Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 26 (1):165-185 (2001)

Abstract
José Luis Bermúdez ha defendido una explicación no-circular de la autoconciencia en virtud de contenidos no-conceptuales de primera persona, explicativa y ontogenéticamente básicos. En este artículo se argumenta que los contenidos no-conceptuales explicativamente básicos caen en el mito de lo Dado; mientras que los contenidos no-conceptuales ontogenéticamente básicos, aunque lo evitan, no constituyen la mejor explicación de la adquisición de capacidades cognitivas
Keywords el mito de lo Dado   conceptos  autoconciencia  self-consciousness   the myth of the Given   percepción   perception   concepts
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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
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What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.

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