What do we owe to non-human animals? How should we respond to the many injustices they face? Answering these questions requires philosophical attention to complicated questions about moral reasoning, moral status, and ethical theory. This first part of this chapter provides an overview of what both good and bad moral reasoning look like in the context of discussions about animal ethics. The second part of this chapter provides an overview of competing approaches to moral status, including anthropocentric, rationality, (...) and sentio-centric approaches. The third, and final, part of this chapter provides an overview of competing approaches to ethical theory, including contractualism, rights theory, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics, as they apply to the moral treatment of other animals. And in its entirety, this chapter provides moral guidance to those who aim to protect animals in a world infested with animal injustices. (shrink)

Environmental ethics has to deal with the challenge of reconciling contrasting ecocentric and animal-centric perspectives. Two classic attempts at this reconciliation, which both adopted the metaphor of concentric circles, are discussed. It is concluded that the relationship between the animal and its environment, whether the latter is human or natural, should be a pivotal element of such reconciliation. An alternative approach is presented, inspired by care ethics, which proposes that caring for wild animals implies caring (...) for their relationship to the natural environment and thus taking action to maintain wildlife habitat. This type of care is labelled non-specific care because it is not directed towards the individual wild animal and its specific individual needs. In contrast, caring for domestic animals is called specific care because it is much more directed towards the individual animal's needs. (shrink)

Concern for what we do to plants is pivotal for the field of environmental ethics but has scarcely been voiced. This paper examines how plant ethics first emerged from the development of plant science and yet also hit theoretical barriers in that domain. It elaborates on a case study prompted by a legal article on “the dignity of creatures” in the Swiss Constitution. Interestingly, the issue of plant dignity was interpreted as a personification or rather an “animalization of (...) plants.” This sense of irony makes sense when one realizes that on scientific grounds the plant is a “second animal,” i.e., it differs from the animal in degree of life or some ethically-relevant criterion but not in nature. From the point of view of ethics however, plants should be defended for what they are by nature and not by comparison to external references: the ethical standing of plants cannot be indexed to animals. It is thus reckoned that to circumvent this odd fetishism, the plant ethics can only be adequately addressed by changing the theory of plant science. Common sense tells us this: plants and animals belong to radically different fields of perception and experience, a difference that is commonly captured by the notion of kingdom. In this paper we remind the ethical conversation that plants are actually incommensurable with animals because they are unsplit beings (having neither inside nor outside), i.e., they live as “non-topos” in an undivided, unlimited, non-centered state of being. It is concluded that the unique ontology of plants can only be addressed through a major change from object-thinking to process-thinking and a move from ego-centric to “peri-ego” ethics. (shrink)

Agricultural technologies are non-neutral and ethical challenges are posed by these technologies themselves. The technologies we use or endorse are embedded with values and norms and reflect the shape of our moral character. They can literally make us better or worse consumers and/or people. Looking back, when the world’s developed nations welcomed and steadily embraced industrialization as the dominant paradigm for agriculture a half century or so ago, they inadvertently championed a philosophy of technology that promotes an insular human-centricism, despite (...) its laudable intent to ensure food security and advance human flourishing. The dominant philosophy of technology has also seeded particular ethical consequences that plague the well-being of human beings, the planet, and farmed animals. After revisiting some fundamental questions regarding the complex ways in which technology as agent shapes our lives and choices and relegates food and farmed constituents into technological artifacts or commodities, I argue that we should accord an environmental virtue ethic of care—understood as caretaking—a central place in developing a more conscientious philosophy of technology that aims at sustainability, fairness, and humaneness in animal agriculture. While technology shapes society, it also is socially shaped and an environmental virtue ethic of care (EVEC) as an alternative design philosophy has the tools to help us take a much overdue inventory of ourselves and our relationships with the nonhuman world. It can help us to expose the ways in which technology hinders critical reflection of its capacity to alter communities and values, to come to terms with why we may be, in general, disengaged from critical ethical analysis of contemporary agriculture and to consider the moral shape and trajectory and the sustainability of our food production systems going into the future. I end by outlining particular virtues associated with the ethic of care discussed here and consider some likely implications for consumers and industry technocrats as they relate to farming animals. (shrink)

