Los Salmanticen-ses fueron teólogos que enseña-ron en el Colegio universitario salmanticenses de los carmelitas descalzos durante el siglo XVII y primera parte del XVIII. A ellos se deben el “Cursus theologi-cus salmanticensis”, así como el “Cursus moralis salmanticensis”. El tratado de penitencia del Cur-sus theologicus salmanticensisestá dividido en dos partes bien diferenciadas, aunque íntima-mente relacionadas: 1. La peni-tencia como sacramento. 2. La penitencia como virtud. Resumi-mos aquí sobre todo lo que se refiere la Penitencia como sacra-mento. Nuestro método es analí-tico (...) y comparativo, y el objeto de nuestra investigación consiste en la síntesis, el análisis y el comen-tario de los textos más destaca-dos sobre la materia penitencial. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es evaluar si, en nuestras sociedades plurales, individualistas y asentadas en el lenguaje normativo de los derechos y los principios, existe un lugar valioso y posible para una reactualización de la tradición de las virtudes. Nuestra opinión es positiva, pero de una manera condicionada. Tal reactualización debe dar una respuesta a dos críticas bien fundadas que se han realizado a reactualizaciones previas: su riesgo de obturar la capacidad transformadora de las costumbres y tradiciones y (...) su dependencia original respecto de un ethos jerárquico. Aquí mostraremos que la creación y mantenimiento de una sociedad democrática, que haga de la igualdad relacional un valor fundamental, requiere de un conjunto de virtudes cívicas básicas y que ellas pueden justificarse reforzando el potencial crítico de las virtudes respecto de su contexto de formación. (shrink)

A través de esta entrevista a Alejandro Vigo, un referente obligado para quien desea profundizar en el pensamiento de autores como Kant, Aristóteles, Husserl o Heidegger, exploramos los puntos de encuentro entre estas tradiciones, a fin de esclarecer la relación entre identidad práctica, virtud y sentido. Esta entrevista a Alejandro Vigo, además de permitirnos explorar parte de su itinerario intelectual, nos da la oportunidad de reflexionar sobre los alcances y las limitaciones de las propuestas filosóficas de cada uno de estos (...) autores. (shrink)

:Es preciso fijar nuestra atención en los principales supuestos que implica la declaración de Derechos Humanos, especialmente respecto de aquellos que actualmente se encuentran bajo una discusión controvertida dentro del campo de la filosofía. En este trabajo, el autor, de acuerdo con las ideas de las diferentes declaraciones de Derechos Humanos, sostiene que estos no son sólo un instrumento jurídico positivo, sino también, y principalmente, un elevada conquista humana basada en el descubrimiento y reconocimiento de la dignidad y del valor (...) inherentes en toda persona humana. Los derechos humanos son el resultado de una larga tradición de gente que lucho en favor del ser humano, en todas las sociedades y en todo momento de la historia de la humanidad. Los Derechos Humanos son universales, y todo gobierno ha de protegerlos y defender su total observancia. La persona humana es el sujeto central de los Derechos Humanos, por lo que se considera que es pura confusión hablar de los derechos de animales. El derecho de la gente a autodeterminarse, como una parte de los Derechos Humanos, se aplica solamente en las situaciones particulares de poblaciones en situaciones coloniales u otras formas de dominación extranjera. Los Derechos Humanos también implican un alto nivel de virtudes, y el reconocimiento de los seres humanos como miembros de una comunidad que hace posible que exista la persona humana. Aunque se suelen centrar en las dimensiones políticas y sociales de la vida humana, también pueden ser perseguidos en pro de la felicidad, de la paz, la democracia, la justicia, la igualdad, el pluralismo, en definitiva, como mejor nivel de vida y de solidaridad. Ahora bien, existe un problema práctico que reclama nuestra unión: crear las condiciones sociales, políticas, económicas y culturales que hagan posibles los objetivos de la declaración de Derechos Humanos. (shrink)

En forma de carta dirigida al amigo ausente se hace un elogio de la vida virtuosa y del conocimiento universal que brota de la cuna sencilla. No hay mayor apertura que el amor por la verdad y la tolerancia.

