In den soziologischen, kulturwissenschaftlichen und politisch-theoretischen Diskursen haben die Themen der Subjektivierungsweisen, Singularisierungen, Selbstsetzungsstrategien und Technologien des Selbst in den letzten beiden Dekaden viel Aufmerksamkeit auf sich gezogen. Angesichts dessen stellt die Suche nach „neue[n] Vokabulare[n] und Theorien der Kollektivität“ (so das CfP zu dieser Ausgabe der Zeitschrift) eine wichtige komplementäre Fragerichtung dar. Unser Beitrag will mit der Forschungsperspektive der ‚digitalen Gouvernementalität‘ sowie den Konzepten der ‚Kollektivitätseffekte‘ und der ‚digitalen Methexis‘ (Teilhabe, Partizipation) die Suche nach einem neuen heuristischen und (...) konzeptuellen Rahmen zur Erfassung und kritischen Durchdringung der zugleich individualisierenden und kollektivierenden Phänomene der Digitalität unterstützen. Ausgangspunkt des Beitrages ist die Überlegung, dass sich die Phänomene der Digitalisierung und Digitalität machthistoriographisch mit Foucault als aktuelle Form von Gouvernementalität – genauer: digitale Gouvernementalität – beschreiben lassen, d.h. als spezifisches epistemischpraktisches Ensemble aus Regierungstechnologien, Subjektivierungsweisen und Wissensformen der Digitalität. Unsere grundlegende These ist, dass sich in der Digitalität und digitalisierten Gesellschaft sowohl Regime der verstärkten Individualisierung als auch Regime der Kollektivierung und Kollektivität installieren, wobei erstere immer schon durch letztere eingeholt sind. Die theoretisch-konzeptuelle Herausforderung besteht darin, beide Ausdrucksformen der digitalen Gesellschaft für sich und in ihrer kokonstitutiven Verfasstheit zu begreifen. Wir versuchen damit, Andreas Reckwitz’ Analyse der „Digitalisierung als Singularisierung“ sowohl um eine regierungsanalytische als auch um eine kollektivitätsfokussierte Perspektive zu ergänzen. (shrink)

In dem Beitrag wird der Frage nachgegangen, wie der Widerstreit zwischen mimesis und methexis eine – so die These – ›atopische Differenz‹ hervorbringt, die den Sinn des Gegenstandes zu einer fortwährenden Bildung zwingt, einen Sinn, der sich weder vollständig erhellen noch in bestehenden Begrifflichkeiten erfassen lässt, sondern sich eher in sinnlichen Erfahrung ausdrückt. Der Begriff der Atopie bedeutet nach Franco Rella , außerhalb unseres Platzes bzw. der Grenzen unserer wahrnehmungsmäßigen und kognitiven Gewohnheiten zu sein. Die hier vorgeschlagene atopische Differenz (...) – eine Differenz, die sich in keinem eigenen Ort bzw. topos idios im Sinne Aristoteles verankern lässt – wandert zwischen dem Abbild und dem Trugbild und entzieht sich unseren Gewohnheiten und übernommenen Begriffen. Um die Voraussetzungen der Repräsentation, wie sie von Platon benannt werden, aufzudecken, soll in einem ersten Schritt das Verhältnis zwischen Urbild und Abbild im Denken Platons vorgestellt werden. Anschließend wird auf Gilles Deleuze’ Schriften Differenz und Wiederholung und Logik des Sinns eingegangen, die die Grundbausteine für eine moderne Aufwertung der mimetischen Praktiken liefern. Der französische Philosoph hebt die Produktion von Trugbildern als eine »Umkehrung des Platonismus« hervor, denn diese reproduzieren nicht mehr das Urbild. In einem dritten Schritt werden die Eigenschaften der Trugbilder anhand der Gemälde des englischen Malers Francis Bacon näher bestimmt. Zum Schluss wird die ›atopische Differenz‹ in ihrer Entstehungsmöglichkeit und ihrer Tragweite näher beleuchtet. Es wird sich herausstellen, dass die Umkehrung des Platonismus nicht nur eine Produktion des Trugbildes ist, sondern auch einen sinnlichen Überschuss verursacht, der sich jeder wesentlichen Bestimmung widersetzt, unlokalisierbar bleibt und die Betrachter affiziert. (shrink)

