Architecture and Deconstruction Case of Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi -/- Introduction Towards deconstruction in architecture Intensive relations between philosophical deconstruction and architecture, which were present in the late 1980s and early 1990s, belong to the past and therefore may be described from a greater than before distance. Within these relations three basic variations can be distinguished: the first one, in which philosophy of deconstruction deals with architectural terms but does not interfere with real architecture, the second one, in which (...) a collaboration between Jacques Derrida and a group of architects interested in his concepts is commenced, and the third one, in which completed or only designed objects or new concepts of deconstruction created by architects gain their supremacy over philosophy. The following book analyses these three possible ways, first of all with the reference to Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi. -/- Peter Eisenman -/- Misreading… and Other Errors -/- The issue of relations between Peter Eisenman’s work and philosophy of deconstruction may be referred to his activity more than ten years preceding his direct collaboration with Jacques Derrida (in 1985) and organisation of the exhibition Deconstructivist Architecture at Museum of Modern Art in New York (in 1988). As soon as at the stage of designing the first houses (House I-III, 1967-1970), which almost entirely inscribed in formalistic aesthetics of Modernism, the architect analysed the problem of architecture dependence on its assumptions. All his later designs may be treated as consequence of this initial interest in relations between practice and theory, and at the same time as an introduction to manipulations later on led at the level of metaphysics of architecture. Beginning with the issue of presence, considered in comments to House VI (1972), the number of ideas having their analogies in philosophy of deconstruction increased. The text entitled The End of the Classical: The End of the Beginning, The End of the End (1984), in which Eisenman criticised questions of representation in architecture, its delusive strive for truth and comparably unattainable attempts at ultimate definition of elementary rules, should be acclaimed the breaking point. This attitude was extended by numerous strategies disturbing architecture rules defined at metaphysical level in an essay Moving Arrows, Eros, and Other Errors: an Architecture of Absence (1986). The issue of Eisenman’s passage from formalism to deconstruction has already been much discussed in the literature (Rosalind Krauss, Thomas Patin among others), still it should be mentioned that the threads similar to Derrida’s concept included in Eisenman’s writing reveal untranslatability of architecture and philosophy. -/- Choral Works or Separate tricks -/- In 1985-1986 a series of seven disputes between Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman took place. The pretext for them were designs concerning Parc de la Villette in Paris. The situation of many months of collaboration between a notable philosopher of the second half of the 20th c. and an architect that already had a huge theoretical oeuvre, ended up with a publication of a large volume entitled Chora L Works and it became at the same time a vast study area for historians of contemporary architecture and philosophers. Derrida’s contribution to concept works were his considerations over the idea of chôra, the properties related to this concept were about to be reflected in shapes of the park. Therefore, Chora L Works became an example of the abilities of contemporary art, both in its capability of translation from philosophical ideas to artistic forms and its resistance to tradition of representing in architecture some phenomena and values originating outside this discipline. In the final period of their collaboration both interlocutors started to polemicise with each other more decidedly, what became a separate part of their thought exchange. The exchange of letters between Derrida and Eisenman at the turn of 1989 ended up the period of their direct contacts, nevertheless, at this time precisely a large group of experts in issues of deconstruction joined the discussion and extended the revealed in the former dispute problems into more than ten years of further considerations and publications. Except for a long text by Jeffrey Kipnis, who had participated in the meetings of the philosopher and the architect, there appeared also comments of researchers of artistic theories (K. Michael Hays, Thomas Patin), philosophers (Andrew Benjamin), and even experts in Greek literature (Maria Theodorou or Ann Bergren). Following these debates a contemporary reflection on architecture has saturated with indeed numerous concepts originating in philosophy of deconstruction. -/- Architecture which imitates mute philosophy -/- The series of Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman meetings, which took place in the period of 1985-1987, induced many authors to make comments. Some of them (Jeffrey Kipnis, Ann Bergren, Maria Theodorou) developed the subject of chôra which was introduced to the discussion by Derrida. The problem that was about to be solved was the question of tying up the concept of chôra with architecture, including Eisenman’s architecture and the series of meetings within frames of Chora L Works project. Kipnis on this occasion paid attention to chôra and its character of anachronia which infects any being created within chôra. In other words any event has its counterpart (analogon) in another, earlier event. He demonstrated the similarity of structure of many events and statements from the times of Derrida and Eisenman’s meetings to the almost identical behaviour of figures in Plato’s dialogue Timaeus. The loss of beginning present in this phenomenon was appropriate to both features of chôra and the effects of typical analyses of philosophy of deconstruction. Bergren’s analyses focused on accentuating gender of chôra, which, according to this author, had been neglected hitherto in discussions. She collated chôra descriptions with characteristics of women in myths, early Greek epic and philosophy and she arrived at a conclusion that chôra has features of a single woman and a married one at the same time. And yet Theodorou’s studies showed that in the Homeric epics chôra is not treated as an idea but is related with single things and events. The other part of the comments (represented by Andrew Benjamin and K. Michael Hays’ utterances) concerns Eisenman’s attitude to tradition which was treated as a variety of iteration understood philosophically. Benjamin commenced his considerations at the point of closeness between a definition of tradition and a concept of chôra understood as perpetuation (placement). A problematic issue was for him Eisenman’s complex relation to tradition based on its contest and affirmation at the same time. Overcoming the simple subordination to tradition – according to Benjamin – was based on awareness of the role of repetition in culture not known before. Hays made an attempt to explain the pleasure and torment of repetition with the support of Sigmund Freud and Roland Barthes’ concepts. According to Hays repetitions are attempts of a single being to a certain primal state perceived as free of any tension. In a similar way Rosalind Krauss explained a motif of a grate present in Modernistic art and also exceptionally frequent in Eisenman’s work. -/- Annex Architecture is still writing Balzac novels. Peter Eisenman and literature -/- Architecture’s approach to writing, script or literature, present within Peter Eisenman’s work, is an exceptional phenomenon, furthermore a complex one. The article considers four possible relations. The first one relates to Eisenman’s characteristics as a person extremely gifted with the ability to wordplay, which very ‘play’ reveals skills to create architectural images. In the second approach the attention has been paid to Eisenman’s interests – in the first period of his oeuvre – in linguistic works by Noam Chomsky and his transformational-generative grammar. The third kind of relations applied to overcoming the need for autonomy of architecture (and of modernist aesthetics at the same time) and renew interests in questions of meaning in architecture. The fourth sort of relations occurred when Eisenman started to create reflections of historic or literary narrations in architecture – ‘stone stories’ and architectural fictions of their kind. -/- Bernard Tschumi -/- From perversion to deconstruction In Bernard Tschumi’s writings from the 1970s and 1980s we can find a transposition of important threads of post-structuralist ideas deriving from Georges Bataille, Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida’s works. The analysis of the architect’s writings also shows roots in Phillippe Sollers, Michel Foucault and Denis Hollier’s works. The analysis of borrowed elements from the beginnings of Tschumi’s theoretical activity may be helpful in explaining the contents of his later writings motre inspired by philosophy of deconstruction. The set of his earliest views was inspired by Marxism, Neo Marxism and French Structuralism, mainly by the writings of Henri Levebre and Guy Debord. From the thought of Levebre Tschumi took interest for city as not only a question of urbanistics but also a political issue. From Debord’s concepts he borrowed a conviction about the role of situational violation for changes in the society structure. Some of these beliefs were preserved in his own concepts of architecture as an event. From this period derived also his will to change conservative elements of social structure not by means of political revolution but of theoretical and creative activity. Tschumi acknowledged that the effective way of the proceedings towards achieving his aims would be accepting the role of both a critical intellectualist and architecture expert who would not hide away his left-wing orientation. The speculations defined by the architect as ‘revolting analyses’ were about to characterise contradictions which tear the society apart, penetrate architecture and constitute the basis of culture. Spreading away of the conscience of false assumptions hidden away in various disciplines could have weakened cohesion of a conservative society and influence the will to change among the elites. This way the beginnings of political revolution were rooted in philosophy of architecture. In 1977 Tschumi published his text entitled The Pleasure of Architecture inspired by Roland Barthes’s The Pleasure of the Text, it also included some concepts derived from Georges Bataille and Jacques Derrida. First of all the author used Barthes’s concept which made an assumption that literary activity is pervaded by the spirit of resistance towards social rules, and Tschudi transferred this remark onto architecture. From the ideas of Bataille, acquainted via Holier’s work, he derived his belief that two concepts of space, a conceptual one (defined as Pyramid) and a sensual one (defined as Labirynth), not losing their distinct features, they join in the concept of experienced space which exceeds contradictions. The exceeding itself was defined as the basic rule of architecture and it was referred to situations in which architecture not only negates social needs, but also disavows its own tradition. Crossing the borders applies not only to political issues or permanent rules of the very discipline but also interfering with other fields (especially literature and film). The fact that architecture is associated with organising events turned Tschumi’s attention to questions of violence that result from upsetting architectural order of a given building by its users and the one hand, and on the other from forcing the users to specific acts imposed by this very order. The analysis of the concepts used by Tschumi in his early writings indicates that they are close to definitions that would occur in his reflection in the following years influenced by philosophy of deconstruction. -/- Approaching deconstruction Tschumi in his theories developed in the 1980s presumed that the current social world had undergone a deep process of decay, and the reaction against which ought to be based on ordering-up actions, and also preserving the main outline of disintegration of the whole and its elements in the state of conflict. The statements concerning the nature of the contemporary to Tschumi social relations