José Luis Bermúdez ha defendido una explicación no-circular de la autoconciencia en virtud de contenidos no-conceptuales de primera persona, explicativa y ontogenéticamente básicos. En este artículo se argumenta que los contenidos no-conceptuales explicativamente básicos caen en el mito de lo Dado; mientras que los contenidos no-conceptuales ontogenéticamente básicos, aunque lo evitan, no constituyen la mejor explicación de la adquisición de capacidades cognitivas.

En su comentario a la Ética a Nicómaco, Averroes se ocupó del pasaje donde Aristóteles distingue entre las cosas que son justas por naturaleza y aquéllas que lo son en virtud de la ley. Su comentario es particularmente breve, pero plantea algunas dificultades importantes, como su alusión a un derecho naturale legale, que, según Leo Strauss, vendría a ser simplemente un derecho positivo de aceptación general. En este artículo se busca caracterizar lo justo natural y lo justo positivo en el (...) comentario de Averroes y mostrar el alcance de la variación de los criterios propios de la justicia positiva. (shrink)

El presente artículo pretende realizar una reflexión sobre la diferenciación entre lo justo y la justicia, a partir de los enfoques interaccional e institucional. Se sustenta teóricamente en dos cuestiones fundamentales, en un primer momento, procura mostrar la imposibilidad de definir la justicia, al considerarla como una noción simple y por lo tanto no definible ni realizable; y en un segundo momento, procura dejar sembrada la diferencia conceptual de la justicia desde la filosofía moral y el enfoque interaccional y la (...) filosofía política y el enfoque interinstitucional, para lograrlo se toman los principales elementos de la moral platónica, de la moral aristotélica y del utilitarismo clásico; asimismo del pensamiento político de John Locke y John Rawls principalmente, para finalmente concluir que la justicia ha de considerarse como una virtud política. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente trabajo es examinar, desde un enfoque epistemológico interdisciplinar, la vigencia o la actualidad que posee la visión heideggeriana de la decadencia occidental en la infoesfera, en virtud de la superación virtual del espacio-tiempo que conllevan, a mediados del Novecientos, las nuevas tecnologías de la información y la comunicación (NTIC). Como trataré de mostrar, el fenómeno óntico de la comunicación instantánea no hace sino consolidar y poner de manifiesto en la praxis histórico-vital el «máximo olvido del ser» (...) que Heidegger teoriza a nivel ontológico. (shrink)

En este artículo nos proponemos dar cuenta del régimen temporal propio del capitalismo tardomoderno y sus consecuencias tanto sociológicas como ontológicas. Para ello, partiremos de las tesis de Hartmut Rosa acerca de la aceleración y la alienación. Posteriormente daremos paso a la indagación ontológica de la mano de Heidegger y la psicología existencial. De ese modo, mostraremos que los análisis sociológicos no pueden prescindir de un estudio ontológico de la cuestión. Por último, concluiremos con el rastreo de los modos temporales (...) de la Grecia clásica aplicada al mundo actual mediante la ontología de Gilles Deleuze, quien, junto a Felix Guattari, tuvo la virtud de analizar el capitalismo como movimiento de axiomatización. Nuestra reflexión quedará atravesada por la necesidad de un diagnóstico de las patologías individuales y colectivas que conectan con los estudios sobre el totalitarismo. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como propósito poner de relieve el contraste trágico entre la afirmación de una teleología natural y la ausencia de teleología moral en el pensamiento de Schopenhauer. Se comprenderá su gesto filosófico como el vaciamiento de la finalidad. Concretamente, se examinará cómo el absurdo que tiene lugar en virtud del contraste mencionado, sumado a la concepción de vida que late en el proyecto schopenhaueriano, conduce a una consideración necesariamente irracionalista y pesimista de la existencia. Desde la perspectiva (...) del autor, ante la ausencia de una finalidad racional del mundo no existe otra vía más que el pesimismo. En esta dirección, quisiera centrarme en una de las consecuencias más profundas de las premisas mencionadas (a saber, la carencia de finalidad final, apariencia de ajuste teleológico, pesimismo, irracionalidad, concepción de vida, etc). Me refiero a la imposibilidad de la historia y, con ella, a la imposibilidad de cualquier clase de cambio o transformación. Por último, intentaré despejar dos posibles suspicacias en relación con la irracionalidad y ausencia de fin final en la filosofía de Schopenhauer. (shrink)

