Substantially increased wealth inequality across the developed world has prompted many philosophers, economists and legal theorists to support comprehensive taxes on all forms of wealth. Proposals include levying taxes on the basis of total wealth, or alternatively the change in the value of capital holdings measured from year-to-year. This contrasts with most existing policies that tax capital assets at the point they are transferred from one beneficiary to another through sale or gifts. Are these tax reforms likely to (...) meet their aims of greater economic and political equality? We argue that these policies are likely to fail because, following neoclassical economic theory, they are based on a conception of capital as possessing given values in what amounts to a static equilibrium. This mischaracterizes the dynamic and subjective character of market economies and the contested value of real instantiations of capital goods. This makes them very difficult, often impossible, to value apart from at the point of voluntary transfer or profit realization. This means most taxes levied on a mark-to-market basis will be arbitrary and unfair. We propose alternative policies based on an income realization approach to taxation that are more likely to curb excessive wealth holdings. This includes introducing international treaties that prohibit preferential tax treatment for individual companies and specific sectors, and broadening the income tax base to include the imputed rent of personal housing wealth. (shrink)

Substantially increased wealth inequality across the developed world has prompted many philosophers, economists and legal theorists to support comprehensive taxes on all forms of wealth. Proposals include levying taxes on the basis of total wealth, or alternatively the change in the value of capital holdings measured from year-to-year. This contrasts with most existing policies that tax capital assets at the point they are transferred from one beneficiary to another through sale or gifts. Are these tax reforms likely to (...) meet their aims of greater economic and political equality? We argue that these policies are likely to fail because, following neoclassical economic theory, they are based on a conception of capital as possessing given values in what amounts to a static equilibrium. This mischaracterizes the dynamic and subjective character of market economies and the contested value of real instantiations of capital goods. This makes them very difficult, often impossible, to value apart from at the point of voluntary transfer or profit realization. This means most taxes levied on a mark-to-market basis will be arbitrary and unfair. We propose alternative policies based on an income realization approach to taxation that are more likely to curb excessive wealth holdings. This includes introducing international treaties that prohibit preferential tax treatment for individual companies and specific sectors, and broadening the income tax base to include the imputed rent of personal housing wealth. (shrink)

The traditional view of tax holds that consumption taxes fail tax the yield to capital, whereas income taxes do, leading to John Stuart Mill's criticism of the income tax as a "double tax" on wealth that is saved. A better analytic understanding illustrates that there are two types of consumption taxes. A prepaid consumption or (equivalently) wage tax indeed ignores the yield to capital. But a consistent progressive postpaid consumption tax gets at such yield, at the individual level, (...) when but only when the returns to capital are used to elevate lifestyles in material terms. Such a tax allows "ordinary" savings that move around labor earnings, in constant dollar terms, to different periods of an individual's life, such as times of retirement or heightened medical or educational needs. Because a progressive postpaid consumption tax falls on the yield to capital at the right time-when its use at the individual level becomes manifest-all other taxes on capital, such as capital gains, gift and estate, and corporate income taxes, can and should be repealed, in the name of fairness. Footnotesa I thank the editors, my research assistants Alex Baskin and Nina Kang, and the other contributors to this volume for their helpful comments. (shrink)

In this comparative analysis of the UK and Sweden, we consider, if inherited wealth is most deserving of redistributive taxation, then what lessons, if any, may be learned from the difficult paths faced by this tax in these countries. We conclude that the political momentum behind the Swedish family business was distinct, and, possibly, capable of travel to the UK. The research for this article is part of the FairTax EU project, which is funded by the European Union’s Horizon (...) 2020 research and innovation programme 2014-2018, grant agreement No. FairTax 649439. (shrink)

In Germany, transfers of assets between generations are subject to inheritance and gift tax.1 However, there are different views on whether or not the present level of taxation is high enough. Our study looks at the potential for applying increases. We show that the constitutional framework does indeed allow for higher taxation in the case of intergenerational property transfers. We identify the essential points in current German inheritance and gift tax law, which make it possible to transfer large (...) assets with no or low inheritance tax burden. For these points as well as the determination of tax rates, we propose reform approaches and present options for the use of possible additional income. (shrink)

Taxation is more than one thing. Taxes can be levied in various ways on various things, with varying effects on a culture and an economy, and raising different challenges of justification.

Rich people stash away trillions of dollars in tax havens like Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, or Singapore. Multinational corporations shift their profits to low-tax jurisdictions like Ireland or Panama to avoid paying tax. Recent stories in the media about Apple, Google, Starbucks, and Fiat are just the tip of the iceberg. There is hardly any multinational today that respects not just the letter but also the spirit of tax laws. All this becomes possible due to tax competition, with countries strategically (...) designing fiscal policy to attract capital from abroad. The loopholes in national tax regimes that tax competition generates and exploits draw into question political economic life as we presently know it. They undermine the fiscal autonomy of political communities and contribute to rising inequalities in income and wealth.Building on a careful analysis of the ethical challenges raised by a world of tax competition, this book puts forward a normative and institutional framework to regulate the practice. In short, individuals and corporations should pay tax in the jurisdictions of which they are members, where this membership can come in degrees. Moreover, the strategic tax setting of states should be limited in important ways. An International Tax Organisation should be created to enforce the principles of tax justice.The author defends this call for reform against two important objections. First, Dietsch refutes the suggestion that regulating tax competition is inefficient. Second, he argues that regulation of this sort, rather than representing a constraint on national sovereignty, in fact turns out to be a requirement of sovereignty in a global economy. The book closes with a series of reflections on the obligations that the beneficiaries of tax competition have towards the losers both prior to any institutional reform as well as in its aftermath. (shrink)