were applied by him to the world of architecture, this led him to coming up with designing strategies that took into consideration the destabilised character of conditions in which works of architecture were created. New ways of conduct invented by Tschumi drew their inspiration from literature and research on literature, psychoanalysis, structural linguistics, structuralism and post structuralism, and eventually also deconstruction philosophy. The proposed methods were opposed by their author both to functionalism continuity trends and postmodern architecture. Tschumi’s proposals contradicted any forms of conservatism or traditionalism in political sphere as well as in reference to tendencies in architecture. They were not simple contradictions of social or architectural rules, they intrude them from the inside, weaken or escalate the already existing incongruities, they move the boundaries between the areas. Revolutionary illusions about the possibility of radical changes were replaced with strategies which completed, tainted or test former rules in the series of formal games of permutation and combination. Quite different from avant-garde formalism Tschumi’s games were not about maintaining the autonomy of a given area, but on the contrary – polluting it with other areas’ influences. Tschumi enjoyed demonstrating illusions of architecture concerning simple relations between form and function, or between form and meaning. Making use of Freud, Lacan and Foucault’s research he introduced a category of “madness” into architecture allowing an observation that the recognised norms are nothing but merely ones of many possible principles of behaviour, and their recognised status resulted from unjustified hindering innovativeness which is crucial for architecture. To reborn architecture’s capability of changing Tschumi also made use of Barthes’s discoveries concerning rules of narration and works by writers who applied in their writing knowledge on linguistics. Making a work’s author unclear by various mechanical transformations of its elements was however apparent only, and formal rigours imposed on the process of designing liberated possibilities difficult to obtain in more traditional creative action. Another mode of acting introduced by Tschumi was combining his work of elements deriving from outside architecture; joining space records with notation of motion and events accompanying architectural objects among others. These architectural and extra-architectural elements were not unified, on the contrary their heterogenous and conflictual character was stressed. This is how shock, anxiety and instability, typical for live in great metropolises, infiltrated architecture. Taking some ideas of deconstruction philosophy as a pattern Tschumi also took into critical consideration in his essays traditional in architecture oppositions between form and figuration, or theory and practice. By combining various inspirations he eventually worked out an idea of architectural event, which he understood as a series of actions contesting its own field, redefining its sources, principles and elements. An event, understood in this way, was not so much producing works as rather creating conditions of their production and at the same time designing the society different from a hierarchic one. -/- Park of deconstruction Among numerous philosophical strategies of deconstruction most frequently used was questioning the practice of strong opposition of two reasons. In many cases Bernard Tschumi’s writings just consider functioning of the conflict juxtaposition of the ideas of structure and ornament or theory and practice in history of architecture. Violation of traditional relations between terms of this kind, both old and modern, raised Jacques Derrida’s objections, when he was induced for the first time to co-operate with architects’ milieu. During this long lasting thought exchange the philosopher eventually acknowledged Bernard Tschumi’s arguments for reasoning the encroachment of architecture’s fundamental rules. Deconstruction applied in architecture was not a simple transposition or analogy of practices that had been applied by philosophy of deconstruction. We may even say that considering architectural terms became an important formula of deconstruction. Architecture understood in philosophical way became something beyond the practice and theory of its own discipline, a sort of metaphysics of both philosophy and architecture. The deliberate encroachment of simplicity of dividing architecture into theory and practice, for the first time became a clear aim for Tschumi in his drawings and texts entitled The Manhattan Transcripts. The contents of this series of works was a record of characteristic features of this New York district in such a way that not only objects were the subject of the record but also relations between objects, people and events. The record was about to take into consideration a conflict character of elements of this representation and at the same time to avoid applying to them the rule of mimetism. The record became a form of reflection over the very record by an increased control over the ways of representation. Architecture which was considered in the The Manhattan Transcripts was not directed to fulfill the needs of inhabitation or production, it was rather related with hitherto usually marginalised liminal situations: building ostentatiously big monuments, religious cult, war etc. Architecture operating in these relations focused also the attention on the included in it continuous tendency to overpass its own restrictions, the role of violence as its not recognised factor, or the meaning of excess and shock in its operation. Architecture moving from reason towards madness became even more visible in the design of Parisian Parc de la Villette, whose pavilions were defined as folies (in French it means both small park buildings and follies). The park was supposed to be on the one hand a reflection of traditional society disintegration while on the other it questioned basic rules of producing a work of architecture. The traditional rules of designing, based on ordering up, were replaced with the strategies of dysfunction and dissociation. In Tschumi’s opinion methods of this kind may be equivalent of what Derrida named différance. Instead of aiming at mergence, any diversity, plays or variations were strengthen. Tschumi’s texts, in which he explained his attitude, were completed by Derrida’s extent statement entitled Point de folie – Maintenant l’architecture. Derrida’s article is the most significant of all his statements on architecture as a form of thinking and activity. According to the philosopher, architecture should divide space (in French defined as espacement), what enables both thinking and action – it arranges the space of an event. Tschumi’s buildings, defined as folies, in an essential way destabilise any created order, and at the same time they refresh it. Derrida’s statement suggests that architecture may become both metaphor of an order merging a language or a society but also of inner forces which deconstruct and reconstruct it. Therefore architecture is at the same time a construction, a deconstruction and a reconstruction. Parc de la Villette stands out in this system with its attempt to step beyond the scheme of an easy repetition and its heading for chances of achieving more radical otherness. -/- Conclusion Destruction as construction. Paradoxes of deconstruction in architecture -/- Scepticism about persistence and common importance of fundamental values of human culture evinced in philosophers and writers’ works as early as in Greek antiquity, nevertheless it was not expressed so strongly as in the second half of the 20th century. Especially in Heidegger’s work Being and Time (although originated in 1927, still influential in all later philosophy) the following states were characterised: the state of losing the ground (Abgrund), of being out of sight (Unheimlichkeit) and of being out of dwelling (Un-zuhause-sein) – as the basis of self-confidence of conscious being there (Dasein). The entire criticism of philosophy of home and dwelling draws the inspiration from this early writing of the German philosopher, it combines crisis of basic terms of metaphysics with social conditions which are dictated by living in large metropolis. The crisis of both metaphysical foundation and home appears to be similar to the situation of weakening the relations between a man and his dwelling in extensively expanding cities. Whereas philosophy, as well as many disciplines of social sciences, have diagnosed for a long time the destabilisation of fundamental ideas of Western culture and crucial changes in the ways of dwelling, architecture itself occurred to be “the last fortress of metaphysics” (J. Derrida). Among contemporary architects, Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi were the ones who engaged most decidedly in the issues of critical analysis of architecture foundation and its social role. Both the architects noticed new formulas of contemporary social and individual existence, tremendously different from the entire history, and at the same time they affirmed lack of adequacy of architecture concepts to new situations. Both Eisenman and Tschumi used to describe the existing architecture as a tool for consolidation of highly integrated and hierarchised societies, and also as a discipline extremely uncoincidental with the current character of social life based on ideas of freedom and diversity. The means to transform architecture and make a factor of further social changes out of it, was a concept that accentuated revealing the inner contradictions of this discipline, and considering them in designing strategies. Eisenman’s activity, in regard of what has just been noticed, was focused on questioning the basic rules of traditionally comprehended architecture, especially the rule of purpose. The American architect noticed that the concept of architecture as fulfilment the need of location, hides away the fact that the location has to be constantly reconsidered, and hence it is overtaken by change (dislocation). Therefore new concept of architecture propounded architectural activity to translocate the concept of location – more than before – but also to change its status perpetually. Such comprehended architecture should claim, as its main purpose, the constant revision of this purpose and create itself anew permanently. Even Eisenman’s earliest designs of houses nos. I-IV broke with such values as the sense of safety, closeness and familiarity, and just on the contrary they accentuated senses of strangeness, homelessness and loss of confidence. The contradictions within architecture noticed by Tschumi referred to combination of intellectual and sensual values in architecture, when their non-appropriation was defeated by an additional condition, namely the way of experience based on pleasure of excess, marked by insanity. The features of folly were especially visible in his designs of gardens, where the order of planning was mixed with sensual experience introduced by particular elements (both the ones created by nature, and the buildings defined as folies). Parc de la Villette designed by the French architect in Paris put in question not only the common understanding of purpose in architecture but also the ideas of order and integrity, as its plan was based on the combination of independent layers with records of grids of points, various lines and planes. The architecture that collides inadequate elements with each other was supposed to be a kind of an event with no beginning and no end. The architecture treated as an event became a form of a space weakened articulation that maintains its diversity and lack of accordance of the elements building it up. The analyses of Eisenman and Tschumi’s theoretical writings indicate how much the aims of architecture have actually changed; instead of supporting social persistence, the architecture is rather intensifying contradictions, and instead of providing people with the sense of safety, it sublimes danger. From simple acts of defamiliarisation, increasing the distance to itself and enhancing the role of theory, through discomfort, anxiety, not feeling someone at home, weirdness, excess, shock and violence, architecture reached the edge of stability and uncertainty, only to make an attempt at penetrating what is impossible and unutterable, and recording what cannot become the subject of any records. -/- . (shrink)