The Animal Catalyst deals with the 'question' of 'what is an animal' and also in some instances, 'what is a human'? It pushes the critical animal studies in important new directions; it re-examines its basic assumptions, suggests new paradigms for how we can live and function ecologically, in a world that is not simply "ours." It argues that it is not enough to recognise the ethical demands placed upon us by our encounters with animals, or to critique (...) our often murderous treatment of them: this simply reinforces human exceptionalism. Featuring contributions from leading academics, lawyers, artists and activists, the book examines key issues such as: - How "compassion" for animals reinforces ideas of what distinguishes human beings from other animals. - How animal documentaries highlight the problematics of human-based representations of nonhumans. - How speciesism and human centricity are built into the legal system. - How individualist subjectivity works in relation to animals who may not think of themselves in the same way. - How any consideration of animal others must involve a radical deconstruction of our very notion of the "human." This volume is a unique project which stands at the cutting edge of both animal rights philosophies and posthuman/artistic/abstract philosophies of identity. It will be of great interest to undergraduates and researchers in philosophy, ethics, particularly continental philosophy, critical theory and cultural studies. (shrink)

In recent years, critics sensitive to animal issues have begun to theorize a new direction in literary criticism, an animal-centric or animal-standpoint criticism. Such a criticism seeks to examine works of literature from the point of view of how animals are treated therein, often looking to reconstruct the standpoint of the animals in question. This article examines a selection of short stories by Leo Tolstoy considering them exemplary from the point of view of animal-standpoint criticism.

Most discussions on animal experimentation refer to domesticated animals and regulations are tailored to this class of animals. However, wild animals are also used for research, e.g., in biological field research that is often directed to fundamental ecological-evolutionary questions or to conservation goals. There are several differences between domesticated and wild animals that are relevant for evaluation of the acceptability of animal experiments. Biological features of wild animals are often more critical as compared with domesticated animals because of (...) their survival effects. An important issue is what is called here ``natural suffering'''': the suffering from natural circumstances. Should this type of suffering be taken into account when suffering from experimentation is evaluated? As an answer, it is suggested that ``natural functioning'''' should be considered as an additional standard in the evaluation of wild animal experimentation. Finally, two topics related to the ecological context are considered. Firstly, the often inevitable involvement of non-research animals in wild animal experimentation, and secondly, the eco-centric approach to nature conservation. According to the latter position, animals are subordinated to ecosystems. All these aspects make the evaluation of wild animal experiments much more complex than experiments with domesticated animals. Preliminary scores are proposed to deal with these aspects. It is argued that this should not lead to a more complex governmental regulation, since an effective maintenance and control are hard to realize and one may loose the cooperation of researchers themselves. In addition, non-governmental professional organizations such as research societies and funding organizations play a pivotal role. (shrink)

Research on ethical issues within food systems is often human-centric. As a consequence, animal-centric policy debates where regulatory decisions about food are being made tend to be overlooked by food scholars and activists. This absence was notable in the recent debates around Australia’s animal live export industry. Using Foucault’s tools, we explore how ‘food security’ is conceptualised and governed within animal cruelty policy debates about the live export trade. The problem of food security produced in (...) these debates shaped Indonesians as ‘victims’ of food insecurity due to the nation’s inability to produce sufficient quantities of protein. This understanding of the problem reproduced the dominant framing of food security as a problem for developing countries addressed by increasing global food production. The underlying premise uncritically accepted in Australia’s debates on live export trade was that intensive animal agriculture, and Australia’s live export trade specifically, were essential to alleviating global food insecurity. Drawing on our findings, we show how dominant representations of ‘food security’, and related regulatory and technological trajectories, flourish where alliances between animal and food activists, scholarship, and movements are weak. Accordingly, we argue for agri-food scholars to take up opportunities to contribute to the policy discussions about the treatment of animals to effectively expand the kinds of problems, solutions, and strategies of resistance produced in the discourses surrounding food system issues. (shrink)

It might become possible to build artificial minds with the capacity for experience. This raises a plethora of ethical issues, explored, among others, in the context of whole brain emulations (WBE). In this paper, I will take up the problem of vulnerability – given, for various reasons, less attention in the literature – that the conscious emulations will likely exhibit. Specifically, I will examine the role that vulnerability plays in generating ethical issues that may arise when dealing with WBEs. I (...) will argue that concerns about vulnerability are more matters of institutional design than individual ethics, both when it comes to creating humanlike brain emulations, and when animal-like emulations are concerned. Consequently, the article contains reflection on some institutional measures that can be taken to protect the sims' interests. It concludes that an institutional framework more likely to succeed in this task is competitive and poly-centric, rather than monopolistic and centralized. (shrink)

