Taking up Alain Badiou's project of systematizing the invariant traits of antiphilosophy as based on a radical "act" capable of discrediting and outstripping the philosopher's relation to truth, the author discusses the cases of Nietzsche's archi-political act of "breaking the history of the world into two halves" and Wittgenstein's archi-aesthetic act of "showing" that which one cannot speak of but which alone matters for the sense of the world. The difference between the antiphilosophical "act" and the philosophical treatment of (...) an "event" is best understood in terms of "suture" and "disaster," two concepts which in the process must be thoroughly revised. Finally, the author discusses the extent to which Badiou's own philosophy falls prey to, and even thrives on, an irresistible antiphilosophical element of its own. (shrink)

This text presents and addresses the philosophical movement of antiphilosophy working thru the texts of Christian thinkers such as Pascal and Kierkegaard. The author as influenced by Alain Badiou, portrays these Christian thinkers as of a subjective dimension negating the possibility of an objective quest for truth. The claim here is that antiphilosophy is abundant in the eyes of these two thinkers who frame the thought event as represented by Christianity, ultimately resigning itself to more or less the (...) opposite of philosophy itself. Readers will discover why philosophical reason should never be convinced by that which denies its very authority. Subjecting faith to the perils of philosophical analysis, confronting the philosophical tradition with the truth of the Christian faith, and occupying the space between the two: such are the challenges facing an antiphilosophy of Christianity. This text will appeal to researchers and students working in continental philosophy, philosophy of religion and those in religious studies who want to investigate the links between Christianity and antiphilosophy. (shrink)

Love, hate, slavery, torture, addiction and death - as this book shows, only psychoanalysis can speak well of such matters. Psychoanalysis was the most important intellectual development of the 20th century, which left no practice from psychiatry to philosophy to politics untouched. Yet it was also in many ways an untouchable project, caught between science and poetry, medicine and hermeneutics. This unsettled, unsettling status has recently induced the philosopher Alain Badiou to characterise psychoanalysis as an 'antiphilosophy', that is, as (...) a practice that issues the strongest possible challenges to thought. Justin Clemens takes up the challenge of this denomination here, by re-examining a series of crucial psychoanalytic themes: addiction, fanaticism, love, slavery and torture. Drawing from the work of Freud, Lacan, Badiou, Agamben and others, Psychoanalysis is an Antiphilosophy offers a radical reconstruction of the operations and import of key psychoanalytic concepts and a renewed sense of the indispensable powers of psychoanalysis for today. (shrink)

This book brings Jacques Lacan's work on the problem of anxiety into a jarring and fruitful confrontation with phenomenology, existentialism, and the 'jargon' of authenticity. Brian Robertson masterfully upends a host of received philosophical truths - most notably, and crucially, the idea that anxiety 'lacks an object.'.

In certain philosophical quarters, a new metaphilosophical position is being discussed—antiphilosophy. Such a position seems to maintain that there is no distinction between philosophy and sophistry, reason and rhetoric, arguing and emoting. This paper examines antiphilosophy. Specifically, it aims to address three interrelated questions: Is antiphilosophy a possible metaphilosophical position? If it is, what characterizes it? And what ramifications would it have? The paper argues that antiphilosophy is possible and is best construed as an attempt to (...) reconstruct philosophical discourse on noncognitive lines. Explicitly, “to assert” and the belief propositional attitude is replaced by “to convince” and a pro‐attitude desire to rhetorically talk someone into something. The paper examines one possible form such a position could take as well as various ramifications of it. (shrink)

Philosophy is traditionally understood as the search for universal truths, and philosophers are supposed to transmit those truths beyond the limits of their own culture. But, today, we have become skeptical about the ability of an individual philosopher to engage in "universal thinking," so philosophy seems to capitulate in the face of cultural relativism. In Introduction to Antiphilosophy, Boris Groys argues that modern "antiphilosophy" does not pursue the universality of thought as its goal but proposes in its place (...) the universality of life, material forces, social practices, passions, and experiences --angst, vitality, ecstasy, the gift, revolution, laughter or "profane illumination" --and he analyzes this shift from thought to life and action in the work of thinkers from Kierkegaard to Derrida, from Nietzsche to Benjamin. Ranging across the history of modern thought, Introduction to Antiphilosophy endeavors to liberate philosophy from the stereotypes that hinder its development. --Publisher. (shrink)

A leading continental philosopher from France and author of Theory of the Subject interrogates the "anti-philosophy" of Ludwig Wittgenstein in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, arguing that his beliefs compromise truth and logic while rendering philosophy a practice of esoteric aphorisms.

