The so-called eighth _Stromateus_ is a series of excerpts on inquiry, demonstration, scepticism, and causal theory, made or adopted by Clement of Alexandria. This book provides a translation and commentary of the text and a study of its origin and purpose.

_ Source: _Volume 62, Issue 1, pp 69 - 89 Galen’s physiology—his theory of elements, mixtures and the emergence of natural capacities—compels him to conceive of each part of the soul as a peculiar mixture of elementary qualities in the material substance of the organ in which it is located. The reason why Galen, nevertheless, refrains from making a dogmatic assertion about the substance of the soul, or of human nature in general, is the acknowledged failure to account for two (...) goal-directed activities—the formation of bodily organs and human intelligence—in terms of elementary qualities and their mixtures. (shrink)

This paper explores the influence of Henri Bergson’s (1859–1941) philosophy of time on three early twentieth-century British philosophers: Karin Costelloe-Stephen (1889–1953), Hilda Oakeley (1867–1950), and May Sinclair (1863–1946). I demonstrate that three central claims of Bergson’s account of temporal experience (novelty, memory, and indivisibility) were creatively incorporated into their accounts of time. All these philosophers place time at the centre of their philosophical systems, so this study of their views on time and temporality can deepen our understanding of their systems (...) more broadly. Further, this study helps us appreciate the reception of Bergson’s thought in British philosophy after it was ferociously attacked by Bertrand Russell in 1912, and can provide more detailed contours on the joint fortunes of temporal experience and Bergson's thought in the history of twentieth-century philosophy. I conclude by emphasizing reasons why contemporary philosophers should pay particular attention to the three figures’ treatment of Bergson. (shrink)

In Quaestiones 1.3 and 2.14, Alexander presents a distinctly realist or essentialist view of the objects of definition, distinguished, on the one hand, from two types of realism rejected by Aristotle, and, on the other, from two types of conceptualism that probably belong within the Peripatetic tradition. The difference between Alexander’s view and essentialist abstractivism lies in his understanding of definienda not as the common concepts of things existing in the particulars, but as the common things conceived of as existing (...) in the particulars. This paper offers a close reading of Quaest. 1.3, whose aim is to flesh out Alexander’s position vis-à-vis the objects of definition against the backdrop of the four rejected alternatives. The distinction between Alexander’s essentialism and the essentialist abstractivist notion of definienda is further explained in light of Quaest. 2.14. The amended Greek text of Quaest. 1.3 is appended with an English translation. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that adjusting Stump and Kretzmann’s “atemporal duration” with la durée, a key concept in the philosophy of Henri Bergson, can respond to the most significant objections aimed at Stump and Kretzmann’s re-interpretation of Boethian eternity. This paper deals with three of these objections: the incoherence of the notion of “atemporal duration,” the impossibility of this duration being time-like, and the problems involved in conceiving it as being related to temporal duration by a (...) relation of analogy. I conclude that “atemporal duration” — when combined with Bergson’s durée to become an “atemporal durée” — is a coherent understanding of divine eternity. (shrink)

Introduction to the first special issue of Bergsoniana, a new journal in Bergson studies.

Este breve ensayo complementa en aspectos esenciales la argumentación de mi libro Introducción a la filosofía de la vocación en la medida en que se analiza la experiencia de la vocación desde el punto de vista de la estética. Me centro en cinco preguntas con respecto a la obra de Felice Casorati titulada Vocation. Primero, partiendo del título de la obra en relación con la desnudez de la figura ilumino la diferencia entre una interpretación santa y profana. En el segundo (...) capítulo intento captar y describir el sujeto de la vocación, uno de las protagonistas de este drama. El tercer capítulo está dedicado a caracterizar el contexto de la vocación con atención especial a la esperanza. El siguiente punto trata del análisis de la experiencia temporal de la vocación. El quinto paso es un nuevo acercamiento a la pregunta más esencial: ¿quién es el que llama en la vocación? El último punto es una recogida de los resultados, es decir, aquellos aspectos esenciales que nos sirven como puntos orientativos para vivir y expresar mejor la vocación como pleno sentido de la existencia. (shrink)

