Frege: Context Principle

Taking a lead from Eva Picardi’s work and influence, I investigate the significance of Frege’s context principle for the philosophy of language. I argue that there are some interpretive problems with recent meta-semantic interpretations of the principle. Instead, I offer a somewhat weaker alternative: the context principle is a tool to license certain definitions. Moreover, I claim that it merely lays out one of many possible ways of licensing a definition. This means, among other things, that despite Frege’s imperative injunctions, (...) the context principle formulates a permission—not a requirement. (shrink)

In the following article I intend to examine the problem of the unity of the proposition in Russell, Frege, and Wittgenstein. My chief aim will be to draw attention to the distinction between Russell’s conception of propositional constituents, on the one hand, with Frege and Wittgenstein’s on the other. My focus will be on Russell’s view of terms as independent, propositions being built up out of these building blocks, compared with Frege and Wittgenstein’s ‘top down’ approach. Furthermore, I will argue (...) that, contra certain other commentators, Frege’s metaphor of saturation and unsaturation does not serve as a solution to the problem of unity, and that the extension of this metaphorical language to Wittgenstein is, therefore, inappropriate. (shrink)

This paper identifies a tension in Frege’s philosophy and offers a diagnosis of its origins. Frege’s Context Principle can be used to dissolve the problem of propositional unity. However, Frege’s official response to the problem does not invoke the Context Principle, but the distinction between ‘saturated’ and ‘unsaturated’ propositional constituents. I argue that such a response involves assumptions that clash with the Context Principle. I suggest, however, that this tension is not generated by deep-seated philosophical commitments, but by Frege’s occasional (...) attempt to take a dubious shortcut in the justification of his conception of propositional structure. (shrink)

Beginning with a research review, the present paper shows that Hans Slugaʼs and esp. Robert Brandomʼs thesis, according to which Frege has adopted the context-principle and the priority of propositional from Kant, can solve problems in current Frege scholarship, on the one hand, but is itself fraught with further problems, on the other hand. In contrast, this paper maintains that the context-principle and the priority of the propositional are implicitly present in Fregeʼs Begriffsschrift since both have not been taken over (...) from Kant, but rather from neo-Aristotelianism: The context-principle and the priority of the propositional were first drawn up in 1834 by O. F. Gruppe. As a consequence, A. F. Trendelenburg has published a re-arranged edition of Aristotleʼs Organon in 1836 which became one of the most influential schoolbooks on logic in the 19th century and of which Frege ought to have been aware. In the beginning of this schoolbook, using the original ancient Greek sentences of Aristotle, the priority of the propositional (De int. I 1) is deduced from the context-principle (De anima III 6). (shrink)

This paper explores the limitations of current empirical approaches to the philosophy of language in light of a recent criticism of Frege's context principle. According to this criticism, the context principle is in conflict with certain features of natural language use and this is held to undermine its application in Foundations of Arithmetic. I argue that this view is mistaken because the features with which the context principle is alleged to be in conflict are irrelevant to the principle's methodological significance (...) for our understanding of the role of analysis in analytic philosophy. (shrink)

[ES] El principio de contexto que Frege establece en Fundamentos de la Aritmética no reaparece en sus escritos posteriores, hecho que podría sugerir que a consecuencia de la sustitución de la noción de contenido juzgable por las de sentido y significado Frege lo rechazara después de 1890. Dummett arguye en 1995 que el principio de contexto continúa formando una parte central de la filosofía de lenguaje de Frege, pero que las teorías establecidas a partir del tomo I de Leyes fundamentales (...) de la aritmética ya no son compatibles con la noción de la perspectiva internalista atribuida a Frege por van Heijenoort e Hintikka. El presente trabajo arguye que Frege no sólo jamás abandonó el principio de contexto, sino que también mantuvo toda su vida la fe en el lenguaje como medio universal con la consiguiente imposibilidad de establecer, vía una teoría semántica, externamente las referencias de nuestros términos. [EN] Frege´s context principle, as put forward in Foundations of Arithmetic, is not mentioned in his later writings which might suggest that as a consequence of substituting the notion of judgeable content by sense and meaning, Frege would have abandoned the context principle after 1890. Dummett argues in 1993 that the context principle continues to form a central part of Frege’s language philosophy; theories put forth from volume I of Fundamental Laws of Arithmetic, however, are no longer compatible with the notion of an internalist perspective attributed to Frege by van Heijenoort and Hintikka. I argue currently that Frege not only never abandoned the context principle but all his life maintained his faith en language as universal medium making and therefore held it impossible to establish reference for our terms externally by means of a theory of meaning. (shrink)