In this article, I will examine Aristotle’s protreptic argument for the necessity of philosophy as it was deployed by Al-Kindi. I will show how a Muslim critic of philosophy, primarily one who is aligned with the theological outlook of Ibn Hanbal, can reasonably reject the protreptic argument as Al-Kindi presents it. The argument can, however, be reworked in a way to circumvent common criticisms of it presented by Hanbalī-style opponents of philosophy. Indeed, I will argue that, once the argument is (...) properly clarified with reference to what constitutes ‘philosophy’, its soundness is incontrovertible. In closing, I will briefly discuss why Muslim critics of philosophy need not see the protreptic argument as threatening, as the inevitability of philosophy does not necessitate a commitment to all sorts of philosophical positions, however problematic these may be for Islamic doctrine. (shrink)

The appearance of Wittgenstein's Antiphilosophy provides the opportunity to deepen our understanding of Alain Badiou's groundbreaking work on the obsessive Austrian. Both thinkers mix high style with logical rigor and are recognized for having proposed radically different directions for philosophy.For decades, Wittgenstein has been seen as the great exemplar of the "linguistic turn" in philosophy. Badiou has repeatedly accused Wittgenstein of initiating a century of sophistic language games that have done little for philosophy other than isolate its discourse and (...) drain it of relevance. Arguably, this was Wittgenstein's aim all along. Yet Badiou has recently undertaken a more serious consideration of Wittgenstein's .. (shrink)

In _Uncanny Rest_ Alberto Moreiras offers a meditation on intellectual life under the suspension of time and conditions of isolation. Focusing on his personal day-to-day experiences of the “shelter-in-place” period during the first months of the coronavirus pandemic, Moreiras engages with the limits and possibilities of critical thought in the realm of the infrapolitical—the conditions of existence that exceed average understandings of politics and philosophy. In each dated entry he works through the process of formulating a life’s worth of thought (...) and writing while attempting to locate the nature of thought once the coordinates of everyday life have changed. Offering nothing less than a phenomenology of thinking, Moreiras shows how thought happens in and out of a life, at a certain crossroads where memories collide, where conversations with interlocutors both living and dead evolve and thinking during a suspended state becomes provisional and uncertain. (shrink)

Friedrich Stadler und sein Team schließen über 40 Jahre nach Präsentation der ersten beiden Bände das von Rudolf Haller initiierte Projekt einer umfassenden Werkschau Otto Neuraths (1882–1945) ab. In acht Bänden wird auf fast 5.000 Seiten das Schaffen eines Polyhistors dokumentiert und zugänglich gemacht, dessen intellektueller Spannweite man nicht einmal gerecht wird, wenn man ihn als Philosophen, Nationalökonomen, Gesellschaftstechniker und Aufklärer bezeichnet.

In a certain sense the fate of philosophy has been tragic. In antiquity the term "philosophy" meant true scientific knowledge, and we retained this sense of philosophy, on the whole, until the eighteenth century. But beginning then the special sciences, differentiating as independent disciplines, gradually took over areas of problems that had at one time been within the purview of their mother, philosophy, and with which the past glory and significance of dialectics was largely connected. In the course of the (...) nineteenth and particularly the twentieth century, the special sciences attained vast successes in their development, a fact that has found concentrated expression in the current revolution in science and technology. (shrink)

In a certain sense the fate of philosophy has been tragic. In antiquity the term "philosophy" meant true scientific knowledge, and we retained this sense of philosophy, on the whole, until the eighteenth century. But beginning then the special sciences, differentiating as independent disciplines, gradually took over areas of problems that had at one time been within the purview of their mother, philosophy, and with which the past glory and significance of dialectics was largely connected. In the course of the (...) nineteenth and particularly the twentieth century, the special sciences attained vast successes in their development, a fact that has found concentrated expression in the current revolution in science and technology. (shrink)

Explores the often elided and interesting relationship between Badiou and Lyotard.

