Feminist Policymaking in Turbulent Times offers a unique and timely reflection of the critical debates around the institutionalisation of feminist and gender-focused ideas and norms into policy. Many states and non-governmental organisations are increasingly invested in 'feminist policymaking' at the domestic and international levels. Yet, this liberal (feminist) agenda is also vastly disputed by critical, intersectional and decolonial voices on the one hand, and by anti-gender movements around the world on the other. Indeed, while opposition to 'gender ideology' is (...) mounting from reactionary, religious and secular forces, feminist policymaking is also being challenged in important ways from within. Thus, this book situates feminist policymaking in a challenging and 'turbulent', global context. This book explores feminist policymaking in multiple areas of policy, examining various gender-focused programmes that states and international organisations have undertaken in the last decade, offering critical interventions and rethinking the relationship between feminism and policy. The book not only reflects on the advances of feminist policymaking globally, but also critically assesses the intersectional challenges embedded within it and lying ahead. It moves the field forward by creating opportunities, based on lived experiences, for re-imagining the transformative potential of the nexus between feminism and policymaking. Interdisciplinary in scope and bringing to the fore the voices of both academics and practitioners, the book is the product of an international collaboration, forging links and dialogue that are increasingly necessary to question some of the exclusionary, militaristic and hierarchical assumptions of policymaking which is labelled as feminist. Feminist Policymaking in Turbulent Times will be of interest to all scholars, students and practitioners interested in the role of gender in policymaking and concerned with contestations around gender-focused projects. (shrink)

Modern democracy is impossible without political parties. They are necessary in the process of the construction of the political class and building of relations between politicians and ‘ordinary people’. So, in Poland in the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries the significance of parties is also very important. Their history is older than the history of the reborn Poland. Especially in Galicia, an autonomous province of the Hapsburg empire, we can see the activities of many politicians. A part of them in (...) 1895 declared the birth of the Popular Party which is a constant element of the Polish political scene. The second traditional current is the socialistic movement, which is also always legally active in Poland. These two camps represent, in simplification, the ‘two Polands’—the first more traditional, conservative and provincial, and the second more progressive, ‘European’ and urban. Actually, in the typical consciousness of a Polish citizen, the political representation of the ‘black’ country is the party Law and Justice of Jarosław Kaczyński, and the ‘red’ country admires the Citizen Platform with Donald Tusk as a leader. But probably the idea of a twoparty system, like in the Anglo-Saxon world, is still very distant to reality, because in the European continent, the tradition of pluralism in a policentric version is still very significant. In Poland, even in the period of the ‘real socialism’ this conception of the organization of political life was realized, though naturally in the specific version. There were three legal parties and the Polish United Workers’ Party (the PUWP) was the most important. From 1976, the PUWP in the light of the Constitution had the official hegemony in the Republic. It is possible to compare this situation with the period 1926–39, when, after the coup d’état by Marshal Piłsudski, the Government still won in the election and the official elite wanted to create a stable political force with a perspective of permanent rule. But we must remember that between the wars opposition always was legal. In our times of demoliberalism, this is quite normal (though under the Constitution, unconstitutional parties, for example, communist or fascist, are unacceptable); however, interesting is the fact that when you observe sine ira et studio the evolutional trend of the Polish political system, you easily find the tendency of the ‘stabilization’ of the party system in the way of legal operations. From 1997, the laws concerning political parties have changed the possibilities of the conquest of seats in the Seym. Actually, only the parties having 5 per cent (or 8 per cent in coalition) of votes can gain the representation in the Diet. So it is possible to claim that the little parties today are in a more complicated situation than in the first years after the ‘operation of Round Table’ in 1989. The contemporary system is maybe more stable, but less liberal. There are theoreticians who note the danger of the alienation of the political class in the situation of the renewal of the alienation of the political elite, which de facto is more connected with the state than with the society. Many theoreticians emphasize that in the future the role and the character of political structures will be profoundly different from today. Maybe they are prophets, but we can expect that the Polish political parties or ‘post-parties’ and also political structure as a whole will have many similarities with their actual equivalents, because the mentality of the Polish nation, including the politicians, is more or less enduring. (shrink)

This paper articulates a functionalist account of intra-party democracy (IPD). Like realist critics, we insist that IPD practices be evaluated on the basis of whether they facilitate resistance to domination and capture at the level of the polity as a whole, and therefore accept certain realist worries about IPD. Yet realists neglect the possibility that wealthy interests could control the political agenda by capturing all viable parties simultaneously-and that mass-facing IPD could counter this threat of oligarchic agenda capture. Taking (...) this as the key function of IPD within broader democratic systems, we conclude that inclusionary party reform is less urgent in more flexible party systems, where dissenters are better able to resist this threat from within the framework of inter-party competition. Regardless of the context, meanwhile, we also conclude that mass-facing IPD practices should aim at enabling ordinary members and supporters of a party to resist agenda capture by oligarchic interests. Though we stop short of defending any particular set of reforms, we reject the emphasis of recent IPD advocates on individualized forms of deliberative participation, in favor of a more oppositional and collectively-oriented approach-on the grounds that the latter is more likely to encourage the development of effective institutions of countervailing power. (shrink)