This paper presents a new interpretation of Frege's context principle on which it applies primarily to singular terms for abstract objects but not necessarily to singular terms for ordinary objects.

The paper focuses on Gottlob Frege’s so called Context Principle (CP hereafter), which counts as one of the most controversial points of his philosophy. Due to its importance and centrality in Frege’s thought, a detailed discussion of the principle requires a detailed analysis of almost all aspects of his philosophy. Obviously, such a task cannot be successfully accomplished here. Thus I limit myself to address only two questions concerning the CP: what role does the principle play (in Grundlagen) and how (...) can we interpret it. Addressing the first problem is required in order to address the second. Most authors interpreted CP from the perspective of Frege’s later distinction between sense and reference, which I will call the ‘semantic interpretation’. Although I accept this perspective as valuable and important, I will initially inverse the action and I will try to approach CP, and generally Grundlagen, in a more natural way, contextually, namely setting them in the initial logicist plan of the Begriffschrift. Finally, I will try to provide an interpretation concerning the alleged conflict between CP and Frege’s compositionality thesis such that they could coherently stay together. (shrink)

Frege proposed that his Context Principle—which says that a word has meaning only in the context of a proposition—can be used to explain reference, both in general and to mathematical objects in particular. I develop a version of this proposal and outline answers to some important challenges that the resulting account of reference faces. Then I show how this account can be applied to arithmetic to yield an explanation of our reference to the natural numbers and of their metaphysical status.

The paper discusses the bearing of Frege′s and Wittgenstein′s interpretations of the Context Principle on the use of proper names. It is argued that the later Wittgenstein, unlike the author of Tractatus, has many interesting things to say concerning the meaning and use of proper names that are not at variance with Frege′s views. If we bear in mind the paramount importance of context in communication we may come to see Frege′s and Wittgenstein′s observations on the fluctuating meaning of proper (...) names from a new perspective. (shrink)

En su obra de 1884, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik [Gl.], Frege establece el principio del contexto como uno de sus principios fundamentales y propone valerse de él para dar con el concepto adecuado de número. Así, ofrece una definición de tipo contextual de número cardinal, pero ante una objeción que le resulta insalvable se decide por una definición explicita. La cuestión acerca de cuál ha sido entonces el sentido de establecer con tanto énfasis el principio del contexto admite más de (...) una respuesta. Mi texto polemiza con la interpretación canónica que se ha dado al papel de este principio en Gl., acusándola de permanecer encandilada por lo que se lee de manera inmediata en desmedro de una evaluación más integral y crítica. En particular, defenderé que: i) a diferencia de lo afirmado en Dummett 1991, la definición contextual de número cardinal no es abandonada por Frege al dar su definición explícita de número, ii) el principio del contexto tiene en Gl. un papel erístico fundamental de eliminar posiciones rivales acerca de la naturaleza de los números, iii) dicha definición contextual de número tiene un papel heurístico en el contexto de descubrimiento, en el sentido de que ofrece una intuición clave que permite llegar a la formulación final, iv) a su vez, la definición contextual es una condición necesaria de la definición explícita en el contexto de justificación, siendo que esta última se ha construido a partir de la primera. Por todo ello, sostengo que la función del principio del contexto no es la que prioriza Dummett, i. e., la fallida función de resolver el problema ontológico de la naturaleza de los números, sino que es fundamentalmente metodológica. En efecto, es en su función erística y heurística en donde debe ubicarse su relevancia para la investigación llevada a cabo en Gl. In his masterpiece of 1884, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik [Gl.] Frege presents the context principle as a fundamental one in his investigation à propos an accurate concept of number. Thus, resting on it he offers a contextual definition of cardinal number; but after analyzing some objections he realizes that this definition does not work and decides himself for an explicit one. The question about what is the purport of the context principle when something that appeared to be the consequence is put aside admits more than a single answer. In this paper I argue against the canonic interpretation for, even while keeping next to the Fregean text, it fails to offer an integral explanation of how the context principle works all along Gl. In particular, I will defend that: i) contrary with Dummett 1991, the contextual definition of cardinal number is not abandoned by Frege when giving his explicit definition of number, ii) the context principle has in Gl. a fundamental eristic role of crossing out rival positions about the nature of numbers, iii) such contextual definition of number has an heuristic role in the discovery context, in the sense it offers a key intuition towards the final formulation, iv) furthermore, the contextual definition is a necessary condition in the justification context for the latest has been built up through the first one. For all this, I maintain that the function of the context principle is not the one Dummett prioritizes, i. e., the failed function of solving the ontological problem of the nature of numbers; the function of the context principle is rather and fundamentally methodological. It is on its eristic and heuristic function that its relevance to the Gl. investigation must be looked for. (shrink)

