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  1. Aristotle and the Necessity of Scientific Knowledge.Lucas Angioni - manuscript
    This is a translation, made by myself, of the paper to be published in Portuguese in the journal Discurso, 2020, in honour of the late professor Oswaldo Porchat. I discuss what Aristotle was trying to encode when he said that the object of scientific knowledge is necessary, or that what we know (scientifically) cannot be otherwise etc. The paper is meant as a continuation of previous papers—orientated towards a book on the Posterior Analytics—and thus does not discuss in much detail (...)
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  2. A BIBLIOGRAPHY: JOHN CORCORAN's PUBLICATIONS ON ARISTOTLE 1972–2015.John Corcoran - manuscript
    This presentation includes a complete bibliography of John Corcoran’s publications devoted at least in part to Aristotle’s logic. Sections I–IV list 20 articles, 43 abstracts, 3 books, and 10 reviews. It starts with two watershed articles published in 1972: the Philosophy & Phenomenological Research article that antedates Corcoran’s Aristotle’s studies and the Journal of Symbolic Logic article first reporting his original results; it ends with works published in 2015. A few of the items are annotated with endnotes connecting them with (...)
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  3. O Silogismo Científico em Aristóteles.Raquel Mieko Nakaza - manuscript
  4. Aristóteles e a necessidade do conhecimento científico.Lucas Angioni - 2020 - Discurso 50 (2):193-238.
    I discuss the exact meaning of the thesis according to which the object of scientific knowledge is necessary. The thesis is expressed by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics, in his definition of scientific knowledge. The traditional interpretation understands this definition as depending on two parallel and independent requirements, the causality requirement and the necessity requirement. Against this interpretation, I try to show, through the examination of several passages that refer to the definition of scientific knowledge, that the necessity requirement specifies (...)
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  5. A Teoria da Demonstração Científica de Aristóteles em Segundos Analíticos 1.2-9 e 1.13.Davi Bastos - 2020 - Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 30:e03021.
    I defend an interpretation of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics Book I which distinguishes between two projects in different passages of that work: (i) to explain what a given science is and (ii) to explain what properly scientific knowledge is. I present Aristotle’s theory in answer to ii, with special attention to his definition of scientific knowledge in 71b9-12 and showing how this is developed on chapters I.2-9 and I.13 into a solid Theory of Scientific Demonstration. The main point of this theory (...)
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  6. A Teoria Aristotélica da Demonstração Científica.Charles Andrade Santana - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Campinas, Brazil
  7. Comprehension, Demonstration, and Accuracy in Aristotle.Breno Zuppolini - 2020 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (1):29-48.
    according to aristotle's posterior analytics, scientific expertise is composed of two different cognitive dispositions. Some propositions in the domain can be scientifically explained, which means that they are known by "demonstration", a deductive argument in which the premises are explanatory of the conclusion. Thus, the kind of cognition that apprehends those propositions is called "demonstrative knowledge".1 However, not all propositions in a scientific domain are demonstrable. Demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable principles, whose knowledge is called "comprehension".2 If the knowledge (...)
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  8. Aristotle’s Contrast Between Episteme and Doxa in its Context (Posterior Analytics I.33).Lucas Angioni - 2019 - Manuscrito 42 (4):157-210.
    Aristotle contrasts episteme and doxa through the key notions of universal and necessary. These notions have played a central role in Aristotle’s characterization of scientific knowledge in the previous chapters of APo. They are not spelled out in APo I.33, but work as a sort of reminder that packs an adequate characterization of scientific knowledge and thereby gives a highly specified context for Aristotle’s contrast between episteme and doxa. I will try to show that this context introduces a contrast in (...)
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  9. What Really Characterizes Explananda: Prior Analytics I.30.Lucas Angioni - 2019 - Eirene: Studia Graeca Et Latina 55:147-177.
    In Prior Analytics I.30, Aristotle seems too much optmistic about finding out the principles of sciences. For he seems to say that, if our empirical collection of facts in a given domain is exhaustive or sufficient, it will be easy for us to find out the explanatory principles in the domain. However, there is a distance between collecting facts and finding out the explanatory principles in a given domain. In this paper, I discuss how the key expression in the sentence (...)
