The notion of Befindlichkeit in Heidegger’s phenomenological way. Heidegger’s phenomenology of Befindlichkeit and the different kinds of affection was initiated still before Being and Time, and developed in its essential features till the end of the 1930’s. The current paper argues that, since its very origins in a philosophical framework, back to the translation of the affectiones in Augustine, the notion of Befindlichkeit sets the beginning of a structural understanding of existence - displayed both at the ontological (...) levei of Grundstimmungen (such as anguish, boredom or reservedness), and at the ontic level of different factual Stimmungen. Any comprehensive analysis of those affections counts on a tripie background with a Wovor, a Worum and the full-fledged exercise (Vollzug) of such and such affective understanding. In Being and Time this analysis is dedicated to fear, in its different nuances. But this phenomenon was already dealt with in Heidegger’s Lectures on Augustine (1921) and will reoccur in the Beiträge (1936-38). A reading of this conceptual evolution will here ground a defense of the phenomenological character of Heidegger’s way of thinking. (shrink)

Ostensibly, Heidegger’s notion of Befindlichkeit isn’t one of the really enigmatic concepts in his oeuvre—for everyone knows that on Heidegger’s account, this phenomenon, which bears at least some connection to what we normally call emotion, provides a basic disclosure of “the Dasein’s” worldly engagement. Nonetheless, there are enigmas here, given that Heidegger connects the phenomenon of Befindlichkeit with the disclosure of the Dasein’s past, as well as to its “thrownness” and its cultural heritage, none of which seems transparently (...) true of emotions. Some clarification is called for, then—and as I attempt to demonstrate in this article, this is possible only by interpreting the notion of Befindlichkeit in the context of an element of Husserl’s account of time- and self-consciousness that Heidegger incorporated as a central feature of his own, amended account of temporality—namely, Husserl’s notion of the protentional fulfillment that, on his reckoning, lies at the heart of this consciousness. Interpreting Heidegger’s account of Befindlichkeit in this fashion, I also show how, so interpreted, it can help us to make headway in both contemporary emotion studies and the currently developing critical theories of affect. (shrink)

This paper contrasts Sartre’s account of emotion with Heidegger’s account of Befindlichkeit and ‘mood’. Sartre’s account of emotion is a strong one: emotions occur only when a more neutral and colourless ‘pragmatic attitude’ is frustrated or breaks down. In this manner, emotion has to be acutely felt in and through the body, which also means that there are many circumstances and states in which we do not undergo any emotion at all. In fact, Sartre’s ‘pragmatic attitude’ is precisely the (...) mode in which we simply go about our business in an emotionless manner. This raises the question as to whether Sartre’s stark opposition between emotional and non-emotional experiences actually holds. I believe Heidegger’s account of Befindlichkeit and its moods are key in this regard, in that it can be used to nuance the Sartrean account. Indeed, Heidegger famously states that Dasein is never unattuned. In fact, precisely because of the ontological structure of Befindlichkeit, the world always already matters to us in one way or another, with moods being one of our primary ways of experiencing what matters and why. This discussion therefore aims to yield an account whereby faint moods and strong emotions form two poles of the same dynamic. To use a metaphor, moods are the tectonic plates that make the various emotional shakes and quakes possible in any given situation. Finally, I finish with some possible remaining tensions between the two thinkers, as well as a way to look for a possible solution. (shrink)

Heidegger, en su obra de 1925, Prolegómenos Para Una Historia del Concepto de Tiempo, realiza una revisión de la propuesta fenomenológica frente a la tradición filosófica, rescatando los descubrimientos de esta investigación: la intencionalidad, la intuición categorial, y el sentido originario de lo «a priori», así como la importancia del trabajo de Husserl para el desarrollo de la investigación filosófica. El concepto de intuición categorial toma para Heidegger relevancia, y lo caracteriza dentro de su investigación. Lo que aquí pretendo hacer (...) es presentar una interpretación de esta noción a partir de la idea de mundo como dimensión de la constitución de la aparición del ente. Como el mundo se presenta como un tema fundamental para la caracterización de la fenomenología Heideggeriana, intento esbozar una manera de aprehensión del mundo dentro de la ontología fundamental, por medio de la estructura del encontrarse, en alemán Befindlichkeit. Esto anterior, me permitirá analizar la particularidad de la fenomenología de Heidegger y, a la vez, mostrar las aproximaciones conceptuales entre Heidegger y Husserl, por medio de la revisión de dos conceptos: reflexión y epojé, pero siempre en relación al mundo. (shrink)

It can be tempting to think of affect as a matter of the present moment – a reaction, a feeling, an experience or engagement that unfolds right now. This paper will make the case that affect is better thought of as not only temporally extended but as saturated with temporality, especially with the past. In and through affectivity, concrete, ongoing history continues to weigh on present comportment. In order to spell this out, I sketch a Heidegger-inspired perspective. It revolves around (...) two claims. The first is that we should understand what Heidegger calls 'Befindlichkeit' (findingness) as radical situatedness. Affectivity is a matter of 'finding oneself' constellated – thrown – into the world in ways that outrun what an individual or collective might grasp and process. The second claim is that the temporal dimension, as a relatedness to the past, takes precedence in affect's situatedness. Key to affect is the way in which the past continues to hold sway over present comportment, collectively and individually. In order to articulate this perspective, it is important to overcome the idea that affect must be understood mainly in terms of feeling or experiential states of other kinds. Better suited to grasp the idea of findingness is the concept of 'disclosive posture', as proposed by Katherine Withy. I suggest that this notion should be put at the fore of a phenomenological approach to situated affectivity. (shrink)