I investigate the complex relationship between politics and philosophy by focusing on the notion of testimony. I argue that there is a necessary and fruitful tension between sapiential and political life. Testimony is characterized here as a free value-response in an intersubjective relation that requires empathy on both sides of the communication. This act of affirming a truth or value goes beyond the limits of prudent self-realization and self-preservation: authentic testimony requires some kind of self-sacrifice. I contrast this general image (...) of testimony to Jan Patočka’s interpretation of «care for the soul». Patočka, by following the early Husserl’s renewal of philosophy, managed to establish and to preserve the harmony between theory and praxis even during persecution of the communist regime. His courageous acts come close to and illuminate the testimony of Edith Stein, who set the measure for philosophical authenticity and self-donation. The comparison of these two testimonies helps to elaborate the notion of exemplary sapiential life — a highly relevant notion for politics. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 62, Issue 1, pp 69 - 89 Galen’s physiology—his theory of elements, mixtures and the emergence of natural capacities—compels him to conceive of each part of the soul as a peculiar mixture of elementary qualities in the material substance of the organ in which it is located. The reason why Galen, nevertheless, refrains from making a dogmatic assertion about the substance of the soul, or of human nature in general, is the acknowledged failure to account for two (...) goal-directed activities—the formation of bodily organs and human intelligence—in terms of elementary qualities and their mixtures. (shrink)

The article is an analysis of a chapter dealing with the Aristotelian categories in the so-called eighth book of Stromata by Clement of Alexandria, a collection of notes from a philosophical source (or sources) concerned with the theory of demonstration and related issues. Though seldom mentioned in contemporary scholarship, this short chapter is a valuable testimony of the reception of the Categories in the philosophy of the Imperial period and before the time of Alexander of Aphrodisias. After a brief survey (...) of its contents, the article investigates parallels in philosophical literature and explores the function of the chapter within the larger context of Stromata VIII. In the final section the question of Clement's source is addressed. Drawing on earlier research concerning other parts of the eighth book, the article argues that in this case, too, Galen's lost writing on demonstration is a likely candidate. (shrink)

Translators' Preface to three texts on Henri Bergson by Jan Patočka: "Review of 'Bergson' by Vladimir Jankélévitch"; "Preface to Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion"; "Bergson" (encyclopedia entry).

This paper provides a Bergsonian response to J.M.E. McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time. McTaggart’s argument has been used as the primary framework for analytic discussions about time for over a hundred years. McTaggart argued that all events in time can be categorised in two ways: either using the A-series (whereby all events are ‘past,’ ‘present,’ or ‘future’) or the B-series (whereby two events are linked by the relation of ‘earlier’ and ‘later’). He argued that the A-series is contradictory (...) and that the B-series does not capture the nature of time. So he famously concluded that time is unreal. I demonstrate that McTaggart’s argument does not pay sufficient attention to the time of consciousness captured by Bergson’s durée. I show that two distinct temporal realms can be extracted from Bergson’s philosophy: (i) la durée and (ii) a mathematical time-ordering generally classified by analytic philosophers as the B-series. The A-series is shown to be an attempt to ‘have it all’ – to retain the features that apply only to the mathematical ordering (e.g., divisibility into distinct segments), but that also somehow contain only those features that apply to subjective temporal experience (e.g., the ‘flow’ of time). (shrink)

The aim of this article is to reassess the similarity between Kripke’s metaphysics and Aquinas’ thought on truth, a similarity affirmed in Schultz-Aldrich’s Heythrop Journal article from 2009 and denied by Klima and Kerr in their analysis of Kripkean and Thomist accounts of essence. My claim is that this similarity has been insufficiently understood and its misunderstanding has closed off ways by means of which Aquinas’ thought can provide Kripkean epistemology with a component that it lacks.

