본 연구는 현상학적 근거이론을 기반으로 대학생의 열등감의 경험에 대한 질적 분석을 통해 열등감의 경험의 구조와 과정에 대한 이론적 모형을 구성하는 것을 목표로 했다. 본 연구는 지방 1개의 국립대와 2개의 사립대 재학 중인 5명의 대학생을 대상으로 면담과 축어록 작성, 개방코딩과 축코딩 및 현상학적분석을 수행한 결과 상황구조적 기술 차원에서 416개의 개념과 109개의 하위범주 및 41개의 범주를 도출했고, 일반 구조적 기술차원에서 범주를 통합한 결과 11개의 대범주를 도출했다. 또한 자기, 타인, 제3자, 집단 및 과거자신과의 비교속에서 현재의 자기의 열등성의 지각이라는 열등감의 구조를 핵심범주로 하는 열등감의 (...) 경험의 구조와 과정에 대한 이론적 모형을 구성하였다. 끝으로 본 연구는 연구결과로서 도출한 11가지 대범주가 갖는 이론적, 상담적 함의를 논의하였고 연구의 의의와 제한점을 서술하였다. (shrink)

Many people experience feelings of inferiority in their life. The concept of striving to avoid inferiority is a belief associated with the unwanted fear of being overlooked, missing out on opportunities for advancement, and active rejection. This study examined the effect of striving to avoid inferiority on mental health and well-being. We hypothesized that striving to avoid inferiority would modify the relationship among socioeconomic status, mental health, and well-being, therefore examined the effect of striving to avoid (...) inferiority on the relationship between annual income, mental health, and well-being. The participants were 491 adults. The results indicated that insecure striving in competition with others positively correlated with depression, anxiety, and stress, whereas secure non-striving in acceptance of inferiority positively correlated with the satisfaction with life and negatively correlated with depression. The effect of striving to avoid inferiority on the relationship among annual income, mental health, and well-being indicated that SNS affected the relationships between annual income and well-being, annual income and depression, income and anxiety, and the interaction between IS and SNS. Moreover, the relationship between income and stress was influenced by SNS and the interaction between IS and SNS. These results indicated that SNS or the interaction between IS and SNS were the only variables regulating the relationship among annual income, mental health, and well-being. These findings suggested that accepting feelings of inferiority or striving to avoid inferiority influences the mental health and well-being of people. (shrink)

In accordance with the concept of A. Adler - the community feeling is an individual characteristic which is relatively stable throughout life. It refers to an inner relationship of one person with other people: a feeling of unity with others or separation from others. People with high community feeling are motivated in their actions by striving towards the common good, whereas people with low community feeling intend to exhibit their superiority over others in their actions, which (...) would allow them to compensate for their inner feeling of inferiority. On the basis of the Adler concept the following hypotheses were formulated: There is a negative connection between the community feeling and anxiety. The community feeling is positively connected with self-esteem and psychological well-being. A slight increase in the community feeling can be observed with age. The community feeling increases in the age of middle adulthood. 585 people between 20 to 65 years of age were examined. Methods: Community Feeling Questionnaire, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, Ryff Scales of Psychological Well-Being. The hypotheses assumed were verified. (shrink)

We present an analysis of emotional experience in terms of beliefs and desires viewed as its minimal cognitive constituents. We argue that families of emotions can be identified because their members share some of these constituents. To document this claim, we analyze one family of emotions—which includes the feeling of inferiority, admiration, envy, and jealousy—trying to show that the distinctiveness of each emotion is due to the specific compound of beliefs and desires it implies, whereas the kinship among (...) related emotions is due to their sharing of cognitive or motivational components. Finally, we address the gestalt problem, that is, the question of how it is possible that emotions, although consisting of several “atomic” elements, are felt as unitary experiences. (shrink)

Few people will easily admit to taking pleasure in the misfortunes of others. But who doesn't enjoy it when an arrogant but untalented contestant is humiliated on American Idol, or when the embarrassing vice of a self-righteous politician is exposed, or even when an envied friend suffers a small setback? The truth is that joy in someone else's pain--known by the German word schadenfreude--permeates our society. In The Joy of Pain, psychologist Richard Smith, one of the world's foremost authorities on (...) envy and shame, sheds much light on a feeling we dare not admit. Smith argues that schadenfreude is a natural human emotion, one worth taking a closer look at, as it reveals much about who we are as human beings. We have a passion for justice. Sometimes, schadenfreude can feel like getting one's revenge, when the suffering person has previously harmed us. But most of us are also motivated to feel good about ourselves, Smith notes, and look for ways to maintain a positive sense of self. One common way to do this is to compare ourselves to others and find areas where we are better. Similarly, the downfall of others--especially when they have seemed superior to us--can lead to a boost in our self-esteem, a lessening of feelings of inferiority. This is often at the root of schadenfreude. As the author points out, most instances of schadenfreude are harmless, on par with the pleasures of light gossip. Yet we must also be mindful that envy can motivate, without full awareness, the engineering of the misfortune we delight in. And envy-induced aggression can take us into dark territory indeed, as Smith shows as he examines the role of envy and schadenfreude in the Nazi persecution of the Jews. Filled with engaging examples of schadenfreude, from popular reality shows to the Duke-Kentucky basketball rivalry, The Joy of Pain provides an intriguing glimpse into a hidden corner of the human psyche. (shrink)

Phillip Sloan has thoroughly documented the importance of Darwin's general invertebrate research program in the period from 1826 to 1836 and demonstrated how it had an impact on his conversion to transformism. Although Darwin later spent eight years of his life investigating barnacles, this period has received less treatment in studies of Darwin and the development of his thought. The most prominent question for the barnacle period that has been attended to is why Darwin "delayed" in publishing his theory of (...) evolution. A related but distinct question concerns the variety of earlier events and influences that led Darwin to the study of "Cirripedia" in 1846, apart from its role in the trajectory that led to "On the Origin of Species ". In this paper I focus on four specific episodes prior to 1846 that inform a picture of why Darwin had an antecedent interest in barnacles: the orientation to collecting strange and curious invertebrate organisms, as well as the strong affinities of Darwin's invertebrate collecting on the Beagle voyage with the work of John Vaughan Thompson; the critical role of marine invertebrate fossils in Darwin's geological reasoning aboard the Beagle and exemplified in his "Geological Observations of South America;" the strange absence of a "Zoology of the Beagle" volume on invertebrates and Darwin's original intent to publish some of the descriptions himself; and the noteworthy presence of barnacles in Darwin's transformation theorizing between 1837 and 1839. There is a wealth of support for the thesis that Darwin had a strong interest in cirripedes prior to the formal barnacle research, blunting arguments that it was psychological aversion or a feeling of inferiority about his taxonomic abilities that drove Darwin to the cirripedes. (shrink)

By the integrative value-like approach to the idea of God and to the function of religion, A. Adler’s individual psychology provides religious studies with considerable axiological and praxiological footings. Filling individual and societal needs within the contemporary world, religion is constituted as an essential factor in the growth and development of the sense of community as a foundation of democratic cohabitation. Adlerian psychology puts forward a holistic-integrative approach to the human being that can be applied to the area of religious (...) studies. The re-shaping of the table of values and of the socialization and education systems is necessary in the context of the crisis of values and discouraging influences specific to the globalized world. Feelings of inferiority are unavoidable realities of this world and, by avoiding becoming their victim and making use of a positive compensating effort, humas can convert them into facts of culture. We have a general responsibility to develop the innate potentiality of the community feeling, and to encourage it to manifest itself into desirable social behaviors. (shrink)

The Mismeasure of the Self is dedicated to vices that blight many lives. They are the vices of superiority, characteristic of those who feel entitled, superior and who have an inflated opinion of themselves, and those of inferiority, typical of those who are riddled with self-doubt and feel inferior. Arrogance, narcissism, haughtiness, and vanity are among the first group. Self-abasement, fatalism, servility, and timidity exemplify the second. This book shows these traits to be to vices of self-evaluation and describes (...) their pervasive harmful effects in some detail. Even though the influence of these traits extends to any aspect of life, the focus of this book is their damaging impact on the life of the intellect. Tanesini develops and defends a view of these vices that puts vicious motivations at their core. The analyses developed in this work build on empirical research in attitude psychology and on philosophical theories in virtue ethics and epistemology. The book concludes with a positive proposal for weakening vice and promoting virtue. (shrink)