It is common knowledge that Nietzsche is very critical of traditional philosophy and strongly opposes a number of philosophers, but Alain Badiou goes beyond this claim to interpret and classify Nietzsche as an “antiphilosopher.” As such, Badiou’s interpretation belongs to the vast literature focusing on Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics and truth. However, Badiou goes a bit further and develops a notion of “antiphilosophy” that not only is critical but also has a positive impact: Nietzsche is not only a critic (...) of metaphysics, but he is also an antiphilosopher like Pascal or Rousseau. Nietzsche. L’antiphilosophie I is the transcript from a seminar Badiou gave in 1992–93 and, as the title suggests, is... (shrink)

Volume 52, Issue 7, July 2020, Page 699-703.

In this article, I focus on Alain Badiou’s idiosyncratic interpretation of Jacques Lacan and highlight his conceptual points of divergence with the psychoanalyst. I elaborate on Badiou’s distinction between philosophy, antiphilosophy, and sophistry as well as the notions of sense, ab-sense, and non-sense that he proposed in the book There’s No Such Thing as a Sexual Relationship: Two Lessons on Lacan as well as in his seminar on Lacan. Unlike Lacan, who affirmed that philosophy is subject to the fantasy (...) of the One, Badiou claimed that the One exists merely as a result of an operation of counting. In this manner, he contested Lacan’s conviction that philosophy forecloses the real. I argue that Badiou’s main point of divergence with Lacan is centred on the notion of the subject and on the localization of the void in relation to the subject. I also touch upon philosophy’s relation to the symbolic, namely its ability to raise powerlessness to logical impossibility. (shrink)

The text deals with the recently renewed issue of?antiphilosophy? in the self-understanding of some prominent contemporary continental philosophers but not only them, such as Alain Badiou and Slavoj Zizek, both referring to the psychoanalyst and theoretician of discourse Jacques Lacan. Starting with a metaphorical analysis of the verdict made by Marx of?merely interpretive? character of philosophy in relation to?the study of real world? and with his comparison of philosophy with?masturbation?, the text addresses new appeals to?antiphilosophy? as samples of (...) a token or rather, as cases of a syndrome connected with Jocasta?s rationalization of Oedipus? curse. It was her discourse based on general rules of rationality with which she unconsciously attempted to avoid the confrontation with the truth of an event which had already occurred. In the text, presuppositions and consequences of such an analogy between ancient and contemporary philosophical material are discussed in order to show-on the basis of arguing that the unconscious is located within rational processes that subjects undertake in order to respond to rational needs -that contemporary discussion about?antiphilosophy? by left-wing philosophers bears unacknowledged tendencies to unconsciously reduce Marx? algorithm of?realization of philosophy? to the Hegelian negation of the negation and to integrate it into the discourse of academic philosophy. Tema teksta je nedavno iznova pokrenuto pitanje "antifilozofije" u samorazumijevanju nekih prominentnih suvremenih evropskih filozofa, ali ne samo njih, kao sto su Alain Badiou i Slavoj Zizek koji se obojica pozivaju na psihoanaliticara i teoreticara diskursa Jacquesa Lacana. Polazeci od metaforicke analize Marxovog iskaza o "puko interpretativnom" karakteru filozofije u odnosu na "studij stvarnog zivota" i od njegove usporedbe filozofije s masturbacijom, tekst se obraca novim pozivanjima na "antifilozofiju" tretirajuci ih kao primjerke jednog tipa, ili radije kao slucajeve jednog sindroma, povezanog s Jokastinom racionalizacijom Edipovog prokletstva; njezin diskurs utemeljen na opcim pravilima racionalnosti nesvjesni je pokusaj izbjegavanja susreta s istinom dogadjaja koji se vec dogodio. U tekstu se ispituju pretpostavke i posljedice takve analogije izmedju antickog i suvremenog tekstualnog materijala s ciljem da se pokaze - na temelju argumenta da je nesvjesno locirano unutar racionalnih procesa koje subjekt poduzima da bi udovoljio racionalnim potrebama - da suvremeno razumijevanje "antifilozofije" nosi u sebi neprepoznate tendencije na lijevom krilu suvremene filozofije da se Marxov algoritam ozbiljenja filozofije reducira na Hegelovu negaciju negacije i integrira u diskurs akademske filozofije. (shrink)

