We investigate the form of mathematical structuralism that acknowledges the existence of structures and their distinctive structural elements. This form of structuralism has been subject to criticisms recently, and our view is that the problems raised are resolved by proper, mathematics-free theoretical foundations. Starting with an axiomatic theory of abstract objects, we identify a mathematical structure as an abstract object encoding the truths of a mathematical theory. From such foundations, we derive consequences that address the main questions and issues that (...) have arisen. Namely, elements of different structures are different. A structure and its elements ontologically depend on each other. There are no haecceities and each element of a structure must be discernible within the theory. These consequences are not developed piecemeal but rather follow from our definitions of basic structuralist concepts. (shrink)

How far should our realism extend? For many years philosophers of mathematics and philosophers of ethics have worked independently to address the question of how best to understand the entities apparently referred to by mathematical and ethical talk. But the similarities between their endeavours are not often emphasised. This book provides that emphasis. In particular, it focuses on two types of argumentative strategies that have been deployed in both areas. The first—debunking arguments—aims to put pressure on realism by emphasising the (...) seeming redundancy of mathematical or moral entities when it comes to explaining our judgements. In the moral realm this challenge has been made by Gilbert Harman and Sharon Street; in the mathematical realm it is known as the 'Benacerraf-Field' problem. The second strategy—indispensability arguments—aims to provide support for realism by emphasising the seeming intellectual indispensability of mathematical or moral entities, for example when constructing good explanatory theories. This strategy is associated with Quine and Putnam in mathematics and with Nicholas Sturgeon and David Enoch in ethics. Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics addresses these issues through an explicitly comparative methodology which we call the 'companions in illumination' approach. By considering how argumentative strategies in the philosophy of mathematics might apply to the philosophy of ethics, and vice versa, the papers collected here break new ground in both areas. For good measure, two further companions for illumination are also broached: the philosophy of chance and the philosophy of religion. Collectively, these comparisons light up new questions, arguments, and problems of interest to scholars interested in realism in any area. (shrink)

What is free will? Can it exist in a determined universe? How can we determine who, if anyone, possesses it? Philosophers have been debating these questions for millennia. In recent decades neuroscientists have joined the fray with questions of their own. Which neural mechanisms could enable conscious control of action? What are intentional actions? Do contemporary developments in neuroscience rule out free will or, instead, illuminate how it works? Over the past few years, neuroscientists and philosophers have increasingly come to (...) understand that both fields can make substantive contributions to the free-will debate, so working together is the best path forward to understanding whether, when, and how our choices might be free. We therefore asked leading philosophers and neuroscientists which questions related to free will they would most like the other field to answer. Those experts then voted on the 15 most important questions for each field to answer. This book is a collection of the answers to those questions along with follow-up questions from world experts in the neuroscience and philosophy of free will. These varied perspectives will fascinate, illuminate, and stimulate students from both fields along with anyone who wants to be brought up to date on these profound issues. (shrink)

This article deals with a tripartite structure applied to a Tannaitic source. This structure is designed in the form of a difficulty and a short resolution, bringing one example for each of the three parts of the Tannaitic source. The uniform formative-stylistic phrasing gives the discussion of the Tannaitic source's three parts a tripartite form. The Tannaitic source utilises a chaining of examples from the first to the second part and from the second to the third part.

Moral philosophers are, among other things, in the business of constructing moral theories. And moral theories are, among other things, supposed to explain moral phenomena. Consequently, one’s views about the nature of moral explanation will influence the kinds of moral theories one is willing to countenance. Many moral philosophers are (explicitly or implicitly) committed to a deductive model of explanation. As I see it, this commitment lies at the heart of the current debate between moral particularists and moral generalists. In (...) this paper I argue that we have good reasons to give up this commitment. In fact, I show that an examination of the literature on scientific explanation reveals that we are used to, and comfortable with, non-deductive explanations in almost all areas of inquiry. As a result, I argue that we have reason to believe that moral explanations need not be grounded in exceptionless moral principles. (shrink)

