The task of presenting for explicit view the store of appraisive terms our language affords has been undertaken in the conviction that it will be of interest not only to ethics and other philosophical studies but also to various areas of social science and linguistics. I have principally sought to do justice to the complexities of this vocabulary, the uses to which it is put, and the capacities its use reflects. I have given little thought to whether the inquiry was (...) philosophical and whether it was being conducted in a philosophical manner. Foremost in my thoughts were the tasks that appeared to need doing, among them these: explicit attention was to be given to the vocabulary by means of which we say we commend,judge, appraise, or evaluate subjects and subject matters in our experience; it was to be segregated from other language at least for the purpose of study; the types of appraisive resources that are at hand in a language such as English were to be classified in some convincing and not too artificial manner; and an empirical standpoint was to be developed for a better view of appraisal, evaluation, and judging within the framework of other ways we have of responding to our surround ings such as appetition and emotion on one side and factual registering and theorizing about states of affairs on the other. Such an inquiry has never been undertaken in quite this manner before. (shrink)

The works of Paul Grice collected in this volume present his metaphysical defence of value, and represent a modern attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for value. The collection includes Grice's three previously unpublished Carus Lectures on the conception of value, a section of his 'Reply to Richards' (previously published in Grandy and Warner (eds.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, Oxford, 1986), and 'Method in Philosophical Psychology' (Presidential Address delivered to the Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical (...) Association, 1975). (shrink)

Environmental problems have an ethical dimension. They are not just about the efficient use of resources. Justice in the distribution of environmental goods and burdens, fairness in the processes of environmental decision-making, the moral claims of future generations and non-humans, these and other ethical values inform the responses of citizens to environmental problems. How can these concerns enter into good policy-making processes?Two expert-based approaches are commonly advocated for incorporating ethical values into environmental decision-making. One is an 'economic capture' approach, according (...) to which existing economic methods can be successfully extended to include ethical concerns. For example, stated preference methods, especially contingent valuation, have been developed to try and capture ethical responses as 'non-use values' of the environment, in particular 'existence values'. The other is a 'moral expert' approach which confines economic methods to the analysis of welfare gains, and assumes committees of ethical experts will complement economic expertise.Both approaches face problems in terms of addressing many widely held ethical values about the environment. Furthermore, both face problems concerning the democratic legitimacy of their procedures. How can policy-making be made responsive to different ethical values? What role is there for new deliberative and participatory methods? How far do existing decision-making institutions have the capacities to incorporate different modes of articulating environmental values?This policy brief examines the limitations of current attempts to capture ethical values within existing economic instruments and considers how these limitations might be overcome. Section 1 examines the assumptions that standard economic theory makes about individuals when they express values and make choices about the environment. The current models of agents that inform policy-making are seen to be ill-suited to incorporating the ethical responses of agents and this reveals some of the policy failures that may result. Section 2 shows how the physical and social properties of many environmental goods prevent their being treated as commodities. Section 3 considers the problems surrounding conceptions of fairness and legitimacy in processes for environmental valuation. Section 4 raises questions concerning the capacities of policy-making institutions to take cognisance of the results of different methods for articulating environmental values. (shrink)

Environmental problems have an ethical dimension. They are not just about the efficient use of resources. Justice in the distribution of environmental goods and burdens, fairness in the processes of environmental decision-making, the moral claims of future generations and non-humans, these and other ethical values inform the responses of citizens to environmental problems. How can these concerns enter into good policy-making processes?Two expert-based approaches are commonly advocated for incorporating ethical values into environmental decision-making. One is an 'economic capture' approach, according (...) to which existing economic methods can be successfully extended to include ethical concerns. For example, stated preference methods, especially contingent valuation, have been developed to try and capture ethical responses as 'non-use values' of the environment, in particular 'existence values'. The other is a 'moral expert' approach which confines economic methods to the analysis of welfare gains, and assumes committees of ethical experts will complement economic expertise.Both approaches face problems in terms of addressing many widely held ethical values about the environment. Furthermore, both face problems concerning the democratic legitimacy of their procedures. How can policy-making be made responsive to different ethical values? What role is there for new deliberative and participatory methods? How far do existing decision-making institutions have the capacities to incorporate different modes of articulating environmental values?This policy brief examines the limitations of current attempts to capture ethical values within existing economic instruments and considers how these limitations might be overcome. Section 1 examines the assumptions that standard economic theory makes about individuals when they express values and make choices about the environment. The current models of agents that inform policy-making are seen to be ill-suited to incorporating the ethical responses of agents and this reveals some of the policy failures that may result. Section 2 shows how the physical and social properties of many environmental goods prevent their being treated as commodities. Section 3 considers the problems surrounding conceptions of fairness and legitimacy in processes for environmental valuation. Section 4 raises questions concerning the capacities of policy-making institutions to take cognisance of the results of different methods for articulating environmental values. (shrink)