The ascendance of populism to power in various liberal democracies around the world triggered vigorous public debates. More often than not, scholars, politicians and analysts warn of the dangers populism poses to democracy and its institutions, expecting populism to turn authoritarian once in government. Viewing populism as a feature of the opposition alone, others argue that populism in government is not meant to last - but rather consolidated into the mainstream of political and party systems. This chapter provides (...) a critical overview of the literature on populism in power, putting into scrutiny dominant theoretical paradigms in the field of so-called populism studies. It discusses the multi-faceted trajectories populist actors globally may take in their transition from opposition to power. It concludes that distinct types of populist actors have distinct implications on democracy depending on factors such as ideology and context. (shrink)

One under-theorized aspect of "multiculturalism and the antidiscrimination principle" is religious and ethnicity based political parties. With political organization, the fact of pluralism is made concrete for democratic purposes. When the struggle for empowerment is "waged within the world of democratic politics" it is waged through parties. That is the associational form modern democracies have settled on for participation, representation, and governing, and for countervailing power and regular opposition. Particularist parties and bloc voting are key instruments of political conflict (...) and, as important, of political integration. This Paper looks at the challenges these parties pose to democracy; specifically, at the principal reasons given for banning parties from participation in electoral politics. I identify four categories of justification for disqualification: violent overthrow, incitement to hate, altering the character of the nation, and outside support or control. This is a preliminary to setting out regulative principles of "defensive democracy.". (shrink)

Niche parties have been increasingly successful during the last 30 years and have accordingly received a lot of scholarly attention. So far most of the focus has been on Green and radical right parties, and to a more limited extent, regional parties. In this paper I analyze the electoral fates and policy outcomes of another type of niche party, namely those focusing on anti-corruption, whose successes culminated during the 2000s. The study is limited to all new parties campaigning on (...) the issue of anti-corruption in Central and Eastern Europe since the fall of the Berlin wall and the questions to be answered are: To what extent are these parties successful in obtaining relevant positions in the government so that they are able to effectively fight corruption? What impact do they have on anti-corruption measures, thereby influencing the level of corruption? How successful are these parties in the elections that follow? In short, to what extent do anticorruption parties matter? Apart from electoral and governmental data, the analysis is based on the Freedom House Nation in Transit annual reports, in which one section deals with the efforts to curb corruption. The results are rather mixed, but indicate that the more influential positions the anti-corruption parties (ACPs) have in government, the better are their anti-corruption performances. That implies that they are serious and competent enough to tackle those issues, despite their newness and lack of experience. Not surprisingly, the incumbent ACPs fare worse than those in opposition in subsequent elections, but quite a few still remain popular. Finally, all but one party abandoned their anti-corruption rhetoric in their second election, which implies that anti-corruption is a different type of issue, compared to the ones used by previous niche parties. (shrink)

The distinguished historian Steven Pincus has recently argued that “Patriotism” was a distinctive ideology in the middle of the eighteenth century that indicated “governmental activism” and support for “the British way of governing, grounded in the principles set forth in England’s Revolution of 1688–89.” By contrast, this essay shows that “Patriot” was more commonly used as a generic term for opposition politicians in eighteenth-century Britain. Moreover, for much of the century, the term was frequently associated with a slightly more (...) precise and substantial set of political arguments: those associated with the “Country party” platform. In its eighteenth-century guise, the Country party’s raison d’être was opposition to the growth of executive power since the Glorious Revolution. It was not a party as such but rather an opposition stance and a set of principles which occasionally brought together Tories, Whigs, and independent Country gentlemen as well as self-proclaimed Patriots. In the eighteenth century, “the Country” was especially scathing of the “financial revolution” and the growth of the fiscal-military state in the years after 1688–1689. By its continuous association with the Country party tradition, Patriotism and suspicion of the growth of executive power and government finance were intimately linked. (shrink)