I explore the decisive connection Frege often draws between the context principle and antipsychologism, arguing that his assertion of this connection occupies a central place within the articulation of his linguistic method. In particular, Frege’s appeal to the context principle in the course of describing the epistemology of arithmetic, I argue, connects his doctrine of the nature of judgment with his defense of the objecthood of numbers, showing how an appeal to the special role of judgment in securing truth can (...) function as a linguistically based account of objectivity that excludes subjectivist psychologism. Expanding and clarifying this appeal, moreover, allows us to understand better the special pragmatic position of the recognition of patterns of use and practice in the process of analyzing meanings. In particular, it emerges that these patterns cannot bear the explanatory weight they have sometimes been taken to bear within an envisaged reductive “theory of meaning.” Rather, their recognition must figure within a practice of analysis that is continuous with, rather than an explanatory reduction of, our ordinary discursive practices, and whose elucidatory resources are not accessible except from within the perspective of those practices. (shrink)

There is considerable likelihood that Gottlob Frege began writing his Foundations of Arithmetic with the expectation that he could introduce his numbers, not with sets, but through some algebraic techniques borrowed from earlier writers of the Gottingen school. These rewriting techniques, had they worked, would have required strong philosophical justification provided by Frege's celebrated "context principle," which otherwise serves little evident purpose in the published Foundations.

I present a novel interpretation of Frege’s attempt at Grundgesetze I §§29-31 to prove that every expression of his language has a unique reference. I argue that Frege’s proof is based on a contextual account of reference, similar to but more sophisticated than that enshrined in his famous Context Principle. Although Frege’s proof is incorrect, I argue that the account of reference on which it is based is of potential philosophical value, and I analyze the class of cases to which (...) it may successfully be applied. (shrink)

Kit Fine develops a Fregean theory of abstraction, and suggests that it may yield a new philosophical foundation for mathematics, one that can account for both our reference to various mathematical objects and our knowledge of various mathematical truths. The Limits ofion breaks new ground both technically and philosophically.

There are two principles which bear the name Frege''sprinciple: the principle of compositionality, and the contextprinciple. The aim of this contribution is to investigate whether thisis justified: did Frege accept both principles at the same time, did hehold the one principle but not the other, or did he, at some moment,change his opinion? The conclusion is as follows. There is a developmentin Frege''s position. In the period of Grundlagen he followed to a strict form of contextuality. He repeatedcontextuality in later (...) writings, but became less strict. From 1914 on,pushed by the needs of research, he comes close to compositionality. Buthe could never make the final step toward compositionality forprincipled reasons, therefore he always would reject compositionality. (shrink)