The works of Paul Grice collected in this volume present his metaphysical defense of value, and represent a modern attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for value. Value judgments are viewed as objective; value is part of the world we live in, but nonetheless is constructed by us. We inherit, or seem to inherit, the Aristotelian world in which objects and creatures are characterized in terms of what they are supposed to do. We are thereby enabled (...) to evaluate by reference to function and finality. The most striking part of Grice's position, however, is his contention that the legitimacy of such evaluations rests ultimately on an argument for absolute value. (shrink)

The works of Paul Grice collected in this volume present his metaphysical defence of value, and represent a modern attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for value. The collection includes Grice's three previously unpublished Carus Lectures on the conception of value, a section of his 'Reply to Richards', Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, Oxford, 1986), and 'Method in Philosophical Psychology'.

The article discusses the concept of value in the ethical thought of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla. The title of this article indicates a twofold delimitation of the problems discussed. The first delimitation is chronological and the theme under consideration is the ethical thought of Cardinal Wojtyla in his pre-papal period.

The article discusses the concept of value in the ethical thought of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla. The title of this article indicates a twofold delimitation of the problems discussed. The first delimitation is chronological and the theme under consideration is the ethical thought of Cardinal Wojtyla in his pre-papal period.

This is a comprehensive investigation of the foundations of value theory. It is a survey of some two or three thousand appraisive concepts in the English language, partly "in order to show that ethics and value theory are but stunted growths if they try to confine their attention merely to the vocabulary of general or ultimate appraisives: good, bad, right, wrong". The book contains three parts. Part I deals with Procedures of Appraisal and Judgment, i.e., with the capacities (...) of the mind to respond or react appetitively or emotionally to the environment. Five topics are examined: enjoyment, response, appraisal, enactment, and moral involvement. (shrink)

The paper argues that an adequate account of Nietzsche's conception of value must take into consideration the complex interaction of intrahuman forces, such as drives and affects, and interhuman cultural forces which together give rise to values. The paper goes on to confront three major interpretive tendencies in Nietzsche scholarship which stem, I argue, from overly reductive accounts of value. The tendencies, exemplified by Richard Schacht, Maudmarie Clark, and Alexander Nehamas respectively claim: that value is or (...) should be objective in character, that value claims are reliant on consistent with truth claims, and that value is realized most highly in individual lives. On the basis of the conception of value articulated, the paper ultimately defends the view that value, for Nietzsche, is intra- and intersubjective in its origins, non-cognitive in character, and realized most importantly as the cultural, rather than individual, level.Im Beitrag wird gezeigt, dass eine angemessene Darstellung von Nietzsches Wertkonzept die komplexe Wechselwirkung von solchen Kräften, die im Menschen selbst zu finden sind, wie Triebe und Affekte, und zwischenmenschlichen kulturellen Kräften, die im Menschen selbst zu finden sind, wie Triebe und Affekte, und zwishcenmenschlichen kulturellen Kräften, die im Menschen selbst zu finden sind, wie Triebe und Affekte, und zwischenmenschlichen kulturellen Kräften berücksichtigen muss. Es werdent drei einflussreiche Interpertationslinien in der gegenwärtigen Nietzscheforschung, vertreten durch Richard Schacht, Maudmarie Clark und Alexander Nehamas, gegenübergestellt, die, wie ich meine, von einem allzu reduzierten Ansatz hinsichtlich des Wertes ausgehen, indem behaptet wirt: dass Werte objektiv sind oder sein sollen, dass Wertansprüche abhängig sind von oder konsistent sind mit Warheitsansprüchen, dass Werte vor allem im individuellen Leben realisiert werden. Der Beitrag stellt dagegen, dass Werte für Nietzsche ihrem Ursprung nach intra- und intersubjektiv sind, ihrem Charakter nach nonkognitiv und eher auf der kulturellen als der individuellen Ebene realisiert werden. (shrink)

