Provides comment on the first of the three primary sections of Kant's Critique; the analytical, the dialectical, and the methodological. The analytical section runs from Kant's Introduction to nearly the end of the Analytic of Principles, and is concerned with the nature, foundations, and the limits of empirical knowledge.

The task of presenting for explicit view the store of appraisive terms our language affords has been undertaken in the conviction that it will be of interest not only to ethics and other philosophical studies but also to various areas of social science and linguistics. I have principally sought to do justice to the complexities of this vocabulary, the uses to which it is put, and the capacities its use reflects. I have given little thought to whether the inquiry was (...) philosophical and whether it was being conducted in a philosophical manner. Foremost in my thoughts were the tasks that appeared to need doing, among them these: explicit attention was to be given to the vocabulary by means of which we say we commend,judge, appraise, or evaluate subjects and subject matters in our experience; it was to be segregated from other language at least for the purpose of study; the types of appraisive resources that are at hand in a language such as English were to be classified in some convincing and not too artificial manner; and an empirical standpoint was to be developed for a better view of appraisal, evaluation, and judging within the framework of other ways we have of responding to our surround ings such as appetition and emotion on one side and factual registering and theorizing about states of affairs on the other. Such an inquiry has never been undertaken in quite this manner before. (shrink)

Tbis inquiry may be thought of as a sequel to The Concepts of Value and as an extension of the brief core-vocabulary of aesthetic concepts found in one of the appendices to it. In terms of sheer numbers, most of the value concepts of our language are to be found in the area of human relations and of the aesthetic. There are also other value vocabularies, shorter but equally important, for example, the cognitive and logical. These and other objects of (...) pbilosopbical study (for example, the question of "other minds") deserve the kind of empirical survey that has been made of moral and aesthetic notions, if only to test a priori approaches to them. In the present studyan even more determined empirical approach than that adopted for the first has been found necessary. Once the moral or human value vocabulary has been identified, sentential contexts for the use of the terms readily come to mind. In a study of the language of criticism, however, the vocabulary has first to be sought in the utterances of critics themselves and quoted in sufficient context to make their critical intentions clear. The outcome is that the present study is of great length, about half of it being quotations from critics. The rule adopted for arriving at tbis length go on collecting quotations as long as new types of appraisal came was to to light. (shrink)

To understand human action in general we must look toward its determinants in the agent's cognitive assessment of an existing situation and in the attitudes this has prompted. But we cannot fully determine why a deed is done without reference also to evaluative appraisal which reveals basic commitment to prescripts. Naturalism either overlooks the autonomy of commitment vis- -vis attitude and cognitive assessment or, erroneously assimilating it to attitude, wholly distorts the plain fact of the clash of duty and inclination. (...) Since the roots of conflict derive from the same source as those of action we respond to it appropriately only if we first identify its components. To ignore commitment distorts conflict as grievously as it does action. (shrink)

Terms for the pitch of tones, such as 'high-low' do not describe pitch and can interfere with our apprehending such data for what they are in their sensuous uniqueness. Very different alternatives such as 'narrow-broad' or French aigu-grave serve equally well. In listening to music the first requisite is the apprehension of 'uncategorized' tones, the words for them serving only as a way of marking the fact of their differences. This must lead us to reaffirm what was said by Gorgias (...) about what language can and cannot do in respect of such data. (shrink)