In this paper, I articulate Heidegger’s notion of Befindlichkeit and show that his phenomenological account of affective existence can be understood in terms of contemporary work on emotions. By examining Heidegger’s account alongside contemporary accounts of emotions, I not only demonstrate the ways in which key aspects of the former are present in the latter; I also explicate in detail the ways in which our understanding of Befindlichkeit and its relationship to moods and emotions can benefit from an (...) empirically-informed study of emotions. (shrink)

The notion of the heart is one of the most basic notions in ordinary language. It is central to Heidegger’s notion of thought that he relates to the primordial word Gedanc as underlying attunement that issues forth in emotional phenomena. He plays with all the etymological cognates of that word to zero in on the phenomena involved. The key experience of Erstaunen that grounds the first beginning of philosophy is paralleled by Erschrecken that grounds Heidegger’s “second beginning” and plays counterpoint (...) with the first. Along with Befindlichkeit as one’s basic attunement, these are key phenomena that belong to the heart, not to ‘intellect’ or ‘will.’ Thinking in terms of the intellect is das rechnende Denken¸ thinking in terms of the heart, besinnliche Nachdenken. It is the latter that provides the “poetic-intellectual” experience for both the arts and philosophy in which such “world space” is created that even the ordinary appears extraordinary. (shrink)

Based on critical readings of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, the paper offers a phenomenological study of the ontology of well-being that transcends the opposition between subjective and objective being. By interpreting the Heideggerian notion of Befindlichkeit as the fundamental way in which humans find themselves in the world, being affected by and faced with their own existence, the paper opens a way to understanding well-being that locates the possibility of elevating one’s own being not (...) inside or outside the I but in the affective bond to others called friendship. Aristotle’s reflections on philia play a crucial role in developing this understanding of well-being, according to which humans find themselves well by sharing joy with each other and making a vital contribution to the realization of their own possibilities. (shrink)

Heidegger famously said that the best treatment of the emotions in western history was Book 2 of Aristotle's RHETORIC. Heidegger then did an analysis of this material prior to the publication of Being and TIme (1927). This engages engages with Heidegger's treatment of Aristotle's treatment of the emotions in relation to Heidegger's design distinction of affectivity (Befindlichkeit), understanding, and discourse (Rede).

Amongst the Arendtian scholars, there is almost a consensus on Arendt’s supposedly reluctance to the question of the body. The Arendtian body is said to belong to the unpolitical realm of necessity, in other words, the body is a private matter that should not appear in public. It is antipolitical. However, in this paper, I want to suggest that there is a possibility to outline a phenomenology of embodied political action in what I think to be Arendt’s hidden phenomenology of (...) the body. To make my point, I will first show that what the scholars call the Arendtian body is in fact an Arendtian Body. Secondly, in the German version of The Human Condition, Arendt surprisingly used the Heideggerian term Befindlichkeit that, I will argue, outline the basis of a political phenomenology of the body in Arendt’s work. More precisely, I will try to show that political action is embodied, that there is a hexis, a pathos and an ethos of action. (shrink)

Este artículo propone una discusión sobre la naturaleza hermenéutica de la corporalidad (Leiblichkeit). Un aspecto que resultará decisivo para descifrar fenómenos corporales como el dolor y que hará comprensible la tesis del filósofo de que para lograr un acceso al fenómeno del dolor es preciso tener en cuenta lo que denomina aspectos existenciales del fenómeno del cuerpo (Leibphänomen). Para ello, este trabajo mostrará, por una parte, en qué sentido el ser corporal(leiblich sein) de lo humano es un fenómeno cooriginario de (...) las otras estructuras existenciales que integran su ser-en-el-mundo (In-der-Welt-sein) y, por otra, el carácter afectivo de dicha constitución existencial o mundana de la experiencia corporal. Una perspectiva hermenéutica que contribuirá asimismo a entender el carácter extático y disruptivo del dolor. (shrink)

This essay provides an analysis of the role of affectivity in Martin Heidegger's writings from the mid to late 1920s. We begin by situating his account of mood within the context of his project of fundamental ontology in Being and Time. We then discuss the role of Befindlichkeit and Stimmung in his account of human existence, explicate the relationship between the former and the latter, and consider the ways in which the former discloses the world. To give a more (...) vivid and comprehensive picture of Heidegger's account of mood, we focus on the experience of anxiety by articulating both its function within fundamental ontology and, relatedly, its revelatory nature. We conclude by considering the place of emotions in Heidegger's thinking from this period. In a companion essay, ‘Affectivity in Heidegger II: Temporality, Boredom, and Beyond’, we complement our present analysis by revisiting the issue of affectivity in terms of Heidegger's discussion of temporality in Division II of Being and Time. We also expand our present discussion by considering the fundamental mood of boredom and other specific moods that Heidegger considers within his later thinking. (shrink)