ABSTRACTCommentators have commonly noted the metaphysical role of participation in Richard Hooker’s Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity: participation both describes how creation is suspended from God and also how believers share in Christ through grace. Yet, the role in Hooker’s thought of the attendant Platonic language of ‘between’ and ‘desire’ has not received sustained attention. Metaxu describes the ‘in-between’ quality of participation: the participant and the participated remain distinct but are dynamically related as the former originates from and returns (...) to the perfection of the latter. Within this metaxological dynamic, desire acts as the physical and psychic motor driving the move between potentiality and perfect actuality, that is to say from multiplicity to divine unity: desire aims at goodness and so ultimately tends towards that which is goodness itself, namely God’s nature. For Hooker, desire becomes couched in amorous affectivity and has an erotic register. This essay explores, then, how Hooker appeals to a language of ‘between’ and ‘desire’ within his accounts of participation. First, it examines how human beings exist between the footstool and throne of God in Hooker’s legal ontology. Here, angelic desire acts as a hierarchical pattern of and spur to erotic participation in the divine nature. Second, this essay examines how theurgy transforms desire in Hooker’s account of liturgical participation as a redemptive commerce between heaven and earth. Here, angels still act as invisible, hierarchical intermediaries within earthly worship, but soon give way to immediate grace through participation in Christ within the sacraments. (shrink)

Western theology struggles with the rise of secularism and postmodernism. The Radical Orthodoxy sensibility asserts that the ancient principles of methexis (participation) and theosis (deification) presents an alternative metaphysical narrative to the narrative of secularism and the onto-theological tradition. This article addresses the problems of the onto-theological metaphysical tradition in Western theology by analyzing Radical Orthodoxy's rediscovery of the philosophical and theological principles of participation and theosis as articulated in the patristic tradition and in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. (...) Using historical and analytical methods, this article will survey the biblical and patristic literature on theosis, as well as John Milbank's understanding of methexis and theosis in Thomas Aquinas. The result of this study will be to offer theosis, rooted in participation in God, as not only a soteriological model to reclaim for the West, but also a core metaphysical principle for Christian ethics that contravenes both onto-theology and the materialistic reduction of ontology in secularism. (shrink)

Platons Lehre von der Weltseele.--Methexis und Metaxy bei Platon. --Der historische Ursprung des Satzes vom Widerspruch.

This lecture-form essay examines various orders of relation between visual art and writing focusing on Adorno’s propositions about art as écriture. Following introductory remarks concerning Adorno’s relation to recent and contemporary Conceptual, activist and multi-media practices and his brief descriptions of the “virtuoso” work of Pablo Picasso, it addresses the relational nexus between art and history mediated by names and titles (looking to the work of the German artist who christened himself Andy Hope 1930), the operations of methexis and (...) Sprachcharakter, realism and abstraction, and ideas, both analagous and discontinuous, in the thinking Jacques Derrida and Jean-François Lyotard, each convened under the auspices of Adorno’s somewhat ahistorical understanding of écriture. The creatively elastic notion of écriture suggests that the defining quality of art as enigma is best comprehended “from the perspective of language.”. (shrink)

This project envisages a study of Eric Voegelin (1901-1985) and of the role played by metaxy in his vision of political philosophy. Metaxy already defined by Plato as the "in-between" matrix of the human condition is for Voegelin a powerful notion that symbolizes the intermediate state in which man experiences diverse and opposing tensions such as the ones between immanence and transcendence or mortality and immortality. The metaxy constitutes the realm of the divine-human mutual participation (methexis), and its locus (...) resides in human consciousness (nous), there where the divine reality manifests itself as the origin of being. Being the field of intermediation between opposing forces, man has to keep the balance of consciousness in order to differentiate the noetic and pneumatic dimensions and so attune his life to the divine ground of being. This project claims that for Voegelin metaxy shapes the possibility of the philosophical, historical, political and religious orientation in life. Indeed, Voegelin's approach deserves recognition as an option adequate for addressing the intellectual challenges engendered by modern and postmodern philosophies. (shrink)