C. D. Broad developed three different accounts of time over the course of his career. Emily Thomas has recently argued that the shift from the first to the second of these was motivated by his engagement with the philosophy of Samuel Alexander. In this paper, I argue that the shift from the second to the third was instigated by Broad’s engagement with precognitive dreams and with the thought of John William Dunne. Furthermore, I argue that fully appreciating Broad’s interest in (...) psychic research in general, and precognitions in particular, is required for understanding the theory of time he defended in the second volume of Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy. I also argue that interpreting the Examination in light of Broad’s engagement with Dunne can help remove the inconsistencies in Broad’s third account. (shrink)

This paper argues that idealism can offer a new solution to the problem of relating the “static” presence of things to eternity and the “dynamic” passage of reality in the temporal realm. I first offer a presentation of this problem using the dispute between Aquinas and Scotus, then describe “ontological idealism about time,” as a smaller–scale idealism, and show how it resolves the original problem. I conclude by demonstrating that this view is consonant with the recent emphasis on the ontological (...) dependence of things on God and that it offers a way of bringing together non–eternalist ontologies and the ontological conclusions posited by the special theory of relativity. (shrink)

The thesis uses key insights from the philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859-1941) to propose a new model of God’s relation to time. Chapter 1 is an introduction to Bergson’s philosophy against the background of Russell’s “The Philosophy of Bergson.” It provides an exposition of two key themes from Bergson central to my argument: the relation between time and space (Chapters 2-4) and the relation between free will and determinism (Chapter 5). Chapter 2 has a twofold task. First, it provides a (...) Bergsonian response to McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time. Second, it uses the underlying metaphysics of McTaggart’s argument to demonstrate that two distinct temporal realms can be extracted from Bergson’s philosophy: (i) la durée and (ii) a mathematical time-ordering generally classified by analytic philosophy as the B-series. Chapter 3 relates this double-tier framework to temporal ontologies in analytic philosophy. I argue that such a framework supports an “ontological idealism about time.” I argue for relativizing temporal existence to distinct points or sets of points of spacetime that leads to a radical mind-dependence of temporal extension of objects. Chapter 4 explores how the durée-based ontology argued for in Chapter 3 impacts the relation between God and time. I argue that analytic philosophy has failed to capture key ontological facets of the God-time relation and that a return to divine “causal knowledge” is required. I demonstrate that the existence of temporal objects comes from two sources: (i) their mind-dependent temporal aspect and (ii) timeless divinely-created esse. Chapter 5 applies this framework to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human free will. I demonstrate that although Bergson’s theory can defend the existence of human freedom, his thought needs to be supplanted with divine “causal knowledge” to guarantee divine omniscience. (shrink)

This book connects the philosophy of Henri Bergson to contemporary debates in metaphysics and analytic philosophy of religion. More specifically, the book demonstrates how Bergson’s philosophy of time can respond to the problem of foreknowledge and free will. The question of how humans can be free if God knows everything has been a perennial issue of debate in analytic philosophy of religion. The solution to this problem relies heavily on what one thinks about time. The problem of time is central (...) to Bergson’s philosophical system. In this book, the author offers a systematic application of Bergson’s thought to the freedom and foreknowledge problem. The first chapter presents a discussion of Bergson’s central concept of la durée (duration). The subsequent two chapters link la durée to the relation of time and space. Here the author provides a Bergsonian response to McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time and develops a novel theory of time connected to Bergson’s analysis of temporal experience. The last three chapters explore the relation between free will, determinism, and divine foreknowledge. The author reconstructs Bergson’s theory of freedom and shows how it undermines the underlying dogmas of contemporary free-will theories. The author then argues that Bergson’s philosophy can be used to resolve the free will and foreknowledge problem in philosophy of religion. The monograph concludes by opening avenues for new research into Bergson and analytic philosophy of religion, such as the philosophy of religious language, the relation between God and modality, religious experience, and religious pluralism. (shrink)

J. M. E. McTaggart’s (1866-1925) argument for the unreality of time, first published in 1908, set the decisive framework for discussions about time in 20th-century analytic philosophy. This chapter provides an outline of the argument and situates it within the wider context of McTaggart’s philosophical system. It then provides an overview of a critique of McTaggart’s philosophical views on time by Hilda Oakeley (1867-1950). Oakeley was McTaggart’s contemporary and her critiques—while firmly based within their shared commitment to idealism—prefigure many later (...) criticisms and problems faced by 20th-century philosophers of time. (shrink)

