the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the various subsequent human rights conventions the rights of individuals were for the first time inscribed into international law, which had previously recognised only collectives as legal subjects. By formulating universal rights as valid for every individual human being regardless of race, colour, sex, religion, birth, etc. the Universal Declaration points to the most important feature of the idea of human rights: the protection of the individual or, to be more precise, the protection of the individual against powerful institutions of the state, society, religion or others. It is individual self-determination and free agency that are protected through human rights. Human rights define the minimum of what is necessary in order to guarantee the freedom of individual agency and the freedom of self-determination. By the definition of inalienable rights,2 the idea of human rights sets limits to those collectives and institutions in which we usually live, limits which for the sake of the basic liberty of the individual are not to be transgressed. Michael Ignatieff summarises this understanding of human rights with the words: "rights exist to protect individuals" (Ignatieff 2001: 67), and "they are worth having only if they can be enforced against institutions like the family, the state, and the church" (Ignatieff 2001: 66f.). Therefore "moral individualism" is "the core of the Universal Declaration" (Ignatieff 2001: 66).It is true that the further development of the human rights debate, particularly within the context of the United Nations, has led to an extension of the idea of human rights to collective rights and collective legal entities by including among human rights, for example, a nations' right to self-determination and the right to peace and the right to development. However, in my opinion it would be highly... (shrink)

The protection of rights of freedom of speech and assembly for gays and lesbians in Poland has come under greater international scrutiny because of the mismanagement of peaceful demonstrations throughout Poland in 2005. An overview and context of the political, economic, and social transformation of Poland in the 1990s shows a flourish of activity among gays and lesbians as the economic and political spheres open, as well as weaker law enforcement during the rapid change to capitalism and democracy. Although (...) society has opened dramatically and tolerance has grown recently, the concept of protecting minority rights for gays and lesbians in Poland continues to be weak in public opinion, laws, and the top sources of opinion. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is to show through the analysis of some recent publications, art exhibitions, trials and other types of discourse, who is considered to be “an enemy” in Russia today and how law enforcement and the judiciary respond to so called “threats,” emanating from the constructed enemies. The analysis reveals some dangerous tendencies in the formation of a common identity for people living in Russia. For instance, search for a “national idea,” “traditional roots,” “patriotism,” and “distinctive (...) nature,” aimed at the formation of this common identity and strengthening the state, is implemented in a way, which leads to the exclusion of ‚others’ and thus undermines the possibility to lay the foundation for the multicultural state based on peace, harmony and tolerance. Russia must become a common house for all ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities living in it, and no one representing them should be in a position of the less favored and less protected. National identity in a multinational state can be only a plural identity, providing for the possibility of living in several communities simultaneously. (shrink)