In this review, I say a few words about the analysis portion of Piketty’s book, but I will focus mostly on its solution portion. In the first section, I go over Piketty’s main argument and make two critical points: there is a lack of consideration for, first, human capital and, second, absolute levels of income and capital per capita. The second section of this essay focuses on the solution portion of the book. I also go over Piketty’s argument (...) and make five more substantial points: I wonder what Piketty means by social justice; I emphasize that raising taxes is desirable; I ask why it is capital that should be taxed, and how feasible a global tax on capital would be; and finally, I claim that the book could provide more guidance in terms of the policies that could be put in place right now. If the global taxation of capital is not politically feasible in the short to medium term, what should be done in the meantime? (shrink)

The distributive justice literature has recently formulated several tax proposals, with limitarians or property-owning democrats proposing new or higher taxes on wealth or capital income intended to decrease the growing wealth gap. This essay joins this debate on inequality and redistributive taxation through the lens of the “benefit principle for public policy.” This principle says that specific rules and institutions are acceptable to the extent that they create benefits for all individuals in society, or at least don’t make (...) anyone worse off. This benefit principle opposes wealth accumulation to the extent that wealth was generated through rent-seeking—that is, income unrelated to economic productivity, which is not embedded in mutually beneficial exchanges. I maintain, however, that ruling out rent-seeking requires not ex post taxation, but primarily a more “predistributive corrective policy,” that is, reconfiguration of market institutions to prevent wealth accumulation through rent-seeking in the first place. The alternative response is, thus, not to tackle inequality as such but to reform the market to promote the occurrence of mutually beneficial exchange. (shrink)

The term ‘predistribution’ draws attention to the need for policies and institutions that are designed to improve the position of the least advantaged members of society by generating a fairer distribution of opportunities and benefits from the operation of the free market system, with less reliance on redistributive tax-and-transfer mechanisms. Although the idea of progressive predistribution has only recently begun to attract the attention of politicians and commentators in the mainstream media, there is an older and more philosophically grounded predistributive (...) approach that goes back to the idea of the property-owning democracy proposed by Economist James Meade and further developed by liberal political philosopher John Rawls. In this article, I argue that neither the Meadeian/Rawlsian POD model, nor the more recent analysis of the idea of progressive predistribution, provide a clear and convincing account of the distinction between predistributive and redistributive mechanisms. I then argue that a more promising account of this distinction is provided by the idea of the socialization of economic rent through taxation of the rental value of land, and that there are good reasons to think that a shift in the burden of taxation away from production and employment and on to the rental value of land might turn out to be both more genuinely predistributive and more effectively progressive than other possible predistributive mechanisms that have recently been proposed, most notably the aggressive taxation of private inheritances as a means to broaden the distribution of privately owned capital and productive property. (shrink)

In October 2021, the Inclusive Framework of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) adopted a new international tax deal, which has been hailed as a major step towards a fair and effective global corporate tax system. In this article, we question this verdict. We analyse this deal on the basis of three complementary fairness principles: preventing free riding by multinational corporations (MNCs), respect for and promotion of the fiscal autonomy of countries, and the limitation of distributive and relational (...) inequalities. We argue that the tax deal is unlikely to lead to a substantial improvement in fairness. We do, however, welcome the deal’s recognition of the need to tax multinational corporations as unitary entities subject to a global minimum effective tax rate. We argue that this recognition creates opportunities for fairer reforms that should be pursued through a more inclusive global decision-making process. (shrink)

Over its entire life, the Internal Revenue Code (like other tax systems) has never tried to tax economic income as such, because of the administrative and liquidity problems that arise from taxing any combination of values consumed and from appreciation (or depreciation) of capital stocks. Instead, the common practice limits tax occasions to a realization of income from sale or other disposition of property. Even then, if the proceeds of the transaction are not cash or marketable securities, as with (...) many corporation reorganizations, taxation is deferred until these assets are converted in cash or marketable securities.Any effort to eliminate these twin filters by taxing income—and income regardless of realization—will overburden government agencies and private taxpayers, while reducing economic activity. A wealth tax scores even worse by these welfare measures, creating massive problems of evasion and enforcement that will reduce capital formation across the board in the effort to transfer wealth from the ultra-rich to everyone else. A simple tax structure with affordable rates is the only path to economic prosperity. (shrink)

Economists and philosophers discuss taxation in the context of the prevailing tax base. This prevailing tax base primarily consists of levies on earned income, capital, and consumption. In the optimal tax literature, economists find that this tax base possesses a problematic tradeoff between equity and efficiency. This tax base is also controversial amongst moral philosophers because it diminishes the principle of labor ownership. I explore a tax base that does not possess these two drawbacks and hence sidesteps problems (...) with the current tax base raised both by optimal tax theorists and moral philosophers. Even partial replacement of the current tax base with the proposed tax base would increase efficiency, improve equity, and preserve labor ownership. (shrink)

Can we rely on the altruism of professionals or the public service ethos to deliver good quality health and education services? How should patients, parents and pupils behave - as grateful recipients or active consumers? The book provides new answers to these questions, and evaluates recent government policies in health services, education, social security and taxation, and puts forward proposals for policy reform: universal capital or 'demogrants', discriminating vouchers, matching grants for pensions and for long-term care and hypothecated (...) taxes. (shrink)