This chapter wagers that dance holds a singular, irreducible place in Nancy's work, that it cannot be reduced to thought about dance, and that it provides a way to understanding Nancy's approach to visual culture in general, to equality, and to the circulation of sense in terms of what he calls singular plural being. The chapter takes its starting point from Nancy's discussions of dance in the as yet untranslated Allitérations, a series of email exchanges from 2003 and 2004 followed (...) by transcriptions of face-to-face exchanges between Nancy and choreographer Mathilde Monnier loosely addressing the question of the relation between philosophy and dance, and a conversation between Nancy, Monnier and film-maker Claire Denis. In the first half of the book Nancy raises two questions, each presenting a pair of seemingly irreconcilable demands: 1. How can we understand dance as something open to everyone while retaining the privilege of professional expertise? 2. How can we understand dance in a way that maintains its uniqueness, not reducing it to an example of thought or a vehicle for thought, and yet still allowing for a relation between dance and thought? Both questions invite us to think the privilege of dance together with its openness; its singularity together with its plurality. As Nancy and Monnier grapple with these seemingly contradictory demands in Allitérations, their conversation opens up onto a fresh way to think political equality, and a different way to understand – or ‘catch’, a much more suitable term that I shall introduce later in this chapter – the sense of the world. It is by taking a detour via ‘The Image: Mimesis and Methexis’ that we can also see how Nancy's approach to dance can open to a new way of engaging with visual culture in general. -/- The point in this chapter is not simply to use dance as an example or illustration that helps us better to understand Nancy's approach to visual culture or the Nancean singular plural or his notion of ‘sense’, for in considering dance in terms of art, singular plurality and sense, we shall also be drawn to reassess sense, art and the singular plural in terms of dance. (shrink)

Podíváme-li se na rané Platónovy dialogy, vidíme, že o co v nich jde především, je předvedení toho, že pojmy mají relativně jasné hranice, že zdánlivému chaosu užívání slov vládne jistý pevný řád, který si člověk dokáže i explicitně uvědomit, je-li k tomu vhodným způsobem veden. Snaha o zdůraznění a znázornění tohoto na první pohled neviditelného 'řádu v chaosu' pak podle mého názoru postupně vedla i ke konstituci Platónovy mytologie říše idejí, které, ač neviděny, hrají z hlediska viditelného světa klíčovou roli. (...) Skrytý řád přítomný ve zjevném chaosu je vykreslen jako participace (methexis) věcí zjevného světa na idejích světa neviditelného. A již Aristotelés poukázal na to, že tato mytologie, jakkoli může být její spektakulárnost užitečná v kontextu nedoceňování existence řádu, může být naopak velice zavádějící, jestliže ji začneme brát jako více než právě mytologii; konkrétně jestliže začneme zapomínat, že 'platónský svět idejí' dává smysl pouze jako nástroj porozumění či výkladu toho světa, ve kterém žijeme, a začneme ho vidět jako něco skutečnějšího, než je svět zjevný. Zdá se mi tedy, že platonismus se ve filosofii dostává ke slovu jako antidotum vždy tehdy, když dochází k absolutizaci 'chaotického aspektu' světa (to jest když je svět vykládán jako něco, co jakýkoli řád postrádá - ať už to má podobu herakleitovského absolutizace pomíjivosti, romantického zdůraznění nevázanosti a iracionality, či postmoderní akcentuace různorodosti a nesouměřitelnosti). Na druhé straně platonismus sám svádí k absolutizaci 'řádu' (před Platónem zosobňovaným zejména parmeninovským popřením jakékoli proměnlivosti, a později pak nabývají podob třeba racionalistického výkladu světa jako vtěleného rozumu nebo moderního scientistichého názoru, podle kterého je mírou všech věcí věda). Existují ideje ve své 'platónské říši' doopravdy? Odpověď na tuto otázku je ovšem podstatným způsobem ovlivněna tím, jak rozumíme termínu "existovat" (nemluvě o slově "doopravdy").. (shrink)

Continuing the systematic henadological interpretation of Proclus' Platonic Theology begun in "The Intelligible Gods in the Platonic Theology of Proclus" (Methexis 21, 2008, pp. 131-143), the present article treats of the basic characteristics of intelligible-intellective (or noetico-noeric) multiplicity and its roots in henadic individuality. Intelligible-intellective multiplicity (the hypostasis of Life) is at once a universal organization of Being in its own right, and also transitional between the polycentric henadic manifold, in which each individual is immediately productive of absolute Being, (...) and the formal intellective organization, which is monocentrically and diacritically disposed. Intelligible-intellective multiplicity is generated from the dyadic relationship of henads to their power(s), the phase of henadic individuality expressed in the second intelligible triad, and is mediated, unlike the polycentric manifold, but not by identity and difference, like the intellective organization. Instead, the hypostasis of Life is constituted by ideal motility and spatiality, figural dispositions, and the intersubjective relations depicted in the divine symposium of Plato's Phaedrus. (shrink)

