Before 1933 commentaries on laws were exclusively juristic texts, written and read only by legal professionals. Beginning in 1934, scholars from different disciplines, especially medical scientists, began writing juristic commentaries. The essay examines the reasons for this development and explores how it changed the genre, using the example of the most important commentary on theBlutschutz-andEhegesundheitsgesetz, which resulted from the collaboration of two medical professionals and a legal professional. The article argues that the recruitment of non-juristic authors and the corresponding methodological (...) changes were caused by a debate on a possible “reform” of juristic commentaries which took place in law journals. From the perspective of the National Socialist regime, the genre in its traditional form was not compatible with the Third Reich’s philosophy of law.In this new genre, commentaries not only referred to legal problems, but also dealt with issues from other disciplines, such as medical questions. The essay modifies Mitchell G. Ash’s theoretical approach regarding the “entanglement” of jurisprudence and other disciplines. Law and other sciences became, according to Ash, “resources for one another”: Legal scholars could claim that legal decisions were based on scientific facts and therefore “unquestionable.” The affected disciplines also gained greater importance as a result of this process in which their findings becoming legally relevant. This transformation also enabled them to acquire resources for new research projects.Moreover, the essay examines the connection between this development and the change of audience within German courts. Not only did the authors of the commentaries change, but also the recipients: Many laws passed after 1933 introduced new courts using lay judges, professionals with a non-law background. These “experts” came from multiple fields connecting them to the new law, such as medical professionals. (shrink)

Mindreading is often considered to be the most important human social cognitive skill, and over the past three decades, several theories of the cognitive mechanisms for mindreading have been proposed. But why do we read minds? According to the standard view, we attribute mental states to individuals to predict and explain their behavior. I argue that the standard view is too general to capture the distinctive function of mindreading, and that it does not explain what motivates people to read minds. (...) In order to understand why mindreading is evolutionarily adaptive, individually beneficial, and motivationally compelling, we need to include another level of explanation: the level of social relationships. I introduce a theory of the cognitive underpinnings of social relationships—the relational models theory of Alan Fiske. I outline the hypothesis that the function of mindreading is to shape social relations. I further hypothesize that mindreading is often motivated by social emotions. If mindreading serves r.. (shrink)

The theory of mind (ToM) framework has been criticised by emerging alternative accounts. Each alternative begins with the accusation that ToM's validity as a research paradigm rests on the assumption of the ‘unobservability’ of other minds. We argue that the critics' discussion of the unobservability assumption (UA) targets a straw man. We discuss metaphysical, phenomenological, epistemological, and psychological readings of UA and demonstrate that it is not the case that ToM assumes the metaphysical, phenomenological, or epistemological claims. However, ToM supports (...) the psychological UA as a claim about cognitive processes responsible for mindreading. The latter can be interpreted as a claim that (a) neither the other's ‘mindedness’ in general nor the other's particular mental states are observable (i.e. apprehended perceptually); (b) particular mental states are unobservable, whereas some aspects indicative of ‘mindedness’ are observable; (c) some mental states are unobservable but some are also observable. Whereas the critics tend to attribute (a) to ToM, most ToM accounts actually take positions (b) or (c). We conclude that the allegations against ToM for positing UA are seriously misdirected. We further bring out an important stipulation of any account of observability of mental states: mental states are not observable in the same way as the sensory properties of physical objects. (shrink)

Chaque nouvelle technologie suscite des illusions sur les nouvelles possibilités d'accès aux connaissances qu'elle ouvre à tous. Cet article s'intéresse aux différents types d'offres éducatives accessibles sur Internet, de la moins structurée à la plus organisée, et s'appuie sur des travaux de recherche pour mettre en évidence le fait qu'il existe un fossé entre la liberté potentielle d'accès aux savoirs et son accès effectif. Il souligne les diverses difficultés rencontrées par les apprenants et rarement prises en compte par l'institution éducative, (...) et il insiste sur l'importance de la fonction tutorale pour aider les moins armés, qui sont aussi les plus nombreux, à acquérir l'autonomie nécessaire à ce mode d'apprentissage. Il conclut que, faute d'un investissement important dans ce domaine, l'égalité des chances et la «liberté d'apprendre» pour tous, dont les formations en ligne se prétendent ou se voudraient porteuses, ne peuvent que demeurer des mythes.Every new technology creates illusions about the new possibilities it opens up access to knowledge for all. This article looks at different types of educational opportunities available on the Internet, the less structured to more organized and is based on research to highlight the fact that there is a gap between the potential freedom access to knowledge and effective access. It highlights the various problems encountered by learners and rarely taken into account by the educational institution, and emphasizes the importance of the role of tutor to help those less armed, who are also the most likely to acquire the necessary autonomy this mode of learning. He concludes that without a significant investment in this area, equal opportunities and the "freedom to learn" for all, including online training would pretend or carriers, can only remain myths. (shrink)