The Umayyad State is widely criticized in the West as well as in its own region. Actually, this is normal situation. Because Hijaz Arabs who had no state experience, built a multinational state in short period of time. Yet, this caused serious matters. The fundamental point of the criticism is the payment of tax, also called jizya, which is taken from residents (mawālī) of Khorasan and Transoxania. However, in most studies on this subject, it is understood that the jizya taken (...) from mawālī is combined jizya and kharja, which is different type of tax. Although mawālī was tested for whether it passes religious criteria in critic periods or not, this situation did not last throughout the entire Umayyad history. It was continued for fifteen and twenty years. In this period, it was understood that the jizya tax taken from the mawālī, was caused by the unlawful practices of some regional governors, most of them were non-Muslim local tax officials and all their purpose was to collect the amount of combined jizya. It cannot be said that the Umayyad caliphs officially ordered written instructions in order to take the conceptual sense from the mawālī part. But some Khorasan governors, who detected that taxes were decreasing, blinked at the collection of the jizya from the mawālī.Summary: The tax policies of a state are of great importance for the political, social, and economic stability. A regular tax system minimizes the problems that the state mechanism might face. The establishment of a fair and just tax scheme is undoubtedly possible with a deep-rooted state experience. It is known that the Umayyad state which is the subject of this research has no state experience. Furthermore, ruling to the area which is on 13 million square kilometers and reaching to Kashgar in the East and to South France in the West and governing this multinational structure who are living on these regions, put the Umayyad government in a very difficult condition. With the vast borders and the stoppage of the conquests, some political, social and economic problems were experienced and these problems deeply affected the government. The groups which had argued with Shiites and Khārijites because of some various reasons led the country into collapsing. It is also known that many plague epidemics in the region of Damascus affected the society in a negative way, changing the capital and changing some of the border cities in favor of the Eastern Roman Empire.All these negativities certainly shaken the Umayyad state economically. It is understood from the data that the instability and political uncertainties in the country led to a decrease in the tax rates. For example, the Umayyad caliph ‘Abd al-Malik İbn Marwān period, only half of the tax was collected at the time of Hazrat ‘Umar could be collected. It can be said that the public who avoided the general policies of the state avoided giving tax, in other words, the tax evasion. Also, the increasing migration from village to city and due to that, the vacancy of tribute tax collected land, failure to obtain expected yield because of rent fights on fertile lands, and conversion process in non-Muslim community are included in other reasons of reduction of taxes.In the Umayyad period, the issue of taking the jizya from the mawālī can be considered in this context. We do not have an independent work or research article on how this practice was initiated, how it was and how it was taken from mawālī, and how it was a state policy, and how long it was sustained. The studies that touch on this subject are far from being holistic. Even in the main sources it is seen that the concepts of kharāj and jizya are not fully understood and therefore used interchangeably. This may be considered normal for the first period in which the concepts are not in place. However, in the following centuries, the works that were copyrighted and, except for a few, instead of understanding and explaining this confusion, chose to use the word jizya from these two words which can be used interchangeably in texts. Therefore, this approach has led to the widespread conviction that the Umayyad state has taken jizya from the mawālī in the conceptual sense.Al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf is claimed to have started the application of taken jizya from mawālī. However, Haccac aimed to provide the regularity of both agricultural products and the kharāj which is taken from farmers because of the status of the soil by sending Sawad villagers who migrated to the big cities and became Muslims by changing their religions. The status of the lands seized was decisive in taxation. According to this, the conquest and the territorial lands were taxed differently, but in some cases the same tax (kharāj) was taken. Non-Muslims who living in the territory of conquest were demanded jizya per capita. The jizya and kharāj tax collected from this category can be expressed as “joint jizya”. Regardless of whether the person is a Muslim or not, the fact that he was demanded from him due to the status of the land was interpreted by some researchers as juristic. However, in times of political instability, it is also a fact that mawālī is demanding jury in addition to the tribute tax. The point that is misunderstood or interpreted is that this practice was carried out throughout the entire Umayyad territory and the history. When examined, this distorted tax concept is actually concentrated in the area of Transoxania. Although some attempts were made to take the jizya from the mawālī to the country, the Umayyad caliphs have not allowed it. The practice of taking the jizya from the mawālī is actually followed by the killing Qutayba ibn Muslim al-Bāhilī (d. 96/715). This started political instability in the Transoxania and continued by some Khurāsān governors. These governors act according to the provocations of the Turkish governors and tax collectors of the region in order to be able to send their taxes completely. They claimed that the region in the region was not a sincere Muslim and, they continued to take the jizya from them.It can be said that jizya is not demanded as it is taken from non-Muslims in the common meaning from mawālī. Because any Umayyad caliph wrote no written instructions regarding this issue in the sources. It is understood that until the caliphate of ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Azîz, the Umayyad caliphs were not even aware of this distorted tax policy in the area of Transoxania. To put it once again, this practice was initiated by some Khurāsān governors with the concern that tax revenues might decrease. However, it should not be forgotten that this unfair practice after 96/715 is limited to certain governors. For example, during the tenure of Naṣr b. Seyyâr, the last governor of Khurāsān (120-131 / 738-748), the jizya tax was completely removed from the mawālī. Another activity that shows this action is regional and that was ordered by some governors of Khurāsān. Therefore, this practice does not reflect the Umayyad state policy. This is also apparent in the fact that the Shiites, Kharijites, and those who carried out the Abbasid Revolution for thirty-two years, did not make an anti-Umayyad propaganda with provoking the slave by the way of wrong application. (shrink)