The scene takes place in O'Higgins Park, in Santiago, Chile, on 1 October 1995. Some women have just taken their place on the stage and the enthusiastic audience is applauding, the women have started singing accompanied by a guitar, but they cannot be heard, for the audience is still applauding. One of the women gets up. Like the others, she is wearing a white blouse and a long black skirt, she is old and her hair is grey. She moves to (...) the front of the stage, chooses her place and stops, her eyes search the horizon but do not wander aimlessly, her eyes are fixed somewhere between the here and the hereafter. When she finds what she is looking for, she raises her right hand to wave a white handkerchief, and the dance begins. The audience, suddenly attentive, watches. And what do they see? Not the woman alone on the stage, but the empty space which she traces. The empty space disturbs us, as Chilean spectators, because the cueca, the national folklore dance, is danced by two people, or it is not danced at all. The invisible other is invoked by this woman's every gesture and we do not smile when faced with the absence of her man because we have a premonition that she is not pretending, we have a premonition that she can see him. The image of women dancing alone has become one of the symbols of the struggle of the families of the disappeared under the dictatorship of General Pinochet. The families are commemorating, on 1 October 1995, the twentieth anniversary of their organization into an association in 1975. The term “the disappeared” has progressively become accepted to indicate the victims of a novel, coercive practice in Chile, since the coup d’état on 11 September 1973. The forced disappearance of people differs from political assassination, as Amnesty International never ceases to indicate in the various reports which it commissions on them. In the Chilean case, this speciality is in part due to the security system which has taken on the responsibility of destroying all organized opposition to the military dictatorship: the DINA, the intelligence service created by the military junta, which is only answerable for its actions to the junta. More fundamentally, the special character of disappearance is due to the invisibility of the victim's body and to the doubt that this invisibility arouses within the victim's family circle: the disappeared is not identified as dead because his death is never certified, on the other hand his sudden and unexplained absence indicates that he is a person in danger and that this danger extends to all those who notice his absence. (shrink)

One of the proofs expressing certain knowledge in fiqh method is ijma. There are hardly any scholars who do not accept that ijma is evidence. It is reported that the first person who objected to this was Mu'tazilî İbrahim en-Nazam. The group that does not accept it as a sect are the scholars who belong to the Imamiyya. It is possible to say that mujtahid scholars have been unanimous since the first period mujtahids on the fact that ijmā is evidence, (...) with a few exceptions. Although there is no significant disagreement about the fact that ijma is evidence, the scholars differed on the details of ijma's types, conditions, proofs, and the number of people who would agree on ijma. One of the issues discussed by the scholars of the methodology is the effect of ijmaa when one or more people oppose the majority of the mujtahids. While some of the methodists think that the opposition of the minority against the alliance of the majority will not harm the ijma, the majority of them argue that all mujtahids must be of the same opinion in order for the ijma to be formed. Basically, it can be said that these two approaches argue with each other, but there are also proceduralists who deal with the issue differently. Some scholars take into account the attitude of the majority towards them in an issue opposed by one or a few people. According to these scholars, if the majority does not oppose the opinion of the minority, then ijma cannot be mentioned. Because this shows that the majority also respect the opposing view. If the majority does not respect or even oppose the opinion of the minority, then the consensus of the majority becomes ijma. The arguments generally used in these discussions are the same. Usulists defend their theses based on the opposing views of some of the Companions, especially Ibn Abbas. Those who do not see the opposition of the minority as an obstacle to ijma, argue that although one or more of the Companions had dissenting views, as in the example of Ibn Abbas on riba and mut'a, the consensus of the other Companions is the ijma of the scholars. Likewise, those who argue that this is an obstacle to ijma, as well as Ibn 'Abbas's opposition to the opinion of the populace on awl, was an obstacle to the formation of ijma on an issue agreed by the other Companions. This study deals with the discussions and the arguments used by the parties. However, firstly, the information value and conditions of ijma, which is thought to be closely related to these discussions, are briefly presented. In the study, the explanations of the scholars of different sects, who were not content with the works of a certain school, were examined and tried to be evaluated. As a result, it should be noted that it is the prevailing view that the opposition of the minority against the majority will prevent the formation of ijma, based on the conditions put forward in order for ijma to be conclusive evidence. However, it has come to the conclusion that whether the opposing view of the minority is taken into account by other scholars is effective in the formation of ijma. (shrink)

The Malaysian electoral behaviour has for some time reflected the thesis. Since 1999, however, there has been a marked shift towards . Analyses of electoral and survey data reveal that although a significant number of Malaysian voters remained attached to the party they identified with, most of the electorate, however, are swayed by short-term factors. Though the economic issues played a role in the three elections, it is the leadership of the parties supplemented by the use of mass media (...) that played a significant role in swinging the vote from one party to the other. The three elections in 1999, 2004, and 2008 can be categorized as evidence of secular dealignment: the 1999 elections substantially reduced the margin of gain by the ruling coalition; the 2004 elections reversed the opposition gain, while the 2008 elections resulted in the loss of two-thirds majority seats in the parliament habitually enjoyed by the ruling coalition and the emergence of a strong opposition coalition. This trend not merely continued but was much more stronger in the 13th Malaysian general election. (shrink)