In this essay I will consider two theses that are associated with Frege,and will investigate the extent to which Frege really believed them.Much of what I have to say will come as no surprise to scholars of thehistorical Frege. But Frege is not only a historical figure; he alsooccupies a site on the philosophical landscape that has allowed hisdoctrines to seep into the subconscious water table. And scholars in a widevariety of different scholarly establishments then sip from thesedoctrines. I believe (...) that some Frege-interested philosophers at various ofthese establishments might find my conclusions surprising.Some of these philosophical establishments have arisen from an educationalmilieu in which Frege is associated with some specific doctrine at theexpense of not even being aware of other milieux where other specificdoctrines are given sole prominence. The two theses which I will discussillustrate this point. Each of them is called Frege''s Principle, but byphilosophers from different milieux. By calling them milieux I do not want to convey the idea that they are each located at some specificsocio-politico-geographico-temporal location. Rather, it is a matter oftheir each being located at different places on the intellectuallandscape. For this reason one might (and I sometimes will) call them(interpretative) traditions. (shrink)

Pretendo usar o exemplo dos nomes de percursos de valores como prova de que, contrariamente ao que Michael Resnik e Michael Dummett sustentam, Frege nunca abandonou o seu princípio do contexto: “Apenas no contexto de uma sentenya tem uma palavra significado”. Em particular, pretendo mostrar que a prova da completude com relação ao significado, que Frege tentou introduzir na linguagem formal das Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, baseia-se em uma aplicação do principio do contexto, e que, em consequencia, tambem nomes de percursos (...) de valores tem significado apenas nocontexto de uma sentença. A teoria Fregeana do sentido e do significado somente pode ser entendida adequadamente sob o pano de fundo do princfpio do contexto.Taking course-of-values names as an example, I want to show that, contrary to what Michael Resnik and Michael Dummett claim, Frege never abandoned his context principle “Only in the context of a sentence do words have meaning”. In particular, I want to show that Frege’s attempted proof of referentiality for the formal language of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik rests on the context principle and that, consequently, course-of-values names have a reference only in the context of a sentence. It is only in the light of the context principle that Frege’s theory of sense and reference can be understood appropriately. (shrink)

Pretendo usar o exemplo dos nomes de percursos de valores como prova de que, contrariamente ao que Michael Resnik e Michael Dummett sustentam, Frege nunca abandonou o seu princípio do contexto: “Apenas no contexto de uma sentenya tem uma palavra significado”. Em particular, pretendo mostrar que a prova da completude com relação ao significado, que Frege tentou introduzir na linguagem formal das Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, baseia-se em uma aplicação do principio do contexto, e que, em consequencia, tambem nomes de percursos (...) de valores tem significado apenas nocontexto de uma sentença. A teoria Fregeana do sentido e do significado somente pode ser entendida adequadamente sob o pano de fundo do princfpio do contexto.Taking course-of-values names as an example, I want to show that, contrary to what Michael Resnik and Michael Dummett claim, Frege never abandoned his context principle “Only in the context of a sentence do words have meaning”. In particular, I want to show that Frege’s attempted proof of referentiality for the formal language of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik rests on the context principle and that, consequently, course-of-values names have a reference only in the context of a sentence. It is only in the light of the context principle that Frege’s theory of sense and reference can be understood appropriately. (shrink)

I try to reconstruct how Frege thought to reconcile the cognitive value of arithmetic with its analytical nature. There is evidence in Frege's texts that the epistemological formulation of the context principle plays a decisive role; it provides a way of obtaining concepts which are truly fruitful and whose contents cannot be grasped beforehand. Taking the definitions presented in the Begriffsschrift,I shall illustrate how this schema is intended to work.

Michael Dummett argued that Frege was a realist while Hans Sluga countered that he was an objective idealist in the rationalist tradition of Kant and Lotze. Sluga ties Frege's idealism to the context principle which he argues Frege never gave up. It is argued that Sluga has correctly interpreted the pre?1891 Frege while Dummett is correct concerning the later period. It is also claimed that the context principle was dropped prior to 1891 to be replaced by the doctrine of unsaturated (...) entities. (shrink)