Completing the systematic henadological interpretation of Proclus' Platonic Theology begun in "The Intelligible Gods in the Platonic Theology of Proclus" (Méthexis 21, 2008, pp. 131-143) and "The Second Intelligible Triad and the Intelligible-Intellective Gods" (Methexis 23, 2010, pp. 137-157), the present article concerns the conditions of the emergence of fully mediated, diacritical multiplicity out of the polycentric henadic manifold. The product of the activity of the intellective Gods (that is, the product of the intellective activity of Gods as such), (...) in resolving the contradiction between existential uniqueness and universalizable potencies in the divine natures, also grounds the human exercise of phi- losophical cognition in the founding self-analysis of divine individuals. (shrink)

The central Platonic concept of the mixture is to be situated in the entire transmission of Methexis: ascending from the level of the participation of the sensible things in the forms to the participation of the forms and finally to the participation of the two Platonic Principles. “Mixture” designates on the one hand the relation between the μέγιστα γένη in the Sophist and on the other hand the one between the Limit and the Unlimited in the Philebus. Thereupon the (...) essence of the Mixture is to be examined and rehabilitated as metaphor, namely as transformation of a sensible image in a philosophical one. Our guiding question will be: W hy can the Mixture be legitimated as a better candidate than the Methexis in the frame of the Sophist? The Mixture is to be regarded as well-founded transformation of Methexis in the context of the equioriginal “greatest kinds”. In our interpretation of the Philebus that restores the disputed unity of this Platonic dialogue, we are about to show how the philosopher Plato “saves” the beautiful phenomena: The fourfold division is to be construed as the place where the beautiful appearances are generated. To them does the philosopher return after his ascent to the σύμφυτον two Platonic Principles. They are no longer degraded as “rolling about in the midregion between being and not-being”, but are rather reevaluated as “procreation”. (shrink)

The central Platonic concept of the mixture is to be situated in the entire transmission of Methexis: ascending from the level of the participation of the sensible things in the forms to the participation of the forms and finally to the participation of the two Platonic Principles. “Mixture” designates on the one hand the relation between the μέγιστα γένη in the Sophist and on the other hand the one between the Limit and the Unlimited in the Philebus . Thereupon (...) the essence of the Mixture is to be examined and rehabilitated as metaphor, namely as transformation of a sensible image in a philosophical one . Our guiding question will be: W hy can the Mixture be legitimated as a better candidate than the Methexis in the frame of the Sophist? The Mixture is to be regarded as well-founded transformation of Methexis in the context of the equioriginal “greatest kinds” . In our interpretation of the Philebus that restores the disputed unity of this Platonic dialogue, we are about to show how the philosopher Plato “saves” the beautiful phenomena: The fourfold division is to be construed as the place where the beautiful appearances are generated. To them does the philosopher return after his ascent to the σύμφυτον two Platonic Principles. They are no longer degraded as “rolling about in the midregion between being and not-being” , but are rather reevaluated as “procreation” .Der in den späteren platonischen Dialogen zentrale Begriff der Mischung wird zunächst in die ganze Übertragung der Methexis eingeordnet: von der Ebene der Teilhabe des W ahrnehmbaren an der Idee zu der innerideellen Teilhabe aufsteigend und von daher zu der Teilhabe der zwei platonischen Prinzipien. Einerseits wird die Beziehung der μέγιστα γένη untereinander, andererseits diejenige zwischen der Grenze und der U nbegrenztheit im Philebos als Mischung bezeichnet . Daraufhin wird ihr W esen als Metapher behandelt und rehabilitiert, nämlich als Transformation eines sinnlichen Bildes in ein philosophisches . Zur Leitfrage unserer Ausführung wird: W arum kann die im Rahmen des Dialogs Sophistes eingeführte Mischung der größten Gattungen miteinander als ein besserer Kandidat als derjenige der Teilhabe gerechtfertigt werden? Die Mischung wird als eine wohlbegründete Verwandlungsform derTeilhabe in den ideellen Zusammenhängen der gleichursprünglichen größten Gattungen betrachtet . Bei unserer die umstrittene Einheit des Philebos wiederherstellende Interpretation wird aufgezeigt, wie der Philosoph Platon die schönen Phänomene rettet: Die vierfache Einteilung des Ganzen wird als Ort der Genese der schönen Erscheinungen interpretiert. Ihnen wendet sich der Philosoph nach dem Aufstieg zum σύμφυτον der zwei platonischen Prinzipien zu, nicht länger sie als “zwischen dem Sein und dem Nicht-Sein herumschweifend” degradierend , sondern als “Zeugung” würdigend .Pojam miješanja, koji je središnji u kasnijim Platonovim dijalozima, ponajprije se smješta u cjeloviti kontekst transponiranja methexisa: od ravni sudjelovanja osjetilnog u ideji uzlazno k sudjelovanju među idejama te odatle k sudjelovanju dvaju platoničkih principa. S jedne strane se kao miješanje označava međusobni odnos μέγιστα γένη, s druge pak onaj između granice i neograničenosti u Filebu . U tu se svrhu razmatra i rehabilitira bit miješanja kao metafore, naime kao transformacija osjetilne slike u filozofijsku . Glavnim pitanjem našeg izvođenja postaje: zašto se uzajamno miješanje “najviših rodova”, koje se uvodi u okviru dijaloga Sofist, može opravdati kao bolji kandidat od sudjelovanja? Miješanje se razmatra kao dobro utemeljena forma preinake sudjelovanja u odnošenjima jednako izvornih “najviših rodova” . U našoj se interpretaciji, koja nanovo uspostavlja osporavano jedinstvo Fileba, prikazuje kako filozof Platon spašava lijepe fenomene: četvorostruka podjela cjeline interpretira se kao mjesto nastajanja lijepih pojava. Njima se filozof vraća nakon uspona k onom σύμφυτον dvaju platoničkih principa, ne degradirajući ih više kao one koji se “potucaju između bitka i ne-bitka” , već ih cijeni kao “rađanje”. (shrink)