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  10. Aristotle on Predication and Demonstration.David Bronstein - 2019 - Manuscrito 42 (4):85-121.
    I argue against the standard interpretation of Aristotle’s account of ‘natural predication’ in Posterior Analytics 1.19 and 1.22 according to which only substances can serve as subjects in such predications. I argue that this interpretation cannot accommodate a number of demonstrations Aristotle sanctions. I propose a new interpretation that can accommodate them.
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  11. Disentangling Defining and Demonstrating: Notes on An. Post. II 3-7.Laura M. Castelli - 2019 - Manuscrito 42 (4):243-281.
  12. Aristotle’s Argument From Truth in Metaphysics Γ 4.Graham Clay - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):17-24.
    Some of Aristotle’s statements about the indemonstrability of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in Metaphysics Γ 4 merit more attention. The consensus seems to be that Aristotle provides two arguments against the demonstrability of the PNC, with one located in Γ 3 and the other found in the first paragraph of Γ 4. In this article, I argue that Aristotle also relies upon a third argument for the same conclusion: the argument from truth. Although Aristotle does not explicitly state this (...)
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  13. On the Pre-Demonstrative (Hoti) Conception of Lunar Eclipse in Posterior Analytics B 8.Wellington Damasceno de Almeida - 2019 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 13 (2):96-108.
    My aim is to show that, in Posterior Analytics B 8, the conception of lunar eclipse brought about by pre-demonstrative knowledge (hoti) is deeply vague and radically different from the one obtained by demonstrative knowledge (dioti).
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  14. Can There Be a Science of Psychology? Aristotle’s de Anima and the Structure and Construction of Science.Robert J. Hankinson - 2019 - Manuscrito 42 (4):469-515.
  15. Aristotle on the Necessity of What We Know.Joshua Mendelsohn - 2019 - Dissertation, The University of Chicago
  16. Causality and Coextensiveness in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics 1.13.Lucas Angioni - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 54:159-185.
    I discuss an important feature of the notion of cause in Post. An. 1. 13, 78b13–28, which has been either neglected or misunderstood. Some have treated it as if Aristotle were introducing a false principle about explanation; others have understood the point in terms of coextensiveness of cause and effect. However, none offers a full exegesis of Aristotle's tangled argument or accounts for all of the text's peculiarities. My aim is to disentangle Aristotle's steps to show that he is arguing (...)
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  17. Situando Aristóteles na Discussão Acerca da Natureza da Causação.Davi Heckert César Bastos - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Campinas, Brazil
    I present Aristotle’s theory of causation in a way that privileges a comparison with contemporary discussion on causation. I do so by selecting in Aristotle’s theory points that are interesting to contemporary discussion and by translating Aristotle in the contemporary philosophical terminology. I compare Aristotle’s views with Mackie’s (1993/1965) and Sosa’s (1993/1980). Mackie is a humean regularist regarding the metaphysics of causal necessity, but his theory postulates some formal aspects of the causal relation which are similar to the Aristotelian theory. (...)
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  18. Aristotle on Kind‐Crossing.Philipp Steinkrüger - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 54:107-158.
    This paper concerns Aristotle's kind‐crossing prohibition. My aim is twofold. I argue that the traditional accounts of the prohibition are subject to serious internal difficulties and should be questioned. According to these accounts, Aristotle's prohibition is based on the individuation of scientific disciplines and the general kind that a discipline is about, and it says that scientific demonstrations must not cross from one discipline, and corresponding kind, to another. I propose a very different account of the prohibition. The prohibition is (...)
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  19. Aristotle on Per Se Accidents.Breno A. Zuppolini - 2018 - Ancient Philosophy 38 (1):113-135.
  20. Explanation and Essence in Posterior Analytics II 16-17.Breno Andrade Zuppolini - 2018 - Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 24:229-264.
    In Posterior Analytics II 16-17, Aristotle seems to claim that there cannot be more than one explanans of the same scientific explanandum. However, this seems to be true only for “primary-universal” demonstrations, in which the major term belongs to the minor “in itself” and the middle term is coextensive with the extremes. If so, several explananda we would like to admit as truly scientific would be out of the scope of an Aristotelian science. The secondary literature has identified a second (...)
