Plato's Republic continues to arouse intense controversy among commentators, both for its ethical and political project and for its psychological, epistemological, and ontological implications for the knowledge of philosophers, who, says Plato, should be set as guides for such a project. Considering just a few examples from recent years, we might recall that a new critical edition of the dialogue has been published 1 that contains significant innovations both in the text and in the attribution of lines to speakers. Moreover, (...) this new edition has been accompanied by a volume of philological commentary edited by the same author. 2 Numerous translations in the main modern languages have also been published with a more or less detailed apparatus of notes. 3 An equally significant quantity of works of commentary, individual or miscellaneous, of extremely varied origin and composition has appeared, from the monumental work coordinated by M. Vegetti , to the volumes of O. Höffe , E. N. Ostenfeld , S. Sayers , R. Gutiérrez , B. Mitchell and J. R. Lucas , S. Rosen , M. Dixsaut , G. Santas , and G. R. F. Ferrari . Just this brief indication of the mass of philological, historical, and philosophical studies suggests the constant—and constantly renewed—appeal of a dialogue that is rightly considered as one of the most influential and representative of Plato's thought. (shrink)

Francesco Fronterotta | : La psychologie platonicienne de la République semble être affectée par une contradiction en relation avec la thèse de la tripartition de l’âme. Celle-ci est esquissée dans le livre IV et est toujours présente dans les livres VIII et IX ; Socrate semble pourtant l’abandonner lorsque, dans le livre X, il introduit la thèse selon laquelle l’âme est une réalité double, et peu après parvient, dans la suite du livre X, à démontrer son immortalité, en la décrivant (...) comme une réalité simple, unique et unitaire. J’essaierai de montrer que ces changements de perspective dépendent du point de vue assumé par Platon dans son traitement de la nature et de la fonction de l’âme, dans les contextes que j’appellerai « génétiques », c’est-à-dire là où l’analyse touche à la question du statut ontologique de l’âme, et dans les contextes que j’appellerai « opérationnels », c’est-à-dire lorsque ce sont les fonctions, les compétences et les motivations de l’âme dans sa direction du corps qui font l’objet de l’analyse. | : There is a seeming contradiction in the Republic in Plato’s psychology of the tripartite soul, which is dealt with in Book IV and which recurs in Books VIII and IX. Socrates seems to retract this view when in Book X he introduces the theory that the soul is actually dual, and then later in the same Book demonstrates its immortality, presenting it in this case as something simple, single and unitary. I shall try to show how this see-sawing depends on the different point of view that Plato takes when he deals with the nature and the function of the soul, respectively in the “genetic” contexts, where his examination touches directly on the question of the soul’s ontological status, and the “operative” contexts, when what is being analysed are the functions, scope and motivations of the soul that intervene in its action of controlling the body. (shrink)

Hípias Menor apresenta a conversação que tem lugar na conclusão da conferência dada por Hípias sobre os poemas homéricos diante de um público numeroso. Sócrates deseja interrogar o sofista sobre um aspecto particular de sua exegese homérica, aquele da descrição dos personagens de Aquiles e de Ulisses: o primeiro, o mais simples e sincero (ou verdadeiro, haploústatos kaì alethéstatos), seria melhor que o segundo, que é dúplice (polútropos). A simplicidade de Aquiles deveria revelar a sinceridade, enquanto a duplicidade (ou melhor (...) a multiplicidade, polú-tropos) de Ulisses indicaria um caráter ambíguo e enganador. Parece então que a quem sabe muitas coisas pertence a capacidade de enganar, precisamente utilizando os muitos conhecimentos que possui, enquanto a sinceridade constituiria um traço específico de quem, não possuindo conhecimentos, não pode senão revelar-se pelo que é. O paradoxo ético que disso deriva é examinado através de uma análise dos argumentos desenvolvidos no diálogo. (shrink)

This article examines the problem of the status of the different degrees of being that Plato, in the Timaeus, seems to attribute to the different kinds of reality that he distinguishes. In what sense and under what conditions is it possible to state that the intelligible forms, the sensible things and the spatial and material substratum of the chora “are” and “exist”?