In the final parts of Piketty’s Capital and Ideology, he presents his vision for a just and more equal society. This vision marks an alternative to contemporary societies, and differs radically both from the planned Soviet economies and from social democratic welfare states. In his sketch of this vision, Piketty provides a principled account of how such a society would look and how it would modify the current status of private property through co-managed enterprises and the creation of temporary (...) ownership models. He also sets out two principles for when inequalities are just. The first principle permits inequalities that are beneficial to the worst-off, while the second permits inequalities that reflect differences in people’s choices and ambitions. This article identifies a tension between Piketty’s two inequality-permitting principles. It also argues that the procedural limits on how decisions are made within the enterprises of participatory socialism might create inequalities not permitted by the guiding distributive principles of participatory socialism. This tension points to the need for either further changes in firm structure and ownership, an even more progressive taxation scheme, or an egalitarian ethos reflected in citizens’ choices in their everyday lives under participatory socialism. (shrink)

The marginal cost of public funds measures the loss incurred by society in raising additional revenues to finance government spending. The MCF has emerged as one of the most important concepts in public economics; it is a key component in evaluations of tax reforms, public expenditure programs, and other public policies. The Marginal Cost of Public Funds provides a unified treatment of the MCF, carefully developing its theoretical foundations in a variety of contexts and describing its application to a wide (...) range of policies--from excise taxes in Thailand to public sector borrowing in Canada and the United States. The Marginal Cost of Public Funds develops the basic theory of the MCF within the framework of public economics and shows how it is related to the traditional measures of the efficiency loss from distortionary taxation. The MCF concept is then applied to the major sources of revenues for governments--sales and excise taxes, taxes on labor income, taxes on the return to capital, public sector borrowing, and intergovernmental grants. This book will be an essential reference for economists and public policy analysts both in and out of government. Exercises and recommendations for further reading at the end of each main chapter highlight its usefulness as a supplementary text in advanced undergraduate or graduate courses in public economics.Bev Dahlby is Professor of Economics at the University of Alberta and a coauthor of Public Finance in Canada, second edition. He has served as a consultant for such organizations as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Canadian government's Department of Finance. (shrink)

Robotics and artificial intelligence are beginning to fundamentally change the relative profitability and productivity of investments in capital versus human labor; creating technological unemployment at all levels of the workforce; from the North to the developing world. As robotics and expert systems become cheaper and more capable the percentage of the population that can find employment will also fall; stressing economies already trying to curtail "entitlements" and adopt austerity. Two additional technology-driven trends will exacerbate the structural unemployment crisis in (...) the coming decades; desktop manufacturing and anti-aging medicine. Desktop manufacturing threatens to disintermediate the half of all workers involved in translating ideas into products in the hands of consumers; while anti-aging therapies will increase the old age dependency ratio of retirees to tax-paying workers. Policies that are being proposed to protect or create employment will have only a temporary moderating effect on job loss. Over time these policies; which will impose raise costs; lower the quality of goods and services; and lower competitiveness; will become fiscally impossible and lose political support. In order to enjoy the benefits of technological innovation and longer; healthier lives we will need to combine policies that control the pace of replacing paid human labor with a universal basic income guarantee provided through taxation and the public ownership of wealth. The intensifying debate over the reform of "entitlements" will be the strategic opening for a campaign for BIG to replace disability and unemployment insurance; Social Security; and other elements of the welfare state. (shrink)

In this article I maintain that a progressive and leftist carbon tax should be revenue-neutral through a dual policy package: first, it should use some revenues to offset price increases for the poor and middle classes; second, it should use the remaining part of revenues to lower taxes on labour income (both employed and self-employed income) for those below a middle-income threshold. I will briefly examine three reasons why such a revenue-neutral and dual-package carbon tax (RN-DP-CT) could (and should) become (...) central in the political agenda of the European Left – even though much of what I will suggest can reasonably hold also with respect to other countries. First, the tax wage on labour in the euro area is one of the highest in the world. Second, the revenue-neutral and dual policy package carbon tax will tax more capital that yields income without a proportional increase in labour demand, rather than capital that creates new job opportunities. Third, we live in societies that are highly unequal, hence I see no moral reason why a carbon tax reform should not aim, among other things, to take wealth away from the richest. (shrink)

Robotics and artificial intelligence are beginning to fundamentally change the relative profitability and productivity of investments in capital versus human labor; creating technological unemployment at all levels of the workforce; from the North to the developing world. As robotics and expert systems become cheaper and more capable the percentage of the population that can find employment will also fall; stressing economies already trying to curtail "entitlements" and adopt austerity. Two additional technology-driven trends will exacerbate the structural unemployment crisis in (...) the coming decades; desktop manufacturing and anti-aging medicine. Desktop manufacturing threatens to disintermediate the half of all workers involved in translating ideas into products in the hands of consumers; while anti-aging therapies will increase the old age dependency ratio of retirees to tax-paying workers. Policies that are being proposed to protect or create employment will have only a temporary moderating effect on job loss. Over time these policies; which will impose raise costs; lower the quality of goods and services; and lower competitiveness; will become fiscally impossible and lose political support. In order to enjoy the benefits of technological innovation and longer; healthier lives we will need to combine policies that control the pace of replacing paid human labor with a universal basic income guarantee provided through taxation and the public ownership of wealth. The intensifying debate over the reform of "entitlements" will be the strategic opening for a campaign for BIG to replace disability and unemployment insurance; Social Security; and other elements of the welfare state. (shrink)