In 1924, Bohr, Kramers and Slater tried to introduce into microphysics conservation principles that hold only on the average. This attempt was abandoned in the light of the Compton-Simon experiment. Since that time, except for a moment of doubt in 1936, it has been thought that the classical conservation laws hold in quantum theory for each individual interaction, in a way that yields the classical exchange-and-balance of momentum familiar from the laws of elastic collisions. It has been thought, that (...) is, that in each individual “collision” what one part of the total system loses in linear momentum another part gains, so as to maintain the same total amount afterwards as before. To those familiar with discussions of the interpretation of quantum theory, however, it will be apparent that the very concepts needed to express this idea of an elastic collision are generally not admitted in the theory. For one needs the idea that both before and after collision the total system has a well-defined value for the conserved quantity and, moreover, that the various component parts of the system have well-defined values for those quantities out of which the conserved one is composed. But in the case of spin, for example, it is customary to say that although total spin may be conserved in certain interactions one cannot attribute values to the separate components of spin because the associated operators do not commute. Moreover, one does not generally refer to the values of quantities except in eigenstates. Hence, in general, one would not refer to the value of the conserved quantity before and after interaction, except for interactions initiated in eigenstates. (shrink)

Network Democracy uses the contemporary tools of ecology and network thinking to unearth the ancient, intellectual ruins of traditional conservative thought. Questioning the West’s veneration of freedom, equality, contractual citizenship, economic progress, cosmopolitanism, secular institutionalism, and reason, Jared Giesbrecht illuminates how these ideals fuel violence and insecurity in our high-speed lives. While the modern age witnesses the rise of a violent conservatism in the form of revolutionary movements enacting terror and vengeance for the interventions of the liberal West, this (...) study reveals a different kind of conservatism - one that has emerged in direct conversation with liberal thought. Giesbrecht highlights the need for intermediate institutions and civil enterprises that form relations and traditions independent of the state in order to develop resistance to the insecurity of the liberal age. This book offers not only a poignant critique, but a constructive and peaceable alternative to the violence of both liberalism and reactionary anti-liberalism. Attuned to the new realities of globalization, advanced technology, and social acceleration, Network Democracy is a masterful hybrid of ancient and cutting-edge political philosophy that casts a new light on the values underlying western civilization. (shrink)

Environmentalism is usually thought to be a liberal political position, but the two primary schools of thought within the conservative intellectual movement support environmentalism as well. The free market perspective has received considerable attention for its potential contributions to environmental protection, but the traditionalist perspective has not. In this essay, I consider several important principles of traditionalist conservatism. The traditionalists are not materialists and are highly critical of our consumer culture. They reject ideology and stress piety toward nature, (...) the intergenerational character of society, and prudence in political and social action. These basic principles are a solid foundation for environmentalism. (shrink)

This essay examines the educational opportunities of people in poverty who receive social welfare assistance. The dominant political theory underlying social policy (including education policy) in the United States has evolved from 1960s and 1970s welfare liberalism into 1980s and 1990s style neo-conservatism—a theory that embraces principles of the market and individual liberty as paramount social values. Against this backdrop, I review two recent books that provide compelling evidence for this turn and I call for increased understanding of (...) the relationship between social welfare policies and higher education opportunities for those in poverty. (shrink)

In this paper I will examine a number of justifications for environmental concern, and show why all except for the (broadly) anthropocentric demonstrate problematic conservative logics that incline them towards socially conservative positions. Environmentalists would do best to take up an anthropocentric, or at least anthropogenic, defence of green values if they want to pair it with a progressive social politics.

Environmentalism is usually thought to be a liberal political position, but the two primary schools of thought within the conservative intellectual movement support environmentalism as well. The free market perspective has received considerable attention for its potential contributions to environmental protection, but the traditionalist perspective has not. In this essay, I consider several important principles of traditionalist conservatism. The traditionalists are not materialists and are highly critical of our consumer culture. They reject ideology and stress piety toward nature, (...) the intergenerational character of society, and prudence in political and social action. These basic principles are a solid foundation for environmentalism. (shrink)

Modern conservatism was born in the crisis of the French Revolution that sought to overturn Christianity, monarchy, tradition, and a trust in experience rather than reason. In the name of reason and progress, the French Revolution led to the guillotine, the dictatorship of Napoleon Bonaparte, and a decade of continental war. Today Western Civilization is again in crisis, with an ever-widening progressive campaign against religion, tradition, and ordered liberty; Francesco Giubilei's cogent reassessment of some of conservatism's greatest thinkers could not (...) be timelier. Within these pages, English-speaking readers will come across some familiar names: Burke, Disraeli, Chesterton, and Scruton. Americans get their own chapter too, including penetrating examinations of John Adams, Richard Weaver, Henry Regnery, Robert Nisbet, Russell Kirk, William F. Buckley Jr., and Barry Goldwater. But perhaps most interesting is Giubilei's coverage of the continental European tradition–largely Catholic, monarchical, traditionalist, and anti-Jacobin, anti-Communist, and anti-Fascist. Giubilei offers insightful intellectual portraits of statesmen and philosophers like Count Klemens von Metternich, the man who restored Europe after the Napoleonic Wars; Eric Voegelin, the German political philosopher who made his career in America and traced recurrent strains of leftism to an early Christian heresy; Joseph de Maistre, the leading French counterrevolutionary philosopher; George Santayana, a Spaniard who became an American philosopher and conservative pragmatist; Jose Ortega y Gasset, who warned of the "revolt of the masses"; and a wide variety of Italian thinkers whose conservatism was forged against a Fascist ideology that presented itself as a force for stability and respect for the past, but that was fundamentally modernist and opposed to conservatism. Unique and written by one of Italy's youngest and brightest conservative thinkers, Francesco Giubilei's History of European Conservative Thought is sure to enlighten and inform. (shrink)

Analyzes President Reagan's speeches and actions to paint a full, accurate picture of his conservative beliefs, and identifies the eleven principles that lie at the core of his conservatism.

Social thought in modern times, in the "modernity" as an empirical value targets and as a "problem" between, there have been several times variation. Contemporary Western society from the post-modern theory, adhere to and develop a modern and conservatism on three different standpoint to reflect modern issues. In the modern quest and modernity reflect the existence of a common demands: liberation. In Modem western social thought, there are several variations between taking 'modernity' as the value that was looked upon and (...) sought after and as an issue of experimental realty. Contemporary social theorists reflect the issue of modernity from three different standpoints: the postmodern standpoint, the conservative standpoint and the standpoint insisting on and enlarging the project of modernity. There are a common concern between the longing for modernization and the reflecting on modernity : emanipation. (shrink)

In this paper, we tackle the widely held view that practice-oriented approaches to ethics are conservative, preserving the moral status quo, and, in particular, that they do not promote any change in our dealings with animals or formulate clear principles that help us to achieve such change. We shall challenge this view with reference to Wittgensteinian ethics. As a first step, we show that moral thought and action rest on basic moral certainties like: equals are to be treated (...) equally and unequals unequally. We then explore the relations between this insight and the notion of the difficulty of reality elaborated by Cora Diamond. Our goal is to show that a Wittgensteinian-Diamondian approach to animal ethics is not necessarily morally conservative. Indeed, it offers a profound practice-oriented approach to animal ethics that is capable of promoting change in human dealings with animals because it is compatible with radical critique. (shrink)

Collingwood's... descendants... will be engaged in conceptual analysis not unlike other modern forms of conceptual analysis but not so isolated, in principle and in practice, from the panorama of the human past, from the rich diversity of contemporary cultures, and from the perplexities of individual experience in art, religion, the privacies of thought, and the publicity of action. They will search out the a priori elements in experience and the empirical genesis of thought. They may try, although they will surely (...) fail, to make the scope of philosophy as wide as life itself, and this attempt would at least be not unwelcome in a time when some of the descendants of Socrates try, although they too will fail, to make the scope of philosophy as narrow as an academic department. Louis O. Mink. (shrink)

Philosophy is an important relation with education as it gives theoretical ground for its development. Principles and values of life learnt through education and experience gives birth to philosophy. Philosophy lays the foundation of leading one’s life based on principles. Education is the source of learning and philosophy it’s applications in human life. While discussing about the real nature of philosophy in present time, we should have a single criteria as if it to be acceptable to all (...) reasonable people of the world. In defining Positive Philosophy it may be said, The Positive Philosophy is an attempt to achieve an intellectual detachment from all philosophical systems, and not to solve specific philosophical problems, but to become sensitively aware of what it is we do when we philosophize. It is an attitude as well as a methodology for both academician and common person. It make education process positive so that it can make something useful for societal growth and in working process it also make the person sensitive about the societal problems and make them ready to be a part of social change. I am not negating something, here “positive” word is not an antonym but it is an adjective. Where there are merely religious, metaphysical and passive ideologies in our education system, we are not able to have a good and creative education. Positive Philosophy is working on that issues which have some worth for human. It is a process to do something creative. We are using innovative method. An innovator could be rebellion because he breaks the established method, norms and redefines the layer of thought. Innovation not simply implies questioning, reshaping, restricting but also developing through transformation. A teacher can play an important role in promoting this discussion because a teacher has the capacity to influence students with their thoughts and personality and engages them to creative activities. Innovativeness needs to be included in the curriculum. Once one becomes habitual to this attitude he/she will be ready to do some positive or creative. In this paper it is an attempt being made to apply positive philosophy though innovative method in our present education system. -/- . (shrink)

Provides an ideology-critique of Whitehead's and Hartshorne's metaphysics and demonstrates how their metaphysical principles reflect their personal commitments to the values and norms of the modern liberal political ideology.

