Should Soviet philosophy take a considered stand on the questions of transcendence and religion, this would entail a fundamental transformation in the Eest-West philosophical oppostion. But all human experience tends to show that a considered stand is the first step toward a genuine knowledge of the true nature of the world. Such a development would, obviously, be the end of Diamat as we know it and, eventually, the end of the ideological East-West conflict.

? A modified and developed version of an article published in Sociology (1973), 7, 3.

Quine's arguments against the attribution of essential properties de re to individuals have been the motivation for attempts at reinstating essentialism as a respectable metaphysical thesis and at defending the coherence of modal logic in general.I shall argue here along somewhat different lines, that the particular version of essentialism Quine objects to is in fact untenable but that this conclusion is far from entailing a commitment to some version of conventionalism, and in particular that it does not entail the view (...) that the only kind of necessity that is coherent is de dicto necessity.In what follows, I shall assume, without arguing for it, that de re essentialism and subjunctive conditionals are intimately related, and in particular, that any version of de re essentialism which conflicts with our basic intuitions about subjunctive conditionals is untenable. (shrink)

Based on her earlier ground-breaking axiomatization of quantified modal logic, the papers collected here by the distinguished philosopher Ruth Barcan Marcus cover much ground in the development of her thought, spanning from 1961 to 1990. The first essay here introduces themes initially viewed as iconoclastic, such as the necessity of identity, the directly referential role of proper names as "tags", the Barcan Formula about the interplay of possibility and existence, and alternative interpretations of quantification. Marcus also addresses the putative (...) puzzles about substitutivity and about essentialism. The collection also includes influential essays on moral conflict, on belief and rationality, and on some historical figures. Many of her views have been incorporated into current theories, while others remain part of a continuing debate. (shrink)

One of the most difficult and interesting problems of rational decision is the choice among possible diverging paths in theory construction and among competing scientific theories—i.e., systems of accurate testable hypotheses. This task involves many beliefs—some warranted and others not as warranted—and marks decisive crossroads. Suffice to recall the current conflict between the general theory of relativity and alternative theories of gravitation that account for the same empirical evidence, the rivalry among different interpretations of quantum mechanics, and the variety of (...) cosmological theories. They all account for the same observed facts although they may predict different kinds of as yet unknown facts; they are consequently, up to now, empirically equivalent theories even though they are conceptually different and may even involve different philosophical views—i.e., they are conceptually inequivalent. (shrink)

Quine's arguments against the attribution of essential properties de re to individuals have been the motivation for attempts at reinstating essentialism as a respectable metaphysical thesis and at defending the coherence of modal logic in general.I shall argue here along somewhat different lines, that the particular version of essentialism Quine objects to is in fact untenable but that this conclusion is far from entailing a commitment to some version of conventionalism, and in particular that it does not entail the view (...) that the only kind of necessity that is coherent is de dicto necessity.In what follows, I shall assume, without arguing for it, that de re essentialism and subjunctive conditionals are intimately related, and in particular, that any version of de re essentialism which conflicts with our basic intuitions about subjunctive conditionals is untenable. (shrink)

Philosophy is the search for the large patterns of the world and of the large patterns of experience, perceptual, theoretical, . . . , aesthetic, and practical - the patterns that, regardless of specific contents, characterize the main types of experience. In this book I carry out my search for the large patterns of practical experience: the experience of deliberation, of recognition of duties and their conflicts, of attempts to guide other person's conduct, of deciding to act, of influencing the (...) physical world with one's doings, and the like. This is the experience that makes possible our social life, the formulation of plans for teamwork, the building of institutions, the development of nations, and the adoption of the ideal of morality. Here I develop a network of theories about the most fundamental aspects of practical thinking: what is thought in such thinking; what makes that thinking correct; what makes it practical; and the structure of the doings that accrue to the world when such thinking is effective. I have attempted to build each theory in sufficient detail, so that it il luminates its subject matter with a certain degree of fullness. But I have also aimed at producing an harmonious system of theories, so that the grand pattern of practical thinking can be admired, not only for the beauty of the separate structures of its parts, but also for its architectonic unity. Chapter 1 gives the details of the many facets of this project and discusses some methodological techniques. (shrink)