This volume presents a framework of general principles for animal research ethics together with an analysis of the principles' meaning and moral requirements. Tom L. Beauchamp and David DeGrazia's comprehensive framework addresses ethical requirements pertaining to societal benefit and features a thorough, ethically defensible program of animal welfare. The book also features commentaries on the framework of principles by eminent figures in animal research ethics from an array of relevant disciplines: veterinary medicine, biomedical research, biology, (...) zoology, comparative psychology, primatology, law, and bioethics. (shrink)

This study sheds new insight on how historically oppressed and marginalized actors are able to pursue environmental sustainability based on alternative worldviews (e.g., Indigenous worldviews) rather than succumbing to those dominant in the Western society, based on a study of the Syilx (“Okanagan”) people in British Columbia, Canada. We found that the Syilx people enacted the ethical practice of _nʕawqnwixʷ_ (“the reciprocal gentle dropping of thoughts, like water, into everyone’s minds to address the issue at the centre of discussion and (...) to reach collective consensus for action”), anchored in the Syilx worldview, to reconstruct the relationships between humans and nature. Two overlapping processes are involved: developing foundational principles for human–nature relations and carrying out reconstruction work. Ongoing enactment of _nʕawqnwixʷ_ practice provided community-based agency, enabling the Syilx people to shift the conversation around environmental sustainability. From this, we discuss the theoretical potential of community-based agency for the study of environmental sustainability, and the role of Indigenous worldviews for (re)imagining human-nature ethics (and reorienting the theoretical lens of human-animal or human-plant ethics form a firm-centric focus to a community-oriented lens), and important implications for practitioners and policymakers in the field of environmental sustainability. (shrink)

It might become possible to build artificial minds with the capacity for experience. This raises a plethora of ethical issues, explored, among others, in the context of whole brain emulations (WBE). In this paper, I will take up the problem of vulnerability – given, for various reasons, less attention in the literature – that the conscious emulations will likely exhibit. Specifically, I will examine the role that vulnerability plays in generating ethical issues that may arise when dealing with WBEs. I (...) will argue that concerns about vulnerability are more matters of institutional design than individual ethics, both when it comes to creating humanlike brain emulations, and when animal-like emulations are concerned. Consequently, the article contains reflection on some institutional measures that can be taken to protect the sims' interests. It concludes that an institutional framework more likely to succeed in this task is competitive and poly-centric, rather than monopolistic and centralized. (shrink)

"A previous edition of this book appeared under the title Magpies, Monkeys, and Morals. The new edition has been updated throughout.

Movies can serve valuable didactic purposes teaching clinical ethics to medical students. However, using film sequences as means to develop critical thinking is not a straightforward task. There is a significant gap in the literature regarding how to analyse the ethical content embedded in these clips systematically, in a way that facilitates the students’ transition from anecdotal reflections to abstract thinking. This article offers a pedagogical proposal to approach the ethical analysis of film sequences in a systematic fashion. This (...) structured stepwise method encourages students to identify the main ethical problem of a selected scene and to reflect on the theoretical principles involved, emphasizing the application of these norms and values in a contextually situated analysis. We believe this method in film studies both reinforces the students’ comprehension of the theoretical framework of an ethical topic, and casts light on its pertinence and limitations under the circumstances of the scene, thus proving a constructive tool to strengthen the bridge between the theoretical teaching of clinical ethics and clinical practice. (shrink)

Animal beauty provides a significant aesthetic reason for protecting nature. Worries about aesthetic discrimination and the ugliness of predation might make one think otherwise. Although it has been argued that aesthetic merit is a trivial and morally objectionable basis for action, beauty is an important value and a legitimate basis for differential treatment, especially in the case of animals. While the suffering and death of animals due to predation are important disvalues that must be recognized, predation’s tragic beauty has (...) positive aesthetic value that can be appropriately aesthetically appreciated. (shrink)