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  21. Angioni, L. (2014) (ed.). Lógica e Ciência em Aristóteles. Campinas, Ed. Phi. [REVIEW]Manuel Berrón - 2017 - Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 20:335-342.
  22. Aristotelian Mechanistic Explanation.Monte Johnson - 2017 - In J. Rocca (ed.), Teleology in the Ancient World: philosophical and medical approaches. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 125-150.
    In some influential histories of ancient philosophy, teleological explanation and mechanistic explanation are assumed to be directly opposed and mutually exclusive alternatives. I contend that this assumption is deeply flawed, and distorts our understanding both of teleological and mechanistic explanation, and of the history of mechanistic philosophy. To prove this point, I shall provide an overview of the first systematic treatise on mechanics, the short and neglected work Mechanical Problems, written either by Aristotle or by a very early member of (...)
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  23. Ontological Underpinnings of Aristotle's Philosophy of Science.Breno A. Zuppolini - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Campinas, Brazil
  24. Book Review: David Bronstein, Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning: The Posterior Analytics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. (Pp.Xiii-272). [REVIEW]Breno Andrade Zuppolini - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):179-186.
  25. Aristotle’s Definition of Scientific Knowledge.Lucas Angioni - 2016 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 19 (1):79-104.
    In Posterior Analytics 71b9 12, we find Aristotle’s definition of scientific knowledge. The definiens is taken to have only two informative parts: scientific knowledge must be knowledge of the cause and its object must be necessary. However, there is also a contrast between the definiendum and a sophistic way of knowing, which is marked by the expression “kata sumbebekos”. Not much attention has been paid to this contrast. In this paper, I discuss Aristotle’s definition paying due attention to this contrast (...)
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  26. Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning: The Posterior Analytics.David Bronstein - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    David Bronstein sheds new light on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics--one of the most important, and difficult, works in the history of western philosophy--by arguing that it is coherently structured around two themes of enduring philosophical interest: knowledge and learning. He argues that the Posterior Analytics is a sustained examination of scientific knowledge, an elegantly organized work in which Aristotle describes the mind's ascent from sense-perception of particulars to scientific knowledge of first principles. Bronstein goes on to highlight Plato's influence on Aristotle's (...)
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  27. The Formal Cause in the Posterior Analytics.Petter Sandstad - 2016 - Filozofski Vestnik 37 (3):7-26.
    I argue that Aristotle’s account of scientific demonstrations in the Posterior Analytics is centred upon formal causation, understood as a demonstration in terms of essence (and as innocent of the distinction between form and matter). While Aristotle says that all four causes can be signified by the middle term in a demonstrative syllogism, and he discusses at some length efficient causation, much of Aristotle’s discussion is foremost concerned with the formal cause. Further, I show that Aristotle had very detailed procedures (...)
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  28. NATURALEZA DE LA CIENCIA DEMOSTRATIVA SEGÚN ARISTÓTELES.Diego Espinoza Bustamante - 2015 - Dissertation, Universidad Panamericana
  29. Aristotle's Architectonic Sciences.Monte Johnson - 2015 - In David Ebrey (ed.), Theory and Practice in Aristotle's Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 163-186.
    Aristotle rejected the idea of a single, overarching super-science or “theory of everything”, and he presented a powerful and influential critique of scientific unity. In theory, each science observes the facts unique to its domain, and explains these by means of its own proper principles. But even as he elaborates his prohibition on kind-crossing explanations (Posterior Analytics 1.6-13), Aristotle points out that there are important exceptions—that some sciences are “under” others in that they depend for their explanations on the principles (...)
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  30. OS TÓPICOS E COMPETÊNCIA DIALÉTICA: LÓGICA E LINGUAGEM NA CODIFICAÇÃO DO DEBATE DIALÉTICO.Fernando Martins Mendonça - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Campinas
    Our aim is to argue for a deflationary interpretation of Aristotelian dialectic in the Topics, showing that dialectic is, for Aristotle, a specific sort of regulated debate, in contrast to a widely spread kind of interpretation which conceives dialectic as a method of philosophical investigation. Our claim is that an analysis carefully conducted of certain key texts does provide us with sufficient evidences for defending that the Topics is a handbook which codifies an existent art. This codification has a descriptive (...)