In the late 1810s and 1820s the Edinburgh phrenologists were largely concerned with trying to establish phrenology as the true science of mind. They challenged the accepted theories about the nature of mind and the brain; in turn, phrenology was attacked by the proponents of Scottish common-sense philosophy and by some medical men. The ensuing debate, which is discussed as an example of conflict between incommensurable world-views, involved a wide range of contentious theological, philosophical, scientific and methodological issues.

Men make for themselves pictures of ideal forms of life. Such pictures are various and may be in sharp opposition to each other; and one and the same individual may be captivated by different and sharply conflicting pictures at different times. At one time it may seem to him that he should live—even that a man should live —in such-and-such a way; at another that the only truly satisfactory form of life is something totally different, incompatible with the first. In (...) this way, his outlook may vary radically, not only at different periods of his life, but from day to day, even from one hour to the next. It is a function of so many variables: age, experiences, present environment, current reading, current physical state are some of them. As for the ways of life that may thus present themselves at different times as each uniquely satisfactory, there can be no doubt about their variety and opposition. The ideas of self-obliterating devotion to duty or to the service of others; of personal honour and magnanimity; of asceticism, contemplation, retreat; of action, dominance and power; of the cultivation of “an exquisite sense of the luxurious”; of simple human solidarity and co-operative endeavour; of a refined complexity of social existence; of a constantly maintained and renewed affinity with natural things—any of these ideas, and a great many others too, may form the core and substance of a personal ideal. (shrink)

That a homosexual -- man or woman -- is neither a sinner nor a sick person is the thesis of this paper by an authority on sexual deviation. Therefore, such a man or woman neither needs penance and pardon nor cure in the medical sense. Nevertheless such individuals sometimes need the help of doctors and must be treated with understanding. The medical profession also has, in the view of the behaviourist school of psychiatrists, of which Dr Bancroft is a member, (...) the duty of influencing social attitudes towards homosexuals. Obviously homosexuals who come into conflict with the law are special cases, and must be treated as such but this is not 'medical' treatment so much as social control even if drugs and other forms of therapy are used. (shrink)

This article tries to confront the answers to certain questions in the opinion poll with the analysis of class conflict in our types of societies.It is wrong to say that people have modified the image they have of society, or that they would not consider it in terms of division and conflict any langer : conflicts are rather well perceived by public-opinion ; their aggravation is felt by many.According to the results of the poll, public opinion holds it that positions (...) in the professional authority structure tend to be no longer identical with positions in the authority structure in society as a whole. This distinction goes together with a diminution of the importance of the professional role. While quite well perceiving authority conflicts, the public seems to try to keep at some «distance» from these conflicts.According to their electorate's structure, political «families» express images of society either rather in terms of division and coercion, or more in terms of integration. (shrink)

This account of the conflict between phrenologists and anti-phrenologists in early nineteenth-century Edinburgh is offered as a case study in the sociological explanation of intellectual activity. The historiographical value and propriety of a sociological approach to ideas is defended against accounts which assume the autonomy of knowledge. By attending to the social context of the debate and the functions of ideas in that context one may construct an explanation of why the conflict took the course it did.