Philosophy of mind is, and for a long while has been, 99% metaphysics and 1% epistemology. But the fundamental question cognitive ethologists face is epistemological: what count as evidence that a creature has a mind, and if the creature does have a mind, what evidence is relevant to deciding which mental state should be attributed to it? The usual answer that cognitive ethologists give is that one’s explanation should be “conservative”. It recommends a two-part plausibility ordering: mindless is preferred (...) to minded, and first-order intentionality is preferred to second-order intentionality. I argue that the principle of conservatism is not a parsimony principle, and it doesn’t have any justification. What is needed is observational test. I also suggest a strategy for designing experiments in the future. What I offered here is a methodological version of naturalism. (shrink)

Ethics, Value, and Reality is a collection of essays written after Kolnai settled in England in 1955. These essays from Kolnai's mature years sit atop a remarkable gestation of moral and political thinking. At the heart of his thought is the special role of privilege in a good social order. Kolnai relies heavily on the work of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century value theorists such as Alexius Meinong, Nicolai Hartmann, and Max Scheler. He blends this continental tradition of ethics with (...) British intuitionism and Scottish Enlightenment articulations. For Kolnai, ethical life cannot be adequately understood except by reference to moral emphasis, and thus, Kolnai can be thought of as a liberal conservative. He acknowledges myriad values, moral and non-moral, and accepts that all can have some claim upon us. Low values as much as high values have a legitimate claim. His is a tolerant conservatism though not for a moment does he forgo the necessity of judgment: a readily graspable hierarchy keeps the respective demands of values in proportion. Kolnai welcomes the call to seriousness, which is the hallmark of existentialism. The ground of Kolnai's thought is the idea of emotion as cognitive. He saw the typical analytical philosopher's fascination with simplicity of explanation not only thoroughly refuted by the gains in understanding wrought by phenomenological method, with its deference to the richness of phenomena, but sensed in the monistic inclination he dreaded a harbinger of totalitarianism. Never denying his emotionalism, he nonetheless made his points well enough by adopting an analytical approach to philosophy and ethics. This is a major work crossing moral and political philosophy. (shrink)

"The picture of Hume clinging timidly to a raft of custom and artifice, because, poor skeptic, he has no alternative, is wrong," writes John Stewart. "Hume was confident that by experience and reflection philosophers can achieve true principles." In this revisionary work Stewart surveys all of David Hume's major writings to reveal him as a liberal moral and political philosopher. Against the background of seventeenth-and eighteenth-century history and thought, Hume emerges as a proponent not of conservatism but of reform. (...) Stewart first presents the dilemma over morals in the modern natural-law school, then examines the new approach to moral and political philosophy adopted by Hume's precursors Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Butler. Illuminating Hume's explanation of the standards and rules that should govern private and public life, the author challenges interpretations of Hume's philosophy as conservative by demonstrating that he did not dismiss reason as a key factor determining right and wrong in moral and political contexts. Stewart goes on to show that Hume viewed private property, the market, contracts, and the rule of law as essential to genuine civilized society, and explores Hume's criticism of contemporary British beliefs concerning government, religion, commerce, international relations, and social structure. Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

The article deals with the philosophy of Nikolai Berdjaev, which he formulated between The Philosophy of Inequality and The New Middle-Ages. Berdjaev’s philosophy is analyzed in the context of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and its aftermath. The other point of reference is the crisis of culture and civilisation, which affected the West in the inter-war period. Berdjaev’s position has been interpreted in view of the archetypal myth of the struggle of the two principles, the principle of order and (...) the forces of destruction. This myth is tied to the millenialist world view. Berdjaev took an anti-utopian stance. He juxtaposed the utopian-revolutionary principle with the hierarchical-creative one. From this position he criticized among others democracy, liberalism and socialism. In the midst of the crisis of the 1920s he remarked the possibility of spiritual rejuvenation putting forward the concept of the New Middle-Ages. One can say that at that time Berdjaev’s philosophy evolved within the conservative-creative framework, from the utopia of conservatism to the utopia of ‘free creativity’. (shrink)

_Experience and Value: Essays on John Dewey and Pragmatic Naturalism _brings together twelve philosophical essays spanning the career of noted Dewey scholar, S. Morris Eames. The volume includes both critiques and interpretations of important issues in John Dewey’s value theory as well as the application of Eames’s pragmatic naturalism in addressing contemporary problems in social theory, education, and religion. The collection begins with a discussion of the underlying principles of Dewey’s pragmatic naturalism, including the concepts of nature, experience, and (...) philosophic method. Essays “Experience and Philosophical Method in John Dewey” and “Primary Experience in the Philosophy of John Dewey” develop what Eames believed to be a central theme in Dewey’s thought and provide a theoretical framework for subsequent discussion. The volume continues with specific applications of this framework in the areas of value theory, moral theory, social philosophy, and the philosophy of religion. Eames’s analysis of value exposes the connection between the immediately felt values of experience and the more sophisticated judgments of value that are the product of reflection. From this basis in moral theory, Eames considers the derivation of judgments of obligation from judgments of fact. This discussion provides a grounding for a consideration of contemporary social issues directed by naturalistic and scientific principles. In the third section, with regard to educational theory, Eames considers possible resolutions of the current dichotomy between the factual worldview of science and the humanistic worldview of the liberal arts. The comprehensive article, “Dewey’s Views of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness,” connects the essays of the first and second sections and explores the placement of Dewey’s value theory with respect to morals and aesthetics. With “Creativity and Democracy,” in the fourth section, Eames also considers the concept of democracy from the standpoint of current and historical issues faced by society. This article hints at a major project of Eames’s intellectual life—the theory of democracy. The volume concludes with a discussion of the difficulty of maintaining the values of religious experience in a scientifically and technologically sophisticated world, the very topic that first brought Eames to philosophy—the meaning of religion and the religious life. Suggested solutions are offered in “The Lost Individual and Religious Unity.” _Experience and Value: Essays on John Dewey and Pragmatic Naturalism _illuminates Eames’ life of inquiry, a life that included moral, social, aesthetic, and religious dimensions of value—all suffused with the influence of John Dewey. _ _ __. (shrink)

Hegel is aware that it is only in the modern world, with the emergence of civil society, that ‘the freedom of property has been recognized here and there as a principle’. Nonetheless, he contends, property is made necessary by the very idea of freedom itself. The purpose of this essay is to explain why this is the case by tracing the logic that leads in Hegel's Philosophy of Right from freedom, through right, to property and its use. I conclude by (...) briefly comparing Hegel and Marx on the topic of ‘value’. (shrink)

Conservatism and Pragmatism illustrates the intersections between classical British Conservative thought and classical American Pragmatist philosophy with regard to methodology in politics, ethics, and law.