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  31. Formal Causes: Definition, Explanation, and Primacy in Socratic and Aristotelian Thought by Michael T. Ferejohn. [REVIEW]Christopher V. Mirus - 2015 - Review of Metaphysics 69 (1):132-134.
  32. Sistemas semânticos e o problema de adequação para uma interpretação na silogística de Aristóteles.Felipe Weinmann - 2015 - Filosofia Grega E Helenística (Coleção XVI Encontro Anpof).
  33. Acerca dos concomitantes per se em Aristóteles.Breno Andrade Zuppolini - 2015 - Filosofia Grega E Helenística (Coleção XVI Encontro Anpof).
  34. Demonstração, silogismo e causalidade.Lucas Angioni - 2014 - In Lógica e Ciência em Aristóteles. pp. 61-120.
    This chapter argues in favour of three interrelated points. First, I argue that demonstration (as expression of scientific knowledge) is fundamentally defined as knowledge of the appropriate cause for a given explanandum: to have scientific knowledge of the explanandum is to explain it through its fully appropriate cause. Secondly, I stress that Aristotle’s notion of cause has a “triadic” structure, which fundamentally depends on the predicative formulation (or “regimentation”) of the explanandum. Thirdly, I argue that what has motivated Aristotle to (...)
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  35. Aristotle on Necessary Principles and on Explaining X Through X’s Essence.Lucas Angioni - 2014 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 7 (2):88-112.
    I discuss what Aristotle means when he say that scientific demonstration must proceed from necessary principles. I argue that, for Aristotle, scientific demonstration should not be reduced to sound deduction with necessary premises. Scientific demonstration ultimately depends on the fully appropriate explanatory factor for a given explanandum. This explanatory factor is what makes the explanandum what it is. Consequently, this factor is also unique. When Aristotle says that demonstration must proceed from necessary principles, he means that each demonstration requires the (...)
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  36. Lógica e Ciência em Aristóteles.Lucas Angioni - 2014 - Phi.
  37. The Art of Dialectic Between Dialogue and Rhetoric: The Aristotelian Tradition. [REVIEW]Mehmet Karabela - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (4):841-42.
  38. A resposta aristotélica para a aporia do regresso ao infinito nas demonstrações.Daniel Lourenço - 2014 - In Jaimir Conte & Cezar A. Mortari (eds.), Temas em Filosofia Contemporânea. Florianópolis, Brazil: NEL – Núcleo de Epistemologia e Lógica. pp. 184-202.
  39. Silogismo e demonstração na concepção de conhecimento científico dos Analíticos de Aristóteles.Francine Maria Ribeiro - 2014 - In Lucas Angioni (ed.), Lógica e Ciência em Aristóteles. pp. 121-160.
    Discussão sobre o papel da silogística e sua relação com as noções de dedução correta e explicação apropriada na concepção aristotélica de ciência.
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  40. Fundacionalismo e silogística.Breno A. Zuppolini - 2014 - In Lucas Angioni (ed.), Lógica e Ciência em Aristóteles. Phi. pp. 161-202.
  41. ASPECTOS FORMAIS E ONTOLÓGICOS DA FILOSOFIA DA CIÊNCIA DE ARISTÓTELES.Breno Andrade Zuppolini - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Campinas
    Aristotle's theory of demonstration, developed in the Posterior Analytics, is not restricted to determining the formal requirements for formulating probative arguments that establish properly the results of scientific investigation. To the probative aspect of demonstration it shall be added its primarily explanatory character, orientated by theses of strong ontological and metaphysical content and involving notions like substance, essence and causation. We shall analyze the relation between those two ranges of Aristotle's philosophy of science and investigate how the formal features of (...)
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  42. Conhecimento e Opinião em Aristóteles (Segundos Analíticos I-33).Lucas Angioni - 2013 - In Marcelo Carvalho (ed.), Encontro Nacional Anpof: Filosofia Antiga e Medieval. Anpof. pp. 329-341.