In 2007, the Ethics and Governance Council of the UK Biobank commissioned a Report on ‘Concepts of Public Good and Pubic Interest in Access Policies’. This study considered the Biobank’s role as a ‘public good’ in respect to supporting and promoting health throughout society. However, the conditions under which access by third parties to UK Biobank are justified in the public interest have not been well considered. In this article, I propose to analyse the conditions that should allow such access. (...) My argument develops UK Biobank’s function as a ‘public good’ and in terms of its responsibilities as a public health institution; both to protect the rights of the participants and in having a role in reinforcing public goals. Although these two tasks may conflict, it is possible that resolute opposition to some third-party access demands—if properly justified in terms of a public interest—will be damaging to, rather than protective of, participants’ rights. To illustrate my argument, I consider the appropriate response to an extraordinary public emergency , such as a serious criminal investigation or disaster response, in terms of an ethical access policy. (shrink)

In this essay I consider the potential of Machiavelli’s Florentine Histories to contribute to the enrichment of contemporary democratic theory. In opposition to both of the major groups of current interpreters of this text—those who see it as representative of a conservative turn in Machiavelli’s thought grounded in a newfound skepticism regarding popular political competencies, and those who see it as merely a re-presentation of the republican commitments of the Discourses on Livy—I argue that it reveals to us a (...) unique political potentiality, but one that is essential for the construction of an internally consistent Machiavellian theory of democracy. Specifically, through disclosing the historicity and contingency of the humors of the parts of the city, the Histories suggests the possibility of concretely actualizing a condition of social equality, thus overcoming the main democratic deficit of the Discourses—the perpetuation of inequality, as represented in the preservation of the existence of a class with a desire to oppress. (shrink)

This paper investigates why some legislators tend to switch parties frequently while others tend to stay put. On the assumption that the ultimate goal of legislators is to be reelected, I argue that voters' demands for local/individual benefits, or pork, and legislators' lack of access to resources for such benefits are likely to lead the legislators to switch parties in order to improve their electoral chances in the subsequent election. By analyzing party switches by legislators from 1988 to 2008 (...) in South Korea, where the president controls access to the pork pipeline, I find that the president's party members are less likely and independents are more likely to change party affiliations, irrespective of voter demands for pork or national public policies. However, I also find that opposition party legislators who are elected from less-developed districts, where voters tend to desire pork over policy, are more likely to switch parties than those elected from more-developed districts. These findings suggest that interaction between voter demands and party access to resources influences politicians’ party loyalty: voter demands for pork (or policy) tend to lead politicians to be less (or more) loyal to their current parties. Voter demands, however, have little impact on the party loyalty of those who are already in parties with access to the pork pipeline. (shrink)

The Democratic Party government, covering the period 1950-60, is seen as one of the most important stages on the road to democracy in Turkey. The Republican People’s Party, which ruled the country from the proclamation of the republic in 1923 to the end of World War II, found itself in opposition for the first time after the 1950 elections, and thus Turkish democracy was given a first chance to stand on its own feet. This work aims to (...) read the era through the eyes of French diplomats, giving an external and disinterested perspective on DP power and the Menderes government, a critical time in the history of Turkish democracy. The study is based on the thoughts and analysis about the DP’s representation of democracy and attitudes towards opposition from 1956 to the coup on May 27, 1960 written down by the 69th and 70th French ambassadors to Turkey, Jean Paul Garnier and Henry Spitzmuller. The reports that Garnier and Spitzmuller sent to Paris contain harsh criticism of the Menderes government for its authoritarian and anti-democratic practices and for its religious policies. These criticisms provide us with important clues about the ways in which the DP transformed the fundamental principles and policies of the Atatürk era. (shrink)

Private certification as a means of risk regulation and quality assurance can offer advantages over government regulation, including superior technical expertise, better inspection and monitoring of regulated entities, increased responsiveness to consumers, and greater efficiency. This Article examines two examples of reliable private certification in regulatory arenas - fire safety and kosher food - where political opposition and resource constraints have frustrated government regulatory efforts. The Article identifies key features of reliable private certification and analyzes its comparative institutional advantages (...) over government regulation. Critics of private certification question its legitimacy, asserting that private regulation is less participatory, transparent, and accountable than government regulation. The Article responds to these claims, arguing that the two examples of private certification presented here compare favorably with government regulation based on these criteria of legitimacy. (shrink)

Within a one-dimensional spatial framework, we deduce that partiesto go negative’, by blaming alleged insufficiencies of the rival concerning commonly shared values, increase with their ideological proximity. We test our hypothesis by considering the long period of no-cabinet alternation that characterized both Italy and Japan. In particular, we focus on the (spatial) incentives of the Italian Communist Party and of the Japanese Socialist Party to emphasize on a particular topic related to negative campaigning, i.e. political corruption issues. The (...) status of the perennial opposition held by both parties, together with the existence of several political corruption scandals during the period considered, makes the Italian and the Japanese political systems particularly apt to test our hypothesis. The results, based on data derived from electoral programs, support our theoretical insights. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to highlight the clientelistic strategies and informal practices that the ruling political parties in Albania use during the elections to ensure an unfair advantage in their favour over the opposition challengers. One of the main characteristics of the political developments of the transition period in Albania since 1991 has been the flourishing of informal practices and clientelist networks of political parties within state structures, which has produced an extreme politicization of these institutions. These (...) strategies that in general terms we label as “clientelistic” and that have been used to a large extent by the incumbent political parties have had a direct negative impact on the conduct of free and fair elections in Albania by distorting their main goal: to reflect the will of the people. This is because such clientelist strategies, together with the informal practices/mechanisms that accompany them, have influenced the creation of an unlevelled playing field, and have produced a hyperincumbency advantage in the electoral contests between political parties in Albania. The case of the recent elections held in Albania on 25 April 2021 will be the empirical case of this study, in which are evidenced the electoral containment strategies and practices that the ruling political party used to provide an unfair advantage in its favour and to secure its grip on power. (shrink)