While putting forward the proposal of a “philosophy of technology in the nominative case,” grounded on the concept of Neoenvironmentality, this paper intends to argue that the best definition of our current age is not “Anthropocene.” Rather, it is “Technocene,” since technology represents here and now the real “subject of history” and of (a de-natured) nature, i.e. the (neo)environment where man has to live.This proposal culminates in a new definition of man’s humanity and of technology. Switching from natura hominis to (...) conditio humana, the peculiarity of man can be defined on the basis of an anthropic perimeter, the core of which consists of man’s worldhood: man is that being that has a world (Welt), while animal has a mere environment (Umwelt). Both man’s worldhood and animal’s environmentality are derived from a pathic premise, namely the fundamental moods (Grundstimmungen) that refer them to their respective findingness (Befindlichkeit).From this anthropological premise, technology emerges as the oikos of contemporary humanity. Technology becomes the current form of the world – and so gives birth to a Technocene – insofar as it introduces in any human context its ratio operandi and so assimilates man to an animal condition, i.e. an environmental one. Technocene corresponds on the one side to the emergence of technology as (Neo)environment and on the other to the feralization of man. The spirit of Technocene turns out to be the complete redefinition of the anthropic perimeter.While providing a non-ideological characterization of the current age, this paper proposes the strategy of an ‘anthropological conservatism,’ that is to say a pathic desertion understood as a possible (pre)condition for the beginning of an authentic Anthropocene, i.e. the age of an-at-last-entirely-human-man. (shrink)

In ‘Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and Emotions in Being and Time’, we explicated the crucial role that Martin Heidegger assigns to our capacity to affectively find ourselves in the world. There, our discussion was restricted to Division I of Being and Time. Specifically, we discussed how Befindlichkeit as a basic existential and moods as the ontic counterparts of Befindlichkeit make circumspective engagement with the world possible. Indeed, according to Heidegger, it is primarily through moods that the world (...) is ‘opened up’ and revealed to us as a world that is suffused with values and entities that already matter to us. In this companion essay, our aim is to expand our analysis of affectivity in the following ways: first, we revisit our discussion of Befindlichkeit in light of Heidegger's discussion of temporality in Division II of BT; second, we discuss the basic or fundamental mood of boredom and its ontological significance; we conclude by providing a brief characterization of how Heidegger's notion of mood changes in his later thinking. (shrink)

The article seeks to reclaim a type of fear lost in silent omission in education, yet central to the development of an ethical subject. It distinguishes the fear described by Martin Heidegger through the concept of befindlichkeit and fear for the other as an essential moment for ethics articulated by Emmanuel Levinas. It argues that the latter conception of fear has inverted the traditional assumption of the ideal ethical subject as fearless. It then examines how Levinas’s interpretation of fear (...) might contribute to the discussion on fear and responsibility in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. It concludes that fear for the other reveals our tremendous capacity to suffer for the other, which is an aspect of the emotional life that has not been identified in the general educational discourse. This inattention manifests itself as a categorical omission in which the existence of fear for the other is not recognized and impedes the ability of educators to address ethics as it is deeply lived. (shrink)

À la croisée des recherches sur l’espace humain et du développement récent des études sur les émotions, l’étude philosophique, esthétique, sociologique, ethnographique, architecturale et urbaine des atmosphères décrit et analyse la manière dont se nouent, dans l’expérience vécue, les propriétés des espaces et des objets, le contexte de la perception sensible, et l’état affectif du sujet sur ses deux versants, l’intime et le partagé. Atmosphère (de même que l’anglais atmosphere ou l’allemand A...

There are two phrases in Heidegger's Sein und Zeit that provide a clue to what is going on in that book: Dasein ist geworfener Entwurf and Dasein existiert faktisch (Dasein is thrown projection and Dasein exists factically). I begin by trying to show how an interpretation of these phrases can help clarify Heidegger's philosophical claim about what it means to be human. I then try and explain why it is that, in a couple of important passages in Sein und Zeit, (...) Heidegger describes thrown projection as an enigma (ein Rätsel). After considering the meaning and etymology of the word ‘enigma’, I trace its usage in Sein und Zeit, and try and show how and why the relations between Heidegger's central conceptual pairings – state‐of‐mind (Befindlichkeit) and understanding (Verstehen), thrownness and projection, facticity and existentiality – are described by Heidegger as enigmatic. My thesis is that at the heart of Sein und Zeit, that is, at the heart of the central claim of the Dasein‐analytic as to the temporal character of thrown‐projective being‐in‐the‐world, there lies an enigmatic apriori. That is to say, there is something resiliently opaque at the basis of the constitution of Dasein's being‐in‐the‐world which both resists phenomenological description and which, I shall claim, is that in virtue of which the phenomenologist describes. In the more critical part of the paper, I try and show precisely how this notion of the enigmatic apriori changes the basic experience of understanding Sein und Zeit. I explore this in relation to three examples from Division II: death, conscience and temporality. I try and read Heidegger's analyses of each of these concepts against the grain in order to bring into view much more resilient notions of facticity and thrownness that place in doubt the move to existentiality, projection and authenticity. The perspective I develop can be described as originary inauthenticity. As should become evident, such an interpretation of Sein und Zeit is not without political consequences. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger's account of attunement [Befindlichkeit] through mood [Stimmung] is unprecedented in the history of philosophy and groundbreaking vis-à-vis contemporary accounts of emotion. On his view, moods are not mere mental states that result from, arise out of, or are caused by our situation or context. Rather, moods are fundamental modes of existence that are disclosive of the way one is or finds oneself [sich befinden] in the world. Mood is one of the basic modes through which we experience (...) the world and through which the world is made present to us. Moreover, moods are the lenses through which things, people, animals, events, and aspects in the world matter to us. In this paper, I make the case that Heidegger's insights with respect to mood can and ought to be extended beyond the narrow scope of his fundamental ontology in which they were developed. I argue that contemporary accounts of mood within psychology ought to take these Heideggerian insights seriously and use them when defining, studying, evaluating, and drawing conclusions about the nature of moods. There are three sections to my paper. In section 1, I delineate Heidegger's account of mood. In section 2, I turn to some key studies on mood in psychology, and I elaborate upon some of the main shortcomings in this literature. In section 3, I suggest how psychology might benefit from understanding and utilizing a Heideggerian-inspired phenomenology of mood. (shrink)