This paper examines the historical claims about philosophy, dating back to Parmenides, that we argue underlie Jacques Lacan’s polemical provocations in the mid-1970s that his position was an “anti-philosophie”. Following an introduction surveying the existing literature on the subject, in part ii, we systematically present the account of classical philosophy Lacan has in mind when he declares psychoanalysis to be an antiphilosophy after 1975, assembling his claims about the history of ideas in Seminars XVII and XX in ways earlier (...) contributions of this subject have not systematically done. In part iii, focusing upon Lacan’s remarkable reading of Descartes’ break with premodern philosophy—but touching on Lacan’s readings of Hegel and the early Wittgenstein—we examine Lacan’s positioning of psychoanalysis as a legatee of the Cartesian moment in the history of western ideas, nearly-contemporary with Galileo’s mathematization of physics and carried forwards by Kant’s critical philosophy and account of the substanceless subject of apperception. In different terms than Slavoj Žižek, we propose that it is Lacan’s famous avowal that the subject of the psychoanalysis is the subject first essayed by Descartes in The Meditations on First Philosophy as confronting an other capable of deceit that decisively measures the distance between Lacan’s unique “antiphilosophy” and the forms of later modern linguistic and cultural relativism whose hegemony Alain Badiou has decried, at the same time as it sets Lacan’s antiphilosophy apart from the Parmenidean legacy for which thinking and being could be the same. (shrink)

The article draws attention to a certain multi-layered parallel between Nietzsche and Badiou’s theory of the event, which the author argues Badiou evaded by a kind of strategic relocation. The article does not focus so much on (and certainly not against) Badiou’s philosophy, but attempts to assess the possible implications of this relocation for Badiou’s interpretation of Nietzsche. In the first part of the article, the key concepts of Badiou’s account of Nietzsche are introduced, such as “archi-politics”, “antiphilosophy”, and (...) the “event Nietzsche”. Later, it is shown that, despite some fundamental differences, there is a strong resemblance between some key concepts of Badiou’s theory of the event, especially those related to the notion of “intervention”, and some concepts found in Nietzsche. Finally, the paper focuses on the problem of the “death of God”, which is somehow absent in Badiou’s interpretation, even though the term itself resonates strongly in various aspects of Badiou’s philosophy. (shrink)

This paper explores Levinas’s Carnets de captivité and Écrits sur la captivité in light of Badiou’s category of ‘antiphilosophy’. We make four movements: firstly, a description of what antiphilosophy is; secondly, an explanation of why the category of antiphilosophy is important to a reading of Levinas; thirdly, an exposition of the antiphilosophical elements of the Carnets and Écrits on captivity; and fourthly, we situate our reading of the notebooks within the larger context of Levinas’s post-captivity work.

L’antiphilosophie de Lacan y est examinée, notamment comme l’interprétation analytique du discours universitaire, dans lequel le philosophe qui s’avance sous la bannière de la quête rationnelle de la vérité, ment sur ses fins, qui ne sont pas de vérité, mais qui touchent à la jouissance. Il s’agit de faire valoir, à partir des indications de Freud et de Lacan, une affinité de l’antiphilosophie avec la dévalorisation de la pensée. La deuxième partie de l’article interroge la critique lacanienne des théories philosophiques (...) de la perception. Suivant en cela la thèse de Lacan, l’auteur montre que le rapport à la réalité en général, et à la perception en particulier, tombe sous l’incidence de l’inconscient. (shrink)

From Antiphilosophy to Worlds and from Beckett to Wittgenstein, the 110 entries in this dictionary provide detailed explanations and engagements with Badious's key concepts and major interlocutors.

The subtractive : preface by Francois Wahl -- Philosophy itself -- The (re)turn of philosophy itself -- Definition of philosophy -- What is a philosophical institution? -- Philosophy and poetry -- The philosophical recourse to the poem -- Mallarm's method : subtraction and isolation -- Rimbaud's method : interruption -- Philosophy and mathematics -- Conference on subtraction -- Truth : forcing and unnameable -- Philosophy and politics -- Philosophy and love -- What is love? -- Philosophy and psychoanalysis -- Subject (...) and infinite -- Antiphilosophy : Lacan and Plato -- Writing of the generic -- Writing of the generic : Samuel beckett. (shrink)

