A recent movement within political philosophy called luck egalitarianism has attempted to synthesize the right’s regard for responsibility with the left’s concern for equality. The original motivation for subscribing to luck egalitarianism stems from the belief that one’s success in life ought to reflect one’s own choices and not brute luck. Luck egalitarian theorists differ in the decision procedures that they propose, but they share in common the general approach that we ought to equalize individuals with respect to brute luck (...) so that differences in distribution are only a consequence of the responsible choices that individuals make. I intend to show that through the application of its own distributive procedures, the interpersonal luck egalitarian approach actually undermines its original motivation by making the lives of individuals subject to brute luck. I propose two alternative methods that the luck egalitarian could use to prevent the problems suffered by the interpersonal luck egalitarian standard. (shrink)

The philosophical debate concerning political exchange has largely been confined to debating the desirability of vote trading; where individuals can sell their votes or buy votes from others. However, I show that the vote credit systems prevalent in public choice theory entirely avoid the common objections to political exchange that afflict vote trading proposals. Namely, vote credit systems avoid equality concerns and inalienability concerns. I offer an alternative critique to formal mechanisms that encourage political exchange by drawing on the role (...) that impartiality and impartial moral judgements play in democratic and electoral institutions. (shrink)

Economists and philosophers discuss taxation in the context of the prevailing tax base. This prevailing tax base primarily consists of levies on earned income, capital, and consumption. In the optimal tax literature, economists find that this tax base possesses a problematic tradeoff between equity and efficiency. This tax base is also controversial amongst moral philosophers because it diminishes the principle of labor ownership. I explore a tax base that does not possess these two drawbacks and hence sidesteps problems with the (...) current tax base raised both by optimal tax theorists and moral philosophers. Even partial replacement of the current tax base with the proposed tax base would increase efficiency, improve equity, and preserve labor ownership. (shrink)