A woman’s lack of or limited reproductive autonomy could lead to adverse health effects, feeling of being inferior, and above all being unable to adequately care for her children. Little is known about the reproductive autonomy of married Ikwerre women of Rivers State, Nigeria. This study demonstrates how Ikwerre women understand the terms autonomy and reproductive rights and what affects the exercise of these rights. An exploratory research design was employed for this study. A semi-structured interview schedule was used (...) to conduct thirty-four in-depth interviews and six focus group discussions with purposively sampled educated, semi-educated, and uneducated Ikwerre women in monogamous or polygynous marriages. The collected data was analysed qualitatively with MAXQDA 11 using open and axial coding. The interviews and focus group responses reveal a low level of awareness of autonomy and reproductive rights amongst the Ikwerre women in Nigeria. While some educated women were aware of their reproductive rights, cultural practices were reported to limit the exercise of these rights. Participants reported that Ikwerre culture is a patriarchal one where married women are expected to submit and obey their husbands in all matters; and a good married woman according to Ikwerre standard is one who complies with this culture. Women’s refusal of sexual advances from their husbands is described as not being acceptable in this culture; and hence rape in marriage is not recognized in Ikwerre culture. Education and awareness creation on the importance of women’s reproductive autonomy could improve their reproductive rights and autonomy in marital settings. Overcoming the patriarchal aspects of Ikwerre culture—for example, the greater value placed on male children than female children and treating women as incompetent individuals—is necessary to promote gender equality as well as help improve women’s reproductive autonomy. (shrink)

Previous research has yielded inconsistent findings concerning the relationship between envy and schadenfreude. Three studies examined whether the distinction between benign and malicious envy can resolve this inconsistency. We found that malicious envy is related to schadenfreude, while benign envy is not. This result held both in the Netherlands where benign and malicious envy are indicated by separate words (Study 1: Sample A, N = 139; Sample B, N = 150), and in the USA where a single word is used (...) to denote both types (Study 2, N = 180; Study 3, N = 349). Moreover, the effect of malicious envy on schadenfreude was independent of other antecedents of schadenfreude (such as feelings of inferiority, disliking the target person, anger, and perceived deservedness). These findings improve our understanding of the antecedents of schadenfreude and help reconcile seemingly contradictory findings on the relationship between envy and schadenfreude. (shrink)

One of the worst aspects of racism is the damage inflicted on the human person by evoking feelings of separateness and inferiority. In his Letter from Birmingham Jail, Martin Luther King meant to capture that impact by referring to a “degenerating sense of nobodiness.” This essay invokes King’s reference to “nobodiness” and connects it explicitly with the negative effects on three particular elements of the human person. Those are having a unique and expressive voice, living a narrative life, and (...) being a Thou. Each is part of a distinctive, unrepeatable personhood. Racism, however, with its categorizing and generalizing tendencies, denies the recognition of those attributes and thereby accords a status of “nobody” to the victim. His or her point of view, personal story, and capacity to stand with integrity as a Thou are set aside. Rendered a “nobody” by racism, his or her personhood has been denied. (shrink)

In his earliest philosophical work, Moritz Schlick developed a proposal for rendering aesthetics into a field of empirical science. His 1908 book Lebensweisheit developed an evolutionary account of the emergence of both scientific knowledge and aesthetic feelings from play. This constitutes the framework of Schlick’s evolutionary psychological methodology for examining the origins of the aesthetic feeling of the beautiful he proposed in 1909. He defends his methodology by objecting to both experimental psychological and Darwinian reductionist accounts of aesthetics. Having (...) countered these approaches, Schlick applies Külpe’s psychological distinction between stimulus-feelings and idea-feelings to collapse the traditional philosophical opposition between the agreeable and the beautiful. Both types of feeling, Schlick argues, result from humans’ adaptation to their environment. Because of this adaptation, feelings that were once only stimuli for action can come to be enjoyed for their own sake. This thesis underlies Schlick’s 1908 argument that art, qua mimesis, is necessarily inferior to aesthetic feelings directed towards the environment. Part of Schlick’s justification for this view is that humans are, through a long evolutionary process, better adapted to their environment than to artworks. Schlick nevertheless concedes that mimetic art can involve ways of abstracting from the objects it copies to produce idealised regularities that are not found in the original. Schlick thus concludes that art teaches its audience how to perceive the world in this abstract and idealised manner. This type of environmental aesthetics constitutes a means for reaching Schlick’s utopian ecological vision of a future in which culture will become harmonised with nature. (shrink)

Violent extremism is often explicitly motivated by commitment to abstract ideals such as the nation or divine law – so-called “sacred” values that are relatively insensitive to material incentives and define our primary reference groups. Moreover, extreme pro-group behavior seems to intensify after social exclusion. This fMRI study explores underlying neural and behavioral relationships between sacred values, violent extremism, and social exclusion. Ethnographic fieldwork and psychological surveys were carried out among young men from a European Muslim community in neighborhoods in (...) and around Barcelona, Spain. Candidates for an fMRI experiment were selected from those who expressed willingness to engage in or facilitate, violence associated with jihadist causes. In the scanner, participants were assessed for their willingness to fight and die for in-group sacred values before and after an experimental manipulation using Cyberball, a toss ball game known to yield strong feelings of social exclusion. Results indicate that neural activity associated with sacred value processing in a sample vulnerable to recruitment into violent extremism shows marked activity in the left inferior frontal gyrus, a region previously associated with sacred values and rule retrieval. Participants also behaviorally expressed greater willingness to fight and die for sacred versus non-sacred values, consistent with previous studies of combatants and noncombatants. The social exclusion manipulation specifically affected non-sacred values, increasing their similarities with sacred values in terms of heightened left inferior frontal activity and greater expressed willingness to fight and die. These findings suggest that sacralization of values interacts with willingness to engage in extreme behavior in populations vulnerable to radicalization. In addition, social exclusion may be a relevant factor motivating violent extremism and consolidation of sacred values. If so, counteracting social exclusion and sacralization of values should figure into policies to prevent radicalization. (shrink)

This volume explores contemporary social conflict, focusing on a sort of violence that rarely receives coverage in the evening news. This violence occurs when powerful institutions seek to manipulate the thoughts of marginalized people-manufacturing their feelings and fostering a sense of inferiority-for the purpose of disciplinary control. Many American institutions strategically orchestrate this psychic violence through tactics of systemic humiliation. This book reveals how certain counter-measures, based in a commitment to human dignity and respect for every person's inherent moral (...) worth, can combat this violence. Rothbart and other contributors showcase various examples of this tug-of-war in the US, including the politics of race and class in the 2016 presidential campaign, the dehumanizing treatment of people with mental disabilities, and destructive parenting styles that foster cycles of humiliation and emotional pain. (shrink)

The behavioral decision-making and negotiations literature usually advocates a first-mover advantage, explained the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. Thus, buyers, who according to the social norm, tend to move second, strive to make the first offer to take advantage of this effect. On the other hand, negotiation practitioners and experts often advise the opposite, i.e., moving second. These opposite recommendations regarding first offers are termed thePractitioner-Researcher paradox. In the current article, we investigate the circumstances under which buyers would make less favorable (...) first offers than they would receive were they to move second, focusing on low power and anxiety during negotiations. Across two studies, we manipulated negotiators' best alternative to the negotiated agreement (BATNA) and measured their anxiety. Our results show that, when facing neutral-power sellers, weak buyers who feel anxious would make inferior first offers (Studies 1 and 2). When facing low-power sellers, weak buyers would make inferior first offers across all anxiety levels (Study 2). Our findings shed light on two critical factors leading to the Practitioner-Researcher paradox: power and anxiety, and offer concrete guidelines to buyers who find themselves at low power and highly anxious during negotiations. (shrink)

This research examines the novel No Time Like the Present (NTLP) by Nadine Gordimer as a material object. This novel outlines the conditions and situation of the post-apartheid South African country with various post-colonial problems. Centered on the life of a mixed family, black and white, with the characters of former independence fighter Umkhonto, the novel shows how the tortured and fragmented essence of a country struggles to define itself as a post-apartheid nation. In this regard, as an implication of (...) this problem, this research formulates two problems, (1) How do the colonial memory and trauma contructed in NTLP novel? And (2) How are the subject efforts to accept and recover from the trauma? To solve those problems, this research uses Postcolonial Trauma perpective of Step Craps and combined with reconciliation theory from Dominick LaCapra as a formal object. The aims of this research to (1) describe the construction of memory and colonial trauma through narrative witnessing that has an impact on the existence of the traumatic subject in the novel, and (2) explain the traumatized subjects efforts to survive through recovery and acceptance of the trauma experienced. This research is qualitative-descriptive by analyzing data using phenomenological method. The method used to analyze the events as well as traumatic experiences constructed in literary texts. The research resulted, (1) the construction of traumatic memories originating from apartheid events is narrated in various forms of torture carried out by the white regime, both directly against Umkhonto and South African society in general, including arrests and killings, segregation and cladestine life, invasions home, and cultural racism. This experience in turn causes collective trauma, which is narrated in symptoms such as the inability of the subject, feelings of inferiority, self-loathing, to Xenophobia. Furthermore, (2) in the efforts of reconciliation, social, political, economic, and other transformations and reforms, it encourages traumatic subjects to persist in the present and in the future, even though the past is still haunted. As an entity that represents the collectivism of the South African people, Umkhonto demonstrates persistence, reconnecting experiences, knowledge and feelings between them through acceptance of reality, selecting the right listeners or mates, and working towards voting rights in elections. (shrink)