Originally published in 1961. Russian Marxist philosophy of science originated among men and women who gave their whole lives to rebellion against established authority. The original tension within Marxist philosophy between positivism and metaphysics was repressed but not resolved in this first phase of Soviet Marxism. In this volume the author correlates the development of ideas with trends in the Cultural Revolution and against this background it is possible to understand why debates over general philosophy gave way to conflicts (...) over specific sciences in the aftermath of the first Five Year Plan and why there was a genuine crisis in Soviet biology. (shrink)

Based on an ethnographic study of women's social groups and networks in a community of Vietnamese immigrants recently settled in the United States, this article explores the effects of migration on gender roles and power. The women's groups and networks play an important role in the exchange of social and economic resources among households and in the mediation of disputes between men and women in the family. These community forms are an important source of informal power for women, enabling (...) them to cope effectively with male authority in the family. Yet, despite their increased power and economic resources, these women supported a patriarchal social structure because it preserved their parental authority and promised greater economic security in the future. (shrink)

"Matter" may be defined, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, as "The substance, or the substances collectively, out of which a physical object is made or of which it consists". And while the O.E.D. is not the ultimate authority on words, nor is it, I believe, far wrong in this particular case. The definition is, as I shall argue in this paper, in substantial harmony with a tradition of some antiquity, according to which material objects do not constitute a somehow (...) 'fundamental category' for ontology; and it is in conflict with a more contemporary view which maintains precisely that they do. (shrink)

The description Ausonius has given us of his family and of the teachers and professors of Bordeaux in the mid-fourth century is exceptional among our sources because of its detail and completeness. There is no reason to suppose that the picture he gives is untypical of life in the provinces and it makes a welcome change from the histories of aristocratic politics at Rome or Constantinople. It provides an excellent opportunity for a pilot study in which we may see how (...) the conflicting elements of social status were in practice reconciled and applied. In the traditional, and still prevalent view, the society of the Later Roman Empire was ‘crushed … in the iron clamp of castes separated from one another by barriers which could not be passed’. The evidence of Ausonius suggests that this judgement should be qualified. The society of the fourth century may have been stable. It was not static. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:70 HUME'S LETTER TO STEWART A Note on a Paper by D. C. Stove In a recent paper, D. C. Stove raises an historical problem. There exists a letter, written in 1754 by Hume to John Stewart, then Professor of Natural Philosophy at Edinburgh, in which the following words occur:. „. J never asserted so absurd a Proposition, as that any thing might arise without a Cause: I only (...) maintained, that our Certainty of the Falsehood of that Proposition proceeded neither from Intuition nor Demonstration; but from another Source. Some commentators, most notably Norman Kemp-Smith, take this as telling strongly in favour of a non-sceptical reading of Hume. Stove undertakes to show beyond reasonable doubt that the claim made in the letter is in blatant contradiction with central theses of Hume's published philosophy, so that it has to be regarded as useless as evidence for the interpretation of the latter. There is a mystery as to how Hume came to say something so clearly false about what he himself had written; Stove offers certain conjectures, none of which he finds wholly satisfactory. As the conclusion of the first, exegetical, part of his article, Stove advances the thesis that Hume held the falsity of the Causal Principle to be possible in at least three senses of "possible". These senses he specifies accurately, but doesn't wish to rest anything on the detail of his specification of the third; it is important only that it be stronger than either of the preceding two. This done, he takes a look at the letter to Stewart, and says, with reference to the first part of the 71 passage quoted above: That something might begin to exist without a cause, is evidently equivalent to the proposition that it is possib Ie for something to begin to exist without a cause. That, in turn, is evidently equivalent to the proposition that the falsity of the Causal Principle is possible. (Stove's o underlining). It follows that what Hume says in the letter is simply false. It could be true only if the "might" referred to some sense of possibility even weaker than the weakest of Stove's three senses. But since that is mere self-consistency, there is no such sense. Now the argument to the contradiction relies on reading "might" as "it is possible", in some sense of those words. Stove says, as we have seen, that they are "evidently equivalent", but the equivalence is certainly not evident, and it may well be asked whether it exists at all. After all, there are English constructions with "might" which don't have modal force: "Do you think something might have happened to them without our knowing about it?" The hearer is not, of course, being asked whether it- is possible that something should have happened without their knowledge; he is being asked for his opinion on whether something actually has so happened. "Most unlikely", would be a perfectly natural and acceptable response. Again : "ïou stay here, to take care of any problem that might arise before we get back". Obviously it is not intended that the hearer should start taking precautions against all possibilities, only that he should cope with whatever actually arises, if anything. 72 This is quite normal modern usage, and I know no reason to think that it wasn't also norT.il usage in the 18th Century. Admittedly, it isn't modern philocophers ' usage - we would be very careful, in writing or; logical matters, not to use the word "might" unless it was definitely the modal proposition that we had in mind, but earlier times haven't always been so professional about their vocabulary. Certainly, if Hume, in the letter to Stewart, was denying that he had ever asserted the possibility of the falsehood of the Causal Principle it would be, as Stove shows, extremely hard to see what he could have been thinking of. But if what he meant could have been as well expressed by "I never asserted... that anything arises without a cause" then most of Stove's problems are over, for there is no 3 conflict with any of the theses (1) - (3) which he... (shrink)