The chapter tackles the complex, tension-ridden, and often paradoxical relationship between relativism and conservatism. We focus particularly on radical conservatism, an early twentieth-century German movement that arguably constitutes the climax of conservatism’s problematic relationship with relativism. We trace the shared genealogy of conservatism and historicism in nineteenth-century Counter-Enlightenment thought and interpret radical conservatism’s ambivalent relation to relativism as reflecting this heritage. Emphasizing national particularity, historical uniqueness, and global political plurality, Carl Schmitt and Hans Freyer moved in the tradition of historicism, (...) stopping short of full relativism. Yet they utilized relativistic elements – such as seeing irrational decisions or the demands of “life” as the basis of politics – to discredit notions of universal political morality and law, thereby underpinning their authoritarian agendas. Oswald Spengler, by contrast, took the relativistic impulses to the extreme, interweaving his conservative authoritarianism and nationalism with full-fledged epistemic, moral, and political relativism. Martin Heidegger has recently been perceived as the key philosopher of radical conservatism, and his thought arguably channeled antimodern aspects of historicism into contemporary political thought. We conclude by analyzing how some radical conservative arguments involving cultural relativism and plurality still reverberate in contemporary theorists such as Samuel Huntington, Aleksandr Dugin, and Alain de Benoist. (shrink)

Hempel’s account of thought experiments has been discussed only by a very few authors and, for the most part, with rather cursory remarks. Its importance, however, is not only historical, but also systematic theoretical, because it involves the distinction between discovery and justification, a main pillar of neopositivistic philosophy of science. Hempel raised the question whether thought experiments constitute a methodological component of scientific research or, on the contrary, are merely a heuristic-psychological device for obtaining and/or transmitting new ideas. While (...) conceding a few exceptions in the natural sciences, he argued that thought experiments always have a heuristic character in the social sciences. There is however a fundamental tension in Hempel’s conception of thought experiments, between the thesis of methodological monism and the neopositivistic dichotomy discovery/justification. On the one hand, on the basis of the unity of scientific method, Hempel admits a difference only in degree between the natural and the human sciences, but on the other hand, he draws a principled distinction between thought experiments of the human sciences (which have only a greater or lesser heuristic value) and those of the natural sciences (which may have also a cognitive-justificatory value). If one assumes the unity of method in the minimal sense in which no scientific knowledge can renounce intersubjective controllability, this tension can be removed either by rejecting the discovery/justification dichotomy or by interpreting it differently. Here, following the second path, two senses of the dichotomy are distinguished, one of which must be accepted, while the other rejected. This removes the internal tension in Hempel’s conception of thought experiments and suggests the thesis that any plausible thought experiment, both in the natural and the human sciences, must already contain some justification, implicit or explicit, of the theoretical hypotheses that they formulate. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:372 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY tranquilly in a world shorn of illusions, avoiding the obvious pitfalls revealed by past human behavior. Bongie's excellent study should help us not only in placing Hume in his century, but in seeing the role of his History as a major part of his philosophical contribution. If, instead of simply seeing Hume as a radical because of his religious views in the context of 18th, (...) 19th, and 20th-century England and America, we can also see him as a conservative for his historical views in the context of 18th-century French events, we may get a richer and more meaningful Hume. We may also see first the revolutionary and then the conservative role that "philosophical history" played in the 18th century, and the tensions that existed between scepticism, Enlightenment, and conservatism in that period. And through this, we may get a clearer understanding of both the role that Hume's sceptical and historical contributions played then, and of the complex legacy that he has bequeathed us today. He was not only the precursor of Bertrand Russell and of modern analytic philosophy. He inspired a variety of conservative and orthodox tendencies in 18th-century France. To understand and appreciate the complete Hume, we need to see the full range of his intellectual achievements both then and now. And this may well help illuminate the roots and the meaning of some of the theories that have run most counter to the liberal and irreligious trends since the Enlightenment. One can hope that Bongie's significant study will be followed by others on the impact of "philosophical history," and of Hume's scepticism on the darker side of our past so that we may more fully appreciate the force and effect of modern scepticism and of the allied historical studies it spawned. Today, as we lose some of the optimism that the Enlightenment heroes bequeathed to us, we may be able to appreciate again some of the doubts and fears of those who struggled against it, and of those who sought solace in Hume's scepticism and in his picture of the human condition. RICHARD H. POPKI~ University oJ California, San Diego Passion and Value in Hume's TrmATxSE. By Piill S. /~rdal. (Edinburgh, at the University Press, 1966. Pp. x + 220. 45/.) This is a meticulous and critical examination of Hume's psychology of the emotional dimension of "human nature." The theme that emerges as central is the contrast between the mental structure of "the understanding" as Locke conceived it and those impressions and expressions in experience that are not perceptions or ideas but affections or passions. Emotions are not "associated" in the way ideas are, according to Locke; they are "communicated" and the ways in which communication among emotions takes place call for a very different type of analysis from the analysis of the understanding./~rdal shows in great detail and with acute observations that Hume is constantly on his guard against the theory of Locke's Essay, and puts his Treatise in the context of "experimental method" applied to the science of the emotions in their impressional and expressional relations. With this as the basic problem of the Treatise, /krdal criticizes those who today are interpreting the Treatise as a theory of evaluative judgment and language, whereas Hume is explicit in making a distinction between the analysis of the "nature and origin" of valuational experience and the logic of judgments of value which he is excluding. I-Iume approaches the passions as powers, and his analysis is closer to the Newtonian method of describing actions and reactions than to Locke's method of compounding simples. The passions are "naturally connected" and do not need to be consciously associated as perceptions do. They are all simple and indefinable, in view of Hume's interest in "moral science", he gives emphasis to the passions of pride, humility, and sympathy. The so-called compound passions or sentiments, such as benevolence, malice, anger together with the discussion of virtues and vices are kept distinct from the "direct" and elementary passions and energies of the mind and organism. Hume was not a hedonist, and he was a utilitarian only BOOK... (shrink)

The essence of Nietzscheanism as a philosophical doctrine has never been characterized by a definite consistency or certainty. Instead "indirect followers" and interpreters of Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy (since this thinker did not have direct followers or a particular school) resorted to a variety of interpretations of his concepts. Considering that, the hermeneutic aspect of the study not only of Nietzsche's texts, but also of his interpreters allows us to look at the hidden potential of the concepts of the German philosopher (...) from a new point of view. In this research, we seek to focus on looking for Nietzschean roots in Ernst Jünger's creative legacy, tracing the transformation of his ideas along the author's intellectual path and showing how those ideas correlate with those of Friedrich Nietzsche himself and how they differ. As a reference point for any study of interpretations of Nietzsche's philosophy, the author singles out many German philosopher concepts at the edge of various interpretations. Such central concepts in the article include the idea of "Apollonian" and "Dionysian" principles (the first), the anthropological idea of " Overhuman" and the interrelated metaphysical triad of "will to power," "reevaluation of all values," and "eternal return." In addition, one of the leading motives of the 20th century, which can be traced to an attempt to read Nietzschean ideas, postulates their location at the junction of philosophical and political-ideological concepts. Analyzing the peculiar hermeneutic conflict of Nietzschean philosophy based on this phenomenon, the author turns to early attempts to understand and implement the ideas of the German thinker, which were carried out directly in Germany. This context is connected in the article with the formation of the foundations of the conservative revolution and the figure of Ernst Jünger since the interpretation of this thinker, to some extent, can be considered one of the first and, undoubtedly, the most resonant. In the course of the research, the author turns to Nietzsche's original texts, forming a kind of hermeneutic circle of the author and interpreters, interpreters and the interpreted, ultimately obtaining in this system the opportunity for a thorough and as independent as possible analysis of the original ideas, counting on the probability of reducing the error of one's interpretation due to paying attention to the entire interpretive field texts The considered ideas of Ernst Jünger demonstrate this thesis, expanding the contextual field of the Nietzschean Overman and the metaphysics of the Will to Power and giving these concepts in an interpreted form a particular social dimension along with the philosophical one, which provides a new context for the interpretation of the ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche. (shrink)