This article proposes that linguistic shame is a form of affective injustice and describes some of the benefits of classifying it as such. Linguistic shame involves feelings of embarrassment, a sense of inferiority, and attitudes of self-reproach that arise in relation to the way one speaks. The article gives an account of three main types of linguistic shame to which Latinx people are subject: the shame of the English as a second-language speaker; the shame of the Spanglish speaker; and (...) the shame of the English-only speaker. In all cases, linguistic shame emerges in the context of linguicism, a system in which some ways of speaking are privileged and the way one speaks is an indicator of the speaker’s social status. Classifying linguistic shame as an affective injustice highlights the political nature of the emotion and provides some guidance for how to resist this injustice. (shrink)

The point of departure used in the article is the statement that in the bourgeois character there is embedded a feeling, not always conscious, of profound impotence. Psychoanalytic experiences are presented to illustrate such feelings. In extreme cases the content of such feeling may be described as follows : „There is nothing I can influence ; nothing I can move ; nothing I can change by my will in the external {World or in myself. I have no power, (...) I am not taken seriously, I am for other people like air which no one notices.“The feeling of being without power may be in relation to other people, to oneself, or to things. Its most important psychological consequences are a feeling of inferiority, fear, and anger. A series of examples are described in which an attempt was made to soften the intensity of the feeling of impotence, or to eliminate it entirely. In this sphere rationalizations explain the impotence as the result of certain non-psychological conditions, rationalizations which console because of their belief in sudden miracles or changes over long periods of time ; finally, a reaction which consists in an attempt to hide this feeling in activity and mere routine.The social conditions of the origin of this feeling of impotence are found in two fields : first in the fact that the child in the bourgeois family, even if treated very favorably, is not really taken seriously, and then in the place the adult has in modern society, his helplessness and dependence on powers he cannot comprehend and control, in particular his position of impotence in a process of production governed by the principle of division of labor.At the end the author attempts to show this feeling of impotence and the rationalizations which covered it up in the political behavior of the European masses during the post-war period.L'article constate tout d'abord qu'un sentiment d'impuissance profond, encore que d'ordinaire inconscient, marque la vie bourgeoise. L'article utilise l'expérience que livre la psychanalyse des individus pour décrire ce sentiment d'impuissance. Dans les cas extrêmes, la description aboutit aux traits suivants : je ne puis exercer d'influence sur rien, je ne puis rien mettre en mouvement, ma volonté est incapable de rien changer ni dans le monde extérieur ni en moi-même, je n'ai pas de force, je n'existe pas pour les autres, je suis comme l'air qu'ils respirent. Le sentiment d'impuissance peut se rapporter aussi bien à d'autres hommes qu'à la personne elle-même, ou à des choses. Les suites psychologiques les plus importantes de ce sentiment sont : complexe d'infériorité, angoisse, colère. L'article décrit une série de tentatives pour adoucir, ou même chasser de la conscience la souffrance qui naît de cette impuissance. A cette catégorie appartiennent des rationalisations explicatives qui ramènent l'impuissance à certaines circonstances extra-psychiques ; des rationalisations consolatrices qui font croire à la brusque irruption d'un miracle, ou bien à des changements progressifs, fruits d'une longue durée ; enfin une forme de réaction qui, à force d'activité, de routine affairée parvient à couvrir le sentiment d'impuissance, qui reste inconscient. Deux ordres de conditions sociales favorisent la formation du sentiment d'impuissance : d’abord le fait que l'enfant dans la société bourgeoise, si affectueusement qu'il puisse être traité, n'est pas — au fond — pris au sérieux ; d'autre part, le rôle de l'adulte dans la société bourgeoise, sa propre impuissance et sa dépendance à l'égard de forces qu'il est incapable de maîtriser ou même de reconnaître, plus particulièrement sa position dans le procès de production, qui, par suite de l'extrême division du travail, lui enlève autonomie et efficacité. Pour terminer, l'article tente de retrouver ce sentiment d'impuissance et les diverses formes de rationalisations qui le dissimulent, dans l'attitude des masses européennes durant l'époque de l'après-guerre. (shrink)

Humility can seem like a somewhat ‘unfashionable’ virtue: the word can conjure an image of cringing servility, unduly romanticised feelings of inferiority, or a level of self-denial which seems ill-placed in a life well-lived. But the term can also capture something of great ethical importance. In this paper, I will propose an account of humility that attempts to capture this moral significance. I will then explore the connection between humility and ethical development, seeking to argue that humility has an (...) important role in ethical improvement. If such a connection is vindicated, it suggests that humility is valuable twice over: it has intrinsic worth but is also instrumentally valuable, enabling us to become better people. (shrink)

Incarceration served as a primary apparatus by which abolition democracy was defeated after Reconstruction. Carceral institutions—such as the penitentiary, the convict-lease system, and the chain gang—functioned to demarcate the racial limits of citizenship and to impede equal political power. This article turns to W. E. B. Du Bois to argue that incarceration constrains democratic political equality. Turning to Du Bois’s treatment of crime and imprisonment in works including The Philadelphia Negro (1899), “The Spawn of Slavery” (1901), and The Souls of (...) Black Folk (1903), alongside archival material, I situate incarceration in Du Bois’s democratic thought. According to Du Bois, carceral institutions bounded ideas of full citizenship, fueled panic over Black “criminality,” fomented feelings of inferiority, and hampered the possibility for abolition democracy, a multiracial, multiclass movement committed to worker democracy and a future rid of slavery and subjugation. Du Bois shows us how carceral institutions run into tension with democratic ideals. (shrink)

Augustine’s insights into the will and its free decision have long been a focus of controversy since his lifetime. Nonetheless, in modern scholarship, little effort has been made to clarify the actual function of the will as a psychological force in the life of mind. It has often been taken for granted that the will is an independent faculty which underlies our moral responsibility by its free choice. Accordingly, much ink has been spilled over issues such as necessity and freedom, (...) grace and free will, sin and evil will etc. This philosophical inquiry distinguishes itself from its antecedents by adopting a psychological focus on the function of the will. It attempts to explicate why uoluntas, and not other psychological activities, is the locus of moral responsibility in Augustine’s philosophical psychology. The work is thus split into two parts, each consisting of four chapters: the first part devoted to the will’s operation as a psychological dynamism, and the second to the traditional consideration of the will as a moral faculty. In the first part, the dissertation systematically investigates the psychological phenomenon of the will in its relationship to other psychological activities, from irrational affection to intellectual cognition. This phenomenological approach starts with Augustine’s unusual conception of concupiscentia carnis in his debates with Julian of Eclanum. According to Augustine’s philosophical interpretation of this biblical term, concupiscentia carnis as an uncontrollable tendency defines the essential infirmity of the will and forms the starting-point of further affective expressions of the soul. Then, the analysis advances to the role of the will in the formation of affection. It reveals the implicit approval that is entailed in the unvoluntary pre-volitional movements of the soul. This explains the superficial discrepancy between Augustine’s accounts of affection as can be found in Books IX and XIV of De ciuitate Dei. This general account of Augustine’s theory of emotion is followed by an in-depth examination of the feeling of shame so as to display the will’s actual contribution in a reflective affection. Augustine convincingly proves that shame reflects the powerlessness of the will in confrontation with concupiscentia carnis as well as the will’s effort to regain its dignity. To complete the foray into Augustine’s philosophy of the soul, his reflections on intellect and will in the process of moral decision are called into question. By reconsidering Augustine’s account of his own conversion and his reflections on our journey to the happy life, my analyses show that neither intellectualitic nor voluntaristic interpretations do justice to his understanding of moral decision. The voluntaristic interpretation overlooks the intellectual perspective of happy life and Augustine’s emphasis on the necessity of a knowledge of the good for our moral behaviour. On the other hand, the intellectualistic account unjustly ignores Augustine’s insights into the severe destructiveness of the failure of the will and the dilemma of two wills at war. To summarize, the phenomenological approach in Part I reveals the omnipresent feature of the will in mental life. The implications of this psychological feature of the will are twofold. It indicates the independence of the will as well as the limitations of the will by its actual conditions. The second part of this work investigates the moral significance of Augustine’s psychological insights into the function of the will. What bridges the gap between uoluntas as a psychological power and uoluntas as a moral faculty is Augustine’s most controversial conception of freedom. The dissertation first scrutinizes Augustine’s arguments for the independence of the will as reconstructed and assumed in the first part. By metaphysical arguments, Augustine reveals that nothing external, neither inferior nor superior being, can force the will to attain a particular disposition. For this cannot happen in a world governed by the divine order. In his analyses of the phenomenon of two contradictory wills, Augustine shows that the will is conditioned but not compelled by other internal forces. However, this merely represents the negative aspect of the will’s freedom, or libertas a coactione. At the same time, the positive aspect of Augustinian uoluntas has frequently been misinterpreted as a faculty of choice, or libertas indifferentiae. A careful reading shows that the free decision of the will is essentially a capacity to pursue one’s own happiness. In accord with this eudemonistic emphasis, the genuine freedom is the freedom to will and to accomplish the good, which alone guarantees the happy life. This original interpretation of freedom offers powerful support to Augustine’s account of moral agency. One is not only held responsible for his voluntary evildoings which he could have avoided, but also for the necessary conditions of life, i.e., ignorantia and difficultas as effects of original sin. For as argued earlier, even the presence of concupiscentia carnis as the inherent infirmity of the will contains the least assent of the will. This assent establishes the moral agency in evil willing. To account for our agency in the good will, the dissertation addresses the problem of compatibility between divine grace and freedom of will. My analysis shows that Augustine’s rigid position in the last years of his life is also philosophically defensible. An internal function of the grace upon the faculty of the will will not destroy its freedom to attain its own disposition. This philosophical analysis concludes by highlightling the close affiliation between the will and the self in Augustinian uoluntas. “I know nothing I could call my own if the will by which I’m willing or unwilling is not my own.”. By consent or dissent of the will, we identify ourselves with mental images, affective movements, practical reasoning and other psychological activities, either implicitly or explicitly. Augustine’s realistic conceptions of the will and its conditioned freedom provide a subtle and rich picture of human nature, which is still relevant to our own theoretical reflections on the self. 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Polyamory is a form of consensual non-monogamy. To render it palatable to critics, activists and theorists often accentuate its similarity to monogamy. I argue that this strategy conceals the distinctive character of polyamorous intimacy. A more discriminating account of polyamory helps me answer objections to the lifestyle whilst noting some of its unique pitfalls. I define polyamory, and explain why people pursue this lifestyle. Many think polyamory is an inferior form of intimacy; I describe four of their main objections. I (...) explain how commitment to ‘the polyamorous possibility’ prompts one to viscerally experience personal, practical, and social constraints. Unlike monogamous dynamics, these confrontations are mediated by third parties who destabilise the familiar dynamics of coupled life. Polyamory can be emotionally challenging but, as I outline in the article, it is sustained by interpersonal emotional work that helps people feel and understand their emotions, communicate without confrontation, and contain the difficult emotions of others. This work is qualitatively and quantitatively intensified in polyamory. Finally, I rebut objections to polyamory whilst also acknowledging the ways polyamory has its own pitfalls. (shrink)