In an effort to theorize educational logics that are oppositional to capitalism, this article explores what it means to study like a communist. I begin by drawing out the tight connection between learning and capitalism, demonstrating that education is not a subset but a motor of political-economic relations. Next, I turn to the concept of study, which is being developed as an educational alternative to learning. While studying represents an educational challenge to capitalism, I argue that there are political limitations (...) to studying for which we need to account. Specifically, studying is not in itself political, but only represents the possibility of politics. To make this claim and to address these limitations, I turn to Jodi Dean’s work on the communist Party. Dean posits the Party not as a master, director, or prophet, but as an infrastructure of affective intensity that maintains a gap in the order of things. I show that the Party is one way to organize and to defend study. Throughout the article, I illuminate the ways in which educational philosophers can contribute to political movement building by showing, developing, and refining the educational components of politics that many organizers and theorists neglect. (shrink)

Dewey’s philosophy of education was heavily criticized by the Chinese Communist Party in the 1950s, which led many to believe that Dewey’s education was in complete opposition to that of the CCP. However, this study intends to prove that Dewey had a tremendous influence on the early CCP members of the 1920s. Dewey’s Chinese visit closely coincided highly with the time of the reception of Marxism in China and the eventual establishment of the CCP. Both founders of the (...) CCP had close personal relationships with Dewey, and Chen even tried to practice Dewey’s educational ideas in Southern China. As a graduate of a normal school, Mao Zedong also read and practiced Dewey’s educational philosophy. Many other CCP members read Dewey in the 1920s and then became left-wing revolutionaries. Though Dewey himself did not stand with Marxism, his idea that education is an agent of social reform paved the way for Marxism in China in theoretical and practical aspects. When an educational theory is spread abroad, it is often not accepted in a fundamentalist way, but rather in a process of collision and integration with the local tradition. (shrink)

Is there a political philosophy of conservatism? A history of the phenomenon written along sceptical lines casts doubt on the existence of a transhistorical doctrine, or even an enduring conservative outlook. The main typologies of conservatism uniformly trace its origins to opposition to the French Revolution. Accordingly, Edmund Burke is standardly singled out as the ‘father’ of this style of politics. Yet Burke was de facto an opposition Whig who devoted his career to assorted programmes of reform. In (...) restoring Burke to his original milieu, the argument presented here takes issue with 20th-century accounts of conservative ideology developed by such figures as Karl Mannheim, Klaus Epstein and Samuel Huntington. It argues that the idea of a conservative tradition is best seen as a belated construction, and that the notion of a univocal philosophy of conservatism is basically misconceived. (shrink)