“On the Subject Matter of Phenomenological Psychopathology” provides a framework for the phenomenological study of mental disorders. The framework relies on a distinction between (ontological) existentials and (ontic) modes. Existentials are the categorial structures of human existence, such as intentionality, temporality, selfhood, and affective situatedness. Modes are the particular, concrete phenomena that belong to these categorial structures, with each existential having its own set of modes. In the first section, we articulate this distinction by drawing primarily on the work of (...) Martin Heidegger—especially his study of the ontological structure of affective situatedness (Befindlichkeit) and its particular, ontic modes, which he calls moods (Stimmungen). In the second section, we draw on a study of grief to demonstrate how this framework can be used when conducting phenomenological interviews and analyses. In the concluding section, we explain how this framework can be guide phenomenological studies across a broad range of existential structures. (shrink)

The author, as the leader of the team that translated Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit into Hungarian, tells the story of the translation. The members of this team were anything else but experts in Heidegger. Belonging to the so-called “democratic opposition” at the beginning of the ‘80s, they asked the author, a dissent himself, to hold for them a private seminar on modern phenomenology. It is here where they read Husserl, Scheler, and wanted to read Heidegger as well. Their German, however, (...) was not good enough to understand Being and Time in the original. That’s why they decided to translate it into Hungarian. In a few years the translation was ready – three years ago, in 2001, it was even published its second, revised edition. In the second part of this short essay, the author deals with those Heideggerian words that have proven to present the most serious difficulties at that time, and explains the nature of their difficulties in some cases: Sein, Seiendes, Dasein, Da, Bewandtnis, Zuhanden, Vorhanden, das Man, Befindlichkeit, Angst, Eigentlichkeit, Unheimlichkeit, Platz, Ort. (shrink)

: En la analítica existencial de Ser y tiempo no aparece la angustia (Angst)como numero modo de encontrarse en un estado (Befindlichkeit), ni tampoco como numero fenómeno psicológico, si no mucho más que eso: la angustia es presentada como un existenciario fundamental, es decir, un encontrarse básicamente en un estado(Grundbefindlichkeit). Al sentirla, lo que se le revela al Dasein es su propio ser, mas esta experiencia puede desestabilizarlo. Es entonces cuando el Dasein busca y se afana en hallar una (...) seguridad óntica que lo lleva a una huída de sí. A partir de dicha búsqueda,sondearemos cómo la angustia, si bien tiene por un lado la esencial capacidad derevelar el ser del Dasein, tiene sin embargo, por otro lado, el poder de conducirlo a lamás absoluta enajenación de sí mismo, aun cuando se afane en hallar el camino haciasu autenticidad. In the existential analytic of Being and time, anxiety does not appear simply asa state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit), nor simply as a psychological phenomenon, but assomething much greater. Indeed, anguish appears as a fundamental existentiale, that is,a basic state-of-mind (Grundbefindlichkeit). By experiencing it, what is revealed toDasein is its very being, yet this same experience may also destabilize Dasein. It isthen that Dasein looks for and strives to find an ontical security which leads it to fleefrom itself. Taking this search as a starting point, we will probe how, whilst on theone hand, anxiety has the essential capacity to reveal Dasein´s being, it neverthelesshas, on the other hand, the power to drive Dasein in turn to the most absolutealienation from itself, even when it is striving to find the path which leads towardsauthenticity. (shrink)

À partir d’éléments théoriques situés au fondement de sa conception des atmosphères (espace pensé à partir de la présence charnelle vs conception géométrique de l’espace comme topos ou spatium ; notion de Befindlichkeit ou « disposition affective » ; réflexions sur la perception), le présent texte de Gernot Böhme offre une synthèse tout à fait remarquable de ses réflexions tissées entre architecture et atmosphères. Il s’agit dès lors, pour le philosophe allemand, de chercher tout autant à penser la spécificité (...) esthétique de l’architecture que de permettre de situer celle-ci de manière adéquate face aux enjeux du monde contemporain, ou encore d’inciter les architectes à réfléchir leur pratique dans et par le type de rapport à l’espace, au monde et aux hommes qui se manifeste dans la méditation de la notion d’« atmosphères ». (shrink)

A orientação da fenomenologia para uma hermenêutica da facticidade do Dasein permitiu a Heidegger sublinhar a importância primordial do afecto na dinâmica ontológica do cuidado. Mais que uma instância de passividade, no sentido husserliano, a Befindlichkeit vem a ser a forma desperta e activa de ser-no-mundo “sentindo-se”, isto é, enquanto compreensão afectiva tácita ou experiência do existir na quotidianidade e na história. Constitui, por isso, o solo abissal pré-reflexivo do que será a Ontologia Fundamental, o qual só na História (...) do Ser terminará de explicitar-se. Mas é também, ao nível da análise meta-ontológica da existência fáctica, que o estatuto da afectividade se revela plenamente, no quadro de uma possível terapia das perturbações do viver e conviver do Dasein de cada um, contornando a mera dinâmica pulsional pensada por Freud. O nosso percurso procurará atender a estes diferentes pontos, tendo como fio condutor o fenómeno exemplar do temor, nas suas diferentes variantes. (shrink)