L'impôt sous son angle colonial en Afrique était perçu comme un instrument de pression, d'oppression et d'appauvrissement du citoyen contribuable par l'impôt dit, de capitation. Ce lourd passé historique pèse encore sur les systèmes fiscaux d'Afrique et d'ailleurs, systèmes au sein desquels les citoyens se sentent encore victimes parce que spoliés de leurs biens par les puissances publiques. Dans cet ouvrage, Docteur Célestin Amané DAGO propose un changement de paradigme du système de la fiscalité à travers la philosophie politique normative (...) et l'éthique économique appliquée du philosophe américain John Rawls, en introduisant une part de volontariat dans l'accomplissement de l'obligation fiscale, afin de changer le rapport du contribuable à l'Etat. L'ouvrage vu sous cet angle, est un appel aux pouvoirs publics pour inscrire le contribuable au coeur du système fiscal afin que, le paiement de l'impôt soit un acte spontané et volontaire. L'acte volontaire, s'entend comme la réponse à la justice et à l'équité fiscales dans la redistribution sociale des richesses nationales. Au commencement était la philosophie en tant que mère de toutes les sciences et, naturellement M. Amané Célestin DAGO, embrassa cette discipline prestigieuse à l'Université de BOUAKE ; mais, cet eudémoniste toujours souriant et généreux, est un monomane de l'application des savoirs, un citoyen rivé au credo selon lequel le bonheur de la cité ne viendra que d'un gouvernement de philosophes. Voilà le principe d'intelligibilité de toutes ses activités théoriques et pratiques. Etonné par la ruée automatique des politiciens négro-africains vers la démocratie comme régime politique idéal, parce que le maître blanc en domination l'a dit, Monsieur DAGO prépara et soutint un mémoire de maîtrise en philosophie politique et sociale sur le thème suivant : Du procès de la démocratie dans la République de PLATON ; à la suite de quoi, un mémoire de DEA de philosophie intégrale intitulé : La République comme médiation de la justice chez PLATON ; puis, voulant être différent du philosophe THALES de Milet, il prépara son second DEA en philosophie politique normative, qui a eu pour thème : La justice et la répartition fiscale dans la philosophie de JOHN RAWLS. Il est admis au Cycle Supérieur de l'Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA) où il obtient le Diplôme option Impôts, promotion 2004-2005. Depuis novembre 2011, Monsieur DAGO a été nommé Receveur des Impôts Divers par Arrêté du Ministre en charge de l'Economie et des Finances. Malgré ses nombreuses charges administratives, Monsieur DAGO a su réaliser sa passion en soutenant une thèse unique de Doctorat de philosophie politique normative, option éthique économique appliquée. Cette thèse a été sanctionnée par la mention très honorable à l'unanimité du jury. Ajoutons que Monsieur DAGO est l'actuel Président de la Mutuelle de Développement de HIRE (MUDH), mission de développement qui l'a contraint à écrire le livre blanc de la sous-préfecture de HIRE intitulé : Besoin de développement et Exploitation minière à HIRE. Aujourd'hui, Dr DAGO est Administrateur Principal des Sces Financiers à la Direction Générale des Impôts de Côte d'ivoire. (shrink)

This article considers the possibility of attaining equality in principle. It begins by proposing the degree of equality that we can expect or hope to achieve in the foreseeable future. It defines the two grand strategies for achieving equality in the last century: socialism and social democracy. Markets are necessary in any complex society, and they perform both a coordination function and an incentive function. It is argued that an understanding of the relative importance of these functions is necessary in (...) order to assess the degree to which economic equality can be achieved. The two most important institutions for achieving equality are redistributive taxation and the reduction in the variation of human capital through public education. The article discusses whether democracy can be expected to implement the kind of educational finance policies which would be necessary to eliminate dynastic variation in the distribution of human capital. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction: Rawls Against Capitalism Rawls's Critique of “Welfare State Capitalism” Rawls (and Meade) on the Aims and Features of “Property‐Owning Democracy” Putting the Democracy into Property‐Owning Democracy: POD and the Fair Value of the Political Liberties Power, Opportunity, and Control of Capital: POD and Fair Equality of Opportunity Power, Status, and Self‐Respect: POD, the Difference Principle, and the Value of Equality Welfare State Capitalism and Property‐Owning Democracy: Ideal Types, Public Policy, and Real Politics Conclusion (...) ‐ Liberty, Equality, and Property‐Owning Democracy References. (shrink)

From the 1980s onward income inequality increased in many advanced countries. It is very difficult to account for the rise in income inequality using the standard labour supply/demand explanation. Fiscal redistribution has become less effective in compensating increasing inequalities since the 1990s. Some of the basic features of redistribution can be explained through the optimal tax framework developed by J.A. Mirrlees in 1971. This Element surveys some of the earlier results in linear and nonlinear taxation and produces some new (...) numerical results. Given the key role of capital income in the overall income inequality it also considers the optimal taxation of capital income. It examines empirically the relationship between the extent of redistribution and the components of the Mirrlees framework. The redistributive role of factors such as publicly provided private goods, public employment, endogenous wages in the overlapping generations model and income uncertainty are analysed. (shrink)

This article analogizes the state, in its role as tax collector, to that of an investor, or to be more precise, that of a residual claimant on the earnings of all of the people and firms subject to the taxing power of the state. The relationship between modern democracy and its citizens would be strengthened if this analogy were more widely acknowledged because it recognizes citizen-taxpayers as contracting partners with the state. Unlike other libertarian conceptions of the state's taxing authority, (...) the framework developed here does not jeopardize the state's ability to collect the revenues it needs to provide for the protections of its citizens. The state-as-investor framework developed in this Article leads to a number of tax policy improvements. The framework suggests limits on the government's ability to change people's tax status after they have already embarked on careers and made the sunken, non-diversifiable investments in human capital that such career training requires. The framework advanced here also suggests that people should be able to make a once-in-a lifetime payment in lieu of taxes to the state in order to discharge their tax liability. This approach articulated here also seems superior to the utopian suggestion offered by Ayn Rand that taxation be voluntary, as well as to the unrealistic suggestion made by Nozick that income taxes are violative of man's natural rights. (shrink)