The central Platonic concept of the mixture is to be situated in the entire transmission of Methexis: ascending from the level of the participation of the sensible things in the forms to the participation of the forms and finally to the participation of the two Platonic Principles. “Mixture” designates on the one hand the relation between the μέγιστα γένη in the Sophist and on the other hand the one between the Limit and the Unlimited in the Philebus. Thereupon the (...) essence of the Mixture is to be examined and rehabilitated as metaphor, namely as transformation of a sensible image in a philosophical one. Our guiding question will be: W hy can the Mixture be legitimated as a better candidate than the Methexis in the frame of the Sophist? The Mixture is to be regarded as well-founded transformation of Methexis in the context of the equioriginal “greatest kinds”. In our interpretation of the Philebus that restores the disputed unity of this Platonic dialogue, we are about to show how the philosopher Plato “saves” the beautiful phenomena: The fourfold division is to be construed as the place where the beautiful appearances are generated. To them does the philosopher return after his ascent to the σύμφυτον two Platonic Principles. They are no longer degraded as “rolling about in the midregion between being and not-being”, but are rather reevaluated as “procreation”.Der in den späteren platonischen Dialogen zentrale Begriff der Mischung wird zunächst in die ganze Übertragung der Methexis eingeordnet: von der Ebene der Teilhabe des W ahrnehmbaren an der Idee zu der innerideellen Teilhabe aufsteigend und von daher zu der Teilhabe der zwei platonischen Prinzipien. Einerseits wird die Beziehung der μέγιστα γένη untereinander, andererseits diejenige zwischen der Grenze und der U nbegrenztheit im Philebos als Mischung bezeichnet. Daraufhin wird ihr W esen als Metapher behandelt und rehabilitiert, nämlich als Transformation eines sinnlichen Bildes in ein philosophisches. Zur Leitfrage unserer Ausführung wird: W arum kann die im Rahmen des Dialogs Sophistes eingeführte Mischung der größten Gattungen miteinander als ein besserer Kandidat als derjenige der Teilhabe gerechtfertigt werden? Die Mischung wird als eine wohlbegründete Verwandlungsform derTeilhabe in den ideellen Zusammenhängen der gleichursprünglichen größten Gattungen betrachtet. Bei unserer die umstrittene Einheit des Philebos wiederherstellende Interpretation wird aufgezeigt, wie der Philosoph Platon die schönen Phänomene rettet: Die vierfache Einteilung des Ganzen wird als Ort der Genese der schönen Erscheinungen interpretiert. Ihnen wendet sich der Philosoph nach dem Aufstieg zum σύμφυτον der zwei platonischen Prinzipien zu, nicht länger sie als “zwischen dem Sein und dem Nicht-Sein herumschweifend” degradierend, sondern als “Zeugung” würdigend.Pojam miješanja, koji je središnji u kasnijim Platonovim dijalozima, ponajprije se smješta u cjeloviti kontekst transponiranja methexisa: od ravni sudjelovanja osjetilnog u ideji uzlazno k sudjelovanju među idejama te odatle k sudjelovanju dvaju platoničkih principa. S jedne strane se kao miješanje označava međusobni odnos μέγιστα γένη, s druge pak onaj između granice i neograničenosti u Filebu. U tu se svrhu razmatra i rehabilitira bit miješanja kao metafore, naime kao transformacija osjetilne slike u filozofijsku. Glavnim pitanjem našeg izvođenja postaje: zašto se uzajamno miješanje “najviših rodova”, koje se uvodi u okviru dijaloga Sofist, može opravdati kao bolji kandidat od sudjelovanja? Miješanje se razmatra kao dobro utemeljena forma preinake sudjelovanja u odnošenjima jednako izvornih “najviših rodova”. U našoj se interpretaciji, koja nanovo uspostavlja osporavano jedinstvo Fileba, prikazuje kako filozof Platon spašava lijepe fenomene: četvorostruka podjela cjeline interpretira se kao mjesto nastajanja lijepih pojava. Njima se filozof vraća nakon uspona k onom σύμφυτον dvaju platoničkih principa, ne degradirajući ih više kao one koji se “potucaju između bitka i ne-bitka”, već ih cijeni kao “rađanje”. (shrink)