The significance of animals in research cannot be over-emphasized. The use of animals for research and training in research centres, hospitals and schools is progressively increasing. Advances in biotechnology to improve animal productivity require animal research. Drugs being developed and new interventions or therapies being invented for cure and palliation of all sorts of animal diseases and conditions need to be tested in animals for their safety and efficacy at some stages of their development. Drugs and interventions (...) for human use pass through a similar development process and must be tested pre-clinically in laboratory animals before clinical trials in humans can be conducted. Therefore, animals are important players in research processes which directly and indirectly benefit animals and humans. However, questions remain as to whether these uses of animals consider the best interests of animals themselves. Various research and training institutions in Tanzania have established some guidelines on animal use, including establishing animal ethics committees. However, most institutions have not established oversight committees. In institutions where there may be guidelines and policies, there are no responsible committees or units to directly oversee if and how these guidelines and policies are enforced; thus, implementation becomes difficult or impossible. This paper endeavours to raise some issues associated with the responsible use of animals in research and training in Tanzania and highlights suggestions for improvement of deficiencies that exist in order to bridge the gap between what ought to be practised and what is practised. (shrink)

Can animals be regarded as part of the moral community? To what extent, if at all, do they have moral rights? Are we wrong to eat them, hunt them, or use them for scientific research? Can animal liberation be squared with the environmental movement? Taylor traces the background of these debates from Aristotle to Darwin and sets out the views of numerous contemporary philosophers – including Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Mary Anne Warren, J. Baird Callicott, and Martha Nussbaum – (...) with ethical theories ranging from utilitarianism to eco-feminism. The new edition also includes provocative quotations from some of the major writers in the field. As the final chapter insists, animal ethics is more than just an "academic" question: it is intimately connected both to our understanding of what it means to be human and to pressing current issues such as food shortages, environmental degradation, and climate change. (shrink)

Can animals be regarded as part of the moral community? To what extent, if at all, do they have moral rights? Are we wrong to eat them, hunt them, or use them for scientific research? Can animal liberation be squared with the environmental movement? Taylor traces the background of these debates from Aristotle to Darwin and sets out the views of numerous contemporary philosophers—including Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Mary Anne Warren, J. Baird Callicott, and Martha Nussbaum—with ethical theories ranging (...) from utilitarianism to eco-feminism. The new edition also includes provocative quotations from some of the major writers in the field. As the final chapter insists, animal ethics is more than just an “academic” question: it is intimately connected both to our understanding of what it means to be human and to pressing current issues such as food shortages, environmental degradation, and climate change. (shrink)

The public attitude to animal use in Australia and New Zealandcan be inferred from survey results and political activity. The publicis concerned about the rights of animals as far as any uses causing painare concerned, but takes a more utilitarian view of the taking of lifewhere no suffering is involved. Many of the participants in two recentANZCCART conferences fall short in their knowledge of and attitudetoward these concerns. Animal welfare legislation and standards need tobe reformed so that painful (...) animal use is eliminated, even if economicgrowth suffers as a result. (shrink)

The significance of animals in research cannot be over‐emphasized. The use of animals for research and training in research centres, hospitals and schools is progressively increasing. Advances in biotechnology to improve animal productivity require animal research. Drugs being developed and new interventions or therapies being invented for cure and palliation of all sorts of animal diseases and conditions need to be tested in animals for their safety and efficacy at some stages of their development. Drugs and interventions (...) for human use pass through a similar development process and must be tested pre‐clinically in laboratory animals before clinical trials in humans can be conducted. Therefore, animals are important players in research processes which directly and indirectly benefit animals and humans. However, questions remain as to whether these uses of animals consider the best interests of animals themselves. Various research and training institutions in Tanzania have established some guidelines on animal use, including establishing animal ethics committees. However, most institutions have not established oversight committees. In institutions where there may be guidelines and policies, there are no responsible committees or units to directly oversee if and how these guidelines and policies are enforced; thus, implementation becomes difficult or impossible. This paper endeavours to raise some issues associated with the responsible use of animals in research and training in Tanzania and highlights suggestions for improvement of deficiencies that exist in order to bridge the gap between what ought to be practised and what is practised. (shrink)

This article provides a critique of the IWC's traditional focus on anthropocentric conservation in the governance of whaling. It is argued that this position, which relies on accepting the view that we have no direct moral duties to whales, is out of step with the moral status that now tends, in theory and practice, to be granted to animals. More specifically, anthropocentric conservation conflicts with the widespread acceptance, in theory and practice, that non-human animals such as whales have moral standing, (...) that what we do to them matters to them directly. This does not mean that whaling should necessarily be prohibited on ethical grounds, although the animal welfare analysis of whaling sketched in this article does suggest that, on balance, it is difficult to defend morally. Rather, it is being claimed that it is morally objectionable to deny, as the whaling nations do, that the IWC ought to be mandated to consider the welfare implications of whaling. (shrink)