Human rights may feel self-apparent to us, but less than 80 years ago, one of the most advanced countries at the time acted based on an utterly contrary ideology. The view of social Darwinism that abandoned the idea of the intrinsic value of human lives instead argued that oppression of the inferior is not only inevitable but desirable. One of the many catastrophic outcomes is the medical data obtained from inhuman experiments at concentration camps. Ethical uncertainty over whether the resulting (...) insights should be a part of the medical literature provides a chance to consider the seemingly irreplaceable social construct of human dignity. Would any medical benefit justify the utilization of this illicit data? Would utilization even qualify as an insult to the dignity of the exploited subjects, or is this a question about intersubjective meaning? This work discusses the wisdom in blind adherence to human dignity, the possibility of retrospective insults, moral complicity, contrary viewpoints, and possible resolutions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:137. PROBABILITY IN HUME'S SCIENCE OF MAN This paper is an attempt to make sense of a fragment of Hume's positive philosophy, namely his theory of how we apportion belief on the basis of ambiguous evidence. The topic is one that has received little critical attention from philosophers. One reason for this neglect is the belief that Hume's discussion of probable reasoning is not addressed to philosophical questions, but (...) rather is concerned merely to give a psychological theory of why we tend to make the inferences we do. Another is the view that Hume's psychology of probability is too obscure to merit serious study. I hope to show, however, that Hume's discussion of probable reasoning contains more philosophy, and more interesting psychology, than the prevalence of these attitudes would suggest. The main philosophical content that I see in Hume's account of probable reasoning is that it embodies a certain theory of belief, worked out in some detail. Here the central notion is the "belief-feeling", vivacity. After an initial discussion of Hume's use of this notion, I hazard the opinion that vivacities are related to probabilities by a simple subtraction formula (§1). The investigation of Hume's account of probable inference (§2) gives strong grounds for thinking that this conjecture is indeed correct. Finally, an examination of what Hume says about the influence of probability on the passions unearths a bold theory of the specific psychological mechanism by which the subtraction of probabilities is effected (§3).§1 Degrees of belief Hume's philosophy makes heavy use of the quality of perceptions which he referred to variously as "force", "liveliness", "violence", "vivacity", "strength", "firmness" and so on. As the variety of these terms indicates, Hume was not entirely happy with any of them. He says it is 138. impossible by words to describe this feeling, which every 2 one must be conscious of in his own breast (A19). But we need to use some word, and rather than emulate Hume's diverse usage it will be convenient to adhere uniformly to the single term 'vivacity'. The first use to which Hume puts vivacity is in distinguishing impressions from ideas. Intuitively, impressions are either sensations, passions or emotions, whereas ideas are the perceptions involved in thinking or reasoning. And Hume maintains that we can distinguish these two kinds of perceptions by their differing degrees of vivacity: all impressions have greater vivacity than any idea. Apparently Hume thinks that the difference in vivacity between impressions and ideas is normally quite considerable, although in a few instances there is only a small differential (T2). Vivacity is again used by Hume to distinguish between belief and conception. Although to have an idea of God, say, is not the same thing as to believe in God, Hume argues that what distinguishes the latter is only the manner of conception. In belief, the idea feels different to an idea that is entertained incredulously. And this difference in feeling is identified by Hume with a difference in vivacity (T96).3 In general, Hume thinks of beliefs as being ideas, not impressions (T86 being an exception). This is the natural view, if one thinks of the distinction between impressions and ideas as a distinction between feeling and thinking (T2, A9 ). What distinguishes beliefs then is a somewhat intermediate vivacity, inferior to the vivacity of an impression but superior to the vivacity of a mere conception. A third use to which Hume puts vivacity is in making the distinction between memory and other beliefs. Just as beliefs are distinguished from other conceptions by their greater vivacity, so likewise memories are distinguished from other beliefs by their greater vivacity (T153). 139. Each of these three applications of vivacity seems to be implausib^e. Introspection inevitably suggests that impressions are not always more vivacious or forceful, or whatever, than ideas. Similarly it seems that our beliefs, and even our memories, are often less vivid than our fancies, contrary to what Hume claims. A considerable part of Hume's appendix to the Treatise is concerned with such objections. Hume appears to allow that what we would naturally call the vivacity of ideas is not a quality... (shrink)

Contemporary theorists critical of the current vogue for compassion might like to turn to Friedrich Nietzsche as an obvious ally in their opposition to the sentiment. Yet this essay argues that Nietzsche’s critique of compassion is not entirely critical, and that the endorsement of one’s sympathetic feelings is actually a natural outgrowth of Nietzsche’s immoralist ethics. Nietzsche understands the tendency to share in the suffering of their inferiors as a distinctive vulnerability of the spiritually strong and healthy. Their compassion, however, (...) is an essential element of the imaginative creativity that Nietzsche holds to be the goal of human existence. Although shared suffering may prove debilitating for some, great individuals must come to affirm their compassion as necessary in achieving accurate knowledge of the human condition. (shrink)

Awareness of internal bodily sensations and its connection to complex socioemotional abilities like empathy has been postulated, yet the functional neural circuitry they share remains poorly understood. The present fMRI study employs independent component analysis to investigate which empathy facet shares resting-state functional connectivity and/or BOLD variability with IA. Healthy participants viewed an abstract nonsocial movie demonstrated to evoke strong rsFC in brain networks resembling rest, and resultant rsFC and rsBOLD data were correlated with self-reported empathy and IA questionnaires. We (...) demonstrate a bidirectional behavioral and neurobiological relationship between empathy and IA, depending on the type of empathy interrogated: Affective empathy and IA share both rsFC and rsBOLD, while Cognitive empathy and IA only share rsBOLD. Specifically, increased rsFC in the right inferior frontal operculum of a larger attention network was associated with increased vicarious experience but decreased awareness of inner body sensations. Furthermore, increased rsBOLD between brain regions of an interoceptive network was related to increased sensitivity to internal sensations along with decreased Affective empathy. Finally, increased rsBOLD between brain regions subserving a mentalizing network related to not only an improved ability to take someone’s perspective, but also a better sense of mind-body interconnectedness. Overall, these findings suggest that the awareness of one’s own internal body changes is related to the socioemotional ability of feeling and understanding another’s emotional state and critically, that this relationship is reflected in the brain’s resting state neuroarchitecture. Methodologically, this work highlights the importance of utilizing rsBOLD as a complementary window alongside rsFC to better understand neurological phenomena. Our results may be beneficial in aiding diagnosis in clinical populations such as autism spectrum disorder, where participants may be unable to complete tasks or questionnaires due to the severity of their symptoms. (shrink)