No apology, I imagine, is necessary for the appearance of this translation\nof Marx's "Misere de la Philosophic" On the contrary it is strange\nthat it should not have been published in England before, anu that\nthe translation of his monumental work, the "Capital," tardy as that\nwas, should have yet been made before that of a work which was originally\npublished some twenty years before "Capital" first appeared.\n\n\nIt may be that the translators and editors of the latter work were\nof opinion that in (...) view of the comprehensiveness of "Capital," a\npublication of an English edition of the "Misere de la Philosophic"\nwould be a work of supererogation. Or it may be that they thought\na book so distinctly French—as the "Capital" may be said to be distinctly\nEnglish—and which was, further, exclusively a criticism of a work\nof Proudhon's little known in England—would have slight interest\nfor English readers. On the other hand, the groundwork of the theories\nso fully elaborated in "Capital," apart from its exhaustive analysis\nof the capitalist system of production and distribution, will be\nfound in "Misere." In addition, there are several subjects—notably\nthat of rent—dealt with in this volume which are barely touched upon\nin the single book of " Capital " which has been translated into\nEnglish.\n\n\nMarx's criticism of Proudhon's theory that " the time which is necessary\nto create a commodity indicates exactly its degree of utility," so\nthat " the things of which the production costs the least time are\nthe things which are the most immediately useful," has been matched\nby H. M. Hyndman's crushing refutation of the theory of Final Utility.\nThe subject of rent, too, has been fully dealt with by the latter\nin the same book, " The Economics of Socialism," published, as the\nauthor says, in the hope of furnishing " the rapidly-increasing number\nof students of sociology with a concise and readable statement of\nthe main theories of the scientific school of political economy founded\nby Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels." Neither of these facts, however,\nnecessarily detracts from the value of this older work of Marx's.\nOn the question of rent, after reviewing the Ricardian theory and\nthe many objections which present themselves to that theory, Hyndman\nsays: " It seems, therefore, that a wider definition of the rent\nof land under capitalism is needed than that given by Ricardo, and\nthe following is suggested: — Rent of land is that portion of the\ntotal net revenue which is paid to the landlord for the use of plots\nof land after the average profit on the capital embarked in developing\nsuch land has been deducted." On the question of confiscating rent\nhe says it " would not affect the position of the working portion\nof the community unless the money so obtained were devoted to giving\nthem more amusement, to providing them with better surroundings and\nthe like. ... In fact, the attack upon competitive rents is merely\na capitalist attack. That class sees a considerable income going\noff to a set of people who take no part in the direct exploitation\nof labor; and its representatives are naturally anxious to stop this\nleakage, as they consider it, and to reduce their own taxation for\npublic purposes by appropriating rent to the service of the State.\nThat is all very well for them."\n\n\nOn this point Marx says: " We can understand such economists as Mill,\nCherbulliez, Hilditch and others, demanding that rent should be handed\nover to the State to be used for the remission of taxation. That\nis only the frank expression of the hate which the industrial capitalist\nfeels for the landed proprietor, who appears to him as a useless\nincumbrance, a superfluity in the otherwise harmonious whole of bourgeois\nproduction."\n\n\n" Rent," says Marx, " results from the social relations in which exploitation\nis carried on. It cannot result from the nature, more or less fixed,\nmore or less durable, of land. Rent proceeds from society and not\nfrom the soil."\n\n\nThe criticism of Proudhon's appreciation of gold and silver as the\nfirst manifestation of this theory of " constituted value" should\nbe interesting reading to those admirers of the French Anarchist\nwho yet profess their profound detestation of money and its function.\nSo, too, should his declaration against strikes and combinations\nof workmen. In this we see once more how extremes meet. This declaration\nof Proudhon's would not be out of place in the organ of the Liberty\nand Property Defence League.\n\n\nIn this matter of trade union combination, Marx was scarcely accurate\nin his perception of its development. He clearly did not foresee\nthat the great English trade unions would become fossilised, as it\nwere; and that instead of being a revolutionary force they would\nbecome a reactionary mass, opposing the progress of the mere proletarian\noutside their ranks, as they have done. With the spread of Socialist\nideas among them, however, their exclusive character is being modified,\nand they may even yet take that place in the revolutionary working-class\nmovement which Marx anticipated they would occupy. Given this change\nof attitude, the development must inevitably be along the lines he\npredicted. We are seeing "in face of constantly united capital, the\nmaintenance of the association [becoming] more important and necessary\nfor them than the maintenance of wages," and, further, that the combinations\nof capital are forcing the trade unions to that point where "association\ntakes a political character."\n\n\nIt is scarcely necessary to point out that in this work, written in\n1847, some words have a meaning quite other than that which they\nbear to-day. Thus, for instance, the words "Socialists" and "Socialism,"\nwhere they occur, refer to the utopians—who formulated theories of\na social system independent of the industrial evolution— and to these\ntheories themselves.\n\n\nIn most cases the numerous quotations have been verified and reproduced\nin the original. In some instances, however, they are summaries rather\nthan quotations, and appear ^is translated.\n\n\nA translation jn* necessarily an imperfect presentation of the thoughts,\nideas, and conclusions of the author. In this work I have endeavored\nto adhere as closely as possible to the form and letter, as well\nas the spirit of the original, and to this the indulgent reader is\nasked to ascribe such faults of language as would otherwise merit\nhis censure. (shrink)