El término “conocimiento” y la disciplina filosófica que lo estudia —la teoría del conocimiento— han experimentado notables cambios hasta el presente. La teoría clásica concibe el conocimiento en íntima unión con la verdad, como una captación intelectual de realidades necesarias e inmutables. Con la llegada de la modernidad, la difusión de un clima escéptico puso en duda esta pretensión, cuestionando la aptitud misma del conocimiento para la verdad. Esta duda ha presidido toda la modernidad hasta el presente. Para responder al (...) desafío escéptico, las principales corrientes de la llamada epistemología analítica contemporánea han intentado, sin éxito, explorar el carácter justificante del conocimiento. En este intento, han destacado teorías encaminadas a mostrar que el conocimiento recibe su justificación desde un fundamento, como el fundacionismo y el coherentismo; teorías encaminadas a mostrar que el conocimiento recibe su justificación desde sus fuentes, como el externismo y el internismo; y teorías encaminadas a mostrar que la recibe por las facultades cognitivas mismas como instrumentos de conocimiento fiables, como la epistemología de la virtud. Todas ellas generan, a su vez, nuevas paradojas e imponen la necesidad de volver a los fundamentos de esta disciplina, presentes en la teoría clásica, para descubrir la conexión entre conocimiento y verdad, e intentar detener el desafío escéptico. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se exponen los cuatro grandes enfoques en educación moral (de transmisión social, de educación en virtudes, de clarificación de valores y evolutivo) y se desarrollan una serie de puntos que se consideran claves en la educación moral: la promoción del desarrollo hacia cotas crecientes de autonomía moral, la consideración de la constitutiva naturaleza comunitaria y dialogal del hombre, así como la naturaleza de los valores específicamente morales, y la necesidad de educar para comportarse moralmente.

En este trabajo se presentan las ideas más representativas que para el siglo XVI, durante la fundación de Bogotá, influyeron en la concepción del imaginario de ciudad. El artículo plantea tres momentos clave: en el primero, se realiza un acercamiento al pensamiento de Aristóteles, a través del análisis de dos de sus obras La política y La ética a Nicómaco. De ellas se deducen seis características que, probablemente, fueron conocidas y estudiadas por los humanistas y renacentistas y aplicadas por la (...) Corona española para dar fisonomía y orden a la fundación de ciudades en toda la América descubierta, conquistada y colonizada por España en los siglos XVI y XVII. En el segundo momento, muestra la influencia de las ideas aristotélicas en el pensamiento de hombres como santo Tomás y León Battista Alberti; además presenta las concepciones de inferioridad de ciertos hombres y de acciones mágicas que, según el imaginario de la época, permiten controlar el espacio a los seres que lo habitan. Cada una de estas concepciones influyó en la manera como los españoles se relacionaron con este territorio y con las razas india y negra. En un tercer momento, se presenta un acercamiento a la ciudad colonial establecida en el siglo XVI, cuyo ordenamiento social estaba enmarcado en la fisonomía ortogonal o damérica de sus calles, con lo cual se buscaba orden y control social. (shrink)

Raimo Tuomela, late Professor Emeritus at the Centre for Philosophy of Social Sciences (TINT), University of Helsinki, is widely regarded as one of the most important philosophers of our time. He published extensively on various topics within social philosophy; particularly, on social action, cooperation, group belief, group responsibility, group reasoning, social practices, and institutions. To celebrate his legacy, this volume engages with and delves deeply into his philosophy of sociality. By gathering original essays from a world-class line-up of social ontologists, (...) social action theorists, and social philosophers, this collection provides the first comprehensive and critical treatment of Tuomela's outstanding contribution to social ontology and collective intentionality. (shrink)