The harmony thesis claims that a virtuous agent will not experience inner conflict or pain when acting. The continent agent, on the other hand, is conflicted or pained when acting virtuously, making him inferior to the virtuous agent. But following Karen Stohr’s counterexample, we can imagine a case like a company owner who needs to fire some of her employees to save her company, where acting with conflict or pain is not only appropriate, but necessary in the situation. This creates (...) a problem for virtue ethicists because the virtue/continence distinction cannot easily be drawn in the case. One solution offered by Stohr is to claim that a virtuous agent will respond with an intensity of feeling corresponding to her correct judgment, whereas a continent agent will miss the mark: he will feel too much or too little pain in response to his correct judgment of value. This demarcation, I argue, is too strict because it entails something like a mean resembling a moral virtue or vice regarding pain, being inconsistent with our ordinary understanding of continence. In dealing with the difficulty, I argue that Aristotle’s virtue of endurance is better suited to account for the problem case. The following move explains why the case of the company owner is problematic: the company owner was missing a virtue on which we did not have the conceptual resources to elaborate. This points to a deeper problem in virtue ethics that needs to be addressed. (shrink)

Revenge is common in our daily lives, and people feel good when engaging in revenge behavior. However, revenge behavior is a complex process and remains somewhat of a puzzle of human behavior. Neuroimaging studies have revealed that revenge behaviors are associated with activation of a neural network containing the anterior cingulate cortex, ventral striatum, inferior frontal gyrus, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Recent brain stimulation research using transcranial direct current stimulation and transcranial magnetic stimulation has shown a causal relationship between brain (...) regions and revenge behaviors, but the findings have been mixed. In the present study, we aimed to study whether stimulation in the DLPFC can change participants’ revenge behavior in conditions where participants’ wealth was taken away in different ways. We adapted the moonlighting game and designed a new paradigm. Our study revealed that revenge behavior increased following activation in the right DLPFC, suggesting that the right DLPFC plays an important role in overriding self-interest and retaliation. In addition, our results revealed that the right DLPFC is crucial in revenge behavior related to the motivation of invasion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In Search of the Sense and the Senses:Aesthetic Education in Germany and the United StatesAlexandra Kertz-Welzel (bio)The dream that art is able to humanize human beings is very old. One person fascinated by this idea claimed:The creative artist educates and perfects through his work the nation's capacity for appreciation, just as conversely the general feeling for art thus developed and sustained creates the fruitful soil which is the (...) condition for the birth, the growth, and the activity of creative forces.1The author asserted that art has educational power and is able to improve appreciation as well as activate creative energy. Art is a way to transform the individual through its aesthetic power.Although these ideas sound similar to some approaches in arts education, this quotation does not represent the ideas of an art educator or a music educator. It is a quotation from one of the most powerful and most dangerous believers in the transforming power of art and music, in particular—Adolf Hitler (1889-1945). His ideology matched perfectly with the ideas of German music education in the 1930s, and therefore music education was a significant part of the school curriculum during the Third Reich. One of the most tempting ideas for music educators is the claim that music is capable of transforming human beings and their society.The idea of the educational power of music starts at least with Plato. Since the 1950s, aesthetic education has emphasized the aesthetic value and educational power of music. The German and the American concepts of aesthetic education are significantly different, but as a result of historical developments, they also share some similarities.The main intent of this paper is to analyze crucial issues of aesthetic education that exist in Germany and the United States. By comparing the two approaches, some core issues of music education will also be revealed in terms of idealistic dreams that are intent on making the world a better place [End Page 102] through music. This leads to some interesting insights concerning the significance but also the ambiguity of art for societies.The Roots: Ancient Greece, Schiller, and Holistic DreamsThe origin of the term aesthetics can be found in the Greek word aisthesis, which means perception through the senses.2 This meaning of aisthesis is originally not related to art. It concerns all kinds of sensations through seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, and tasting. In Greek philosophy, aisthesis as a way of experiencing the world through the senses is opposite to cognition in terms of an intellectual way of realization, the theoria. But given that art is something one can perceive through the various senses, aisthesis also concerns art.Most theories of aesthetic education refer to the ancient Greek idea of music, the musiké, which is a unity of music, dance, and literature. Plato emphasized the educational power of music and its effects on character development: "Musical training is a more potent instrument than any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into the inward places of the soul.... "3 Since music is so powerful, the correct use and the correct kind of music are important. According to Plato, art is a way to learn about truth and ideas through beauty. But art is also dangerous, because the senses "lie" and art is only an imitation of truth. For Plato, the senses are not as clear as the intellect.Plato's concerns about the ambivalence of sensorial perception are typical for the way aisthesis and aesthetics have been understood throughout the history of philosophy. The tension between a "true" intellectual approach to knowledge and an inferior approach through the senses is one aspect of the well-known mind-body dichotomy.During the eighteenth century, the era of enlightenment, Alexander Baumgarten (1714-62) introduced the term aesthesis into the philosophical discussion.4 In his book Aesthetica (published in 1750), he attempted to justify sensorial perception and emotions as a unique way of understanding the world. Baumgarten was not interested in the arts at all and tried to establish aesthetics as the science of sensuous cognition in order to improve the sensuous capacity for cognition. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Painful Lack of ConnectionChristopher Bailey (bio)Keywordsdepression, detachment (as a defense), empathy, evolution, masculinityI greatly appreciate the incredibly thoughtful responses to my clinical anecdote, “A Painful Lack of Wounds.” There is, in some more than others, a peculiar aura of detachment that, for me, evokes the very abyss (and its lack of an opposing force) that Colin and I found ourselves staring into that day. I realize, of course, (...) that some level of detachment is necessary to allow airspace for intellectual arrivals and departures.Detachment, moreover, is a form of emotional and psychological escape. In contrast with physical escape, detachment makes something that is present seem absent and, in that regard, is more like camouflage than flight. In some of the responses, therefore, I find myself tuning out the intellectual labyrinth and tuning in to how well it obscures its creator. What wounds or weaknesses, I wonder, is the author trying to hide? Insulin-dependent diabetes? An inferiority complex? Cannot climb chain-link fences? Is he or she hiding these problems from him- or herself? Or just the rest of us?This drive to connect, to regain the biological and the personal, was the ultimate point of my anecdote. I am not suggesting that human beings are biologically built for warfare or that all forms of pathology, at one time, must have conferred some evolutionary advantage. But as omnivorous, social primates, we are definitely adapted for engagement (of all varieties).Certainly, we need to avoid overidentification or sweepingly premature conclusions. Still, no doctor would deny his or her nostrils if cued by a foul, fetid odor to examine a patient for bed sores or gangrene. Likewise, we cannot in our clinical efforts recoil from the same instincts for sniffing out pathology that once made us successful predators. To paraphrase Jeffrey Masson and Susan McCarthy, the authors of When Elephants Weep, when one feels, from observing a bear, that the bear is sad, chances are the bear is sad. To call this anthropomorphizing is a much less parsimonious explanation than the possibility that evolutionary cousins can accurately read one another. And if inter-mammalian empathy is not too much of a stretch, we can probably trust what we feel from an animal of our own species.Granted, it is a long way from feeling to formulation. I chose to write about Colin because he expressed a kind of craving I am finding in a lot of men these days. I do not doubt that cultural pressure, heaped on personal issues and genetic prerogatives, can push a man to place heroism at the center of his psychic universe. Nonetheless, I find it odd that ostensibly comprehensive formulations, like the biopsychosocial model, fail to acknowledge the greater ecosystem in which we dwell. The wheelchair-accessible communities we have created to detach from natural selection are [End Page 249] the same frictionless planes on which masculinity, like a grotesque evolutionary artifact, tends to stumble nowadays.In short, were we not so dependent on the very things we call progress, had we not atrophied from a well-adapted ape to one that can die of hypothermia in 50° weather, I doubt if Colin's insecurity (or anyone's) would be so great. Not that I did not challenge Colin on aspects of his self-doubt. But I did not see it as “inappropriate” either. And although I agree a sense of helplessness can be both cause and effect of depression, his self-doubt, to me, was more than just a “cognitive error” unconsciously conceived as cover for a dark mood. Nondepressed people, after all, score higher than their depressed counterparts on measures of self-deception. The same false sense of security that we, as a culture, have coasted on for decades was shattered for Colin in Iraq. And I believe that is a good thing.Related ArticlesFeature Article: Clinical Anecdotes: A Painful Lack of WoundsCommentary: The Nature of Proof in PsychiatryCommentary: Truth and Healing a Veteran's DepressionCommentary: Inappropriate RegretCommentary: The Cultural Context of Post-traumatic Stress DisorderCommentary: Explication or Explanation?Commentary: The Importance of What Psychiatrists Care AboutCommentary: Mourning or MelancholiaResponse: A... (shrink)

In the global context, the economic-technological powers are also the political-cultural powers, which have the capacity to obtain the maximising benefits from the global flow of information. Meanwhile, the countries which are inferior in economics, technology, etc. feel unable to enjoy the fruits of the information society; they have to struggle for their right to communicate.

