The Concept of Disorder Revisited: Robustly Value-Laden Despite Change

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1):141-161 (2020)
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Abstract

Our concept of disorder is changing. This causes problems for projects of descriptive conceptual analysis. Conceptual change means that a criterion that was necessary for a condition to be a disorder at one time may cease to be necessary a relatively short time later. Nevertheless, some conceptually based claims will be fairly robust. In particular, the claim that no adequate account of disorder can appeal only to biological facts can be maintained for the foreseeable future. This is because our current concept of disorder continues to be laden with ethical and political values in multiple ways.

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10.1093/arisup/akaa010

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Citations of this work

Against the generalised theory of function.Harriet Fagerberg - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (4):1-25.
Scientific Pluralism.Ludwig David & Ruphy Stéphanie - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Health as a theoretical concept.Christopher Boorse - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (4):542-573.
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