Individuals in the Social Lifeworld is an analysis of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world by asking how an individual Dasein (a person) interacts with their fellow Dasein (other people). Acknowledging that mineness is fundamental to Dasein, the book’s analysis uncovers Being-sphere as the existential place of Dasein that is formed through a person’s interactions with and involvements with the world. Being-sphere does not express any form of idealism but is an acknowledgment of what Being-in-the-world means for perception and individual responses to the world. (...) -/- Being-sphere provides valuable tools for social and political philosophy by seeing interpersonal relations as a dynamic interaction of individual Being-spheres (people). Using the concept of Being-sphere in social philosophy explains how a person is embedded in the world and how the world is an integral part of a person. The concept of Being-sphere avoids the problems of the Cartesian subject while at the same time acknowledging the person as a dynamic self-constituting rational and moral agent not wholly determined. It shows how people gain beliefs and use them as the basis for their worldviews and actions. -/- Being-sphere improves Heidegger’s concepts of das Man and Befindlichkeit and provides a broader conception of Dasein and its projection into its possibilities. Because it takes seriously Heidegger’s observation that subjectivity is the true world of Dasein, it can explain the way that a person encounters and appropriates anything in the world, particularly other people. Being-sphere also explains how people experience and are affected and changed by their experiences, revealing new depths of a person’s situatedness in the world and their relationship with society. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se aborda la relación entre la antigua tragedia griega y el pensamiento de MartinHeidegger. Se indagará en el tipo de lectura de la tragedia que hace el pensador alemán y los alcancesde la relación que podemos establecer entre ella y su pensamiento. A partir del análisis de lasreferencias heideggerianas y de la caracterización de la esencia de la tragedia por parte de Aristóteles,en la que destacan las pasiones del miedo y la compasión, se intentará comprender cómo (...) dichavinculación puede establecerse, al menos, en el ámbito del fenómeno de la disposición afectiva(Befindlichkeit) y su carácter aperiente. (shrink)

In Sein und Zeit, the Dasein, thrown in the world by Geworfenheit and relaunched by Entwurf (projection) into the future, experiences itself as a “Self”. This exercise of existence cannot escape the critique of solipsism. However, paragraph 29 — about the existentiale of Befindlichkeit — opens an access way to the Other, which later will be ceaselessly explored by Heidegger, after having found the Stimmungen of the Greek beginning in Holderlin’s poetry and the Grund Stimmungen of “the night of (...) the gods” and of the forgetfulness of being of our time. Not until the fifties and the mystical experience of the fourfold (das Geviert) will Heidegger find the possibility of transmuting the experience of the Other from a πόλεμος into a being-in-harmony (stimmen). This unique path of affectivity, asserted in paragraph 29 of Sein und Zeit, will enable Heidegger to reach an essential way of working out the question of Otherness, that only right now we may be starting to understand. (shrink)

Die „künstliche Ernährung“ steht in enger Beziehung zu den grundsätzlichen Fragen nach medizinisch sinnvollen und angemessenen Maßnahmen, nach Therapiebegrenzung, Lebensqualität und Sterbehilfe. Im Diskurs müssen die dabei verwendeten Begriffe hinsichtlich der ihnen innewohnenden, oft unbewussten Wertungen zur Diskussion gestellt werden. Einer ethischen Entscheidungsberatung muss eine sorgfältige Abklärung der naturwissenschaftlichen Aspekte, einschließlich einer umfassenden Erhebung der Vorsituation und der gegenwärtigen Befindlichkeit des einzelnen Kranken sowie eine aufrichtige Einschätzung der Zielorientierung vorausgehen. Unter Zugrundelegung der—unter Umständen auch nur ersatzweise wahrgenommenen—Selbstbestimmung des Patienten (...) werden in der ethischen Diskussion mögliche stereotype Vorgehensweisen, latente Entscheidungskonflikte oder eine vermeintliche Vorrangigkeit naturwissenschaftlicher Lösungsansätze zur Sprache kommen. Ziel ist eine gemeinsam erarbeitete individuell angemessene Lösung, die sich—unabhängig vom Ergebnis—heilsam in den Lebenshorizont des Patienten einbetten lässt. (shrink)

Die „künstliche Ernährung“ steht in enger Beziehung zu den grundsätzlichen Fragen nach medizinisch sinnvollen und angemessenen Maßnahmen, nach Therapiebegrenzung, Lebensqualität und Sterbehilfe. Im Diskurs müssen die dabei verwendeten Begriffe hinsichtlich der ihnen innewohnenden, oft unbewussten Wertungen zur Diskussion gestellt werden. Einer ethischen Entscheidungsberatung muss eine sorgfältige Abklärung der naturwissenschaftlichen Aspekte, einschließlich einer umfassenden Erhebung der Vorsituation und der gegenwärtigen Befindlichkeit des einzelnen Kranken sowie eine aufrichtige Einschätzung der Zielorientierung vorausgehen. Unter Zugrundelegung der—unter Umständen auch nur ersatzweise wahrgenommenen—Selbstbestimmung des Patienten (...) werden in der ethischen Diskussion mögliche stereotype Vorgehensweisen, latente Entscheidungskonflikte oder eine vermeintliche Vorrangigkeit naturwissenschaftlicher Lösungsansätze zur Sprache kommen. Ziel ist eine gemeinsam erarbeitete individuell angemessene Lösung, die sich—unabhängig vom Ergebnis—heilsam in den Lebenshorizont des Patienten einbetten lässt. (shrink)