This paper has aimed to remedy a neglect of multi-party disputes by addressing how those involved in a two-party argument may collaborate with others who are co-present. Collaboration is a complex phenomenon. In the first place, we have seen that disputes, although initially produced by two parties, do not consist simply of two sides. Rather, given one party's displayed position, stance, or claim, another party can produce opposition by simply aligning against that position or by (...) aligning with a counterposition. This means that parties can dispute a particular position for different reasons and by different means. It is therefore possible for several parties to serially oppose another's claim without achieving collaboration. A second complexity, then, is just that collaboration is a negotiated phenomenon. For example, while it is possible for an outside party to produce an uninvited alignment display that is sympathetic to an already-stated position in a two-party dispute, the party whose position it supports can agree or disagree with that display. Thus, outsiders' uninvited alignment displays that occur subsequent to those of the insiders or principals in a two-party dispute must be considered as collaboration offers, which can be accepted or rejected. But that is not the end of it, for an outside party can offer alignments that now align with a principal party's position and then, addressing a different aspect of the principal's talk, align against it. Finally, in addition to being offered, collaboration can also be solicited. A principal in a two-party dispute solicits collaboration by inviting an outsider to display an alignment favorable to inviter's own position or to participate in a joint activity that supports that stance. Such solicits can be accepted, rejected, or, again, handled in such a way as to exhibit neutrality. Argumentative collaboration, in short, is a specific, momentary, and delicate state of affairs that is also an organized, technical achievement.The fact that the subjects for this study were children has become submerged in the formal analysis of alignment structures and collaboration. Thus, following this research, two directions can be pursued. One would be to ask how children's arguments differ from those occurring among adults. A reasoned answer would be that matters of substance or content may distinguish disputes among youthful persons from those occurring among older ones, while the forms of disputing remain relatively invariant (Maynard, 1985a, 1985b). In other words, by studying multi-party disputes among first-grade children, we learn about the structure of collaboration as a generic phenomenon among at least practitioners of standard English no matter what their age. This claim can be sustained in part because the analysis presented here depends upon deriving a priori conventional relations between utterances, rather than statistical relations between variables (Coulter, 1983). We have not examined exogenous influences — which would include the age characteristics of participants — on disputes, but rather the endogenously-produced structure of argumentative discourse. Still, the claim that patterns of collaboration are generic to children and adults can be examined with further research on multi-party disputes among different age groups.Another, more radical, research orientation, would be to consider, in any social arena where the members are identified as children, how it is that such a ‘membership category’ (Sacks, 1972) is relevant. If that query is made, then research on ‘children's arguments’ would involve investigating formal practices for exhibiting the accountable category ‘children’ as much as it would mean describing the ways that disputing is done. Those who have studied children's arguments, in Pollner's (1979) terms, have treated ‘children’ as a social fact, a ‘thing,’ rather than as a socially organized meaning, or ‘ing.’To attend to the -ing of things involves a radical modification of the attitude of daily life, for it requires attending to the processes of constitution in lieu of the product thus constituted (Pollner, 1979: 253, fn. 11).In short, we have treated arguments as the important event without also seeing how it is that the category ‘children’ is constituted as a recognizable feature of and within the research setting. (shrink)

Cet article étudie les noms propres de groupes sociaux en français (en particulier les noms de partis politiques) de la forme [les + Npluriel (Adj)], en examinant les spécificités de ces expressions en tant que noms propres, d’un point de vue référentiel et du point de vue de leur forme ; celle-ci présente la particularité de refléter iconiquement la pluralité. En se basant sur l’opposition désignation/dénomination (Kleiber 1984), on les compare à d’autres appellatifs de même forme plurielle, mais dont (...) le lien dénominatif à leur référent n’est pas officialisé sur la scène publique. Enfin, l’article s’intéresse à la désignation au pluriel des membres des partis politiques, en particulier lorsqu’elle est homonyme des noms de partis, et étudie les effets discursifs qui en découlent. (shrink)

This contribution explores the reciprocal links between the organisational transformation of Western European Green parties and the access of some of these parties to national government participation. On the one hand, a series of hypotheses with regard to the possible link between prior organisational adaptation and eventual access to governmental participation are examined. On the other hand, the opposite question is addressed : that of the potential impact of governmental participation on further organisational adaptation. Following both a qualitative and Qualitative (...) Comparative Analysis, one does ultimately identify a link between prior organisational adaptation and eventual access to government, but a much more indirect and contrasted link between governmental participation and further organisational adaptation. (shrink)

In January 1990, the Parti Réformateur Libéral inaugurated a brand new management, called "bicephalism ": instead of the traditional presidentialsystem, one "ticket" with a president and a vice-president was commissioned to ensure the leadership of the party.The bicephalism was only the result of a tricky internal compromise, stemming from the discontent following the return of the party in the opposition and strengthened after the defeat at the European polls.The "two-headed" system wanted to restore the credibility and to (...) reinforce the cohesion of the PRL. In fact, this genuine political "curiosity" mainly revealed the structural and ideological deficiency which made its coming possible. lts ultimate defeat - at the 24 November1991 polls - caused itsfalling down.The bicephalism was bound to an identity problem of the french Belgian liberalism but also some features of the experience refer to a more general crisis of the values carried by the old traditional political movements. (shrink)