    This chapter discusses the first part of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics A-33, 88b30-89a10. I claim that Aristotle is not concerned with an epistemological distinction between knowledge and belief in general. He is rather making a contrast between scientific knowledge (which is equivalent to explanation by the primarily appropriate cause) and some explanatory beliefs that falls short of capturing the primarily appropriate cause.
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  43. Knowledge and Opinion About the Same Thing in APo A-33.Lucas Angioni - 2013 - Dois Pontos 10 (2):255-290.
    This paper discusses the contrast between scientific knowledge and opinion as it is presented by Aristotle in Posterior Analytics A.33. Aristotle's contrast is formulated in terms of understanding or not understanding some "necessary items". I claim that the contrast can only be understood in terms of explanatory relevance. The "necessary items" are middle terms (or explanatory factors) that are necessary for the fully appropriate explanation. This approach gives a coherent interpretation of each step in the chapter.
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  44. Aristotle on Modality and Predicative Necessity.Jean-Louis Hudry - 2013 - International Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1):5-21.
    Many logicians have tried to formalize a modal logic from the Prior Analytics, but the general view is that Aristotle has failed to offer a consistent modal logic there. This paper explains that Aristotle is not interested in modal logic as such. Modalities for him pertain to the relations of predication, without challenging the assertoric system of deductions simpliciter. Thus, demonstrations or dialectical deductions have modal predicates and yet are still deductions simpliciter. It is a matter of distinguishing inferential necessity (...)
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  45. Aristotle on Deduction and Inferential Necessity.Jean-Louis Hudry - 2013 - Review of Metaphysics 67 (1):29-54.
    Aristotle’s Prior Analytics identifies deductions simpliciter with inferential necessity, so that a deduced conclusion is necessarily inferred from some premises. Modern logical reconstructions claim that inferential necessity in Aristotle corresponds to logical validity. However, this logical reconstruction fails on two accounts. First, logical validity does not highlight Aristotle’s distinction between inferential necessity and predicative necessity, meaning that the inferential necessity of a deduction is not of the same kind as the predicative necessity of a non‑deductive argument. Second, logical validity does (...)
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  46. Definição, não contradição e indemonstrabilidade dos princípios: uma proposta de leitura para metafísica 4 à luz de segundos analíticos I,22.Daniel Lourenço - 2013 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
  47. Predicação e demonstração: algumas considerações sobre Segundos Analíticos I, 22.Daniel Lourenço - 2013 - Peri 5 (2):185-200.
  48. Forma Lógica das Proposições Científicas e Ontologia da Predicação: um dilema na filosofia da ciência de Aristóteles.Breno Zuppolini - 2013 - XI Semana Acadêmica Do PPG Em Filosofia da PUCRS:1-15.
    In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle imposes some requirements on scientific propositions: (i) they must be susceptible of syllogistic articulation, (ii) they must have universal terms as subjects of predication and (iii) their subjects must be primary, i.e. they cannot “be said of a distinct underlying subject”. However, it is problematic to meet those three requirements together. If associated with the theory of predication in Categories, the requirement (iii) shall prescribe names or descriptions of individuals within the category of substance as (...)
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  49. Os seis requisitos das premissas da demonstração científica em Aristóteles.Lucas Angioni - 2012 - Manuscrito 35 (1):7-60.
    I discuss in this paper the six requirements Aristotle advances at Posterior Analytics A-2, 71b20-33, for the premisses of a scientific demonstration. I argue that the six requirements give no support for an intepretation in terms of “axiomatization”. Quite on the contrary, the six requirements can be consistently understood in a very different picture, according to which the most basic feature of a scientific demonstration is to explain a given proposition by its appropriate cause.
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  50. As quatro causas na filosofia da natureza de Aristóteles.Lucas Angioni - 2011 - Anais de Filosofia Clássica 10:1-19.
    I have two aims in this paper. First, I argue that, in Aristotle’s theory of the four causes, there is a basic and common feature by which all causes are causes: they all work in a triadic framework in which they explain why a given attribute holds of a given underlying thing. Secondly, I argue against a version of “compatibilism” according to which each kind of cause is complete in its own domain and does not compete with any other kind. (...)
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