The current pandemic represents unprecedented times in medical education. In addition to the already strenuous demands of medical school, the SARS-CoVid-2 pandemic introduced a new source of ethical and moral pressure on students. Medical students navigated finishing their didactic years in isolation and initiated their clinical rotations in a pandemic environment. Many medical students found themselves in the frustrating position of being non-essential healthcare workers but still wanting to help. This paper follows the personal and shared experiences of a second-year (...) medical student transitioning to their third year. In particular, this paper examines the author’s personal ties to the disability community through their family, and how this impacted their approach in striving to aid in the pandemic. (shrink)

Traditional theory of mind (ToM) accounts for social cognition have been at the basis of most studies in the social cognitive neurosciences. However, in recent years, the need to go beyond traditional ToM accounts for understanding real life social interactions has become all the more pressing. At the same time it remains unclear whether alternative accounts, such as interactionism, can yield a sufficient description and explanation of social interactions. We argue that instead of considering ToM and interactionism as mutually exclusive (...) opponents, they should be integrated into a more comprehensive account of social cognition. We draw on dual process models of social cognition that contrast two different types of social cognitive processing. The first type (labeled Type 1) refers to process es that are fast, efficient, stimulus-driven, and relatively inflexible. The second type (labeled Type 2) refers to processes that are relatively slow, cognitively laborious, flexible, and may involve conscious control. We argue that while interactionism captures aspects of social cognition mostly related to Type 1 processes, ToM is more focused on those based on Type 2 processes. We suggest that real life social interactions are rarely based on either Type 1 or Type 2 processes alone. On the contrary, we propose that in most cases both types of processes are simultaneously involved and that social behavior may be sustained by the interplay between these two types of processes. Finally, we discuss how the new integrative framework can guide experimental research on social interaction. (shrink)

Most objectivist and dispositionalist theories of color have tried to resolve the challenge raised by color variations by drawing a distinction between real and apparent colors. This paper considers such a strategy to be fundamentally erroneous. The high degree of variability of colors constitutes a crucial feature of colors and color perception; it cannot be avoided without leaving aside the real nature of color. The objectivist theory of color defended in this paper holds that objects have locally many different objective (...) colors. Most color variations are then real and result from the extreme richness of color properties. (shrink)

In this paper we defend structural representations, more specifically neural structural representation. We are not alone in this, many are currently engaged in this endeavor. The direction we take, however, diverges from the main road, a road paved by the mathematical theory of measure that, in the 1970s, established homomorphism as the way to map empirical domains of things in the world to the codomain of numbers. By adopting the mind as codomain, this mapping became a boon for all those (...) convinced that a representation system should bear similarities with what was being represented, but struggled to find a precise account of what such similarities mean. The euforia was brief, however, and soon homomorphism revealed itself to be affected by serious weaknesses, the primary one being that it included systems embarrassingly alien to representations. We find that the defense attempts that have followed, adopt strategies that share a common format: valid structural representations come as “homomorphism plus X”, with various “X”, provided in descriptive format only. Our alternative direction stems from the observation of the overlooked departure from homomorphism as used in the theory of measure and its later use in mental representations. In the former case, the codomain or the realm of numbers, is the most suited for developing theorems detailing the existence and uniqueness of homomorphism for a wide range of empirical domains. In the latter case, the codomain is the realm of the mind, possibly more vague and more ill-defined than the empirical domain itself. The time is ripe for articulating the mapping between represented domains and the mind in formal terms, by exploiting what is currently known about coding mechanisms in the brain. We provide a sketch of a possible development in this direction, one that adopts the theory of neural population coding as codomain. We will show that our framework is not only not in disagreement with the “plus X” proposals, but can lead to natural derivation of several of the “X”. (shrink)