Utilitarians take an uncritical attitude toward the sort of individual claims they seek to aggregate. In this way they cannot account for an individual's valid claim against a policy which actually maximizes aggregate satisfaction. We thus claim that utilitarianism properly functions only after conflicting claims have been adjudicated; consequently, Utilitarianism properly maximizes the satisfaction of claims judged to be valid. In such a program, Utilitarianism ceases to be considered a part of ethics, But is seen as maintaining a principle of (...) feasibility and efficiency. Finally, We briefly suggest the methods we believe to be most effective in the resolution of ethical conflict. (shrink)

An explicit philosophy and meta-philosophy of positivism, empiricism and popperianism is provided. Early popperianism is argued to be essentially a form of empiricism, the deviations from empiricism are traced. In contrast, the meta-philosophy and philosophy of an evolutionary naturalistic realism is developed and it is shown how the maximal conflict of this doctrine with all forms of empiricism at the meta-philosophical level both accounts for the form of its development at the philosophical level and its defense against attack from nonrealist (...) quarters. Following an earlier article on realism of similar theme (Synthese 26 (1974), 409) this paper then further explores the ramifications of a thoroughgoing realist position. (shrink)

THE QUESTION TO BE CONSIDERED is the relation of Hume's celebrated scepticism to his own constructive philosophical projects and analyses. Since Thomas Reid there have been those who detect an unresolved tension between, on the one hand, Hume's Enlightenment devotion to science with its attendent opposition to dogmatism and superstition and, on the other, his explicitly sceptical manner and principles. Some (e.g., Green and Kolakowski) find this tension unresolvable in principle and utterly subversive of Hume's positive ambitions; others (e.g., Flew (...) and Passmore) propose revisionary interpretations of Hume that will mitigate the tension. Still others adopt the view made popular by Kemp Smith and Hendel, according to which the special virtue of Hume's philosophy is precisely his employment of the principle of "natural interpretation" to overcome the apparent conflict between science and scepticism. The reading of Hume proposed here fits comfortably into none of the traditions, largely because of the emphasis placed upon the changes, both in the character of Hume's scepticism and, more fundamentally, in his own conception of his philosophical project. I shall argue: that Hume began his study of human nature with reformist aspirations toward an accurate and serf-evident "science of man"; that the critical method adopted in pursuit of this goal occasioned corrosive doubts concerning the very possibility of science; that reflection upon the failure of his initial effort led Hume to replace his earlier scientific ideal with a less rigorous program of "natural, unforced interpretation"; that this new "academical philosophy" succeeded neither in providing workable criteria for distinguishing justifiable belief from superstition nor in avoiding the excesses of unmitigated scepticism; and, finally, that there is evidence that Hume was aware of and tacitly conceded these difficulties. (shrink)