The general concept of a trope – that of a non-shareable character-grounder – admits of a distinction between modifier tropes and module tropes. Roughly, a module trope is self-exemplifying whereas a modifier trope is not. This distinction has wide-ranging implications. Modifier tropes are uniquely eligible to be powers and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes are uniquely eligible to play a direct role in perception and causation. Moreover, each type of trope theory faces unique challenges concerning character- grounding. Modifier trope theory (...) faces challenges concerning the inscrutability of predication and the incompatibility with bundle theory, whereas module trope theory faces challenges concerning character overdetermination and a collapse into austere nominalism. These differences indicate that the modifier/module distinction divides the advantages of general trope theory and thus presents the trope theorist with a pivotal choice. (shrink)

In this paper I explore Michael Loux’s important distinction between “tropes” and “tropers”. First, I argue that the distinction throws into relief an ambiguity and discrepancy in the literature, revealing two fundamentally different versions of trope theory. Second, I argue that the distinction brings into focus unique challenges facing each of the resulting trope theories, thus calling into question an alleged advantage of trope theory—that by uniquely occupying the middle ground between its rivals, trope theory is able to recover and (...) preserve the insights of these views. Ultimately, the distinction suggests that trope theory is a divided house. (shrink)

Hacemos una lectura del “Tratado sobre los principios de la teología” de Guillermo de Occam, y echamos un vistazo a la Escolástica tardía que esta obra representa tan bien, revisando diferentes referencias bibliográficas, que me han permitido conocer y analizar diferentes conceptos y enfoques acerca de este singular tema. De hecho, se trata de una obra mayor, de gran calibre, pero de autor incierto, generalmente atribuida a Occam, aunque la autoría real está en disputa. Lo cierto es que se trata (...) de un momento culminante de una época de la historia del pensamiento occidental; una en la que su autor, con briosa arquitectura, levanta un edificio que perenniza el pensar occamista, comentándolo, glosándolo y dándole forma enciclopédica, minuciosa, como la que uno esperaría encontrar en un diccionario o un manual del Nominalismo naciente. (shrink)

Defends a version of the Davidsonian Demonstrative Theory of quotation against proponents of the Fregean Identity Theory.

This paper defends a version of Davidson’s demonstrative theory of quotation and against against the Fregean identity theory (IT henceforth) as articulated and defended by Corey Washington (1992). On the Fregean view, when an expression is referred to by means of quotation the quoted material itself is a linguistic referring expression. Quotation-marks are not needed; when they are used, they serve to make clearer the shift in syntactic and semantic properties effected on the quoted material by its occupying that linguistic (...) context: whatever its usual syntactic function, the quoted material functions as a singular term; whatever its usual semantic function, in that linguistic environment the quoted material refers to itself. On DT, in contrast, quotation-marks themselves are the linguistic bearers of reference, functioning like a demonstrative; the quoted material merely plays the role of a demonstratum. In the version I argue for the referent is obtained through some contextually suggested relation; in the default case the relation will be: … instantiates the linguistic type __, but there are other possibilities. In this way, the view can deal with the fact that we do not merely refer with quotations to expression-types, but also to other entities related in some way to the relevant token we use: features exhibited by the token distinct from those constituting its linguistic type, features exhibited by other tokens of the same type but not by the one actually used (as when, by using a graphic token, we refer to its phonetic type), or even other related tokens. (shrink)