The notion of stench appears to have two faces. On one side, it seems to belong to the world that surrounds us. This is the case, for example, when we say that the smell of sewers is unbearable or that curdled milk stinks. On the other side, variations in people’s preferences for certain smells suggest that the attribution of stench to certain objects or substances is not objective as they first appear. Stench and Olfactory Disgust, by Vivian Mizrahi, explains the (...) bifacial nature of stench by arguing in favor of the idea that stench has to be understood in emotional rather than in strictly perceptual terms. Mizrahi’s strategy consists in showing that stench is the object of olfactory disgust. This puts her in a position to maintain that no smell is intrinsically unpleasant. The defense of these claims leads Mizrahi to lay out a view of olfactory disgust and to explain the singular nature of the relation between smell and stench. In the process, she examines the notion of hedonic value for smells and offers a non-polar opposition view of olfactory pleasantness. According to this view, olfactory disgust does not have an opposite emotion. A smell can be pleasant for a variety of reasons: it may whet our appetite or trigger different other positive emotions, but none of these positive olfactory emotions is strictly the opposite of olfactory disgust. (shrink)

Few views have seen a more precipitous fall from grace than hedonism, which once occupied a central position in the history of ethics. Recently, there have been efforts to revive interest in the view, including well-motivated pleas for contemporary ethicists to at least take the view seriously. In this article, I argue for the seriousness of hedonism on metaethical grounds. Taking J.S. Mill's argument for hedonism as a test case, I show that historically, classic hedonism was grounded metaethically via a (...) commitment to two positions: empiricist epistemology and the view that pleasure occurs in sensation. Together, these two positions provided principled grounds for various iterations of classic hedonism. Moreover, these two positions are still serious options in both contemporary epistemology and the contemporary literature on the nature of pleasure. Insofar as a contemporary ethicist takes those two views seriously, they ought to take classic hedonism seriously as well. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 33.4 (2000) 303-318 [Access article in PDF] The Threshold of the Self Bradford Vivian The subject has a history. Classical Greek sculpture expressed a fascination with the formal beauty of one's self. Ever gazing outward or upward, the marble figures symbolized the Greek preoccupation with a boldness of being, a constant focus on the ideals of the body and mind, which, through their pursuit, might allow (...) one a foretaste of heaven. Centuries later, as the pagan symbols of the ancient world were replaced with those of the growing Byzantine Empire, blocks of the same marble were fashioned into very different expressions. The ideals of form made manifest in the smooth, taught lines and surfaces of classical Greek sculpture were supplanted by Byzantine art's attention to the less perfect details of the individual: distinctive and common faces, beards, clothing, and less glorified bodies. The gazes of the Byzantine statues were cast down, contemplative, reflecting Byzantium's early Christian emphasis upon the modesty of human existence, the pious appraisal of one's time on Earth. Each of these sculptural styles is a material way of thinking and expressing one's being in the world. In this context, each is also symptomatic of the conditions in which such being was possible.The subject must not be conceived as a transcendent entity. Quite to the contrary, there is a historicity to our being and its expression, to our subjectivity and its elaboration. Within a more sweeping perspective, our epochal narratives of the subject--as well as the modes of thought and speech by which we make sense of ourselves--change with each passing age.At the forefront of the current era is a manifold effort to rethink and elaborate anew the concept of the subject. Feminist scholars have initiated political critique and transformation by arguing that the very notion of a subject in Western discourse has functioned as a trope of masculine privilege cloaked in the language of equality and secular humanism. 1 Postmodernists, of course, define contemporary subjectivity as de-centered and fragmented by nature (e.g., Baudrillard 1994; Latour 1993; Lyotard 1984). And [End Page 303] a variety of interdisciplinary studies illuminate the role of modern science and technology in not only sustaining our being, but actually constituting the human; in short, our daily interdependence and union with artificial body parts, synthetic products, life-support machines, test-tube reproduction, computers, and more, characterizes the arrival of what has been called "the posthuman." 2 Like ancient marble from a quarry, however, all of these materials are sculpted in historically specific ways to simultaneously think and express our subjectivity.What role might rhetoric play in this re-imagining of subjectivity? Modern Western thought has defined the subject according to content--that is, by the nature of the essence or being the subject is said to possess. Drawn around this content, the subject comes to appear enclosed, perhaps autonomous, and identical to itself. In this essay, however, I argue that the self may be conceived as a form--a rhetorical form--that exists only in its continual aesthetic creation, in its indefinite becoming. The self is, by this account, isomorphic with the threshold out of which it is composed. Such a formulation makes the self open to difference, to continual movement and transformation, instead of identical to itself.I aim in this essay to explore the abstract rhetorical forms and functions out of which the self is composed. The distinction here amounts to no longer asking, "What is a subject?" but, "What conditions and forces enable the ongoing production of the self?" Commensurate with such a proposal, it will be essential to ask how this movement--this continual becoming--of the self is brought about. The answer to this question ultimately will amplify the role of rhetoric in, not simply expressing, but actually producing conditions of being. In what follows, I begin by reviewing the very general aspects of subjectivity that I wish to call into question. Thereafter, I explore how the subject might be conceived differently. Finally, I discuss the manner in which rhetoric may... (shrink)