The concept of valuing plays an important role in the way we think about people’s attitudes toward the things they care about most. We invoke this concept in sentences like: I value your friendship. We need to find a leader who truly values political equality. To live a good life, one must always return to the things one values most. Yet there also seem to be cases in which a person has a strong desire for a particular object but (...) in which we would not say that he or she ‘values’ this object. Thus, consider the typical heroin addict. It would sound wrong to say of such a person. (shrink)

The term “value” has a wide range of current usage in philospohy and the sciences. Descriptively, a man's “values” may refer to all his attitudes for-or-against anything. His values include his perferences and avoidances, his desire-objects and aversion-objects, his pleasure and pain tendencies, his goals, ideals, interests and disinterests, what he takes to be right and wrong, good and evil, beautiful and ugly, useful and useless, his approvals and disapprovals, his criteria of taste and standards of judgment, and so (...) forth. (shrink)

This paper relates an empirical study demonstrating asymmetry in the concept of valuing.

While classical neo-positivists reject any role for traditionally understood values in science, Kuhn identifies five specific values as criteria for assessing a scientific theory; this approach has been further developed by several other authors. This paper focuses on Helen Longino, who presents a significant contemporary critique of Kuhn’s concept. The most controversial aspect of Longino’s position is arguably her claim that the criterion of empirical adequacy is the least defensible basis for assessing theories. The de-emphasizing of the importance of external (...) consistency as a value and the introduction of socio-political considerations into the processes of an assessment of scientific theories are also considered problematic issues. I provide arguments against Longino’s conception, identify some of its problems, and argue for refusal of her approach. (shrink)

Our concept of disorder is changing. This causes problems for projects of descriptive conceptual analysis. Conceptual change means that a criterion that was necessary for a condition to be a disorder at one time may cease to be necessary a relatively short time later. Nevertheless, some conceptually based claims will be fairly robust. In particular, the claim that no adequate account of disorder can appeal only to biological facts can be maintained for the foreseeable future. This is because our current (...) concept of disorder continues to be laden with ethical and political values in multiple ways. (shrink)

Many philosophers of science have maintained that science should be value-free; still others believe that such ideal is neither achievable nor desirable for science. Hugh Lacey is presently one of the main supporters of the idea of value-free science and his theory is probably the most debated today and attracts the most attention and criticism. Therefore, in this text, I will primarily analyze his theory of value-free science. After briefly defining the notion of value I highlight (...) which strategy Lacey chooses to lay a firm foundation for the concept of science without value, with his starting point being the differentiation between cognitive and non-cognitive values. Then I describe three basic characteristics of Lacey’s value-free science: impartiality, neutrality, and autonomy. However, the overall plan and design of his project, together with some concrete steps he takes, are not without problems in our view. I will try to point out some of these problematic issues and provide brief suggestions for alleviating them. (shrink)

Many philosophers of science have maintained that science should be value-free; still others believe that such ideal is neither achievable nor desirable for science. Hugh Lacey is presently one of the main supporters of the idea of value-free science and his theory is probably the most debated today and attracts the most attention and criticism. Therefore, in this text, I will primarily analyze his theory of value-free science. After briefly defining the notion of value I highlight (...) which strategy Lacey chooses to lay a firm foundation for the concept of science without value, with his starting point being the differentiation between cognitive and non-cognitive values. Then I describe three basic characteristics of Lacey’s value-free science: impartiality, neutrality, and autonomy. However, the overall plan and design of his project, together with some concrete steps he takes, are not without problems in our view. I will try to point out some of these problematic issues and provide brief suggestions for alleviating them. (shrink)