We have come to regard nonhuman animals as beings of concern, and we even grant them some legal protections. But until we understand animals as moral agents in and of themselves, they will be nothing more than distant recipients of our largesse. Featuring original essays by philosophers, ethicists, religionists, and ethologists, including Marc Bekoff, Frans de Waal, and Elisabetta Palagi, this collection demonstrates the ability of animals to operate morally, process ideas of good and bad, and think seriously about sociality (...) and virtue. Envisioning nonhuman animals as distinct moral agents marks a paradigm shift in animal studies, as well as philosophy itself. Drawing not only on ethics and religion but also on law, sociology, and cognitive science, the essays in this collection test long-held certainties about moral boundaries and behaviors and prove that nonhuman animals possess complex reasoning capacities, sophisticated empathic sociality, and dynamic and enduring self-conceptions. Rather than claim animal morality is the same as human morality, this book builds an appreciation of the variety and character of animal sensitivities and perceptions across multiple disciplines, moving animal welfarism in promising new directions. (shrink)

People, as Aristotle said, are political animals. Mainstream political philosophy, however, has largely neglected humankind's animal nature as beings who are naturally equipped, and inclined, to reason and work together, create social bonds and care for their young. Stephen Clark, grounded in biological analysis and traditional ethics, probes into areas ignored in mainstream political theory and argues for the significance of social bonds which bypass or transcend state authority. Understanding the ties that bind us reveals how enormously capable (...) we are in achieving civil order as a species. Stephen Clark advocates that a properly informed political philosophy must take into account the role of women, children, animals, minorities and the domestic virtues at large. Living and comnducting our political lives like the animals we are is a more congenial prospect than is usually supposed. (shrink)

Though there is a burgeoning interest in applied Buddhist ethics, Buddhist animal research ethics remains an underdeveloped area. In this paper I will explore how some central Buddhist ethical considerations can usefully engage our use of other animals (henceforth, animals) in science. As the scientific use of animals is broad, I will narrow my focus to laboratory science. I will show that, though a Buddhist abolitionism would not be unmotivated, it is possible to reject it. While doing (...) so, it will be important to resist emphasizing elements of Buddhist thought that merely provide reasons to adopt the dominant ethical framework governing laboratory animal research ethics, known as the 3Rs. Though I will suggest how a Buddhist animal research ethics can sometimes permit the use of animals in harmful research, it will also require ethical constraints that resonate with some of the more progressive elements in ‘Western’ bioethics. (shrink)

The roles companion animals have played in our lives has dramatically changed over the last few decades. At the same time, the terms we use to describe both the people and animals in these human-animal relationships have also changed. One example includes the use of the terms ‘owner’ or ‘guardian’ to refer to the human caretaker. While preferences by society appear to indicate increased interest in referring to companion animal caretakers as ‘guardians’, others have cautioned against its use (...) or attempted to restrict it. Additionally, the use of animal welfare terminology has direct implications for how we conduct both welfare research and practice. Our paper examines the use of ‘owner’ and ‘guardian’ with respect to (1) the implications for changing terminology on the function, clarity and uniformity of their use, and (2) the ethical and welfare impact that coincides with each term’s use. Our goal is to propose terminological considerations that could influence future welfare research, as well as help guide our interactions with companion animals. (shrink)

Alongside in vitro studies, researchers are increasingly exploring the transplantation of human brain organoids (HBOs) into non-human animals to study brain development, disease, and repair. This paper focuses on ethical issues raised by such transplantation studies. In particular, it investigates the possibility that they might yield enhanced brain function in recipient animals (especially non-human primates), thereby fundamentally altering their moral status. I assess the critique, raised by major voices in the bioethics and science communities, according to which such concerns are (...) premature and misleading. I identify the assumptions underlying this skeptical critique, and mention some objections against them, followed by some possible replies. I proceed to argue that the skeptical position is ultimately implausible, because it presupposes an unreasonably high standard of full moral status. My argument appeals to David DeGrazia’s idea of a “borderline person”, and to the need for consistency with existing animal research regulations. I outline the practical implications of my view for the conduct of studies that might result in the development of full moral status in a transplanted animal. I also discuss some of the ethical implications of animal enhancement (particularly of rodents) below the threshold associated with full moral status. I conclude that far from being premature, further debate on these issues is urgently needed to help clarify the prospects that a neural chimera might attain full moral status in the foreseeable future, and the level of quality of life required to make it acceptable to knowingly create such a being via HBO transplantation. (shrink)