In accordance with Leo Strauss’s ingenious suggestion, the Athenian Stranger of Plato’s Laws is best understood as an alternative ‘Socrates’, fleeing from the hemlock to Crete. Situated between Crito and Phaedo, Laws effectively tests the reader’s loyalty to the real Socrates who obeys Athenian law and dies cheerfully in Athens. Having separated Plato from the Stranger, a nuanced defence of Karl Popper’s suspicions about Laws confronts the apologetic readings of both Strauss and Christopher Bobonich. As hinted by his preference for (...) wine, the antidote for hemlock, the Athenian Stranger repeatedly proves himself the opposite of Socrates, particularly with respect to piety. Once the Stranger is recognized as ‘an unreliable narrator’, this apparently ponderous product of Plato’s senility becomes the taut thriller of an innovative teacher at the peak of his powers. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the protection offered to parties, participants and third parties during enforcement, as one of the most important requirements of the enforcement procedure. Having in mind that bailiffs except for implementing enforcement, they are also competent to determine the means by which creditors’ claims will be fulfilled. The realization of the creditors’ claims does not mean use of any kind of measure or enforcement procedural activity. In this context the authors review ways in (...) which debtors and their family members can be protected during enforcement actions, such as measures of exclusion and restriction of enforcement on the debtor’s items and income. Furthermore, the authors elaborate other legal and important ways for protection of parties, participants and third parties, such as opposition to illegality and complaints provided by the Law on Enforcement. In this regard, results of this research have shown that the RNM is making efforts to create a more effective enforcement system, which includes guarantees not only for the protection of the creditor and the debtor as a party, but also for the participants and third parties. From the enforcement experiences of citizens were reported dissatisfaction and complaints of citizens regarding the performance of bailiffs, namely taking the necessary means of subsistence form them. To avoid this situation Amendments on the Law on Enforcement in 2020 were brought, so the legal framework was clarified in terms of measures for exclusion and restriction of enforcement. This resulted in the prevention of economic damage of debtors and their family, because now no action can be taken if the debtor has an average salary or pension. Extraordinary legal remedies in enforcement proceeding are excluded, but there are other safeguards that are related to enforcement process but are not regulated by the Law on Enforcement. (shrink)

The political system adopted by Restoration France seemed to call for opposition, and possibly even parties, on the model of Britain. The French, however, remained deeply divided by the Revolution, such that the civilities of parliamentary government developed only with difficulty. Reflecting the distrust inherited from the Revolution, deputies favoured a secret ballot for votes in the chambers and this alone made it easy to disguise political loyalties or to change them. Those who resisted the British model emphasized the (...) virtues of political choices that responded only to one's conscience and sense of honour. On that basis, party seemed inconsistent both with French individualism and with a sense of delicacy. Supporting the claims for indig- enous political mores were perceptions of British politics that exaggerated the discipline of their parties. Though party bonds in France remained very loose — and understanding of the logic of parliamentary government less than perfect — those now deemed the important political thinkers of the time were, in the main, admirers of the politics of party. (shrink)

In accordance with Leo Strauss's ingenious suggestion, the Athenian Stranger of Plato's Laws is best understood as an alternative 'Socrates', fleeing from the hemlock to Crete. Situated between Crito and Phaedo, Laws effectively tests the reader's loyalty to the real Socrates who obeys Athenian law and dies cheerfully in Athens. Having separated Plato from the Stranger, a nuanced defence of Karl Popper's suspicions about Laws confronts the apologetic readings of both Strauss and Christopher Bobonich. As hinted by his preference for (...) wine, the antidote for hemlock, the Athenian Stranger repeatedly proves himself the opposite of Socrates, particularly with respect to piety. Once the Stranger is recognized as 'an unreliable narrator', this apparently ponderous product of Plato's senility becomes the taut thriller of an innovative teacher at the peak of his powers. (shrink)

This paper presents an explanation for the breakdown of dominant party systems. In contrast to previous works that examine how ruling parties lose their dominant position as a result of interparty competition, this paper focuses on how they are undermined from within by factional conflict. Through an overview of dominant party systems in the postwar world, we show that most of the ruling parties suffered from major splits that significantly reduced their electoral strengths before their final electoral defeat. (...) In order to explain why large groups of politicians decide to leave dominant parties that are likely to remain in power, we develop simple game-theoretic models of intraparty bargaining between party factions over the distribution of benefits from office. Our results suggest two mechanisms through which dominant parties break up. First, factional defections from dominant parties are likely to occur when they are experiencing a significant decline in public support. Second, factional defections are likely to occur when a non-mainstream faction is rapidly losing its bargaining power against the party leadership. Importantly, our results show that under certain conditions, dominant parties will break up even when their electoral prospects are much better than the opposition. We briefly discuss how these mechanisms can be applied to actual cases of dominant party systems. (shrink)

In contrast to his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, Russia's President Vladimir Putin continues to successfully neutralize legislative opposition and push his reform agenda through the State Duma. His success is due in large part to the transformation of the party system during the 1999 electoral cycle. In the face of a less polarized and fragmented party system, the Kremlin-backed party of power, Unity, became the foundation for a stable majority coalition in parliament and a weapon in the (...) political battle to eliminate threatening opponents such as Yuri Luzhkov's Fatherland-All Russia and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. (shrink)

In contrast to his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin continues to successfully neutralize legislative opposition and push his reform agenda through the State Duma. His success is due in large part to the transformation of the party system during the 1999 electoral cycle. In the face of a less polarized and fragmented party system, the Kremlin-backed party of power, Unity, became the foundation for a stable majority coalition in parliament and a weapon in the (...) political battle to eliminate threatening opponents such as Yuri Luzhkov’s Fatherland-All Russia and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. (shrink)