‘Marx on tax’ as an effective antidote to inequality is an overlooked theme within his own output, but also for our own time. Marx theorising on tax is seen even by pre-eminent Marxists as an empty box, but Marx and Engels in fact had plenty to say about tax. Their coverage embraces progressive taxes, both on capital and income, a strong preference for direct over indirect taxation, inheritance tax, land-value tax, taxes on financial transactions, and state finances around (...) the world. Tax also provides the battleground for a rare sight of Marx as campaigning activist, in 1848, matched in the same period by close ally Wilhelm Wolff. The tax policies of Marx and Engels have been neglected because they are primarily to be found in their journalism and letters. They are no anachronistic curiosity but perfectly applicable to the income and wealth inequalities of our own era. (shrink)

China has for almost four decades been experiencing a market transition and an associated tax state transition, leading to the emergence of capitalists who increasingly control economic resources and serve as important sources of tax revenue. Some theories suggest that these changes should give capitalists political power. From the perspective of the taxation institution, using a mechanism-based case study, this article investigates whether China’s emerging capitalists have gained bargaining power with the party-state. Findings suggest that hidden bargaining, patron-clientelism, legislature (...) co-optation, and legal repression constrain their bargaining power. The underinstitutionalized taxation system has co-opted the capitalists through patronage and, more important, deterrence, thereby building an asymmetric mutual dependence between the local state and capital owners. (shrink)

The process of globalization undoubtedly contributes to the change and reduction of the scope of state sovereign powers. We consider these transformations to be among the most important ones. However, the reduction of sovereignty is sometimes a destructive process, which leads to the disintegration of states and numerous human tragedies. Overall, in the globalization processes the speed of the destruction of old relations often exceeds the speed of the formation of the new ones. Thus, philosophy faces a challenge of comprehending (...) the changes brought about by globalization in general and the tendency to reduction of sovereignty in particular. It is worth taking into account that the latter is a bilateral process. On the one hand, some factors that fairly undermine the states’ sovereignty are strengthening; on the other hand, most states voluntarily limit the scope of their sovereignty including their rights to determine taxation rates, monetary emission, to use capital punishment etc. We argue that the factor of voluntary reduction of the scope of sovereignty appears to be of utmost importance though its basic trends vary greatly in different parts of world. (shrink)

Virtually all liberal egalitarian advocates of redistributive taxation support an income tax, believing that consumption taxes fail to reach capital and its yield. But this is not true under progressive rates. There are two forms of consumption tax, prepaid and postpaid. A consistent progressive postpaid consumption tax reaches the yield to capital in just those cases in which ordinary moral intuitions want it to be reached: when savings are used to finance a "better," more expensive, lifestyle. Such (...) a tax stands between an income tax, which double taxes all savings, come what may, and a prepaid consumption tax, which never taxes savings. It is the last, best hope for some semblance of redistribution via tax on earth. (shrink)

Development economics became a separate discipline in economic science in the 50s but only in the 60s and mid-70s can one note a bigger interest in those issues. Gradually, there has appeared an extensive literature concerning economic development. In the 80s it turned out, however, that despite some successes, the economic development of the majority of mid- and less developed countries was less satisfactory than expected. During most of the 80s and 90s the so-called Washington consensus dominated theory and practice (...) of economic development. This notion covered the whole range of activities that were to lead the developing countries to greater welfare and prosperity. It included tough fiscal and monetary policy, deregulation, foreign trade and capital flow liberalisation, elimination of government subsidies, moderate taxation, liberalisation of interest rates, maintaining low inflation, etc. From the developmental experience of the past years, a new developmental paradigm is emerging, the elements of which can be described in the following way: • basic economic environment should support investments in the long term • economy should be very sensitive to market stimuli • human resources should complement physical capital • information quick flow and absorption in the fast changing world attribute the key role to the institutions and mechanisms which jointly react to the stimuli. • Wherever there are market imperfections, state intervention should be market friendly. • Social equality must be guaranteed if the economic development is supposed to last on a sustainable basis. (shrink)

Economic analysis identifies comparative, rather than absolute, advantage as the basis of international trade, a distinction first thought to have been clearly made by David Ricardo in his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation . Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations is thought to have failed to make this distinction, instead treating foreign trade principally as a “vent” for surplus domestic produce. However, Smith's underlying argument in favour of a “system of natural liberty” made his name synonymous with open seas (...) and free markets, and the economist most closely linked to free trade. This paper suggests that Smith advanced a rather more sophisticated analysis of the gains from trade than this textbook understanding would suggest, but that his line of reasoning has long been obscured by the long-established habit of reading Wealth of Nations as a work whose first two books contain the important analytical elements that the later books merely elaborate. It is demonstrated that Smith's analysis of the gains from trade derives from his discussion of capital, and that therefore a reader needs to begin at the end of Book II, and not with the principles of exchange outlined in Book I. (shrink)

We analyse whether Belgian tax policy over the period 1965-1995 was affected by the ideological position of the government. Both the level and composition of taxation are considered. We find no significant ideological effect on the level of the tax burden. The burden has increased systematically over most of the period, irrespective of the ideology of the incumbent. Considering individual tax categories, one can find a significant ideological influence for taxes on financial and capital transactions. Under centre-left oriented (...) governments this tax is lowered whereas it increases under centre-right governments. A possible explanation is that centre-left governments try to stimulate households' wealth acquisition by keeping taxes on transactions of immovable properties low. (shrink)