On 15 October 1959, Rudolf Carnap, a leading member of the recently founded Vienna Circle, came to lecture at the Bauhaus in Dessau, southwest of Berlin. Carnap had just finished his magnum opus, The Logical Construction of the World, a book that immediately became the bible of the new antiphilosophy announced by the logical positivists. From a small group in Vienna, the movement soon expanded to include an international following, and in the sixty years since has exerted a powerful (...) sway over the conduct of the philosophy of science as well as over wide branches of philosophy, economics, psychology, and physics. The site of Carnap’s lecture that day, the Dessau Bauhaus, was a stunning building designed by Walter Gropius and dedicated just three years earlier. Protected by its flat roof and glass walls, the artists, architects, weavers, and furniture designers had made the school a citadel of high modernism. It was here that Carnap addressed an enthusiastic audience on “Science and Life.” “I work in science,” he began, “and you in visible forms; the two are only different sides of a single life.”1 In this paper I will explore this “single life” of which the new philosophy and the new art were to be different facets; in the process, I hope to cast light on the shared modernist impulses that drove both disciplines in the interwar years. 1. Rudolf Carnap, lecture notes for his Bauhaus lecture, “Wissenschaft und Leben,” prepared 1 Oct. 1929 and delivered 15 Oct. 1929, transcription from shorthand by Gerald Heverly, Carnap Papers in the Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh Libraries, University of Pittsburgh , document RC 110-07-49. Quoted by permission of the University of Pittsburgh. All rights reserved. Translations are my own unless otherwise noted. Peter Galison is associate professor in the departments of philosophy and physics at Stanford University, where he co-chairs the program in the history of science. His primary interest is in the history and philosophy of experimentation, the subject of his How Experiments End and Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale Research, edited with Bruce Hevly . His current project is entitled Image and Logic: The Material Culture of Modern Physics. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What is Practice Theory? What is a Practice? Being‐in‐the‐World and Practical Holism Two Philosophers and an Antiphilosophy: Kripkenstein, Winchgenstein, and Therapeutic Quietism Winchgensteinian Practice Theory From Winchgenstein to Frankenstein Investigating Practices Note.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:John R. Boly NIHILISM ASIDE: DERRIDA'S DEBATE OVER INTENTIONAL MODELS DERRIDA'S PHILOSOPHY, or perhaps antiphilosophy, emerges from phenomenological thought. But to a great extent, he has been permitted to define that emergence on his own terms, particularly in his writings on Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger. This is, of course, highly questionable. It in effect licenses Derrida to become a revisionist historian of his own origins. So I propose (...) a variation. Instead of placing phenomenology against Derrida's backdrop, I want to question his deconstructive project in its relation to the phenomenological venture. The difficulty with this is apparent. What would such a venture be? Even posing the question raises problems in that it presupposes an impossible vantage, an uninvolved point from which to look down in serene mastery at a game rigged in advance. Yet perhaps a synoptic point ofview may be indulged in for a while, provided no one forgets its provisional nature. In that case, the phenomenological venture includes four moments. 1. Suspension (or epoche). Human beings cannot perceive reality in itself. They can only experience meaning through the operations of intentionality, which may be thought of as the exclusions, selections, and combinations of a mediating system. This truism is no less terrifying for being so true, and every mediating system bears within itselfan impulse towards protective closure, an impulse to veil its own forming activity. Such closure eventually encrusts a mediating system and hardens into what Marxists call ideology, the early Barthes called myth, or contemporary response theorists call repertoire. Suspension involves a questioning attentiveness that remains within the closure it questions. Every fact is reconsidered, as factum, a deed brought forth through a process ofmaking. The consequently bracketed "fact" is both sacred object, granting reflexive ac152 John R. Boly153 cess to its formative process, and utter pretension, trying to conceal that process and thereby promote itself as fact rather than facture, origin rather than product. Phenomenology begins with a questioning of that pretension. Like a difficult child, it is perplexed at the self-evident and wonders at the obvious. 2.Reduction. Yet this questioning attentiveness takes only a first step. Suspension disenchants or disillusions, but it does not advance toward an understanding of the intricate patterns through which meaning emerges from the infinite possibilities of perception. That is the task of reduction, to which Husserl assigned two phases, the eidetic and the transcendental.1 In the eidetic phase, phenomena are released, so far as this is possible, into a preflective and preconceptual mode, as pure perceptions still awaiting the activity of mediation. Here, phenomena are boundless as well as exhilarating in their semantic potential. This return to primary perception, however, generates an opposing phase, the transcendental reduction, which traces the way in which mediating systems or what John Wild called versions of the life-world, select and arrange a potentially infinite semantic potential into actual meanings.2 Eidetic and transcendental phases work together, as inseparable antagonists within a continuous dialectic of disclosure. Because these two phases oppose one another, reduction involves a continuous interplay between energy and order, dynamism and system, with the result that it tirelessly traces patterns in the life-world, yet does so only to modify and transform those patterns through the very act of its tracing. Efforts to set the patterns of a life-world into a stable structure at the same time set free their infinite possibilities.3 The eidetic phase of the reduction thus provides a relentless semantic pressure that qualifies, elaborates, and eventually disperses every order of the transcendental phase. Yet without the revealing provocation of such inadequate orders, the eidetic phase would become incoherent and lapse into a speechless nihilism. Though it enacts a comic drama, reduction is the central task of the phenomenological venture, which halts the instant it is denied access to the intentional realm of the life-world. 3.Opening. So important is this access that it generates a separate moment, which pauses to meditate on the conditions of such access. The issues that arise here dominated Heidegger's thought after Being and Time, and they are among the most abstruse yet important concerns of phenomenology. How can models of intentional patterning be... (shrink)