This paper argues that the possibility of revealing counterfactuals of creaturely freedom to agents in possible worlds forming part of God’s natural knowledge poses a new problem for Molinism. This problem best comes to light when considering the phenomenon of stubbornness, i.e., the conscious refusal of fulfilling the providential plan revealed to and intended for us by another agent. The reason why this problem has gone unnoticed is that the usual instances of prophecy dealt with by Molinists are highly specific (...) cases. These cases are special for three reasons: because the content of the revelations does not include the relevant counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, because the specific revelation plays no causal role in the immediate circumstances of the action that the agent is performing, and because the agent is not intent on consciously refusing the providential plan intended by the relevant counterfactual. I explore possible worlds where one or more of these three conditions do not obtain and demonstrate the consequences these possible worlds have for Molinists. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that the French philosopher Henri Bergson was a hidden interlocutor in Susan Stebbing’s critique of Arthur Eddington in her Philosophy and the Physicists. First, we outline Stebbing’s critique of Eddington’s philosophical- physical writings with a particular emphasis on her case against Eddington’s account of the passage of time. Second, we provide evidence that Eddington’s philosophy is, at its core, Bergsonian and make the case that Eddington was directly influenced by Bergson’s philosophy of la durée. Third, (...) we lay out Stebbing’s critique of Bergsonism in her Pragmatism and French Voluntarism and identify important similarities with her critique of Eddington over twenty years later. In doing so, we show that it is Eddington’s Bergsonism that she is attacking. Finally, we situate Stebbing’s criticisms of both Eddington and Bergson within two wider conflicts that emerged in early twentieth century British philosophy: one between an objectively describable time of physics and subjective temporal experience, and the other between science and intuition. (shrink)

Ocherk 1. Voprosy ontologii -- Ocherk 2. Voprosy ėtiki i ėstetiki -- Ocherk 3. Voprosy gnoseologii i aksiologii.

Determining what has gone wrong in a malfunctioning body and proposing an effective treatment requires expertise. Since antiquity, philosophers and doctors have wondered what sort of knowledge this expertise involves, and whether and how it can warrant its conclusions. Few people were as qualified to deal with these questions as Galen of Pergamum. A practising doctor with a keen interest in logic and natural science, he devoted much of his enormous literary output to the task of putting medicine on firm (...) methodological grounds. At the same time he reflected on philosophical issues entailed by this project, such as the nature of experience, its relation to reason, the criteria of truth, and the methods of justification. This volume explores Galen's contributions to epistemology, as they arise in the specific inquiries and polemics of his works, as well as their legacy in the Islamic world. (shrink)

Because the techno-economic paradigm of contemporary conceptualizations of innovation is often taken for granted in the literature, this chapter opens up this self-evident notion. First, the chapter consults the work of Joseph Schumpeter, who can be seen as the founding father of the current conceptualization of innovation as technological and commercial. Second, we open up the concept by reflecting on two aspects of Schumpeter’s conceptualization of innovation, namely its destructive and its constructive aspect, based on findings in the history of (...) innovation. Finally, we synthesize our findings and propose an ontic-ontological conceptualization of innovation as ontogenetic process and outcome with six dimensions—newness, political dimension, economic dimension, temporal dimension, human dimension and risk—that moves beyond its technological and commercial orientation. (shrink)

Research on brain or cognitive/affective processes, culture, social interaction, and structural analysis are overlapping but often independent ways humans have attempted to understand the origins of their evolution, historical, and contemporary development. Each level seeks to employ its own theoretical concepts and methods for depicting human nature and categorizing objects and events in the world, and often relies on different sources of evidence to support theoretical claims. Each level makes reference to different temporal bandwidths (milliseconds, seconds, minutes, hours, days, months, (...) years, decades, and centuries) and focuses on different spatio-temporal activities and controlled and non-controlled stimulus conditions. Biological mechanisms and environmental pressures for survival simultaneously created a gradual intersection and enhancement of cognitive/affective skills, cultural practices, and changes in collaborative social interaction and communicative skills. The evolution of a given level of analysis is assumed to have been incremental and overlapping. These innovative and independent ways humans have learned to characterize their brain or cognitive/affective and social/economic/political life often depend on unexamined, representational re-descriptions or cognitive/affective and socio-cultural devices and forms of communication that facilitate the depiction of practices and beliefs we attribute to respondents or subjects and research colleagues. (shrink)

В книге очерки Владимира Брагинского в жанре ироничного эссе о любви.