The ethics of using nonhuman animals in biomedical research is usually seen as a subfield of animal ethics. In recent years, however, the ethics of animal research has increasingly become a subfield within research ethics under the term “animal research ethics”. Consequently, ethical issues have become prominent that are familiar in the context of human research ethics, such as autonomy or self-determination, harms and benefits, justice, and vulnerability. After a brief overview (...) of the development of the field and a discussion of relevant theoretical ethical frameworks, I consider two of these issues, namely autonomy and self-determination on the one hand, and harms and benefits on the other hand. My concern is with philosophical and ethical issues, rather than animal research oversight. I focus my discussion on nonhuman primates, as the most plausible nonhuman candidates for this approach. I conclude that the approach, although promising, depends strongly on the moral status of nonhuman research subjects. (shrink)

The industrialisation of agriculture has led to considerable alterations at both the technological and economical levels of animal farming. Several animal welfare issues of modern animal agriculture – e.g. stress and stereotypical behaviour – can be traced back to the industrialised intensification of housing and numbers of animals in production. Although these welfare issues dictate ethical criticism, it is the claim of this article that such direct welfare issues are only the forefront of a greater systemic ethical (...) problem inherent to industrialisation. Consequently, this article provides an analysis of the foundational ethical problems in animal agriculture which derive from overly positivistic science and free-market ideology. It will be argued that both these ways of thinking allow for a systematic reification and commodification of animals and that this contributes to language and attitudes which cannot encompass ethical consideration of animals. (shrink)

This chapter explores critically ethical concerns arising from forms of suffering to which domesticated nonhuman animals are subjected in scientific instruction and research and within the industrial-factory-farm-food complex, as well as other contexts. Consideration is given to the views of Arthur Schopenhauer on suffering, René Descartes’s designation of ontological differences between human and non-human animals, and Donna Haraway’s reconfiguration of the relationship between human and nonhuman animals in scientific laboratory settings. Proceeding from a discussion of David Benatar’s “antinatalist” views the (...) focus of analysis is on the forms of suffering imposed on domesticated nonhuman animals by humans. In response to ethical concerns raised about the suffering inflicted on nonhuman animals in the course of scientific research, scientists have sought a “solution” in the form of genetically engineered nonhuman animals whose responses to painful stimuli are presented as modulated to reduce pain. This reductive conceptualization of suffering reduces the complexity of suffering to physical sensation alone and does not engage with the ethical issues involved. Drawing on the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Albert Schweitzer the chapter concludes that an ethical solution to the complex issues explored lies in refraining from exposing nonhuman animals to pain and suffering. (shrink)

Research ethics is a core component of undergraduate psychology curricula, typically first encountered in introductory textbooks. Previous analyses of introductory textbooks focused on human research ethics. Given growing concerns about animal research—particularly among college students—we analyzed discussions of animal research ethics in 18 introductory psychology textbooks. Our results revealed that while most textbooks address this topic, defenses of animal use and mentions of oversight account for a majority of content, while discussions of ethics (...) were lacking. We discuss implications of these results and suggest improvements for engaging students to think critically about animal research ethics. (shrink)

Traditionally animal ethics has criticised the anthropocentric worldview according to which humans differ categorically from the rest of the nature in some morally relevant way. It has claimed that even though there are differences, there are also crucial similarities between humans and animals that make it impossible to draw a categorical distinction between humans who are morally valuable and animals which are not. This argument, according to which animals and humans share common characteristics that lead to moral value, (...) is at the heart of animal ethics. Lately the emphasis on similarity has been under attack. It has been claimed that the search for similarity is itself part of anthropocentric morality, since only those like us are valuable. It also has been claimed that true respect for animals comes from recognising their difference and 'otherness', not from seeing similarities. This paper analyses the new 'other animal ethics' by critically examining its basis and consequences. The conclusion is that despite the fact that other animal ethics is right in demanding respect also for difference, it remains both vague and contradictory in its theoretical basis, and leads to undesirable consequences from the perspective of animal welfare. (shrink)