Race/Class/Gender otherwise known as Intersectionality is one of the most important theoretical precepts developed in the past two decades in women's and gender studies and in the social sciences and humanities. Yet the concept remains elusive and poorly understood. This book seeks to solve these problems by answering the basic questions surrounding intersectionality in prose undergraduate students can understand and appreciate.

According to socio-relational theory, men and women encountered different ecologies in their evolutionary past, and, as a result of different ancestral selection pressures, they developed different patterns of emotional expressivity that have persisted across cultures and large human evolutionary time scales. We question these assumptions, and propose that social-cognitive models of individual differences more parsimoniously account for sex differences in emotional expressivity.

This commentary argues that Gallagher's account of direct social perception has remained underdeveloped in several respects. Gallagher has not provided convincing evidence to support his claim that mindreading is rare in social situations. He and other direct perception theorists have not offered a substantive critique of standard theories of mindreading because they have attacked a much stronger claim about the putative unobservability of mental states than most theories of mindreading imply. To provide a genuine alternative to standard theories of mindreading, (...) the direct perception theorist needs to provide more detailed answers to the following questions: What are the criteria for distinguishing perceptual processes from non-perceptual processes? How exactly does direct social perception function on the subpersonal level? What is the content of direct social perception? How does direct perception theory relate to more recent developments in the mindreading literature? (shrink)

Professor Vivian Weil, directs the Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions at Illinois Institute of Technology and has published articles on teaching scientific research ethics and engineering ethics.

Neurosemantics is not yet a common term and in current neuroscience and philosophy it is used with two different sorts of objectives. One deals with the meaning of the electrical and the chemical activities going on in neural circuits. This way of using the term regards the project of explaining linguistic meaning in terms of the computations done by the brain. This book explores this second sense of neurosemantics, but in doing so, it will address much of the first as (...) well, for we believe that the capacity of neural circuits to support linguistic meaning, hinges on their peculiar role in coding entities and facts of the world. It is an enterprise at the edge of the available state-of-the-art knowledge in neuroscience and specifically, in the growing understanding of brain computational mechanisms. We conceive neurosemantics, however, as the natural evolution of a long standing project that began in the early days of Boole’s logic, the idea that semantics can be construed and explained in mathematical terms. Classical formal semantics, for a very long time, excluded from the analysis of language any account of mental processes, which on the contrary, became the central focus during the cognitive turn. Cognitive semantics, however, failed to provide a rigorous mathematical framework for semantic processes. Today, it is possible to begin explaining language by way of a new mathematical foundation, one that is empirically grounded in how the brain computes: neurosemantics. The way this book intends to contribute is twofold. One is to present a series of existing examples of neurosemantics in practice: early models addressing aspects of linguistic semantics purely in neurocomputational terms. The other is to try to identify the principles upon which models of this kind can be constructed, and their corresponding neural bases. (shrink)

Plant MADS‐box genes encode transcriptional regulators that are critical for a number of developmental processes. In the angiosperms (the flowering plants), these include the specification of floral organ identities, flowering time and fruit development. It appears that the MADS box gene family has undergone considerable gene duplication and sequence divergence within the angiosperms. Here I discuss the possibility that these events have allowed the recruitment of these genes to new developmental pathways in particular angiosperm lineages. Recent analyses of sequence changes, (...) expression patterns and, in a few cases, gene function are beginning to provide tantalizing evidence for deciphering when and how such genetic diversification has led to particular morphological innovations. In the future, comparative studies of large numbers of species will be required to assess the extent of such variation as well as to fully understand the mechanisms by which evolution of these developmental regulators has played a role in shaping new morphologies. BioEssays 25:637–646, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Background: Perfectionism is increasing over time and associated with various mental health problems. Recent research indicates adverse childhood experiences may play a role in the development of perfectionism. In addition, perfectionism is marked by interpersonal problems with implications for treatment outcome.Aim: This study aimed to fill an important gap in the predominantly quantitative literature field by exploring how individuals with perfectionism understand the relationship between painful experiences and how they relate to others.Method: Nine individuals with perfectionism were interviewed using McAdam's (...) life-story interview. Thematic analysis was used to analyze the interviews.Results: Four themes emerged: “A childhood with big responsibilities,” “I am still the responsible one,” “Keeping others at a distance to protect the inner self,” and “Achieving physical distance to get a fresh start.” These themes are grouped into two overarching themes: “You can't always trust people” and “A distancing from others.”Conclusion: Findings highlight taking responsibility and social distancing serve an important function for perfectionistic individuals in response to painful relational events. We discuss how themes of control and agency impact individuals' relationship to mental health and turning toward others for help. The findings provide greater complexity to understanding perfectionism as a “barrier to treatment.”. (shrink)