Der verfasser analysiert den umschwung der philosophie der reflexion in der positiven philosophie, der sich im spaten deutschen idealismus ereignet hat und der unvoraussehbare konsequenzen fur die gesamte entwicklung des posthegelianischen denkens gehabt hat. dieselbe tendenz findet der verfasser im heideggerschen werk "sein und zeit" (1927). in der analyse der befindlichkeit und der faktizitat zeigt er, wie jedes denken von der ursprunglichen versetzung des daseins in seinem "dass es ist" abhangig ist. diese umkehr des denkens war schon am werk (...) bei marx wie auch bei vielen nachfolgern seines denkens. (edited). (shrink)

in his last work, the phenomenological philosopher hans lipps raises the cuestion of human nature. this nature can only be revealed by striking the concepcion of its very essence. this conception has to be found within the realm of the differenciating possibilities, in which human nature appears. one of these is the possibility of having affections. through his phenomenological analysis of the human embarrassment and its expresion, lipp calls into question the "psycho-physical nature" of man by showing its original embodiment. (...) in his aurel kolnai`s analysis of repugnance and criticizes ludwing klages´theory of gestures. the human embarrassment and its expression is a striking example of the fundamental "befindlichkeit" of human being. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore links between the phenomenology-inspired philosophy of emotion, especially discussions of affective intentionality and situated affectivity, and those strands of work in the field of cultural affect studies that take their inspiration fromSpinoza and Deleuze. As bridges between these fields, I propose the concepts ‘disclosive posture’ and ‘affective arrangement’. ‘Disclosive posture’ condenses insights from phenomenological work on affectivity, especially those pertaining to what Heidegger calls Befindlichkeit. ‘Affective arrangement’ is a descendant of Deleuze and Guattari’s term (...) agencement. It refers to heterogeneous ensembles of elements coalescing into a sphere of heightened affective intensity in a local setting. I develop this notion into a tool for analyzing situated affectivity. As it does not yet figure prominently within debates in the philosophy of emotion, I will outline what is meant by ‘affective arrangement’ in some detail. Throughout, I discuss a productive tension between these two conceptual strands. (shrink)

Heidegger’s ontological account of affectivity provides an interesting angle to consider questions of politics. On the one hand, one might take some of what Heidegger wrote on affectivity in the late 1920s and early 1930s—usually couched in the idiom of Stimmungen and Befindlichkeit—as a foreshadowing of his involvement with Nazi politics, culminating in his time as Führer-Rektor of Freiburg University. On the other hand, Heidegger’s views on affectivity might be taken as a starting point for an ontological perspective on (...) the political as such. His perspective on Befindlichkeit as disclosive postures can prepare such a reading, while especially his views on the ontological character of anxiety and boredom lead into the founding dimension of the political as such.This is because these affective orientations reveal the ungroundedness and thus radical contingency of existence. The flip side of this ungroundedness is the inevitability for self-determination—in other words: the need for deciding the undecidable. Although Heidegger’s own politics—at least in the early 1930s—did not explicitly relate to the affectively disclosed ungroundedness of existence, but rather curtailed this openness and indeterminacy in an individualistic and decisionistic closure, we argue that Heidegger’s view yields to a radically political reading. Not least, this is evidenced in much of French political thought since the 1960s which heavily draws on Heidegger’s ontological difference. The political as such does not refer to politics as a sub-system of society, but to the questioning of the foundations of politics, which turn out to be necessarily “contingent foundations”. It is our aim to trace this line of thought back to its origins in Heidegger’s works, in order to assess the potentials and pitfalls of ‘Heidegger on politics’. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis essay tracks Heidegger’s thought from 1919 forwards to the decisive years of his political engagement, on behalf of the Nazi movement. Part 1 tracks how the question concerning Being devolves into the implicitly identitarian question of who “we” are. Part 2 addresses the “existential” of Befindlichkeit which Heidegger in Sein und Zeit positions as prior to understanding, and examines his esoteric mode of writing as the means to cultivate a prerational Stimmung. Part 3 examines Heidegger’s response to his (...) 1929–1930 questions of “What mood must we awaken?... Who are we, then?” in the decisive years of the Gleichchaltung, showing how Heidegger’s thinking elevates to ontological primacy a discriminatory and identitarian decision concerning who “we” are as the German volk. Part 4 examines in this light the Heideggerian “end of philosophy” in what the Black Notebooks talks of in terms of a “metapolitics ‘of’ the historical people”. (shrink)

Things get to us. We are moved or affected by 'things' in the ordinary sense-the paraphernalia of our daily lives-and also by ourselves, by others, and by ontological phenomena such as being and time. How can such things get to us? How can things matter to me? Heidegger answers this question with his concepts of finding (Befindlichkeit) and attunement (Stimmung). In this text, Withy explores how being finding allows things to matter to us in attunements such as fear and (...) hope by allowing those things to show up as benefits or detriments to our pursuits and so to put those pursuits at stake. She also explores how we can be affected ontologically-that is, affected by being-in special attunements such as angst and boredom, as well as how Heidegger's account of being affected has contributed to our understanding of emotions, moods, and affective disorders. (shrink)