Recent literature on intrinsic value contains a number of disputes about the nature of the concept. On the one hand, there are those who think states of affairs, such as states of pleasure or desire satisfaction, are the bearers of intrinsic value (“Mooreans”); on the other hand, there are those who think concrete objects, like people, are intrinsically valuable (“Kantians”). The contention of this paper is that there is not a single concept of intrinsic value about which (...) Mooreans and Kantians have disagreed, but rather two distinct concepts. I state a number of principles about intrinsic value that have typically (though not universally) been held by Mooreans, all of which are typically denied by Kantians. I show that there are distinct theoretical roles for a concept of intrinsic value to play in a moral framework. When we notice these distinct theoretical roles, we should realize that there is room for two distinct concepts of intrinsic value within a single moral framework: one that accords with some or all of the Moorean principles, and one that does not. (shrink)

The paper aims to present a critical evaluation of Dietrich von Hildebrand’s account of value. This account is von Hildebrand’s most important and original contribution, not just to general value theory but to philosophy as such. I first present this account by explaining, in detail, his analysis of the so-called categories of importance. Then I critically examine the philosophical originality and merit of von Hildebrand’s account of value. I do so by arguing against his claim that (...) class='Hi'>value, in the sense of the important in itself, is not in the centre of “traditional ethics”. (shrink)

This article, translated into Chinese by Tian Kaifang, summarizes and critically reflects on the current state of the literature that has recently begun to put Chinese Confucianism into dialogue with characteristically African conceptions of what is good, what fundamentally exists, and how to obtain knowledge. As most of this literature has addressed value theory, this article focuses largely on it, too. It first illustrates how similar the foundational values are between the two cultural traditions; central to both traditional China (...) and Africa is an ethic prescribing the development of one’s humanness through virtues that honour harmonious relationships. The article then indicates how the two traditions nonetheless have different understandings of the nature of harmony, which have grounded divergent judgments of which practices are morally desirable. The final section of the article discusses ontology and epistemology, which are extremely under-developed in the comparative literature, and it suggests some avenues for future research on these topics. (shrink)

This paper defends a conception of epistemic value that I call the “Simpliciter Conception.” On it, epistemic value is a kind of value simpliciter and being of epistemic value implies being of value simpliciter. I defend this conception by criticizing two others, what I call the Formal Conception and the Hybrid Conception. While those conceptions may be popular among epistemologists, I argue that they fail to explain why anyone should care (...) that things are of epistemic value and naturally undercuts disputes about what is of epistemic value. I end by sketching and locating my conception within some increasingly popular views in meta-normativity. (shrink)

Reconnection between producers and consumers is often presented as an integral part of the local food narrative. However, questions can arise as to whether local food producers and their food purchasers align in mindset and the value proposition that underpins their involvement. This paper draws on interview data collected from producers and consumers participating in direct-sell meat operations to explore so-called value propositions between these two actors in local food initiatives in Southwestern Ontario, Canada. We suggest that because (...) producers and consumers value their participation and associated ‘reconnection’ for different reasons and experience practical limitations in satisfying diverse expectations, the ‘reconnection’ metaphor is complex and contingent—especially at the level of the individual. The findings suggest that new roles, realities and beliefs for each party in regard to marketing, customer relations, distribution, and convenience might predispose participants to be in favor of other arrangements if they became more readily available and were capable of guaranteeing both profitability for the producer and healthy foods for the consumer. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The author continues his challenge to the “official” Objectivist view of free will by addressing the implications of his value-determinism/conditional-volition model for various Objectivist moral concepts including value, sacrifice, virtue, obligation, and moral and legal responsibility and accountability. He argues that based on Rand’s definitions, the conventional understandings of sacrifice or betrayal of values, lapses in virtue, and breaches in morality need considerable reconceptualizing. The author gives special attention to Rand and Kant with regard to lying, use (...) of force, and acts of generosity, finding not nearly as much difference between them as is commonly believed. (shrink)