In the context of feminist and postmodern thought, traditional conceptions of masculinity and what it means to be a “Real Man” have been critiqued. In Genevieve Lloyd's The Man of Reason, this critique takes the form of exposing the effect that the distinctive masculinity of the “man of reason” has had on the history of philosophy. One major feature of the masculine-feminine dichotomy will emerge as a key notion for understanding the rest of the paper: the dichotomy of reason-feeling, (...) a parallel and a foundational aspect to the dichotomy of masculinity and femininity. In exploring the history of symbolic conceptions of masculinity in ancient Greece, the Renaissance, and the present, one finds that the oppression of women is integrally linked to the traditional tie between masculinity and reason. There have been many efforts in recent feminist philosophy to rewrite or redefine “Woman” in such a way as to alleviate the oppression of women. I argue that the effectiveness of rewriting Woman for this purpose is problematic, primarily because any rewriting of this type must occur in the current historical context of hierarchical dualisms, like Man-Woman, masculine-feminine, male-female. These binary oppositions arguably find their roots in Pythagorean philosophy and can be traced through the Renaissance to our current historical context. It is these dualisms that have traditionally valued the masculine side of the Man-Woman dichotomy more than the feminine. Further, it will be argued that the hierarchical dualism of Man and Woman is so pervasive that if we rewrite or redefine the inferior, deprivileged side of that dualism, we cannot correct its devalued status. Instead, we redefine that which is undervalued but retain its devalued status. This particular aspect of attempts to critique hierarchical dualisms like reason and feeling has been reflected in the writings of many feminists, male and female. This paper will show that in cases where women attempt to redefine the dichotomy by revaluing the traditionally feminine (like feelings and emotions) over the traditionally masculine (like reason) their work is often mistakenly criticized for being purely political; conversely, when men attempt to redefine the same dichotomy in an attempt to allow men to “get back in touch with their feelings,” to be nurturers, their work is described in terms of providing a better epistemology. The current literature on masculinity explores alternatives to rewriting or redefining Woman that try to avoid the problem of status remaining with redefinition. This alternative is rewriting or redefining Man. Through redefining Man, one may be able to reconceptualize the privileged side of the hierarchical dualism in such a way that it is no longer privileged. Deprivileging, as well as redefining Man, is argued by theorists of masculinity to be possible because while the devalued status of the inferior side of a hierarchical dualism tends to keep the same status when redefined, it may be possible to redefine the privileged side of the dualism in such a way that it loses its privileged status. Unfortunately, many of these attempts to rewrite or redefine masculinity have detrimental faults of their own. Finally, this paper will discuss more promising possibilities for new definitions of Man, as well as a vision for better interaction between the work of women and men in general. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to illuminate the meaning of receiving help from home nursing care for the chronically ill, elderly persons living in their homes. The study was carried out in Norway. Data were collected by narrative interviews and analysed by phenomenological hermeneutic interpretations. Receiving help from home nursing care sometimes meant ‘Being ill and dependent on help’. Other times it meant ‘Being at the mercy of help’. It could also mean ‘Feeling inferior as a human being’. (...) Sometimes help was given by nurses who were respectful and proficient at caring for an elderly person, while at other times nurses seemed to be incompetent and worked with a paternalistic attitude without respect for privacy. Receiving help also meant elderly persons wanted to be regarded and approached as equal human beings, supported in the courage to meet challenges in life. (shrink)

Publication date: 30 August 2017 Source: Author: Elham Ghaderi Doust Apparently, English is globally used as the most fundamental communication medium. Regarding the objectives of Foreign Language Education in Iran Curriculum, an Iranian educated must be capable of expressing his opinions and viewpoints as well as accurately utilizing the foreign sources and satisfying his demands. Also, he must understand English speeches produced by native English speakers. With perspectives on these objectives, experts involved in English Education sphere design and write Educational (...) English books and teachers have been instructing these books for ages. Indeed we must raise this question: Why Iranian students are such evasive learners and why does almost nobody acquire English in an applicable way in Iranian schools? It is evident that most students of first grade of secondary schools are confronted with certain problems following as:Many students are slightly familiar with English.They often recognize English as a difficult subject to study.Also, they believe that they will not achieve a genuine progress in English.Many students show a lack of self-confidence and inferiority complex.Comparing themselves with the students in the upper grades, they feel that they cannot master English.So, certain efforts must be channeled into resolving these problems, in particular, the ways the students deal with their English books are to be changed and so are the methodologies in teaching. These may become perfectly practicable by utilizing instructional aides, preserving the students' fondness for their English courses, and organizing the instructional content from the simple to complex, as well as discussing with experts, parents, educational managers, and students. The objectives of this study are to shift students' perspectives upon English and support them through their learning English; consequently they will progress satisfactorily at present and in the future. (shrink)

I continue my argument that Millian qualitative superiorities are infinite superiorities: one pleasant feeling, or type of pleasant feeling, is qualitatively superior to another in Mill's sense if and only if even a bit of the superior is more pleasant than any finite quantity of the inferior, however large. This gives rise to a hierarchy of higher and lower pleasures such that a reasonable hedonist always refuses to sacrifice a higher for a lower irrespective of the finite amounts (...) of each. Some indication of why this absolute refusal may be reasonable is provided in the course of outlining the content of the Millian hierarchy. It emerges that Mill's hedonistic utilitarianism has an extraordinary structure because it gives absolute priority over competing considerations to a code of justice that distributes equal rights and correlative duties for all. His utilitarianism also recognizes that certain aesthetic and spiritual pleasures may be qualitatively superior even to the pleasant feeling of security associated with the moral sentiment of justice. Thus, for instance, a noble individual may reasonably choose to waive his own rights so as to perform beautiful supererogatory actions that provide great benefits for others at the sacrifice of the right-holder's own vital interests. (shrink)

Valmaer. [pseud]. [Ream, Michael]. Lawyer's Code of Ethics. A Satire. St. Louis: The F.H. Thomas Law Book Co., 1887. 143 pp. Reprinted 2001 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. LCCN 00-021508. ISBN 1-58477-047-3. Cloth. $65. * Witty satire of the world of law practice, written in the form of an instructional code of ethics, providing advice such as "When old members of the bar do come into contact with the young men, they should by their conduct towards them make them feel (...) their insignificance. Show them that patronage that all great men show towards inferiors. They are obtruders in our select circle, but since they have wedged their way in, they are entitled to a little consideration, but not much; and that only because they are lawyers." Pp. 31-32. Marke, A Catalogue of the Law Collection of New York University (1953) 161. (shrink)

Universal health coverage is often implemented within countries through several national insurance schemes that collectively cover their populations. Yet the extent of services and benefits available can vary substantially between different schemes. This paper argues that these variations in coverage comprise tiering and then reviews different accounts of health and social justice that consider whether and when a tiered health system is fair. Using these accounts, it shows that the fairness of tiering can be determined by assessing whether differences in (...) coverage mean enrolees under some national insurance schemes do not achieve sufficient health or normal functioning and/or feel inferior relative to those belonging to other national insurance schemes. The paper further contends that these determinations of fairness should involve the people covered by different insurance schemes. Key universal health coverage questions to involve the public in answering are: Do the sum of differences between the schemes in your country generate feelings of unequal moral worth and/or mean enrolees struggle to achieve sufficient health or normal functioning? Which specific differences between health insurance schemes generate the greatest feelings of unequal moral worth in individuals? Which specific differences generate the greatest barriers to individuals achieving sufficient health or normal functioning? Rather than identifying which services to extend coverage to first, answering these questions will identify which disparities in services and benefits are the most morally urgent to address. Finally, some initial thoughts are offered on who from the public should be involved in making these decisions and how they might be involved as a matter of justice. (shrink)

In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas offers an adept account of the vice of envy. Despite the virtues of his account, he nevertheless fails to provide an adequatedefinition of the vice. Instead, he offers two different definitions each of which fails to identify what is common to all cases of envy. Here I supplement Aquinas’saccount by providing what I take to be common to all cases of envy. I argue that what is common is a “perception of inferiority”—when a person (...) perceives her ownself-worth to be inferior to another and thereby feels her own self-worth diminish. By incorporating perceptions of inferiority into the definition of envy, we obtain adefinition that retains the spirit of Aquinas’s thought, while improving upon its letter. (shrink)