The long-standing conflict between the two theories centers about the question whether time can exist independently of that which is in it. Those who advocate absolute time answer in the affirmative while the relationists take the opposite position claiming that temporal relations, and thus time, have no reality apart from the things and events which they order. In the terminology of Paul Weiss, relational time is "concrete." The considerable emphasis placed upon this issue of the concreteness of time has adversely (...) affected the absolute theory, leading to presentations of the absolutist position that are confusing, if not erroneous. Absolute time, as interpreted by philosophers such as Broad, Gunn, and Whitehead, posits the existence of abstract moments which are arranged in serial order one before the other by virtue of relations of precedence between them. Things and events participate in time only vicariously, so to speak, being joined to their respective moments by another kind of relation which Whitehead calls "occupation." The overall structure presented by the absolute theory is therefore thought to be as follows: one event is before another if both are respectively bound by relations of occupation to moments which are in turn so related as to be one before the other. Relational time mercifully simplifies this picture by a neat bit of surgery, cutting away the abstract moments and tying the relations of precedence directly to things and events themselves. As a consequence, the parasitic relations of occupation wither away. (shrink)

In May of 1973 we organized an international research colloquium on foundations of probability, statistics, and statistical theories of science at the University of Western Ontario. During the past four decades there have been striking formal advances in our understanding of logic, semantics and algebraic structure in probabilistic and statistical theories. These advances, which include the development of the relations between semantics and metamathematics, between logics and algebras and the algebraic-geometrical foundations of statistical theories (especially in the sciences), have led (...) to striking new insights into the formal and conceptual structure of probability and statistical theory and their scientific applications in the form of scientific theory. The foundations of statistics are in a state of profound conflict. Fisher's objections to some aspects of Neyman-Pearson statistics have long been well known. More recently the emergence of Baysian statistics as a radical alternative to standard views has made the conflict especially acute. In recent years the response of many practising statisticians to the conflict has been an eclectic approach to statistical inference. Many good statisticians have developed a kind of wisdom which enables them to know which problems are most appropriately handled by each of the methods available. The search for principles which would explain why each of the methods works where it does and fails where it does offers a fruitful approach to the controversy over foundations. (shrink)