Traditionally, the negative way is a process by which the mental process ties to reach truth about its object through negation of what it is not rather than through affirmation of what it is. In dialectics, the negative moment is one where we examine critically a proposition though the affirmation of its contrary. But in philosophy as a pedagogy or as a practice, there is a tradition, like with Socrates, the cynics or the Zen master, which is more concerned about (...) interrupting the mental process and obtaining silence than explaining. Philosophy has here little to do with “science,” and more with an ascetic conception of “being,” where one shows the absurdity of speech, common or erudite. Consciousness therefore becomes the condition and substance of truth, in a sort of antiphilosophy. Antiphilosophy which pretends to show and shock more than it pretends to tell and explain, is already very present and visible within philosophy itself, for example in the character of Socrates, and his devastating irony, this form of speech that says the contrary of what it says. The cynic, with its total lack of respect for anything and anyone, provides in this context an interesting historical example: it is the rare case of a philosophical school whose name is used as well as a moral condemnation. The XIV century Turkish figure Nasruddin Hodja has a lot do with this tradition. Although he inscribes himself in the Sufi current, he is primarily known through his numerous outrageous and funny stories, very popular all around the Mediterranean. But behind the comic surface of an oral tradition, we discover profound and provocative insights about the man, the world, language, truth, and many other subjects. (shrink)

In this volume, author Steven L. Bindeman presents a survey of the key figures in postmodern antiphilosophy. Noting that the main thrust of their work can be found in their need to respond to the threat of nihilism, he is guided by the question, if the path to abstract truth is no longer viable, what then? He shows how the antiphilosophers turn their focus on the complexity of lived experience in place of the search for certainty, which was in (...) their view what previously had guided the dominating discourse of the modernist philosophical tradition. Through close examination of a broad variety of texts, Bindeman illuminates how the antiphilosophers initiate a new way of doing philosophy, one which prefers to examine the question, Does it work? instead of, Is it true? Moreover, Bindeman demonstrates how the antiphilosophers are united in questioning the centrality of the great cornerstones of western metaphysics - time, self, universe, and God - because of their insistence that there is no way to reach beyond any of these words to the actual things to which they refer. Utilizing the exposed, significant fault in the foundation of all philosophical systems, "The Antiphilosophers" delivers new insight concerning the issue of how we should relate to the resultant chaos. Written with a rare combination of philosophical rigor and clarity of expression, Bindeman's work will be of interest to students and scholars of postmodern philosophy. (shrink)