O objetivo de presente artigo é trazer uma reflexão sobre o lugar central da noção heideggeriana de “disposição” (Befindlichkeit) para as práticas clínicas daseinsanalíticas. Se o fundamento da daseinsanálise é a compreensão do homem como ser-aí e se, na analítica existencial de Heidegger, essa compreensão só é aberta a partir de disposições afetivas fundamentais, depreende-se que a própria prática daseinsanalítica se dá como atenção apropriativa dessas disposições fundamentais. São esses modos de aberturas, exemplarmente caracterizados pela angústia na obra Ser (...) e Tempo, que deixam aparecer as estruturas ontológico-existenciais encobertas pelos sentidos ônticos que regulam de modo impessoal as ocupações cotidianas: a estrutura ontológica do ser-aí como “cuidado” (Sorge).A hermenêutica clínica daseinsanalítica se dá, portanto, como preocupação antepositiva na medida em que devolve ao ser-aí sua própria compreensão pré-ontológica já sempre incluída e projetada em todos os comportamentos ôntico-existenciários da vida cotidiana. (shrink)

Jacobi schließt in seinen Vorwurf an Fichte , Fichtes Idealismus sei Nihilismus, den Vorwurf des Atheismus und des Egoismus mit ein. Im Entweder/Oder von Jacobis Aufforderung, es gelte entweder Gott oder das Ich zu wählen, zeigt sich eine Argumentationsfigur, die bei Nietzsche wiederkehrt. Es geht um die eine absolute Wahl: Gott oder das Nichts!Nietzsche eröffnet die zu ,Jacobi gegen Fichte' analoge Alternative: Gott und das im Glauben an einen guten, gerechten Gott ewig geborgene konzentrische Ich oder Leugnung/Verlust/,Tod' Gottes und ein (...) dezentriertes, aus der Mitte des Kosmos verstoßenes Selbst, das seinen unbedingten Wert im Weltall verloren hat.Das was bei Nietzsche der ,Tod Gottes' und die aus ihm entspringende Heimatlosigkeit bzw. der Sinnlosigkeitsaffekt ist, dem entspricht bei Heidegger die ,,Seinsverlassenheit" des Menschen. So wie für Nietzsche der ,Tod Gottes' es ist, der den Nihilismus auf den Plan ruft, so ist es analog für Heidegger der ,Seinsentzug', der die nihilistische Befindlichkeit des Menschen erwirkt.,Gott ist tot' ist für Heidegger das Ende der abendländischen Metaphysik, von dem sein Denken den Ausgang nimmt. (shrink)

Starting from a comparison of the similarities between a poem by Sylvia Plath called Tulips and the words of someone in the thrall of a delusion I develop a phenomenology of how mood is basic to our articulation of the world. To develop this argument I draw on Heidegger’s concept of attunement [befindlichkeit] and his contention that basic emotions open up aspects of the world for closer inspection and articulation. My thesis in this paper is that there is an (...) underlying structural similarity between the forms of words used in poems and those found in medically diagnosed delusions and this similarity is based on the role of mood in both arenas. The difference, I argue, is that although both forms of articulation are negotiated ‘as if’ the subject matter was literal, the person writing the poem is self-aware that their uses of language are figurative and metaphorical. This is because the emotional lens they use to describe a situation poetically can always be removed by a return to a ground-mood of acceptance, that prevents them from becoming lost in the poetical mood. The person experiencing psychosis, on the other hand, is unable to extricate herself from the mood that underlies their delusional utterances as they have lost access to the ground-mood that the poet takes for granted. I illustrate the point using Hume’s famous statement about the mood he philosophises in and look at ways sufferers from delusions could regain a sense of the non-literal projections of their words. (shrink)

Die Vorstellungswelten bilden einen eminent wichtigen Bestandteil historischer Forschung, weil bei kaum einem anderen Gegenstand die Menschen selbst so deutlich in den Mittelpunkt des Interesses treten wie bei menschlichen Vorstellungen, mit denen die Menschen sich selbst und ihre Umwelt wahrnehmen und sie zu erklären und zu begreifen suchen. Das Denken der Menschen ist Grundlage ihres Handelns und bildet daher einen entscheidenden Faktor aller historischen Vorgänge. Im Zuge einer sich immer stärker abzeichnenden kulturwissenschaftlichen und anthropologischen Betrachtungsweise heutiger Geisteswissenschaften dürfte das Thema (...) in Zukunft noch an Bedeutung gewinnen. Mit den religiösen Vorstellungswelten des Mittelalters aber erfassen wir den zentralen Aspekt dieser Epoche schlechthin. Ziel des Autors ist es, einen repräsentativen und zugleich informativen und anschaulichen Einblick in die geistig-religiöse Befindlichkeit der (schreibenden) mittelalterlichen Menschen aus geschichtswissenschaftlicher Perspektive zu bieten, als ein erstes Ergebnis, an das die künftige Forschung anknüpfen oder mit dem sie sich auseinandersetzen kann. Unter dem Titel „Gott und die Welt“ ist dabei auf die Bedeutung religiöser Vorstellungen im Mittelalter, vor allem aber auf deren zentralen Ausgangspunkt mittelalterlicher Religiosität verwiesen: den Schöpfer und seine Schöpfung. Im ersten, nun vorliegenden Teilband des Werkes behandelt der Autor das mittelalterliche Gottesbild, einen Aspekt mittelalterlicher Vorstellungswelten, der hier erstmals in dieser Ausführlichkeit aufgearbeitet wird. Erkenntnisprobleme, Diskussionen um Gottes Wirken als Schöpfer, Lenker und Richter kommen dabei ebenso ausführlich zur Sprache wie Diskurse um das göttliche Wesen, das Trinitätsproblem, Gottesbeweise und bildliche Gottesdarstellungen. Der in Kürze folgende zweite Teilband wird über die materielle und personelle Schöpfung, also über den Kosmos (Natur und Kosmos, Himmel, Paradies, Hölle und Erde) und die Geschöpfe (Engel, Teufel, Menschen) sowie das Heilsgeschehen, handeln. Den Abschluß des Werkes wird ein Band über einzelne konkrete Aspekte religiöser Vorstellungen, wie Buße und Sünde, Heilige und Wunder, Tod und Jenseits, bilden. (shrink)