Long-lasting debates, caused by conflicting viewpoints among biometrists on the phenomena of rhythmic growth in plant shoots, are at last being settled on certain crucial points. Most workers today agree that not all symmetrical constructions in plants can be explained by the application of the phyllotaxis theory. This theory explains adequately the orthostichous arrangement of leaves on growing photosynthetic apices, but fails in the case of non-photosynthetic reproductive organs.In the present paper three successive systems of shoot arrangement are described: phyllotaxis (...) for cauline leaves, anthotaxis for sporophylls, and semataxis for semaphylls . Each of these systems serves a different purpose: photosynthesis, reproduction and advertisement, and is accordingly adapted to its special function. “Phyllotaxis” and “anthotaxis” are classical concepts dealing with the arrangement of leaves and flowers; “semataxis” is a new term used in this paper to describe the arrangements of semaphylls.Goethe's classical theory of the metamorphosis of plants and his hypothetical “Urpflanze” are discussed in this paper from the viewpoint of the phyllotaxis-semataxis relation.Nach den langen Debatten über die Anwendbarkeit der Phyllotaxistheorie zur Erklärung der Blatt- und Blütenstellungen, hat man sich schliesslich über einige alte Streitfragen geeinigt. Man nimmt nun ganz allgemein an, dass nicht alle symmetrische Bildungen an Pflanzen sich mit der Anwendung der Phyllotaxisgesetze und Fibonazzi Reihe begründen lassen. Diese Theorie erklärt glaubwürdig die rhythmische Anordnung der vegetativen Blätter an den photosynthetischen Sprossen, nicht aber die symmetrischen Bildungen in den Blüten.In dem vorliegenden Aufsatz sind drei historisch nacheinander folgenden Entwicklungssysteme: Phyllotaxis, für die vegetativen Blätter, Anthotaxis für Sporophyllen und Semataxis für die Semaphyllen eingehend diskutiert worden. „Phyllotaxis” ist ein klassischer Begriff für die Anordnung der Blätter; “Anthotaxis” wurde später eingeführt, ist bis jetzt aber nur wenig in diesem Sinne gebraucht und deshalb in diesem Aufsatz neu definiert worden. „Semataxis” ist neu. Sie betrifft die Anordnung der Semaphyllen, der auffälligen Teile der von den Insekten bestäubten Blüten der höheren Pflanzen. Jedes von diesen Systemen dient einem bestimmten Zweck. Die phyllotaktische Anordnung der vegetativen Blätter bezweckt die rationellste Photosynthese. Anthotaxis ist die zweckmässigste Ordnung der Sporophyllen für die mechanische Bestäubung und Fruchtbildung, während Semataxis schliesslich die Ankündigung der insektenbestäubten Blüten bedeutet. Alle diese Systeme sind ihren besonderen Funktionen eingehend angepasst.Obwohl die historische Entwicklung der Sprossysteme der höheren Pflanzen nach der Reihenfolge: Phyllotaxis →Anthotaxis → Semataxis erfolgt, sind in dem vorliegenden Aufsatz mehrere Ausnahmen mit umgekehrter Richtung angeführt. Semataktische Bautypen können unmittelbar von Phyllotaxis, und anthotaktische Anordnungen von Semataxis abgeleitet werden.Ferner sind in diesem Aufsatz die klassischen Theorien vonGoethe über die Metamorphose der Pflanzen und die hypothetische “Urpflanze” von dem neuen Gesichtswinkel der Phyllotaxis- und Semataxislehre eingehend diskutiert worden.Après de longs débats sur le phénomène de la croissance rhythmique des pousses des plantes, les biométristes s'accordent aujourd'hui sur certains points essentiels de la discussion. Au contraire des auteurs antérieurs, les chercheurs d'aujourd'hui admettent que toutes les constructions symétriques des plantes ne s'expliquent pas par l'application de la théorie de phyllotaxie. Cette théorie explique suffisamment la disposition orthostichique des feuilles sur des sommets photosynthétiques croissants, mais échoue dans le cas des organes reproductifs non-photosynthétiques.Dans le présent écrit trois systèmes successifs d'arrangements de pousses sont décrits: phyllotaxie pour feuilles caulines, anthotaxie pour sporophylles et sémataxie pour sémaphylles . Chacun de ces systèmes sert à des fins différents: à la photosynthèse, à la reproduction et à l'avertissement, et s'adapte par conséquent à sa propre fonction.Phyllotaxie et anthotaxie sont des conceptions classiques pour désigner la disposition des feuilles et des fleurs, sémataxie est un term nouveau qui sert à désigner dans cette étude l'arrangement des sémaphylles.La théorie classique deGoethe sur la métamorphose des plantes et son hypothétique „Urpflanze” sont discutées dans cet écrit du point de vue de la relation existant entre la phyllotaxie et la sémataxie. (shrink)

Prior to the advent of evolutionary theory the Natural System was generally conceived as based on "distinctions of kind, not consisting in a given number of definite properties" (J.S. Mill). It was considered final and unique, to be arrived at by more than one approach. Evolutionary theory has shifted emphasis to different characters, yet explicitly or implicitly the belief in a final natural system in biology persists in many textbooks and taints research. Allegedly natural systems are shown to be fundamentally (...) arbitrary and artificial, dependent on numerous value judgments and intrinsically conflicting to varying degrees. Because of this and because it has turned into a bar to clear thinking, the adjective "natural" should be abolished. (shrink)

Originally published in 1961. Russian Marxist philosophy of science originated among men and women who gave their whole lives to rebellion against established authority. The original tension within Marxist philosophy between positivism and metaphysics was repressed but not resolved in this first phase of Soviet Marxism. In this volume the author correlates the development of ideas with trends in the Cultural Revolution and against this background it is possible to understand why debates over general philosophy gave way to conflicts (...) over specific sciences in the aftermath of the first Five Year Plan and why there was a genuine crisis in Soviet biology. (shrink)