Rene Le Senne belongs to the classical tradition of French philosophy. Unlike Sartre and Merleau-Ponty who owe so much to German sources Le Senne draws his philosophical sustenance primarily from the French tradition of Descartes, Octave Hamelin, Maine de Biran, and Bergson. His thought is the primary form of "Neo-Cartesianism" in contemporary philosophy. He is most well known for the alliance he formed in 1934 with Louis Lavelle and which is known as the Philosophie de l'Esprit movement. This movement subscribes (...) to two principles: the primacy of the Cartesian experience of the thinking self, and the discoverability of God in the experience of the self. Obstacle and Value, Le Senne’s major work, was published in 1934. In this work he develops a concept of the "I" as the "unity of experience," the matrix of all particular experiences, of both ideal cognitions and concrete existential encounters. This "ideo-existential" complex is what he calls "spirit." Spirit develops in an opposition or tension with "obstacles" which resist it. Spirit overcomes these obstacles by subverting them to its own goals, thereby endowing them with "value." The experience of obstacles gives rise to the hope of an absolute value. The spirit and God exist in a reciprocal relationship. God is never something wholly other to the self; and the self is in its inner being divinized by its relationship to God. There is then a double cogito: the cogito as man and the cogito as God. All experience is dominated by this reciprocal relationship between the self and God. The concluding chapters of the book explain how man can have the experience of being independent of God, without God. There is a helpful introduction by translator Dauenhauer, a brief bibliography, and no index of any kind.—J.D.C. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the philosophical and cultural analysis of postmodern philosophy on the basis of the Hegelian methodology, Heidegger's philosophy of language, structural psychoanalysis, deconstructionism, hermeneutics, universal ethics and philosophy of dialogue. The article substantiates the thesis that postmodernism as a model of theoretical reflection is autonomous with regard to liberalism and relativism with the concept of a "French school", which has an anti-liberal orientation and corresponds to the conservative Christian attitudes imposed by implicit ontological meanings. The (...) medieval ontological "nuclei" of postmodernism are concepts: "Real" by J. Lacan, "Archepism" by J. Derrida, "Schizoid" by J. Deleuze, "language reconfiguration" by P. Ricker. Thus, freed from the stereotypes of relativity, postmodernism appears as a third alternative in opposition to the European choice between liberalism and radicalism. The double standard extends to the attitude of liberals to radical currents in crisis processes. Initially, liberal leaders take an overwhelming majority in right-wing nationalism, using it as a tool to support the status quo of capitalism, a means of distracting the masses from real problems, and a mechanism of intimidation. When the mass is intimidated enough, it is proposed to liberalism as "a source of defacing" as the "only alternative". We can talk about the artificial situation of identifying the choice of Fa versus Antifa for the subject who is forced to choose between "purse and life" - between multiculturalism and radical nationalism The key task of structural psychoanalysis is not only the returning of the conflict to its original place, that is, the disclosure of the deep-seated class traumas of the capitalist neoliberal world itself, according to S. Zizek and other representatives of the Slovenian school, but also - the separation of the philosophy of postmodernism as a spiritual phenomenon from political projects of neoliberalism and multiculturalism, which until recently were considered an applied dimension of postmodern politics and promoted the introduction into the social practice of the vicious circle "liberalism - nationalism liberalism" - a circle that does not provide choice and which excludes from its own semiosfery any other values: ethical and dialogical, modern, conservative, religious, international, non-system Left and others. In order to realize this task, postmodernism must be considered under the other viewpoint, depriving it of the stereotypes of "relativism", "cynicism" and "enlightenment", that is, it is necessary to demonstrate that the authentic core of postmodern philosophy is far from multicultural indifference of "post-truth" and includes expressive ontological motives. The double goal of our study: to carry out a critical rethinking of postmodernism as a form of manifestation of a conservative attitude based on hereditary archetypes of the Middle Ages and Modernism, and to show that postmodernism as a philosophy is not the cause of the tragic self-denial of postmodernism as an applied measurement of multiculturalism, that multiculturalism with its vicious circles of relativity, devastation and radicalism is separate from the phenomenon of postmodernism and belongs to the "shock" project of American liberal democracy, and not to "French school" Moreover, the School of Post-Structuralism of the Sorbonne, as the basis of postmodernism, is the descendant of the Marxist school of "new left" in Frankfurt and its meaning is fundamentally anti-capitalist and anti-liberal. By combining among themselves in a single interdisciplinary field the classical philosophy of M. Heidegger's language, J. G. Derrida's "grammar", G. Lacan's structural psychoanalysis, J. Habermas's universal ethics, J. de Gaulle's schizodiscourse, and hermeneutics and the philosophy of P. Ricker's dialogue, we have shown that In the semantic field of postmodernism there are ontological kernels of conservatism, which approximate this philosophical model to medieval traditionalist thought and make the border between modern and postmodern very conditional. The return of postmodernism to the status of the philosophy of being and the liberation of the French school from the stereotypes of "lack" and "loseness" is necessary in order to protect postmodernism from accusations of cynicism, relativism and "emptiness", since these allegations are, firstly, based on the mixing of postmodernism with liberal irony, and, secondly, often serve as an excuse for the revival of various kinds of fundamentalist aspirations. We have shown that liberalism, by provoking through the irony of the identification of the "illusion", initially contributes to the development of radical movements, and then, when they emerge from the symbolic control, they remove them from the agenda as "fascist", opposing them to themselves. There is a closed vicious circle of impossibility to choose between "Fa and Antifa". Our work was an attempt to remove postmodernism from this circle. (shrink)

Seth Vannatta’s book Conservatism and Pragmatism in Law, Politics, and Ethics is a thought-provoking inquiry challenging the reader to go beyond the clichés imposed by contemporary American everyday discourse, namely, to overcome associating conservatism with right wing politics, and pragmatism with the formula that practice determines what should work best in politics. He sets the ambitious goal of demonstrating how comparing rather than contrasting the visions of classical British conservative thought and classical American pragmatist philosophy contributes to revealing the (...) complex genealogy of a normative methodology that can be applied in many disciplines. The normative methodology can question the universal.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 40.4 (2006) 104-117 MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Performative Somaesthetics: Principles and ScopeEric C. MullisJohn Dewey's aesthetic has been invoked in recent discussions because many have realized that it resists the pull toward conceptualism that characterizes a great deal of aesthetic theory. Further, Art as Experience—Dewey's chief work on the philosophy of art—is rich with ideas that call for development. Richard Shusterman's work does (...) just this as it suggests that Dewey's approach is a practical alternative to those that hinder a comprehensive understanding of art and/or ignore art's capacity to enrich the quality of lived experience. More specifically, Shusterman develops key Deweyan ideas by considering the aesthetic merits of popular music and by exploring Dewey's "somatic naturalism," that is, a naturalism that strives to understand the role played by the human body in aesthetic experience. Somaesthetics is the pragmatic discipline that explores somatic practices and ultimately demonstrates how they can lead to the attainment of fulfilling experiences. Shusterman argues that various disciplines can be taken up in order to improve the clarity of somatic functioning, perception, and thought as they "help us reconstruct our attitudes or habits of feeling to give us greater flexibility and tolerance to different kinds of feeling and bodily behavior." 1 Ultimately, Dewey's emphasis on the everyday origins of aesthetic experience is combined with his rejection of mind-body dualism in order to demonstrate how aesthetic experiences can be cultivated through such practices. One is not limited to going to museums and reading art criticism in order to have meaningful aesthetic experiences because somaesthetics shows how one's body can be transformed into a locus of aesthetic value.This said, we also find that similar techniques are used in the training of actors, dancers, and other performance artists. Performative somaesthetics explores the body disciplines that are instrumental to the performer's craft—that allow him or her to master the body and to enhance its expressive powers. In this article I would like to explore a few elements of this [End Page 104] craft in order to flesh out what the performance arts can reveal about the aesthetic body. In order to do so I will need to first say something about Shusterman's pragmatist aesthetic and the Deweyan foundation of that approach. After this is done I will discuss what I take to be a few core principles of performative somaesthetics and, with them in mind, will go on to discuss the relationship between practical and performative somaesthetics.Aesthetic MeliorismIn Art as Experience Dewey describes the process of "doing and undergoing," in which the energies and forces of the environment mix with those of the organisms that inhabit it. 2 For human beings life is lived to its fullest when difficult situations arise and are efficiently dealt with, that is, when the energies of particular situations are ordered and brought into accord with those of the individuals within them. This, in turn, renders experience meaningful as it simultaneously produces a sense of agency and solves particular problems. Ultimately, Dewey notes that the process of doing and undergoing is the foundation of aesthetic experience because it marks those intense organic moments that stand out from the broader context of humdrum or chaotic experiences: "Art... unites the very same relation of doing and undergoing, outgoing and incoming energy, that makes an experience to be an experience." 3 Aesthetic experience, like any instance of doing and undergoing, involves the organization of energies, which solves a characteristically aesthetic problem. For artists this may be the problem of adequately expressing emotion and for observers it may be interpreting or judging the quality of a work. Regardless, for Dewey the aesthetic must not be conceptually or institutionally divorced from its broader context, for doing so not only ignores its natural origins but also limits its ability to imbue the world with meaning. Hence, Shusterman writes that for Dewey, "if anything is to have human value, it must in some way serve... (shrink)

Utilitarians believe that personal decisions and public policies should be made so as to maximize the public good, or, as Jeremy Bentham put it, to produce the greatest good of the greatest number. Bentham identified the public good with the maximization of happiness, and believed that many traditional practices were inimical to the production of happiness. So in the name of maximizing the public good, Bentham advocated, for example, extending the franchise, reforming the criminal code and re-designing prisons. People's prejudices (...) and traditional habits of thought must yield in the face of utilitarian-inspired reforms. (shrink)

These essays explore the continuities and discontinuities between the Neo-Confucian thought of Ming China and early Tokugawa Japan and the "practical learning" of the 17th and 18th centuries, underlining the need for a deeper examination of the complex relationship between "traditional" and "modern" thoughts and values.