Most philosophers consider olfactory experiences to be very poor in comparison to other sense modalities. And because olfactory experiences seem to lack the spatial content necessary to object perception, philosophers tend to maintain that smell is purely sensational or abstract. I argue in this paper that the apparent poverty and spatial indeterminateness of odor experiences does not reflect the “subjective” or “abstract” nature of smell, but only that smell is not directed to particular things. According to the view defended in (...) this paper, odors are properties of stuffs. This view, motivated by several arguments grounded in the phenomenology of olfactory experience, explains in particular why odors appear to be located both in the air around our nose and in the objects from which they emanate. It also explains the power of smell in the task of discriminating chemical compounds. (shrink)

The low and shrinking numbers of women in higher computer science education is a well-known problem in most Western countries. The dominant Western perception of the relationship between gender and computer science codes the latter as “masculine,” and the low number of women is seen at least partly as an effect of that coding. Malaysia represents a different case. There are large numbers of women in computer science, and computer science is not perceived as “masculine.” Rather, it is deemed as (...) providing suitable jobs and good careers for women. This reflects an understanding of gender where femininities are constructed by association to office work, commonly recognized as a woman-friendly space because it is seen as more safe and protected than, for example, construction sites and factories. The findings suggest that gender and computer science may be more diversely coproduced than commonly believed in Western research. (shrink)

There are cases of emotion that we readily describe as 'sharing emotions with other people.' How should we understand such cases? Joel Krueger has proposed the Joint Ownership Thesis : the view that two or more people can literally share the same emotional episode. His view is partly inspired by his reading of Merleau-Ponty -- arguably Merleau-Ponty advocates a version of JOT in his "The child's relations with others." My critical analysis demonstrates that JOT is flawed in several respects: 1) (...) It involves a vague account of joint subjects; 2) It relies on a confusion between phenomenological and ontological levels of analysis. When these are clearly distinguished, Krueger's phenomenological analysis contradicts JOT understood as an ontological claim; 3) It relies on a highly problematic coupling-constitution inference; 4) It relies on a shift from the claim that the child and the caregiver jointly _realize_ an emotion, to the claim about joint _ownership_, which is a _non sequitur_. I argue that we can reach a better understanding of the phenomenon of shared emotions by bringing in another level of analysis: that of _social relationships_. I propose that shared emotions are a special case of _social-relational emotions_, typically arising within and/or giving rise to communal relationships. (shrink)

Taking up Kimberlé Crenshaw's conclusion that black feminist theorists seem to continue to find themselves in many ways “speaking into the void” (Crenshaw 2011, 228), even as their works are widely celebrated, I examine intersectionality critiques as one site where power asymmetries and dominant imaginaries converge in the act of interpretation (or cooptation) of intersectionality. That is, despite its current “status,” intersectionality also faces epistemic intransigence in the ways in which it is read and applied. My aim is not to (...) suggest that intersectionality cannot (or should not) be critiqued, nor do I maintain that celebratory applications/interpretations are immune from epistemic distortion when it comes to interpreting intersectionality. Rather, my goal is to demonstrate that critiques of intersectionality are one important site to examine hermeneutic marginalization and interpretive violence; the politics of citation; and the impact of dominant expectations or established social imaginaries on meaning-making. In so doing, I aim to consider more fully how entrenched ways of thinking are frequently relied upon to interpret and critique intersectionality, even as these are often the very frameworks that intersectionality theorists have identified as highly problematic tools of misrepresentation, erasure, and violation. This slippage away from intersectionality's outlooks, whether in critical or laudatory contexts, is a pivotal site of epistemic negotiation we must examine more closely. (shrink)