"In an exciting range of original responses to Nancy's work, these 12 essays reanimate the dialogue between interdisciplinary scholars and practicing artists that originally gave birth to visual culture as a field of study. A new translation of Nancy's essay, 'The Image: Mimesis and Methexis', reveals how Nancy's work informs, challenges and inspires our encounters with visual culture. Jean-Luc Nancy is one of the most original and compelling of those contemporary political and ethical philosophers who, like Jacques Ranciere and (...) Alain Badiou, have turned in recent works towards aesthetics and visual art. Nancy's challenging and inspiring writings on painting, film, photography, video and contemporary visual art have informed the work of scholars of visual culture and aesthetic theory as well as artists, filmmakers and curators"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

"The Notion of the concrete General in Plato and Aristotle – Questioning formal logical Ontologies" - The problem of the concrete general notion is equivalent to enquiring about the unity of the general and the singular. Since Plato, this question - which is commonly referred to as the problem of methexis – is one of the most fundamental problems which philosophy is engaged in. This article pursues two goals: Firstly, it aims to provide a brief systematical account on the (...) origin and the solution of this problem with regards to Plato and Aristotle. In doing so, Plato’s solution of the problem of methexis, in the dialectic of his late period, is contrasted with Aristotle’s concept of substance. In this regard the question arises whether Aristotle’s thinking of the problem of methexis has exceeded his teachers achievements in the field of fundamental philosophy or not. Is Aristotle not ultimately avoiding the dialectic, which is contained in the concept of substance – for reasons of formal logic? This point, secondly, shall question the currently prevailing implicitness of the presupposed autarky of formal logic. For it is the very problem of logical justification of the concept of substance in Aristotle which raises this issue: Can the notion of the concrete general be conceivable at all under the precondition that formal logical axioms are also ontologically relevant? (shrink)

The aim of this study is to discuss an original philosophical contribution made by Philoponus, who in In Cat. 18, 14–22 equates koinon in its most peculiar meaning with the concept of koinônia understood as a particu­lar case of Platonic methexis. First, the paper analyzes the passages where the Neoplatonic commentators of the Categories distinguish four distinct meanings of the Aristotelian concept of koinon. Subsequently, this article emphasizes the differences between Philoponus’ herme­neutical suggestions and those of the other commentators. (...) Philopo­nus clarifies that while every koinon is methekton, Aristotle’s koinon is characterized by the fact that the participation is ex isou and kata meros. Thus, koinônia, according to Philoponus, is a particular case of methexis, where everyone participating in something participates in it equally and singly. The example cited by Philoponus to explain Aristotle’s koinon is that of men participating equally and singly in human nature. The study concludes with a discussion of the relationship among the concepts of koinon, koinônia and methexis. (shrink)