There is a long-standing discussion concerning the nature of moral discourse. Multiple views range from realism—according to which moral discourse is closer to scientific discourse than to fictional discourse—to anti-realism—according to which moral discourse is rather closer to fictional discourse. In this paper, I want to motivate a novel anti-realist account. On this view, there are no moral properties or truths, neither mind-independent nor mind-dependent ones (i.e., anti-realism). However, moral cognition results from the use of higher order cognitive abilities with (...) enough resources to grant moral discourse with all the features of a realist talk (i.e., cognitive quasi-realism). I defend this view based on empirical evidence on human moral development and by showing that the resulting account can meet the demands of robust moral realism. The paper concludes by placing the proposed view within the metaethical landscape by comparing it against other forms of anti-realism, most significantly against expressivism. (shrink)

The paper discusses the criticism of externalist theories of content which, on the basis of "Twin Earth" considerations, claims that such theories cannot make intentional properties supervenient on basic, intrinsic properties of the organism -- while supervenience is a necessary condition for the causal efficacy of any macro-property. The paper accepts the supervenience requirement, understood as arising from a requirement that macro- properties should be explained by micro- properties. It points out, however, that as a consequence of this, the modality (...) in the concept of supervenience should be understood as "nomic", not conceptual. Then the paper attempts to show that the usual thought- experiments do not establish that such variety of supervenience does not hold for psychological properties -- at least with regard to a particular, teleo- functional way of interpreting them. (shrink)

Proxy agency is the capacity of individuals and groups to act for other individuals or groups in specific social transactions. For example, a legal team acts as a proxy for a client in a courtroom, or the Prime Minister acts as a proxy for the UK Government when attending international meetings, etc. Although a very common social phenomenon, it has not yet received enough philosophical treatment. Currently, the most developed account of this capacity is Ludwig’s proxy agency in collective action. (...) Yet, his account relies on a deflationary, we-content approach to collective intentionality (á la Bratman). In this chapter, I argue that this approach is far too weak to explain proxy agency in institutional contexts—where the individuals and groups formally authorised to perform rule-guided group activities for the principal hold a strong, non-conditional we-commitment. In order to elucidate this feature, I provide an account of proxy agency based on a more robust, we-mode approach to collective intentionality (á la Tuomela). I suggest with this that, for institutional proxy agency to operate as expected, there must be appropriate conditions of sociality in place—which ultimately coheres with the larger project developed by Tuomela on social ontology. (shrink)

Since the publication of Hartry Field’s influential paper “Tarski’s Theory of Truth” there has been an ongoing discussion about the philosophical import of Tarski’s definition. Most of the arguments have aimed to play down that import, starting with that of Field himself. He interpreted Tarski as trying to provide a physicalistic reduction of semantic concepts like truth, and concluded that Tarski had partially failed. Robert Stalnaker and Scott Soames claimed then that Field should have obtained a stronger conclusion, namely that (...) Tarski’s failure in his allegedly intended physicalistic reduction was total. From another front, Hilary Putnam argued for an even more sweeping thesis: “[a]s a philosophical account of truth, Tarski’s theory fails as badly as it is possible for an account to fail.” Scott Soames followed suit also on this count, endorsing Putnam’s argument in section iii of the aforementioned paper; and John Etchemendy used a very similar argument to contend that “a Tarskian definition of truth [...] cannot possibly illuminate the semantic properties of the object language.” The paper argues that these contentions are based on several misunderstandings about the nature of a definition like Tarski’s. Regarding the Putnam-Soames-Etchemendy argument, we must apply a distinction Frege found natural to draw—and is natural to draw anyway—between what he called “constructive” definitions, definitions properly so called, which are mere stipulations, and what he described as “analytic” definitions, definitions which aim to make explicit the meaning of a term already in use. Regarding the Field-Soames-Stalnaker criticism, the paper contends that the true aims of a Tarskian truth definition are perfectly well fulfilled without Field’s amendments. (shrink)