Rare diseases, defined as having a prevalence inferior to 1/2000, are poorly understood scientifically and medically. Appropriate diagnoses and treatments are scarce, adding to the burden of living with chronic medical conditions. The moral significance of rare disease experiences is often overlooked in qualitative studies conducted with adults living with rare diseases. The concept of morally problematic situations arising from pragmatist ethics shows promise in understanding these experiences. The objectives of this study were to (1) acquire an in-depth understanding of (...) morally problematic situations experienced by adults living with rare diseases in the province of Québec and (2) to develop an integrative model of the concept of morally problematic situations. To this end, an online survey targeting this population was developed through a participatory action research project. Respondents provided 90 long testimonies on the most important morally problematic situations they faced, often in healthcare settings. An integrative model was developed based on various qualitative analyses of these testimonies and relevant literature. The integrative model showcases that morally problematic situations have causes (i.e., contextual and relational factors, personal factors, jeopardized valuations), have affective repercussions (i.e., emotions and feelings, internal tensions), prompt action (i.e., through empowerment strategies leading to the evolution of situations), and elicit outcomes (i.e., factual consequences, residual emotions and feelings, positive or negative resolutions). In sum, this study advances understanding of the moral experiences of adults living with rare diseases while proposing a comprehensive conceptual tool to guide future empirical bioethics research on moral experiences. (shrink)

This paper explores how whiteness as the transcendental norm shapes the meaning structure of Black-being-in-the-world. If home is a place, a site, a dwelling of acceptance, where one is allowed to feel safe, to relax, to let one’s guard down, then being Black in white supremacist America is anathema to being at home for Black people. Indeed, to be Black is to be a stranger, something “strange,” “scary,” “dangerous,” an “outsider.” To be Black within white America belies what it means (...) to dwell, to reside, to rest. In other words, one’s sense of racialized Black embodiment remains on guard, unsettled, hyperalert. Phenomenologically, there is a profound sense of alienation, where one’s racialized body is ostracized and shunned. On this score, I examine, within the mundane context of an elevator, how the dynamics of intersubjectivity and sociality are strained through the dynamics of the white gaze. The white gaze, among other things, functions to police the meaning of the Black body and attempts to de-subjectify Black embodiment. In this way, the only real perspective is white. Black bodies are deemed devoid of a perspective on the world as there is no subjectivity, no sense of agential meaning making. One might say that Black people, on this view, constitute an essence, a typified mode of being. Unlike the existentialist thesis where existence precedes essence, Black people are locked into an objecthood, a fungible and fixed essence. This racial and racist myth is what, for Schutz, would collapse the importance that he places on intersubjectivity and sociality. Indeed, within this paper, I delineate the threatening, necro-political dimensions of whiteness that I experienced after writing the well-known article “Dear White America.” That experience cemented, for me, and for many other readers, what it means to occupy the residence of whiteness, an abode that can take one’s life in the blink of an eye. The experience of the racialized stranger means walking a tightrope, a precarious situation where one flirts with death, where one’s body is deemed hypersexual, inferior, frightening, and monstrous. Based upon this construction, the white body is deemed the site of virtue, safety, deliverer, protector of all things white and pure. Think here of “the white man’s burden” or the idea of “white manifest destiny.” Stain, blemish, taint, and defilement are indelible markers of the stranger. And based upon the logics of racial purity, one must extinguish the “vermin,” the “criminals,” the “rapists.” While I don’t explore this within the paper, Schutz scholars will immediately recognize the genocidal implications of what would have been at stake for Schutz had he not escaped Adolf Hitler’s anti-Semitic gaze and his Anschluss of Austria. My sense is that Schutz would have understood not just the horrors of white racism but would appreciate the necessity of theorizing the need to rethink home as existentially capacious and intersubjectively vibrant. I conclude this paper by thinking through the concept of “breakdown”, delineating its spatial, phenomenological, and subjectively embodied implications. Breakdown, as I use the term, upends forms of white racialized habituation, creating possible embodied psychic space for what I term un-suturing, which involves undoing the machinations of white safety in the face of alterity, where the stranger invokes wonder and self-critique. (shrink)

Envy is, roughly, the disposition to desire that another lose a perceived good so that one can, by comparison, feel better about one’s self. The divisiveness of envy follows not just from one’s willing against the good of the other, but also from the other vices that spring from it. It is for this second reason that envy is a capital vice. This chapter begins by arguing for a definition of envy similar to that given by Aquinas and then considers (...) its relationship to other vices (e.g. jealousy, schadenfreude, and hate). At the heart of envy is a disposition to make relative comparisons which lead to a sense of inferiority. This is turn can lead a person to feel and act in ways destructive of community and the self. The present chapter also addresses recent work in both psychology and economics related to envy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Lumps and Bumps”Kathleen Wallace (bio)Reason/Emotion Distinction in PhilosophyI would like to use Radden’s interesting exploration of the historical roots of a split between affect and thought as an occasion for reflecting on the distinction itself and some of the philosophical reasons for its appeal. There is a range of presuppositions in philosophical theories about knowledge, judgment, moral judgment and the like that have disposed us, at least (...) in the West, to accept a split between emotion or affect and reason or thought. At least in the modern tradition (from the seventeenth century on), judgment has been identified with “reason” and conceived of as the making of logical, evidential, “impartial,” or “legislative” inferences or the asserting and applying of universal principles and rules. 1 Feelings might provide content or data for reasoning but do not themselves judge.A brief review of recurrent assumptions about feelings will be indicative of possible rationales for their subordination to “reason.” Some of these assumptions are that feelings (1) are untransformable; (2) are incompatible with autonomy because they are not self-caused but are part of a deterministic causal chain; (3) are noncognitive; (4) are unreliable; (5) are demeaning because associated with the animal, sensual, or “natural” side of human nature; (6) have no moral content; and (7) have only an accidental relation to action and choice. 2In his thought Kant, who had such a strong influence on the development of Kraepelin’s theory, reflects several of these assumptions. Emotions are part of the sensible world and subject to the strict law of causality. The only exception to the deterministic view of emotion is the moral feeling of respect for the moral law. The feeling of respect “is not one received through an outside influence but is, rather, one that is self-produced by means of a rational concept.” 3Most of these accounts presuppose that feeling is a reactive or passive state or that it “expresses” or reveals an inner state over which one has no control. If feeling also tends to be viewed as noncognitive, then it has no value for knowledge. Given these assumptions, actions and judgments that are based on, motivated by, or formed with reference to feeling are viewed as suspect with regard to their objectivity.ImplicationsThe split between reason and emotion has had interesting consequences in the assessment of behaviors that are thought of as gendered. For example, moral deliberation that seems to be based on feeling or emotion is assessed as inferior to that which is allegedly based on reason, and the [End Page 17] former tends to be associated with women. For example, an “epistemic lean” of the moral commitment to care (Bartky 112) involves “a displacement of interest from my own reality to the reality of the other” (Noddings 14). 4 But if the perspective into which a female caregiver enters is one that is structured in terms of a presumed supremacy of the male, then a woman, through caregiving, could participate in her own social (and personal) demotion (Bartky 109). Yet she may thereby be caught in an interesting bind: “Tenderness requires compassion and forgiveness,... virtues under some circumstances and... excellences in a caregiver. But there are situations in which [such] virtues... can lead to moral blindness or outright complicity” (Bartky 112). Bartky cites the example of Teresa Stangl, wife of Fritz Stangl, Kommandant of Treblinka, who, although appalled by what she knew of her husband’s activity, supported him at home and never publicly challenged his moral outlook (Bartky 1990, 113). Thus a woman is caught in a doublebind. If she is “forgiving” and “tender,” she may be identified as “complicitous,” “unprincipled,” or morally “weak-willed,” but if she were to assert her [other] principles she would fail to be “virtuous” as a caregiver, her designated, but subordinate, moral role. 5 Thus, a traditional association of judgment with “reason” may support the inference that the affectively motivated person does not count as a moral agent, or is at best an inferior one.What this suggests is not only that a sharp split between reason and emotion or thought and affect may lead to a distorted understanding... (shrink)

In Feeling of Knowing cases, subjects have a form of consciousness about the presence of a content (such as an item of information) without having access to it. If this phenomenon can be correctly interpreted as having to do with consciousness, then there would be a P-conscious mental experience which is dissociated from access.