Autocracies draw their political power from cronyism and organized repression. The opacity of business information protects these regimes and their crony firms from any opposition. However, autocracies might also desire to eliminate cronyism because it dampens economic growth. Autocracies survive through repression that engenders tensions, as evident in the Spanish newspaper industry during the Francoist dictatorship. State control over this industry was important because the press disseminated news to the public. From 1939 to 1957, the autocracy institutionalized both cronyism (...) and the opacity of circulation figures to sustain the political powers of Franco and the single party state. Opacity concealed the economic performance of newspapers owned by sole legal party and any distribution of resources in its favor. Franco authorized voluntary disclosure of reliable circulation figures in 1964, after eliminating cronyism in favor of a freer market. Repression guaranteed support for this industry until Franco's death. (shrink)

My education in political poetry begins with William Blake’s remark about John Milton in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell: “The reason Milton wrote in fetters when he wrote of Angels & God, and at liberty when of Devils & Hell, is because he was a true Poet and of the Devil’s party without knowing it.”1 The statement is usually taken as a charming misreading of Milton or as some sort of hyperbole. We find it lumped with other readings (...) which supposedly view Satan as the hero of Paradise Lost, such as Percy Bysshe Shelley’s in A Defence of Poetry, although neither Blake nor Shelley says anything of the kind.2I consider Blake’s statement simply accurate. I think it the best single thing anybody has ever said about Paradise Lost. If not clear as a bell, then at least as compressed as diamonds. The insouciant opening gesture takes for granted what to Blake is obvious” that the poetry qua poetry is better, more exciting, more energetic in the sections dominated by Stan, worse, duller, less poetic in the sections dominated by God. As a lover of poetry Blake has evidently struck a perplexity. Why does Milton’s Satan excite me and this God bore me even though he plainly intends me to adore God and scorn Satan? The answer could have been that Milton “wrote in fetters” where constrained by theology and the danger of lapsing into inadvertent sacrilege, but “at liberty” otherwise. Other critics have claimed that it is impossible to make God talk successfully in a poem, but the Book of Job is enough to refute that position. Why did Milton choose to make God talk at all? Dante cleverly avoided that difficulty.The second half of Blake’s sentence not only solves the Paradise Lost problem but proposes a radical view of all poetry which might be summarized as follows: All art depends on opposition between God and the devil, reason and energy. The true poet is necessarily the partisan of energy, rebellion, and desire, and is opposed to passivity, obedience, and the authority of reason, laws, and institutions. To be a poet requires energy; energetic subjects make the best material for poems; the truer the poetry, the more it will embody the truths of Desire. But the poet need not think so. He can be of the devil’s party without knowing it. 1. William Blake, “The Marriage of Heaven and Hell,” Complete Poems, ed. Alicia Ostriker , p. 182.2. Let one instance serve: Marjorie Hope Nicolson wonders whether the members of the “‘Satanic School’ of Milton criticism” have read past books 1 and 2 of Paradise Lost . Alicia Ostriker, professor of English as Rutgers University, is the author of Stealing the Language: The Emergence of Women’s Poetry in America. Her most recent book of poetry is Imaginary Lover. (shrink)

This article investigates the efficacy of a form of electoral innovation unique to the island-state of Singapore, the Nominated Member of Parliament scheme, and its impact on democratic governance, in light of the changing political landscape. A comparative perspective will be employed and broader conclusions on electoral engineering will be reached, especially for democratizing countries. Contrary to conventional scholarly wisdom, I argue that the NMP scheme can actually boost democratic representation in the country, considering the changing political landscape in the (...) state previously dominated by a hegemonic party. This is via two ways: firstly, NMPs could better represent the voices of the people at the margins of society and, secondly, they could be better positioned to raise issues that are deemed too to be raised by opposition parties. NMPs can enhance democratic governance by promoting deliberation, accountability, and representation. (shrink)

When parties and interest groups interact, they can do so in several ways which could be on an informal level, lobbying for a party candidate, or group representatives approach party leaders in the parliament to lobby them on an issue. There is a plethora of studies on the extent to which major political parties and major interests have related in the past and continue to relate or interact at the organizational level. Researchers have investigated to what extent parties (...) and groups had formal organizational ties, cooperated in elections, or worked in concert on developing and implementing policies. Factors that for decades have determined the relationship between political parties and interest groups in liberal democracies are political system and subsystem development, political culture and political ideology, centralization of government and policymaking, nature of the party system, political party dependence on interest groups, encompassing characteristics of the interest group system, interest group development, ideology, and leadership. However, the pandemic has influenced to a great extend the relationship between interest groups and politics. While Covid-19 crisis has consolidated power within governments, leaving opposition parties in a bind, on the other hand it has galvanized interest groups and businesses to mobilize. The pandemic has opened up the lobbying playing field to many new players. The paper aims to investigate to what extend the pandemic has influenced the relationship between political parties, government and interest groups and what strategies have these last ones used to get heard in a time when social distancing has reduced the opportunities for face-to-face lobbying. (shrink)