Capital punishment—the legally authorized killing of a criminal offender by an agent of the state for the commission of a crime—stands in special need of moral justification. This is because execution is a particularly severe punishment. Execution is different in kind from monetary and custodial penalties in an obvious way: execution causes the death of an offender. While fines and incarceration set back some of one’s interests, death eliminates the possibility of setting and pursuing ends. While fines and incarceration (...) narrow one’s routes to happiness, death eliminates its possibility. Not surprisingly, there is much debate about the moral permissibility of capital punishment. This entry maps the terrain of this debate. The first section discusses justifications of the death penalty as they appear in major theories of punishment. The second section surveys moral objections to execution that apply to most justifications. The third addresses procedural criticisms, which do not target the morality of execution so much as the justice of its implementation. (shrink)

I examine how reforming our international tax regime could be an important vehicle by which we can begin to realize global justice. For instance, eliminating tax havens, tax evasion, and transfer pricing schemes are all important to ensure accountability and to support democracies. I argue that the proposals concerning taxation reform are likely to be more effective in tackling global poverty than Thomas Pogge's global resources dividend because they target some of the central issues more effectively. I also discuss (...) many particular proposals for global taxes that have already been floated and implementation prospects and successes. (shrink)

Lockeans regard taxation as a—perhaps sometimes permissible—infringement of moral property entitlements. This essay discusses whether, or in what form, this charge is defensible. In doing so, it will explore the truth and the limits of the conventionalist reply of Murphy and Nagel to Lockean challenges to taxation. It argues that there is a moral rationale for property conventions that is independent of the question whether and how one can acquire natural, pre-conventional property rights in the state of nature, (...) that this rationale sets a moral standard for how good property conventions are and whether they are justifiable at all, and that once property conventions are in place, people’s moral property entitlements are at least partly determined by these conventions, sometimes even by unjustifiable ones that ought to be reformed. Because taxation can be a part of property conventions, taxation as such is not an infringement of moral property entitlements. But the essay will also argue that some taxation—excessive taxation—does infringe on moral property entitlements. This is because the moral rationale for property conventions sets some standards for what owners should be entitled to, and so excessive taxation will infringe upon moral entitlements that are partly not convention-based. (shrink)

This essay represents an initial attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the systems of taxation described and/or mandated in the Hebrew Bible for various periods in ancient Israel. Beyond this preliminary descriptive task, a concentration here is upon the ethical evaluation of these taxation systems-evaluations both according to voices within the Hebrew Bible and according to the general criteria of freedom, equity, and distributive justice.

Two essays, one by Althusser, the other by Balibar which were presented as papers at a seminar on Marx's "Capital" at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in 1965, and included al.

This article focuses on the justification of taxation, in other words the principled rather than the technical aspect of taxation. We first show how democracy is on the one hand required for legitimate taxation, and how on the other hand democratic communities are dependent on taxation, and argue there is no vicious cirle. We then present a typology of ways of justifying taxation, according to which taxation can base its legitimacy on (1) meeting basic (...) needs, (2) financing public goods, (3) redistribution, or (4) (dis-)incentivising certain types of conduct. We then discuss the applicability of each of these types of justification on the global level, arguing that all of them do apply to the global level. The article further concludes that different normative justifications guide us towards different designs of taxation in practice, so the background justification has to be made clear, especially when designing new taxation systems. (shrink)

Taxation is a vestige of feudalism and monarchy. It persists because of the mistaken belief that government is somehow entitled to a portion of our labor or assets. This article challenges that belief from a philosophical perspective and offers a different viewpoint.

Drawing upon empirical studies of racial discrimination dating back to the 1940’s, the Movement for Black Lives platform calls for the abolition of capital punishment. Our purpose here is to defend the Movement’s call for death penalty abolition in terms congruent with its claim that the death penalty in the U.S. is a “racist practice” that “devalues Black lives.” We first sketch the jurisprudential history of race and capital punishment in the U.S., wherein courts have occasionally expressed worries (...) about racial injustice but have usually taken such evidence to warrant reform but not outright abolition. We argue that the racial discrimination at issue flows in significant part from implicit biases concerning race, criminality, and violence, which do not fit comfortably within the picture of racial bias advanced by the courts. The case for abolition, we contend, rests on Black Americans as a class (not merely those who interact with the criminal justice system as capital defendants or as murder victims) being subject to such bias and thereby not being accorded equal status under the law. (shrink)

Like many governments in this COVID-19 pandemic, the Nigerian government imposed a lockdown on the country. As a consequence of the lockdown, many businesses shutdown and effectively had no source of revenue. Yet, without receiving any bailout or palliatives from the government, these businesses are required to meet their tax obligations to the government. Bearing in mind that this time (COVID-19 era) is different, one wonders what is required of businesses in view of the taxation problem and the social (...) contract between the businesspersons and the government. In view of social contract obligations, in this COVID-19 pandemic should businesses pay tax to a government that seems to have delegitimised itself by its exploitative actions in terms of taxation and delinquent omission in terms of the provision of public goods and social services? The Nigerian government at all tiers (federal, state and local) seldom respect the essence of taxation. Therefore, businesses often pay tax for nothing. For many businesses, as far as taxation is concerned, to pay or not to pay? that is the question. This article is aimed at teasing out this taxation problem that may or may not be a moral dilemma. In view of certain ethical considerations, this article shows why in spite of social contract obligations, there is no consensus or canonical agreement on whether, as law-abiding citizens and juridical persons (legal entities), businesspersons and businesses ought to or ought not to pay tax to the Nigerian government in this COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)