Part I: On Althusser -- Contextualization -- Periodization -- Taking sides: Hegel or Spinoza? -- Structural Causality -- Althusser before Althusser: from Christianity to Communism -- Marxists' prehistory -- Proletariat of human condition versus the proletariat of labor -- Christian materialism -- Antiphilosophy -- Definition of ideology -- Epistemological break -- Interpellation -- State apparatuses -- Church as an ideological state apparatus -- Althusser's politics -- Part II: The Gospel According to Althusser -- Setting the stage -- Camera as (...) an ideological apparatus -- Film as a commodity -- Representation -- The Christian reality -- Religious suspension of the theological -- Religious-political -- Class struggle -- Class struggle versus humanity -- The politics of religion -- Pasolini's political thought -- Conclusion: Marxism and films. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Marx's Attempt to Leave PhilosophyOmar DahbourDaniel Brudney. Marx's Attempt to Leave Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998. Pp. xviii + 425. Cloth, $45.00.In the introduction to this book, Daniel Brudney writes, "The humanist Marx has been in the shadows. I think it time he was brought into the light" (13). The way Brudney chooses to do this is by examining Marx's writings of 1844-46, along with some of (...) Feuerbach and Bauer's works, for their critique of philosophy. Brudney argues that Marx's early texts are the most intrinsically interesting, in that they contain Marx's explicit antiphilosophical claims (163). Brudney asks three questions about these claims: [1] how different was Marx's critique of philosophy from that of other Young Hegelians, particularly Feuerbach and Bauer? [2] Why was Marx so committed to "leaving philosophy"? and [3] Was he successful in justifying his critique of capitalism nonphilosophically?For this reader, the most compelling part of the book was Brudney's treatment of the first question, in which he gives Feuerbach's "antiphilosophy" a sympathetic yet critical treatment. While Brudney claims that Feuerbach ultimately can substantiate neither his critique of Christian faith nor that of speculative philosophy (73), Feuerbach's work is still of interest for his ambitious, if failed, attempt to do so. Furthermore, Marx's later antiphilosophy, Brudney ultimately concludes, is much more indebted to Feuerbach than Marx cares to admit.The treatment of Marx's early work is aimed at examining the reasons for the hostility to philosophy that infuses virtually all of Marx's texts. After carefully distinguishing between the conceptions of human nature in Marx's 1844-45 manuscripts and in the German Ideology, Brudney concludes that Marx was pessimistic about providing a philosophically compelling argument for the central importance of labor (218). Much more likely, in Marx's view, was a case made on the basis of facts, practice, or experience.But Brudney argues that this will not doóthat philosophy is required because [End Page 135] Marx's conception of labor is irreducibly normative. This is what he calls the "justification problem": how can claims about the alienation of labor, e.g., be derived from facts of the matter without some further (philosophical) interpretation of these facts? In the German Ideology, the problem is compounded: how can social critics attack the "ruling ideas" of capitalism, when they live within the society in which these ideas dominate?So far, so good: Brudney makes his case for the necessity of a normative critique of capitalist society. While Marx was genuinely antiphilosophical, this was to his detrimentóit robbed him of the ability to justify his critique. But Brudney claims that, consequently, what Marx needed was "moral philosophy." This is where the problems with his argument become manifest. Despite an exhaustively detailed treatment of Marx's early texts, Brudney paints with a very broad brush when he employs the terms "philosophy" and "moral philosophy." What exactly do they mean? Brudney refuses to specify or limit Marx's critique to what Marx very probably thought of as most essentially philosophicalónamely, Hegelianism.To limit Marx's criticisms of philosophy in this way might imply that Marx was simply wielding a different kind of philosophical apparatus, one that was, in the particular intellectual world of 1840s Germany, "antiphilosophical." Specifically, Brudney wants to avoid the conclusion that Marx was a materialist, only opposed to idealism, not to "philosophy" as such. Yet, this reader cannot escape the sense that what Brudney really is comparing Marx (and Feuerbach) to the philosophy, not of the 1840s, but of the 1990s.This is especially the case in his discussion of Marx's rejection of "morality." By "morality" Brudney seems to mean some sort of rule-governed theory of moral conduct (e.g., Kantianism). But Marx's rejection of this sort of moral theory certainly need not mean his rejection of ethics of any kind. Brudney fails to adequately confront interpretations of Marx that suggest he was influenced by earlier, particularly Aristotelian, philosophy in his criticisms of German idealism (see, e.g., Carol Gould's Marx's Social Ontology or the writers in George McCarthy [ed... (shrink)