Though usually Edmund Burke is identified as the first to articulate the principles of a modern conservative political tradition, arguably he was preceded by a Scotsman who is better known for espousing a brilliant concept of skepticism. As Laurence Bongie notes, "David Hume was undoubtedly the eighteenth-century British writer whose works were most widely known and acclaimed on the Continent during the later Enlightenment period. Hume's impact in France] was of undeniable importance, greater even for a time than (...) the related influence of Burke, although it represents a contribution to French counter-revolutionary thought which, unlike that of Burke, has been almost totally ignored by historians to this day." The bulk of Bongie's work consists of the writings of French readers of Hume who were confronted, first, by the ideology of human perfection and, finally, by the actual terrors of the French Revolution. Offered in French in the original edition of David Hume published by Oxford University Press in 1965, these vitally important writings have been translated by the author into English for the Liberty Fund second edition. In his foreword, Donald Livingston observes that "If conservatism is taken to be an intellectual critique of the first attempt at modern total revolution, then the first such event was not the French but the Puritan revolution, and the first systematic critique of this sort of act was given by Hume." Laurence L. Bongie is Professor Emeritus of French at the University of British Columbia. Donald Livingston is Professor of Philosophy at Emory University. Please note: This title is available as an ebook for purchase on Amazon, Barnes and Noble, and iTunes. (shrink)

Philosophy of history has been condemned in recent times; however, it is becoming increasingly evident that a new Europe cannot do without a critical philosophy of history that analyses values and gives hierarchical structure to diverse experiences and historical memories. From this hypothesis, a result of previous projects, the project “Philosophy of History and Values in the Europe of the 21st century” has these fundamental objectives: 1) critically analyze the complex forms of conceiving science, history (society), culture (languages, (...) religion), law, ethics and politics, in order to understand the full scope of the idea of Europe in which we find ourselves; 2) systemize them with the proposal for a new critical philosophy of history, based on a “practical turn” that contemplates the elements (real responsibility, solidarity and justice) that should form the foundation of social and ethical political relations; 3) apply them to the constructionof a new Europe, in which implicit diversity and the demands of internationality, interculturality and dialogue between the genders can reconcile itself with the basic principles of universality, equality and justice and with the establishment of minimum human rights. The conclusions of our research will help to provide solutions to conflicts that are occurring in the heart of Europe, which at the high point of globalization, transcend European borders. (shrink)

Each of us is a measure. The project of advocates of change in Plato’s Theaetetus as compared with sophistic thought -/- Summary -/- One of the most intriguing motives in Plato’s Theaetetus is its historical-based division of philosophy, which revolves around the concepts of rest (represented by Parmenides and his disciples) and change (represented by Protagoras, Homer, Empedocles, and Epicharmus). This unique approach gives an opportunity to reconstruct the views of marginalized trend of early Greek philosophy - so called „the (...) sophistic movement”. Paradoxically, previous research shows little interest in sophistic thought as a source of the standpoint of advocates of change („the secret doctrine”). The roots of „the secret doctrine” were investigated in the works of Heraclitus, Aristippus, and Antisthenes or those related to “neoheracliteanism”. However, researchers did not make any significant attempt to confront this concept with the contemporary research on the sophistic movement. The conviction that sophistry was primarily humanistically oriented was one of the main reasons why researches were opposed to the fact that „the secret doctrine” could represent a true expression of Protagoras’ views. This is why J. Burnet and F. M. Cornford in their seminal works assumed that “the secret doctrine” should be attributed to Plato, who simply combined a series of loose statements into one single project. In this work, we argue that the thesis which questions the parallels between the sophists’ interests and the philosophers of nature requires a significant revision. There is ample evidence to suggest that the philosophy of nature was a part of sophists’ research. This is supported by two main arguments. First, the tutors of sophists were philosophers of nature. Second, there are numerous sources that explicitly show sophists’ interest in the physical issues. These sources include anecdotal evidence about the fact that sophists wrote works On nature. There is also information confirming that they deliberated on detailed physical issues. The analogies between the concepts attributed to the advocates of change and our knowledge about sophists from other sources is very wide and contains most elements, which are included in the project of “changeable reality” presented in Theaetetus. The deliberations on the mechanism of perception, which are close to those of flux theory of perception in Theaetetus, are present in the sources referring to Gorgias of Leontinoi, the famous sophist and rhetorician. Also, the second element of “the secret doctrine” that is the metaphysics of flux matches up with what we know about the sophists’ views from other sources. On this basis, one can deduce that – contrary to the tradition which marginalized the role of sophistic considerations on the issue of being and non-being – it was one of the major subjects of sophistic research. Its main point was the criticism of the Eleatic conception of a single and unchangeable being, which also plays a key role in the doctrine of flux in Theaetetus. The epistemological theses which are presented in Theaetetus are borne out in sophistic sources. They include the definition of knowledge as perception, the „Man-measure” formula and a number of principles, which result from these foundational theses. Sophists’ empirical preferences resonate with the theses of the advocates of change in Theaetetus. Special attention that is given to the issues of differences among people, and even to cognitive differences in one person depending on the changeable states to which a person is subject, goes well together with what we know about reciprocal influence between the sophistry and medicine. The consequences of the epistemological conception present in Theaetetus have their equivalents in sophists’ works and other testimonies. An example of these consequences may be the abolition of truth and falsehood or the abolition of contradiction, which finds its expression in the thesis ouk estin antilegein. The analogies also concern reflections on the language itself. The project of the “new language” uses categories, which were developed by sophists. These include the antithesis of nomos and physis. The general intentions of this project reflect Protagoras’ ideas, at least to the extent to which they are known from the sources reporting his thoughts on language. Plato’s Theaetetus can thus be considered a veritable treasury of sophistic motifs. Even though the problem remains unsolved and one is still not able to unambiguously decide about the author of “the secret doctrine”, one can come to a certain conclusion – even if Plato synthesized various doctrines, he must have relied in his project mostly on the elements that he borrowed from sophists. Moreover, the value of reconstructing the project of the advocates of change in Theaetetus does not consist of mere enumeration of sophistic motifs. The dialogue is key to understanding the sophistic movement, whose separate doctrines – for the lack of sources and as a result of centuries-old disregard – are usually treated as rhetorical formulae that are interpreted in many ways and have no philosophical foundations. If it is really the case that the theses attributed to Protagoras in Theaetetus were actually a part or a derivative of Protagoras’ thought, or – speaking more conservatively – if they constitute a synthesis of sophistic thought done by Plato, they could represent philosophical foundations for the most important sophistic theses: the “Man-measure” formula, the ouk estin antilegein principle, the concept of language as a tool, the idea of the relativity of good and the whole practical sphere of sophists’ activity. Contrary to the views of many researchers, we are certain that the representatives of the sophistic movement did not limit themselves only to the application of practical rules, which determined the extent of their educational or rhetorical-political activity. They were capable of creating – indeed, they did create comprehensive projects that embraced the whole thematic scope subject to philosophical reflection. (shrink)

This book was written with three aims in mind. The first was to provide a reasonably concise account of Hume's social and political thought that might help students coming to it for the first time. The second aim was to say something about the relationship between philosophy and politics, with explicit attention to Hume, but implicit reference to a general issue. The third is to offer an integrated account of Hume's thought. The book accounts for the varying interpretation of the (...) conservative and liberalist traditions by arguing that the distinction between liberalism and conservatism had little application in mid-18th-century Britain. Hume's ideology contained elements that we should now identify as conservative and liberal respectively, and so by selective emphasis it is possible to make him seem a thoroughbred conservative or liberal according to choice. These two problems the relationship between Hume's philosophy and his politics, and the ideological character of his thought are pursued through the first and second parts of the book respectively. (shrink)

US conservatives have repeatedly turned to classical Greece for inspiration and rhetorical power. In the 1950s they used Plato to defend moral absolutism; in the 1960s it was Aristotle as a means to develop a uniquely conservative social science; and then Thucydides helped to justify a more assertive foreign policy in the 1990s. By tracing this phenomenon and analysing these, and various other, examples of selectivity, subversion and adaptation within their broader social and political contexts, John Bloxham here employs (...) classical thought as a prism through which to explore competing strands in American conservatism. From the early years of the Cold War to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Bloxham illuminates the depth of conservatives' engagement with Greece, the singular flexibility of Greek ideas and the varied and diverse ways that Greek thought has reinforced and invigorated conservatism. This innovative work of reception studies offers a richer understanding of the American Right and is important reading for classicists, modern US historians and political scientists alike. (shrink)

This article examines contradictions between the theory and practice of comparative philosophy in a global world. Aristotle and Plato had different approaches to these “contradictions” that show a “discrepancy” between these two classical thinkers. The topic unaddressed by Plato is taken up in the topos of Nāgārjuna, the great ancient logician of ontology in Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy (the 3rd century AD). The “contradiction” is a principle that have/had profound influence on creative thought in East Asia. Nishida, the founder of the (...) Kyoto School (20th century), established his philosophy through the principle of “Absolute Contradictory Self-Identity.” This principle may stimulate reflection upon our digitally connected contemporary global world, and the chaos it has to face. (shrink)

The article deals with the philosophy of Nikolai Berdjaev (1874–1948), which he formulated between The Philosophy of Inequality (written in 1918, but published in 1923) and The New Middle - Ages (1924). Berdjaev’s philosophy is analyzed in the context of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and its aftermath. The other point of reference is the crisis of culture and civilisation, which affected the West in the inter-war period. Berdjaev’s position has been interpreted in view of the archetypal myth of the (...) struggle of the two principles, the principle of order (cosmos) and the forces of destruction (chaos). This myth is tied to the millenialist world view. Berdjaev took an anti-utopian stance. He juxtaposed the utopian-revolutionary principle with the hierarchical-creative one. From this position he criticized among others democracy, liberalism and socialism. In the midst of the crisis of the 1920s he remarked the possibility of spiritual rejuvenation putting forward the concept of the New Middle-Ages. One can say that at that time Berdjaev’s philosophy evolved within the conservative-creative framework, from the utopia of conservatism to the utopia of ‘free creativity’. (shrink)