Die Beschäftigung mit Platon hat eine lange Geschichte, Rezeptionen seines Denkens sind so prägend für die Philosophiegeschichte geworden, dass diese verständlicherweise zuweilen als eine Sammlung von Fußnoten zu seinem Werk begriffen wurde. Das gilt besonders für einen durchgängigen metaphysischen Zug des abendländischen Denkens, ein grundsätzliches Ordnungsmodell aus der Antike, das, christlich gewendet, die Theoriebildung bis in unsere Tage fundiert. Aber mit einer Reihe anderer Gewissheiten ist auch dieser erfolgreiche Platonismus Gegenstand der Kritik geworden. Kann und soll man den metaphysischen Platon (...) retten oder muss man Platon vielmehr gegen die metaphysische Tradition neu verstehen? Muss man Platon gegen die Platonisten verteidigen, ist er der Anfang einer philosophischen Verirrung? -- Dorothea Frede, Ekkehard Martens, Arbogast Schmitt, Gernot Böhme, Hermann Schmitz, Wolfgang Detel und andere entdecken – auch durch ihre Kritik – Platon als Gesprächspartner der Gegenwart neu. (shrink)

Ch.9 of Metaph. 12 gives no support to the common view (against which I have argued elsewhere) that in ch.7 Aristotle identifies his Prime Mover not only as a god but also as an intellect. Rather, ch.9 approaches the divinity of intellect as a common belief (ἔνδοξον) from the Greek philosophical and poetic tradition (as at ch.7, 1072b23) that now requires dialectical testing. Here Aristotle initially establishes that there is a most active intellect (proposed ch.7, 1072b18–19: demonstrated ch.9, 1074b17–21, b28–9), (...) and that it contemplates what is best (proposed loc. cit.: demonstrated ch.9, 1074b21–7). Thus ch.9 proceeds by deducing, as a new result, characteristics implying that this intellect is itself the Prime Mover, since its object, qua best, must be the god of ch.7, and divine intellect is essentially identical (1074b33–1074a5), and an indivisible unity (a5–10), with that object. (shrink)

For Aristotle, the shape of a physical body is perceptible per se (DA II.6, 418a8-9). As I read his position, shape is thus a causal power, as a physical body can affect our sense organs simply in virtue of possessing it. But this invites a challenge. If shape is an intrinsically powerful property, and indeed an intrinsically perceptible one, then why are the objects of geometrical reasoning, as such, inert and imperceptible? I here address Aristotle’s answer to that problem, focusing (...) on the version of it that he presents in De caelo III.8. I argue that if we grant that Aristotle conceived of the shape of a sensible body as some kind of causal power, then the satisfactory resolution of that challenge pushes us to interpret him as having conceived of it as being, more specifically, an impure power—that is, as a property that is not only intrinsically powerful but also, in some way, intrinsically non-powerful as well. This is a notable result not only insofar as it illuminates Aristotle’s conception of shape but also insofar as it contributes to our knowledge of Aristotle’s theory of dunameis and his ontology more broadly. (shrink)

The principle of performative contradiction. On the epistemological significance of the dialogue form in Plato's "Euthydemus". - In this study, an analysis of the section 285d-288a of Plato's "Euthydemus" shall show two things: (1) The sophistic model of a world in which there is no contradiction, in which every linguistic utterance is true and every action correct, has no semantic inconsistencies, but can only be rejected with the help of the principle of performative contradictions. (2) It is precisely these performative (...) contradictions that make it necessary for Plato to philosophize not in treatises but in dialogues; in other words, that the philosophical relevance of the Platonic form of dialogue can be seen, among other things, in the fact that - in contrast to philosophical forms of representation such as the treatise, the essay, and a henology as reconstructed and represented by the Tübingen School - it permits the representation of performative reflections and performative contradictions. (shrink)

In Book v of Plato's Laws, he defends that a virtuous life is better than a vicious one, based on the idea that the former involves more pleasure than the latter (733a-734e). The use of this kind of argumentation seems to contradict other passages of the Laws, in which it will be objected that pleasure can work as a criterion of election. This essay aims to show that this recourse does not presuppose any kind of hedonism. In order to prove (...) this, I hold that in the Laws (i) education tries to integrate our natural tendencies in the good life; (ii) this integration is possible because some pleasures can be pursued for their own sake because they are harmless. Based on these principles, I argue that (iii) the argument of Book v appeals to the possibility of choosing pleasure if they are not involved in other criteria of election. (shrink)

