Abstract

This paper points to the relation between Wittgenstein's position and Kant's transcendental dialectics with regard to the nature of philosophical problems and their roots in language, thinking and affinities of humans. Related to this, there is the question of function of philosophy which involves the removal of these problems, according to both authors. The author supports the thesis that, when it comes to Wittgenstein, it cannot be discussed about the end of philosophy if he considers that there is the natural affinity towards philosophical errors, the cause of which is the complexity of language. Therefore, the author criticizes the view according to which Wittgenstein speaks about antiphilosophy, that is, about the negative meaning of philosophical thought. U ovom radu se pokazuje srodnost Vitgenstajnovih stavova sa Kantovom transcendentalnom dijalektikom u pogledu prirode filozofskih problema i njihove duboke ukorenjenosti u jeziku, misljenju i sklonostima ljudskih bica. Sa time je povezano i pitanje funkcije filozofiranja, koju prema obojici autora, cini otklanjanje ovih duboko usadjenih problema. Autor zastupa tezu da se kod Vitgenstajna ne moze govoriti o kraju filozofije ukoliko smatra da postoji prirodna sklonost ka filozofskim pogreskama ciji je uzrok u kompleksnosti jezika. Stoga autor kritikuje stanoviste prema kojem je kod Vitgenstajna rec o antifilozofiji, odnosno o negativnom odredjenju filozofskog misljenja.