In the team context, leaders usually develop differentiated leader-member exchange relationships with employees, resulting in some employees having relatively inferior relationships with the leader than others. Nevertheless, how and when employees with low relative leader-member exchange (RLMX) relationships react toward the leader have been rarely considered in empirical research. Drawing upon social comparison theory, we develop a cross-level moderated mediation model to examine how and when RLMX may lead to employee’s unethical pro-leader behavior (UPLB). We propose that employees with low (...) RLMX would feel envy which in turn motivates them to engage in UPLB in order to gain the rewards and resources that are distributed by the leader. Further, we argue that envy is less likely to motivate low RLMX employees to engage in UPLB when distributive justice climate is high, because high distributive justice indicates that rewards and resources are distributed fairly (based on work contribution rather than engaging in unethical behaviors that please the leader). Data were obtained from 504 employees in 102 divisional teams in a large retail corporation at three time points. Results of the multilevel moderated mediation analysis show that envy mediates the effect of RLMX on UPLB and that the indirect relationship is moderated by team-level distributive justice climate. These findings suggest the importance of adopting a social comparison perspective to understand the negative consequences of RLMX via emotional mechanisms. (shrink)

Art as a Singular Rule "Art has nothing to do with me. Or my family. Or anybody I know" Abstract - This paper will examine an unresolved tension inherent in the question of art and argue for the idea of a singular rule as a natural resolution. In so doing, the structure of a singular rule will be fully outlined and its paradoxical constitution will be resolved. The tension I mention above unfolds both as a matter of history and as (...) a product of analysis. The concept of imitation will be our introduction to a brief overview of a historical trajectory starting with Plato. Plato is notorious for having imposed one of the most humiliating verdicts ever on the Arts: Art is imitative he argued, it is the practice of reproducing illusions and is, therefore, both an inferior source of knowledge and an ethically corrupt activity. Then, the story continues, came Aristotle, the savior of the Arts: he suggested that since essence, form, is imbedded in reality, the artist who imitates essence performs the noble task of abstracting form from substance. Art could now proudly stand alongside other highly respectable branches of human activities, such as the sciences. With the dominance of Aristotle in Western culture, abstraction came to play a key role. Leaping forward to our time, it can be argued that in Modernism the move towards abstraction was pushed to breaking point - to the point where the object was dismissed and denied relevancy to the work of art. This will bring us to a discussion of Art as representation and subsequently, to the introduction of a line of philosophical reasoning that threatens the Arts. It will seem as if we are caught between two extremes: If we assume that art is representational, we open the door for the old Platonic criticism that art is merely imitative (of its object); If we return to abstractionism, we may be led along a path that does not stop short of renouncing the object altogether, i.e. nothing is asserted as standing to the work of art as an "object" or an outer aim; this leaves us on a suspiciously skeptical note concerning the purpose and aim of art - and it indeed echoes prevailing feelings of unrest and confusion concerning the arts, precisely the sort that the quote above indicates. This seems to entrap us in a vicious circle. However, drawing upon the philosophies of Kant, Wittgenstein, Goodman and the contemporary Czech philosopher and esthetician, Tomas Kulka, I suggest a way for resolving the dilemma. This is my analysis of singular rule. (shrink)

I continue my argument that Millian qualitative superiorities are infinite superiorities: one pleasant feeling, or type of pleasant feeling, is qualitatively superior to another in Mill's sense if and only if even a bit of the superior is more pleasant (and thus more valuable) than any finite quantity of the inferior, however large. This gives rise to a hierarchy of higher and lower pleasures such that a reasonable hedonist always refuses to sacrifice a higher for a lower irrespective (...) of the finite amounts of each. Some indication of why this absolute refusal may be reasonable is provided in the course of outlining the content of the Millian hierarchy. It emerges that Mill's hedonistic utilitarianism has an extraordinary structure because it gives absolute priority over competing considerations to a code of justice that distributes equal rights and correlative duties for all. His utilitarianism also recognizes that certain aesthetic and spiritual pleasures may be qualitatively superior even to the pleasant feeling of security associated with the moral sentiment of justice. Thus, for instance, a noble individual may reasonably choose to waive his own rights so as to perform beautiful supererogatory actions that provide great benefits for others at the sacrifice of the right-holder's own vital interests. (shrink)

South African philosopher Mabogo Percy More has devoted more than four decades of his work to the problem of “being-black-in-an-antiblack-world.” This article interrogates the extent to which More homogenizes the contingencies of black2 existence and black embodiment, as I feel black existentialists do; or subsumes the phenomenology of the lived experience of blackness under a “black universalist” account that does not give an adequate account of the gendered embodied experiences with antiblack racism. By “contingency” I mean More’s concept of the (...) contingency of existence, where he claims that human existence is without necessity, nor is it justified; and so people resort to attempting to justify their existence and to find meaning by trying to assume the status of God or superiority in relation to others. More argues that contingency is the source of antiblack racism, as white people attempt to justify their existence by dehumanizing black people. I claim that contingency does not only play out in the interracial domain, but is also one of the sources of intraracial sexism within the black community. My interrogation aims to extend the reach of More’s work by giving an existential-phenomenological account of “being-black-and-female-in-an-antiblack-antifemale-world.” To this end, I focus on two contingencies—the contingencies of biological sex and the contingency of physical strength—that More discusses in his sole article on intraracial sexism, “Black Attitudes: A Call for Personhood” (1981). I argue that within the black intraracial domain, these two contingencies are ascribed meaning that creates a binary, which elevates black men to superior status, while reducing black women to the inferior. (shrink)

A dominant view in contemporary cognitive neuroscience is that low-level, comparator-based mechanisms of motor control produce a distinctive experience often called the feeling of agency . An opposing view is that comparator-based motor control is largely non-conscious and not associated with any particular type of distinctive phenomenology . In this paper, I critically evaluate the nature of the empirical evidence researchers commonly take to support FoA-hypothesis. The aim of this paper is not only to scrutinize the FoA-hypothesis and data (...) supposed to support it; it is equally to argue that experimentalists supporting the FoA-hypothesis fail to establish that the experimental outcomes are more probable given the FoA-hypothesis than given the simpler hypothesis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Simone de Beauvoir: The Making of an Intellectual WomanCatharine Savage BrosmanSimone de Beauvoir: The Making of an Intellectual Woman, by Toril Moi; xii & 324 pp. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, $54.95 cloth, $21.95 paper.Eschewing linear patterns and other conventional ways of writing lives, feminist critic Toril Moi has undertaken instead to construct a “personal genealogy” of Beauvoir, using notions derived partly from Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu (Jacques Lacan (...) and Freud are cited likewise). This manner of understanding what the French existentialists called the human project seeks “to achieve a sense of emergence or production and to understand the complex play of different kinds of power involved in social phenomena” (p. 7). The human subject is viewed as a product of forces; individual choice—emphasized continually, and probably excessively, by existentialists—is secondary. All types of evidence, not only writing, are considered germane: social institutions and the subject herself are “text,” part of a “discursive network” (p. 5). The point is to illuminate Beauvoir’s “speaking position” (p. 9) and what it means, for herself and others, and concurrently to explain the rather low disregard in which she appears to be held in France presently.The chief social factor identified is, not surprisingly, what is called the patriarchal order, which Moi sees even today as powerful enough to threaten thinking women’s chances for fulfillment. “Displaying a pernicious imagery of ugly bluestockings and dried-up spinsters, patriarchal ideology seeks to enforce the split between body and mind with particular rigor in the case of intellectual women” (p. 256). Cited in this connection are novels by Germaine de Staël and George Eliot; but, although Eliot influenced the young Beauvoir, these nineteenth-century models pertain little to today’s situation in America and England, for instance (where Moi, a Norwegian, has resided). But Moi needs to believe that such strictures still operate, in order to argue for Beauvoir’s unique position as “a mythological figure, an imago that has made its presence felt in the thoughts and dreams of every intellectual woman in the Western world since the early 1950s” (p. 5)—a claim no less absurd for being unoriginal.The study investigates three “moments” or crucial questions. The first is Beauvoir’s discovery in 1929 (justified or not, and made chiefly perhaps through sexual desire) that she was intellectually inferior to Sartre, despite her stellar academic performance; this led to her positioning herself as second among equals. Moi explores this momentous choice in personal and sociological terms, examining the French academic establishment that formed her and asking what it meant to be a woman agrégée in philosophy, in love with a brilliant man.The second major topic is Beauvoir’s writing itself, as it springs from and refers to her self-image, especially in She Came to Stay and The Second Sex. The former provides telling evidence of what happens when an intelligent woman persuades herself that her lover considers her an equal, whereas actually the [End Page 417] authority remains his. Moi views this novel as more revealing, although oblique, because it is more affectively nuanced and apparently genuine, than direct accounts in Beauvoir’s memoirs of the triangle involving her, Olga Kosakiewicz, and Sartre. The Second Sex—said to be unrivaled in any field in this century, in terms of influence—is examined in light of Beauvoir’s tardy revelation in the 1940s (if one believes her) that being a woman meant something different from being a man. Beauvoir’s understanding of woman’s position is compared to Sartre’s (expressed in fiction and essays, and deduced from his behavior) and to Frantz Fanon’s concept of racial oppression.Lastly, Moi focuses on the bitter conclusion to Force of Circumstance, in which Beauvoir confesses, in her fifties, feeling cheated by life. The problematic quality of this admission can escape no one, in light of her repeated assertions elsewhere that her relationship with Sartre—central to her self-image—constituted an unreserved success, involving utter transparency and union of thought. Moi studies this in terms of other statements—some by Sartre—and Beauvoir’s true accomplishments, and shows how Beauvoir’s... (shrink)