The technical possibilities of biomedicine open up the opportunity to intervene in ageing itself with the aim of mitigating, reducing or eliminating it. However, before undertaking these changes or rejecting them outright, it is necessary to ask ourselves if what would be lost by doing so really has much value. This article will analyse the desirability of ageing from an individual point of view, without circumscribing this question to the desirability or undesirability of death. First, we will present the three (...) most widely used arguments to reject biomedical interventions against ageing. We will argue that only the last of these arguments provides a consistent answer to the question of the desirability of ageing. Second, we will show that the third argument falls prey to a conceptual confusion that we will call the paradox of ageing: although ageing entails negative health effects, it leads to a life stage with valuable goods. Both valuations, one positive and the other negative, refer to two different dimensions of ageing: the chronological and the biological. We will defend that, by not adequately distinguishing these two types of ageing, it does not become apparent that all the valuable goods exclusive to ageing derive only from its chronological dimension. Third, we will argue that, if we just conceive ageing biologically, it is undesirable. We will elaborate on the two kinds of undesirable effects biological ageing has: direct and indirect. Finally, we will respond to potential objections by adducing that these are insufficient to weaken our argument. (shrink)

For the philosopher of Rotterdam, religious coercion has two essential sources of illegitimacy: the linking of religious and ecclesiastical belief and the use of politics for religious purposes. Bayle responds to it, with his doctrine of freedom of conscience, on one hand and by means of the essential distinction between voluntary religious affiliation and political obligation, on the other hand. From my perspective, his doctrine of tolerance does not involve an atheist state, nor does it mean the rejection of the (...) presence of religion in the public space or its displacement to the intimate sphere of the conscience. This paper proposes a reading of Baylean tolerance as a political doctrine that allows the articulation between freedom of conscience, minority confessions, and official religion. Thus, the Baylean theoretical model could be considered a proposal to provide a normative form to the practice of toleration present in the seventeenth -century Netherlands. (shrink)

Dennett (1988) provides a much discussed argument for the nonexistence of qualia, as conceived by philosophers like Block, Chalmers, Loar and Searle. My goal in this paper is to vindicate Dennett's argument, construed in a certain way. The argument supports the claim that qualia are constitutively representational. Against Block and Chalmers, the argument rejects the detachment of phenomenal from information‐processing consciousness; and against Loar and Searle, it defends the claim that qualia are constitu‐tively representational in an externalist understanding of this. (...) The core of the argument is contained in section 3. In the first part, I contrast a minimal conception of qualia, relative to which their existence is not under dispute, with the sort of view to which I will object. In the second part I set the stage by presenting the facts about (minimal) qualia on which a Dennett‐like argument can be based. (shrink)

Dennett provides a much discussed argument for the nonexistence of qualia, as conceived by philosophers like Block, Chalmers, Loar and Searle. My goal in this paper is to vindicate Dennett's argument, construed in a certain way. The argument supports the claim that qualia are constitutively representational. Against Block and Chalmers, the argument rejects the detachment of phenomenal from information-processing consciousness; and against Loar and Searle, it defends the claim that qualia are constitutively representational in an externalist understanding of this. The (...) core of the argument is contained in section 3. In the first part, I contrast a minimal conception of qualia, relative to which their existence is not under dispute, with the sort of view to which I will object. In the second part I set the stage by presenting the facts about qualia on which a Dennett-like argument can be based. (shrink)

Cosmopolitan critics attack the scope-limitation of justice of egalitarian liberal theorists to states. They treat justice as the production of a given set of outcomes for people regardless of location or relationship. However, in doing so they either ignore the relevant agent towards whom principles of justice are addressed or see the question of agency as a practical, derivative question, of a secondary character. This paper argues that a principle of justice without a clearly justified agent is not a genuine (...) principle at all. This is what writers like Rawls mean by the "subject" of justice (analogous to the grammatical subject of a sentence, i.e.,the agent). We should reflect on agents and why they would or would not justifiably carry certain burdens for others and what kind of benefits or goods they are able to secure. The answers to those questions explain why the idea of cosmopolitan global justice is incomplete, either requiring a global basic structural agency or not applying because no relevant agent is present that can create cooperative arrangements between individual persons across the globe. Other moral principles will still apply globally, but they will be distinct from those that apply to basic-structural agencies. This account is not a practice dependence account, as it bases the distinctness of moral and political principles on purely moral and value-based considerations. (shrink)