In Principles of Animal Research Ethics, Tom Beauchamp and David DeGrazia (hereafter B&D) aim to replace the well-known “3Rs”—Replacing animal research with non-animal methods, Reducing the numbers of animals, and Refining experiments to reduce harms and improve welfare—as the guiding principles regulating animal research. . . B&D present their principles as “useful” for people engaged in animal research and as a “philosophically sound” (p. 4) framework for a new ethic for animal research. Regrettably, (...) I have doubts about both these overall claims and so am pessimistic about the book. (shrink)

Animal research has long been a source of biomedical aspirations and moral concern. Examples of both hope and concern are abundant today. In recent months, as is common practice, monkeys have served as test subjects in promising preclinical trials for an Ebola vaccine or treatment 1 , 2 , 3 and in controversial maternal deprivation studies. 4 The unresolved tension between the noble aspirations of animal research and the ethical controversies it often generates motivates the present issue of (...) the Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics. As editors of this special section, we hope that these original and timely articles will push the professional discussion of animal research ethics in a positive direction that will benefi t research scientists and others interested in moral problems in animal research. We also look forward to a day when animal research will genuinely meet both appropriate scientifi c and appropriate ethical criteria—criteria that themselves can be improved by critical scrutiny. Animal research—that is, the use of live animals as experimental subjects in biomedical and behavioral fi elds of learning—has been deeply entrenched for well over half a century. One signal development was the enactment in the late 1930s of federal product safety legislation in the United States and other nations that required animal testing of food, drugs, and medical devices prior to use by human subjects or consumers. 5 Another development was the publication of codes of research ethics that called for animal research prior to human research. The Nuremberg Code, published by an American military tribunal in 1947–48 after scrutiny of Nazi medical atrocities, stated that experiments involving the use of human subjects should be " based on the results of animal experimentation. " 6 The Declaration of Helsinki, fi rst published in 1964, reaffi rmed this assumption and added, rather imprecisely, that " the welfare of animals used for research must be respected. " 7 Against the background of such statements, the institutionalization and widespread acceptance of animal research in the twentieth century rested on two basic assumptions, one factual and one moral. The factual assumption was that animal research is suffi ciently reliable as a basis for predicting the effects of drugs, products, and other materials on human beings that animal trials can be expected to yield signifi cant scientifi c conclusions and medical benefi ts to humanity. (shrink)

This book review essay discusses Principles of Animal Research Ethics (2020), by Tom L. Beauchamp and David DeGrazia.

Partly in response to rising rates of obesity, many governments have published healthy eating advice. Focusing on health advice related to the consumption of animal products (APs), I argue that the individualistic paradigm that prevails must be replaced by a radically new approach that emphasizes the duty of all human beings to restrict their negative “Global Health Impacts” (GHIs). If they take human rights seriously, many governments from nations with relatively large negative GHIs—including the Australian example provided here—must develop (...) strategies to reduce their citizens’ negative GHIs. As the negative GHIs associated with the consumption of many APs are excessive, it is my view that many governments ought to adopt a qualified ban on the consumption of APs. (shrink)

Kant on the Human Animal offers the first systematic analysis of this central but neglected dimension of Kant's philosophy.

Traditional approaches to animal ethics commonly emerge from one of two influential ethical theories: Regan’s deontology (The case for animal rights. University of California, Berkeley, 1983) and Singer’s preference utilitarianism (Animal liberation. Avon Books, New York, 1975). I argue that both of the theories are unsuccessful at providing adequate protection for animals because they are unable to satisfy the three conditions of a minimally decent theory of animal protection. While Singer’s theory is overly permissive, Regan’s (...) theory is too restrictive. I argue that a minimally decent animal ethic requires a framework that allows for context-dependent considerations of our complex human–animal relationship in a non-ideal world. A plausible theory which exemplifies this new ethic is virtue ethics. (shrink)

Research ethics -- The ethical perspective -- The 3rs and good scientific practice -- Applying ethical thinking and social relevance -- Regulation and legislation : overview and background -- Public involvement : how and why? -- The future of animal research : guesstimates on technical and ethical developments -- New refine.