In this article, I wish to present and discuss some Heideggerian theses concerning the notions of “being,” “presence” and “truth” in Plato’s dialogues, taking as a point of departure Heidegger’s course on Plato’s Sophist given in Marburg in 1924–1925. My aim is to show that the fundamental philosophical link that unites them makes it possible to better understand seemingly obscure aspects of the Platonic conception of being and knowledge as it is presented in particular in the concluding pages of Republic (...) V, to which this article is therefore essentially devoted. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine heraclitean fragments evoking the metaphor of rivers and waters flowing, usually associated by tradition to the image of reality in becoming and the conception of nature as a more or less disordered streaming. These fragments are certainly among the most celebrated and lucky fragments of the philosopher of Ephesus, which can be explained by the fact that they have been used since Plato and Aristotle, to represent in an exemplary way the philosophical (...) perspective of Heraclitus. These are the three fragments which appear in the collection of Diels and Kranz under the numbers 12, 49a and 91, and correspond, in the edition of Marcovich to the numbers 40, 40c2 and 40c3. This mere indication brings out the problem that should be given priority review with regard to the three mentioned fragments, this is the one of their authenticity. Admitted by Diels and Kranz and by a certain number of scholars, among which stands out Mouraviev, it is rejected, with respect fragments 49a and 91 DK [40c2 and 40c3 Marcovich] by other commentators, and primarily by Marcovich for whom, as suggested by the numbering that adopted itself, should be considered as mere reminiscences of the fragments 12 DK [40 Marcovich], the only authentic. (shrink)

In this paper I examine G. R. Carone's interpretation of the mind-body problem in late Plato, published in a recent issue of this review. Against Carone's attempt to attribute Plato with a reductionist thesis, whereby the soul can be reduced to the body, I argue that a careful reading of the Timaeus confirms that Plato held a dualist thesis, the soul consisting of an incorporeal substance which cannot be reduced to the corporeal substance the body consists of.

This article is currently available as a free download on ingentaconnect.

In this paper I propose a reconstruction of the onto-cosmological perspective of Plato’s Timaeus and suggest an interpretation of it in the light of some contemporary approaches to ontology and logic, i.e. “ontological sequentialism” and “fuzzy logic”, attempting to use the categories and language of present-day ontology and logic to examine from a different point of view some aspects of the Timaeus onto-cosmology and of its logical scaffolding.

Dans le Parménide de Platon (135 c8 - d5), Parménide propose à Socrate un exercise dialectique, préliminaire à la recherche de la vérité, qui consiste essentiellement dans la vérification de la cohérence logique des conséquences déduites d'une certaine hypothèse et, ensuite, du renversement de l'hypothèse initiale, par rapport à l'objet de l'hypothèse et par rapport à son opposé. Dans un passage très bref (137 b 1-4), Parménide déclare que son examen sera consacré à l' « un lui-même » et qu'il (...) se déroulera à partir de sa propre thèse philosophique. Mais quel est l'objet de l'hypothèse de Parménide? L' « un lui-même », comme le texte semble l'indiquer, ou alors le principe de l' « unité du tout », qui constitue la thèse fondamentale défendue par l'Éléate dans le dialogue? Le but de cet article est justement d'éclairer le contenu de l'hypothèse de Parménide. In Plato's Parmenides (135 c8 - d5), Parmenides suggests Socrates to practice a dialectical exercise before the search for truth: this exercise consists in verifying the logical consistence of the consequences of a certain hypothesis and of its reversal, with respect to the object of the hypothesis and to its opposite. In a very short passage (137 b1-4), Parmenides states that his analysis will be dedicated to the « One itself » and that it will start from his philosophical thesis. But what's the object of Parmenides' hypothesis? The « One itself », as the text seems to mean, or the principle of the « Unity of the All », which is Parmenides' fundamental thesis in the dialogue named after him? This paper intends to clarify the content of Parmenides' hypothesis. (shrink)

La Repubblica di Platone non cessa di suscitare, fra i filosofi e i commentatori, un dibattito intenso e controverso, tanto dal punto di vista del progetto etico e politico che disegna, quanto sul piano delle implicazioni psicologiche, epistemologiche e ontologiche connesse alla definizione del sapere dei filosofi che, secondo Platone, devono essere collocati alla guida di tale progetto. In questa relazione tentero di delineare le principali strategie interpretative che, nel XX secolo, sono state adottate nella lettura del dialogo.

In this paper, I discuss the new edition of Y. Lafrance’s La théorie platonicienne de la Doxa, trying to examine the Author’s reconstruction and interpretation of Plato’s conception of δόξα in the dialogues.

This paper suggests a new proposal of translation and interpretation of Heraclitus’ fragment 41 D.-K. , with reference to his conception of σοφία, which is aimed to an explanation of everything.