In explicating a passage from Physics A 3, Simplicius reports a criticism by Alexander of Aphrodisias against Plato’s conception of not-being in the Sophist. Alexander deems this conception contradictory, because it posits that unqualified not-being is. Simplicius defends Plato and gives a diagnosis of what he regards as Alexander’s interpretative mistake in raising his objection. I unpack this debate and bring out ways in which it sheds light on important aspects of Plato’s project in the Sophist and of Simplicius’ own (...) philosophical background, notably in Damascius’ De principiis. (shrink)

Protagoras’ Grand Speech is traditionally considered to articulate a contractualist approach to political existence and morality. There is, however, a newly emerging line of interpretation among scholars, which explores a naturalist layer in Protagoras’ ethical and political thought. This article aims to make a contribution to this new way of reading Protagoras’ speech, by discussing one of its most elaborate versions.

The present paper has two, interrelated objectives. The first is to analyze the different senses in which arguments are characterized as persuasive in the extant writings of Sextus Empiricus. The second is to examine the Pyrrhonist’s therapeutic use of arguments in the discussion with his Dogmatic rivals – more precisely, to determine the sense and basis of Sextus’ distinction between therapeutic arguments that appear weighty and therapeutic arguments that appear weak in their persuasiveness.

Epicurus’ original version of atomism takes atoms to be physically indivisible but not completely unanalysable: each atom contains a finite number of minima. This paper explores the nature of the minima by focusing on a specific question: in which sense are the minima minimal? I do so by investigating the notions of parthood and divisibility into parts that are at play in paragraphs 56–59 of the Letter to Herodotus, where the theory of minima is introduced. By focusing on the analogy (...) (noticed by Francesco Verde) between Epicurean minima and Aristotelian limits, I argue that the minima should be understood as the minimal realiser of the atom’s physical functions. This allows me to keep together two very plausible but apparently incompatible claims: (i) the minima are supposed to block the paradoxes of theoretical divisibility, but (ii) their existence and their indivisibility can only be justified in physical (rather than geometrical) terms. (shrink)

In disagreement with Claudia Baracchi’s controversial thesis that there is a “simultaneity and indissolubility” if not an “identity” of intelligence (nous) and perception (aisthēsis) at the core of Aristotle’s philosophy, I will argue that Aristotle maintains a fundamental distinction between these cognitive faculties. My goal in this paper is to examine specific parts of two central and complex passages, VI.8, 1142a12-30 and VI.11, 1143a33-b15, from the Nicomachean Ethics to show that Baracchi’s view is unpersuasive. I will show that Aristotle considers (...) nous to be a different capacity than mere perception and one through which particulars and indemonstrable principles become intelligible. Moreover, I will show that Aristotle considers that the objects of nous differ in kind from those that sensation (our senses) and perception (inference from our senses) grasp. After examining critically Baracchi’s thesis in light of a close reading of those two relevant passages, I will conclude the paper by showing the significance of Aristotle’s claim that a state is defined in terms of its objects of apprehension for understanding the distinction between nous and aisthēsis. (shrink)

Scholars debate whether ‘apeiron’ (unlimited) is univocal or multivocal in Plato’s 'Philebus.' Offering a ‘middle path,’ I argue that the term is univocal, but used with respect to two senses of unlimited continua. The term appears early in two dense passages on ontological structure: the descriptions of the ‘god-given method’ (16b-18d) and ‘the fourfold division of beings’ (23c-27c). I consider each passage and argue that they respectively concern the eidetic continua of being that the knower comes to understand and the (...) fluxing continua of opposed and co-constitutive bodily elements from which spatiotemporal objects derive their natures. They also indicate two major influences on Plato, respectively the Pythagorean and Heraclitean as recorded in Aristotle’s 'Metaphysics,' and I draw on these resources to develop my account. I conclude by considering some important Platonic lessons that we learn from thinking through this distinction between the related senses of the unlimited. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to free Aristotle's Metaphysics, especially book XII (Lambda), frome some metaphysical and theological presuppositions by detecting their inappropriate conceptual framwork, which once was progressive, but now holds an obsolete position. Ousia, being (not substance, a much later concept, construed to solve other problems than Aristotle's), stand for a question, not for an answer. Book Lambda develops a highly speculative argument for this queston. The famous noesis noeseos says that empirical being and knowledge is the (...) realization of a noetic structure (noesis), laid down in our most fundamental opinioons about being. (shrink)