This paper points to the relation between Wittgenstein's position and Kant's transcendental dialectics with regard to the nature of philosophical problems and their roots in language, thinking and affinities of humans. Related to this, there is the question of function of philosophy which involves the removal of these problems, according to both authors. The author supports the thesis that, when it comes to Wittgenstein, it cannot be discussed about the end of philosophy if he considers that there is the natural (...) affinity towards philosophical errors, the cause of which is the complexity of language. Therefore, the author criticizes the view according to which Wittgenstein speaks about antiphilosophy, that is, about the negative meaning of philosophical thought. U ovom radu se pokazuje srodnost Vitgenstajnovih stavova sa Kantovom transcendentalnom dijalektikom u pogledu prirode filozofskih problema i njihove duboke ukorenjenosti u jeziku, misljenju i sklonostima ljudskih bica. Sa time je povezano i pitanje funkcije filozofiranja, koju prema obojici autora, cini otklanjanje ovih duboko usadjenih problema. Autor zastupa tezu da se kod Vitgenstajna ne moze govoriti o kraju filozofije ukoliko smatra da postoji prirodna sklonost ka filozofskim pogreskama ciji je uzrok u kompleksnosti jezika. Stoga autor kritikuje stanoviste prema kojem je kod Vitgenstajna rec o antifilozofiji, odnosno o negativnom odredjenju filozofskog misljenja. (shrink)

U ovom ću članku razmotriti Aristotelov protreptički argument za nužnost filozofije kako ga je postavio Al-Kindi. Pokazat ću kako muslimanski kritičar filozofije, prvenstveno onaj koji je usklađen s teološkim stajalištima Ibn Hanbala, može s razlogom odbaciti protreptički argument kako ga predstavlja Al-Kindi. Međutim, argument se može preraditi na način da se zaobiđu uobičajene kritike koje iznose protivnici filozofije u stilu Hanbalīja. Dapače, tvrdit ću da je njegova ispravnost neupitna jednom kad se argument pravilno razjasni s obzirom na to kako se (...) treba shvatiti 'filozofiju'. Na kraju ću ukratko raspravljati o tome zašto muslimanski kritičari filozofije ne moraju smatrati protreptički argument problematičnim, budući da neizbježnost filozofije ne zahtijeva privrženost svim vrstama filozofskih pozicija, koliko god one bile problematične za islamsku doktrinu. (shrink)

The article analyses Alain Badiou`s philosophy from the point of view of his relation to postmodernity. Alain Badiou is a political activist, mathematician, writer, playwright and literary critic. However, above all, he is a philosopher of the totality who attempts to give a thoroughgoing explanation of the world. This is the sense in which he is an anti-postmodernist. His whole philosophy is directed against sophistry. Badiou consistently builds his own system in order to oppose it to the philosophy of the (...) twentieth century. He does not engage in dogmatic criticism. He goes further and repeatedly finds inspiration in the postmodern thought. Although his philosophy is evidently opposed to it, his anti-postmodernity should be considered a synthetic attempt to exceed two competing traditions. (shrink)

L'anti- phénoménologie prend place dans un quadriparti dont les trois autres places sont occupées par la phénoménologie, la contre- phénoménologie et la non- phénoménologie. On peut voir en cette effectuation de l'antiphilosophie comme gnose rigoureuse la théorie-méthode transcendantale d'une rébellion qui ne serait pas du semblant. Anti-phenomenology takes place within a quadripartite whose three other parts are occupied by phenomenology, counter-phenomenology and nonphenomenology. This effectuation of anti-philosophy as a rigorous gnosis can be seen as the transcendental theory-method for a rebellion (...) that would not be a pretence. (shrink)

On a longtemps pensé le XVIIIe siècle à travers l'affrontement exclusif de deux mouvements : les Philosophes exaltant la raison critique et leurs adversaires représentants des anti-Lumières. Cet ouvrage vise à étudier les marges de ce noyau dur, objet privilégié de la tradition historiographique. Le mot marges est pris dans toutes les acceptions du terme : limites, seuils, zones grises, incertaines et problématiques. Il désigne les courants de pensée les plus divers qui se situent à la frontière des mouvements philosophiques, (...) sans basculer pour autant dans l'antiphilosophie ou les anti-Lumières. Il montre d'abord comment les Lumières elles-mêmes pensent les limites extrêmes de la validité de leur démarche, puis examine des courants intellectuels, à l'origine divergents ou opposés, qui se rencontrent ou coexistent, dans un état de tension et d'instabilité. Dans les trente années précédant la Révolution, on a souvent recours au vocabulaire philosophique, alors qu'on adopte des positions vaguement ou ouvertement antiphilosophiques. Fruit d'un colloque international tenu à l'Université de Tours en 2001, cet ouvrage nous rappelle que l'histoire culturelle de la deuxième moitié du XVIIIe siècle est faite de contradictions et de chevauchements, parfois paradoxaux. (shrink)