Die response bezieht sich auf die Beobachtungen der Inszenierung von Lam Gods und setzt sich mit dem ethnografischen Beobachtungsprotokoll auseinander, das Birgit Althans zu einer der Szenen geschrieben hat. Verfasst wird diese response aus der Perspektive einer ethnografischen Kindheitsforscherin. Aus ethnografischer Perspektive interessiert Christina Huf insbesondere die Befremdung, die in dieser Szene so weit geht, dass die Ethnografin ihre teilnehmende Beobachtung am liebsten aufkündigen würde. Die Beschreibung der engen Verstrickung der Ethnografin mit dem Geschehenen auf der Bühne macht das Potential (...) der diffraktiven Methodologie von Karen Barad für ethnografisches Beobachten und Schreiben offensichtlich. Die zum Ausdruck gebrachte Befindlichkeit und Empfindsamkeit der Ethnografin deute ich in kindheitstheoretischer Perspektive als eine Irritation der generationalen Ordnung. (shrink)

For the purpose of enabling a dialogue between Martin Heidegger’s philosophy and Rudolf Steiner’s work, we start from Rainer Thurnher’s hypothesis that Heidegger’s “existentials”, Befindlichkeit, Verstehen and Rede, represent correlates of psychic phenomena in their traditional triple division into thinking, willing and feeling. To test this hypothesis, we analyze the temporal constitution of these psychic phenomena, that is, their existential correlates from the temporal dimensions of future, present, and past in Heidegger’s Being and Time and in some of Steiner’s (...) lectures. (shrink)

In this paper I will present the idea of a phenomenology of the “pathic” by interpreting some passages of Heidegger’s lecture course of 1919, Being and Time and What is Metaphysics? The first part provides a critical discussion of the perspective of AldoMasullo, who denies not only that Heidegger really succeeded in fathoming the pathic sphere, but also that a phenomenology of the pathic in general is possible. In contrast, my purpose is to outline a phenomenology of the pathic in (...) two possible directions of investigation, both inspired by Heidegger. On the one hand, the phenomenology of the “pathic” intends to define the distinctive features of what Heidegger calls experience of the “preworld” (Vorwelt) and to specifically argue for its premeaningful character. On the other hand, this phenomenological approach aims at identifying the transcendental conditions of possibility for experiencing the “prewordly something”: in such a factical experience the hermeneutic capacities of the subject are temporarily suspended, so that the sole Befindlichkeit, understood as the primordial way of access to the phenomenal horizon, is still at work. (shrink)

Die „künstliche Ernährung“ steht in enger Beziehung zu den grundsätzlichen Fragen nach medizinisch sinnvollen und angemessenen Maßnahmen, nach Therapiebegrenzung, Lebensqualität und Sterbehilfe. Im Diskurs müssen die dabei verwendeten Begriffe hinsichtlich der ihnen innewohnenden, oft unbewussten Wertungen zur Diskussion gestellt werden. Einer ethischen Entscheidungsberatung muss eine sorgfältige Abklärung der naturwissenschaftlichen Aspekte, einschließlich einer umfassenden Erhebung der Vorsituation und der gegenwärtigen Befindlichkeit des einzelnen Kranken sowie eine aufrichtige Einschätzung der Zielorientierung vorausgehen. Unter Zugrundelegung der—unter Umständen auch nur ersatzweise wahrgenommenen—Selbstbestimmung des Patienten (...) werden in der ethischen Diskussion mögliche stereotype Vorgehensweisen, latente Entscheidungskonflikte oder eine vermeintliche Vorrangigkeit naturwissenschaftlicher Lösungsansätze zur Sprache kommen. Ziel ist eine gemeinsam erarbeitete individuell angemessene Lösung, die sich—unabhängig vom Ergebnis—heilsam in den Lebenshorizont des Patienten einbetten lässt. (shrink)

Fur Descartes galt die Erkenntnistheorie als <I>prima philosophia. Mit der beruhmten Formel <I>cogito ergo sum erhob er das denkende Selbstbewusstsein zum <I>fundamentum inconcussum et primum veritatis. Diesen Primat der Erkenntnistheorie in der Neuzeit stellt Heidegger mit seinem ontologischen Ansatz in <I>Sein und Zeit in Frage. Das menschliche Erkennen ist fur ihn nicht etwas Ursprungliches, sondern etwas Abgeleitetes. Es setzt das <I>Verstehen voraus, das gemeinsam mit <I>Befindlichkeit und <I>Rede die ursprungliche Erschlossenheit des Daseins ausmacht. Spater sieht Heidegger, dass der Entwurf (...) des Verstehens vom Lichtungsgeschehen des Seins ermoglicht ist. Dabei gewinnt die Sprache eine grundlegende Funktion. Diese Abhandlung geht dem theoretischen Erkennen auf den Grund und bietet dabei einen neuen Horizont zum besseren Verstandnis von Heideggers Philosophie.". (shrink)