The paper examines an alleged distinction claimed to exist by Van Gelder between two different, but equally acceptable ways of accounting for the systematicity of cognitive output (two varieties of compositionality): concatenative compositionality vs. functional compositionality. The second is supposed to provide an explanation alternative to the Language of Thought Hypothesis. I contend that, if the definition of concatenative compositionality is taken in a different way from the official one given by Van Gelder (but one suggested by some of his (...) formulations) then there is indeed a different sort of compositionality; however, the second variety is not an alternative to the language of thought in that case. On the other hand, if the concept of concatenative compositionality is taken in a different way, along the lines of Van Gelder's explicit definition, then there is no reason to think that there is an alternative way of explaining systematicity. (shrink)

The paper examines an alleged distinction claimed to exist by Van Gelder between two different, but equally acceptable ways of accounting for the systematicity of cognitive output (two “varieties of compositionality”): “concatenative compositionality” vs. “functional compositionality.” The second is supposed to provide an explanation alternative to the Language of Thought Hypothesis. I contend that, if the definition of “concatenative compositionality” is taken in a different way from the official one given by Van Gelder (but one suggested by some of his (...) formulations) then there is indeed a different sort of compositionality; however, the second variety is not an alternative to the language of thought in that case. On the other hand, if the concept of concatenative compositionality is taken in a different way, along the lines of Van Gelder's explicit definition, then there is no reason to think that there is an alternative way of explaining systematicity. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se propone determinar un criterio con que interpretar de modo global el desarrollo del pensamiento de Giovanni Gentile. Su caracterización como pensador neohegeliano no da razón del sentido global de su filosofía ni de sus efectivos puntos de partida ni de los pensadores con los que directamente se midió. El trabajo hace ver que, con Donato Jaja, su maestro universitario, la tradición idealista iniciada por Bertrando Spaventa se separa definitivamente de la interpretación de Hegel y se constituye (...) como tradición autónoma. En ese sentido, buscamos precisar los rasgos característicos de la personalidad filosófica de Gentile dentro de dicha tradición y concluimos que Vico ocupó un papel nuclear en ella. (shrink)

I argue racial injustice undermines the reliability of news source reports in the information domain of racial injustice. I argue that this in turn undermines subjects’ doxastic justification in inferences they base on these news sources in the racial injustice information domain. I explain that racial injustice does this undermining through the effect of racial prejudice on news organizations’ members and the effect of society's racially unjust structure on non-dominant racial group-controlled news sources.

"Epistola a Memeceo, Maximas capitales, Sentencias vaticanas, fragmentos y testimonios; texto griego y traduccion": p. [87]-161.

Either a person's claim to subsistence goods is held against institutions equipped to distribute social benefits and burdens fairly or it is made regardless of such a social scheme. If the former, then one's claim is not best understood as based on principles setting out a subsistence goods entitlement, but rather on principles of equitable social distribution — a fair share. If, however, the claim is not against a given social scheme, no plausible principle exists defining what counts as a (...) reasonable burden for any of the available agents to secure subsistence. No justifiable principle exists implying generalised perfect duties any agent could clearly follow or clearly breach that secure subsistence conditions for others. At best we can justify rescue duties under very specific conditions, or general but imperfect duties to improve arrangements. Neither of these obviously correlates with human rights standards. Attempts in the literature to overcome the dilemma by claiming basic rights can correlate with imperfect duties or can generate duties to work towards institutions that ‘perfect’ our imperfect duties, are faulty. I then show how the dilemma can be avoided by accounts of human rights focusing on minimum respectful treatment rather than goods or interests. (shrink)

I argue racial injustice undermines the reliability of news source reports in the information domain of racial injustice. I argue that this in turn undermines subjects’ doxastic justification in inferences they base on these news sources in the racial injustice information domain. I explain that racial injustice does this undermining through the effect of racial prejudice on news organizations’ members and the effect of society's racially unjust structure on non-dominant racial group-controlled news sources.