This article presents the promising framework for educational decision makers developed by Brighouse, Ladd, Loeb, and Swift. The framework consists of an account of the educational goods, distributional principles and independent values at stake in education, and a method for making policy decisions on the basis of these and solid social science. I present three criticisms of this approach. The first says that the derivation of educational goods proceeds on the basis of a too narrow conception of (...) class='Hi'>values. I suggest that this foundation should consist of an overlapping consensus, rather than flourishing. The second criticism has to do with the way that the distributive principles are characterized. I argue that BLLS’s characterization of distributive principles should be complemented with accounts of what domains of social life these principles regulate and a specification of whether the distributive principles should be understood as applying over time or at specific instances. The final criticism is that BLLS’s conception of independent values focuses solely on values that constrain the pursuit of educational goods. I claim that this part of the framework should be revised to include aspects of values that also support this pursuit. I conclude arguing that the BLLS frameworks should be further developed rather than rejected. (shrink)

This book examines the crisis of values engendered by the advent of modernity, which still plagues the post-modern west today. The book examines anti-modernist thought as an attempt to reclaim traditional belief systems during a period of profound spiritual, political and economic upheaval. The dangers and psychological appeals of anti-modernism are examined in detail.

Moral philosophy has for quite some time practiced the use of thought experiments in argumentative strategies. Thought experiments can be understood as imagined scenarios with a certain level of complexity and novelty, which are usually designed and used to elicit our responses or moral intuitions in order to make our use of key moral concepts clearer or in order to support or reject a particular ethical theory, general moral principle, hypothesis, deeply held moral belief or presupposition. Such imagined cases also (...) often offer us a new insight, illumination and perspective on a given problem. One of the open questions is what is the epistemic status and value of such generated intuitions given their variability and instability. The paper combines a moderate defence of moral intuitions with a discussion of selected aspects of the use of cases in ethics education. (shrink)

This is essentially a study in the philosophy of culture, which tries to define the specific East-Central European modes of thinking as dimensions of a "peripheral" identity. The first chapter argues that an "anthropological conservatism" underlies much of the intellectual evolution of the Danubian area in the last two hundred years or so. Nyíri traces five successive waves of conservatism beginning with the circle of St. Clemens Maria Hofbauer and Friedrich Schlegel soon after 1800 and going all the way to (...) Friedrich Hayek and Robert Musil between the two world wars. Common to these successive waves of conservative theorizing was their moderation, or the attempt to combine liberal and conservative values. They often took their cue from English, rather than from the more radical or utopian French and German models. They also used a nonpolitical language and Nyíri sketches out tantalizingly the conservative implications of Musil's novels and Freud's psychoanalytical essays. Marginality is seen as the belated or muted response of all these thinkers to initiatives coming from a more remote "center." One of the most valuable passages for the Western reader should be the one describing the thought of Jozsef Eötvös, a kind of Hungarian Tocqueville. (shrink)

We all could have had better lives, yet often do not wish that our lives had gone differently, especially when we contemplate alternatives that vastly diverge from our actual life course. What, if anything, accounts for such conservative retrospective attitudes? I argue that the right answer involves the significance of our personal attachments and our biographical identity. I also examine other options, such as the absence of self-to-self connections across possible worlds and a general conservatism about value.

In his recent book Against Liberalism, philosopher John Kekes argued that liberalism as a political system is doomed to failure by its internal inconsistencies. In this companion volume, he makes a compelling case for conservatism as the best alternative. His is the first systematic description and defense of the basic assumptions underlying conservative thought. Conservatism, Kekes maintains, is concerned with the political arrangements that enable members of a society to live good lives. These political arrangements are based on skepticism (...) about ideologies, pluralism about values, traditionalism about institutions, and pessimism about human perfectibility. The political morality of conservatism requires the protection of universal conditions of all good lives, social conditions that vary with societies, and individual conditions that reflect differences in character and circumstance. Good lives, according to Kekes, depend equally on pursuing possibilities that these conditions establish and on setting limits to their violations. Attempts to make political arrangements reflect these basic tenets of conservatism are unavoidably imperfect. Kekes concludes, however, that they represent a better hope for the future than any other possibility. (shrink)

Skeptics about nonlinguistic mindreading often use an inferential rule of thumb—the principle of conservatism—to cast doubt on purported empirical evidence of mindreading abilities in nonlinguistic creatures. This principle, if warranted, would seem to count generally against explanatory hypotheses that posit nonlinguistic mindreading, instead favoring mere behavior-reading hypotheses. Using a test case from research with chimpanzees, I show that this principle is best understood as an appeal to parsimony; that, regardless of how one conceives of parsimony, the principle is unwarranted; and (...) that, once we put the principle aside, the prospects for nonlinguistic mindreading are brighter than traditionally thought. (shrink)

This book was written with three aims in mind. The first was to provide a reasonably concise account of Hume's social and political thought that might help students coming to it for the first time. The second aim was to say something about the relationship between philosophy and politics, with explicit attention to Hume, but implicit reference to a general issue. The third is to offer an integrated account of Hume's thought. The book accounts for the varying interpretation of the (...) conservative and liberalist traditions by arguing that the distinction between liberalism and conservatism had little application in mid-18th-century Britain. Hume's ideology contained elements that we should now identify as conservative and liberal respectively, and so by selective emphasis it is possible to make him seem a thoroughbred conservative or liberal according to choice. These two problems the relationship between Hume's philosophy and his politics, and the ideological character of his thought are pursued through the first and second parts of the book respectively. (shrink)

While Karl Popper highly valued the ability to invent a bold new form of theoretical thought, he warned us at the same time of the need to be cautious in action. Ambitions that are utopian or revolutionary seemed to Popper always unacceptable. We must always be open to reforming our practices, but we must attempt this slowly and piecemeal. Every change that we make we must hold open to criticism. However, change must be conservative and anti-revolutionary. This is the (...) demand that while any one element of current culture may be criticised and rejected, it is important to do this work piecemeal and carefully. Only then does the audacity or boldness of rejecting a seemingly settled view amount to courage: for it reflects also significant conservation of values. Popper regarded no social change or scientific breakthrough as revolutionary. Even the process of conjecture and refutation, of trial and error, is a piecemeal method. Popper’s piecemeal method depicts Otto Neurath’s metaphor of not dismantling the whole ship except perhaps one plank at a time, replacing each plank as the effort goes on. Every step is as conservative as it is also bold, and that alone helps make it courageous. It is only through this conservatism, the piecemeal anti-revolutionary change, that people can become bold in how they experiment and replace some formerly received norm or idea. (shrink)

The article explores the connection between politics of democracy and current communication medium. Color revolutions, particularly the one experienced in Ukraine, raise an issue of the present day relation between public and political spheres in the new global communicative context. Following the detailed analysis of the modern formation of public sphere done by Charles Taylor the author concentrates on the influence of communication on democratization processes. Amongst others, he focuses on such principle features of the public sphere as domination of (...) rationality in its formation, its claims for providing accountability norms for power, and particularly on its extra-political status. In its turn, these key characteristics of the sphere include everyone as its potential legitimate participant. The field experience gained during the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity make it possible to correct the view on interrelations of politics and the public sphere. Recent developments do increase dependence of powers that be on the public’s day-to-day feeling of their legitimacy. To elucidate the new state of interpenetration between two given spheres the author examines the issue of specificity of discourse that unites both. It allows to establish that it’s precisely the democratic ideals, concerning each and every one, that expand the frameworks of the sphere of political beyond its traditional meaning through inclusion of a broad spectrum of people’s cultural experiences. The author links current co-existence of liberal and conservative values within liberal democracies with people’s experiencing of their cultural identity. That conclusion gives the basis to clarify a phenomenon of rising conservatism inherent in today’s politics. (shrink)

The most important, or at least the most central, part of Ferdinand de Saussure's Course in General Linguistics is found in the first six chaptersof Part Two. Here, Saussure formulates one of the basic principles of Structuralism. Yet the text is in some ways oddly impenetrable. It is dear enough on a quick reading, but closer attention discovers doubtful meanings, ambiguity, the beginnings even of contradictions. These defects may, of course, be inevitable in a reconstructed text. Or they may (...) testify to some profound erroneousness in the thought, to a theory whose natal difficulties are symptoms, not of the elusiveness of truth, but of a miscarriage. It is mypurpose here to argue the latter. (shrink)

I try to reconstruct how Frege thought to reconcile the cognitive value of arithmetic with its analytical nature. There is evidence in Frege's texts that the epistemological formulation of the context principle plays a decisive role; it provides a way of obtaining concepts which are truly fruitful and whose contents cannot be grasped beforehand. Taking the definitions presented in the Begriffsschrift,I shall illustrate how this schema is intended to work.