According to Alix Cohen, Kant defines emotions as ‘feelings’. Although I find her account of Kantian feelings compelling, I provide three reasons to doubt that it is an account of emotions: (1) it is unclear why Cohen identifies emotions with Kantian feelings; (2) some Kantian feelings are not emotions; (3) some Kantian desires may be emotions. I propose, however, that with some qualifications Cohen’s account may be upheld, provided its extra-textual assumptions about emotions are explicated. Against her claim that Kantian (...) feelings have a derived intentionality, I argue that the text is compatible with their being intrinsically intentional. (shrink)

Biological phenomena can be investigated at multiple levels, from the molecular to the cellular to the organismic to the ecological. In typical biology instruction, these levels have been segregated. Yet, it is by examining the connections between such levels that many phenomena in biology, and complex systems in general, are best explained. We describe a computation-based approach that enables students to investigate the connections between different biological levels. Using agent-based, embodied modeling tools, students model the microrules underlying a biological phenomenon (...) and observe the resultant aggregate dynamics. We describe 2 cases in which this approach was used. In both cases, students framed hypotheses, constructed multiagent models that incorporate these hypotheses, and tested these by running their models and observing the outcomes. Contrasting these cases against traditionally used, classical equation-based approaches, we argue that the embodied modeling approach connects more directly to students’ experience, enables extended investigations as well as deeper understanding, and enables “advanced” topics to be productively introduced into the high school curriculum. (shrink)

In this essay I offer a new particularist reading of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. I argue that the interpretation I present not only helps us to resolve some puzzles about Aristotle’s goals and methods, but it also gives rise to a novel account of morality—an account that is both interesting and plausible in its own right. The goal of this paper is, in part, exegetical—that is, to figure out how to best understand the text of the Nicomachean Ethics. But this paper (...) also aims to contribute to the current exciting and controversial debate over particularism. By taking the first steps towards a comprehensive particularist reading of Aristotle’s Ethics I hope to demonstrate that some of the mistrust of particularism is misplaces and that what is, perhaps, the most influential moral theory in the history of philosophy is, arguably, a particularist moral theory. (shrink)

Commentators provide two different accounts of desires in Kant: “feeling-based” accounts stress their connection with feelings, while “action-based” accounts view them as causes of action. I argue that “feeling-based” accounts blur the feeling-desire distinction, while the “action-based” accounts conflict with Kantian desires that do not cause action. On my alternative, Kantian desires are dispositions to action normally directed at producing future objects, and so they differ from the feelings they are connected to, which refer to the way we are affected (...) by objects. This account preserves the feeling-desire distinction, is compatible with desires that do not cause action, and anticipates holistic theories of desire that combine dispositional, hedonic, and evaluative components. (shrink)

Commentators disagree about Kant’s view on the proper treatment of emotions. In contrast to a tendency in this literature to treat them uniformly, I argue that, according to Kant, feelings (but not affects) require cultivation, and inclinations – although they can and perhaps may be cultivated – generally require discipline. The appropriate treatment for emotions depends on their susceptibility to rational constraint and on the threat they pose to rational deliberation. Although I read Kant as recommending that we cultivate certain (...) emotions, I argue that my reading is not vulnerable to Thomason’s recent pertinent objections to such readings. (shrink)

What makes some acts morally right and others morally wrong? Traditionally, philosophers have thought that in order to answer this question we must find and formulate exceptionless moral principles—principles that capture all and only morally right actions. Utilitarianism and Kantianism are paradigmatic examples of such attempts. In recent years, however, there has been a growing interest in a novel approach—Particularism—although its precise content is still a matter of controversy. In this paper I develop and motivate a new formulation of particularism (...) as a research program and I show that my formulation is not vulnerable to the most common objections to particularism. Moreover, I argue that the particularist research program shows enough promise to warrant further exploration. (shrink)

Nietzschean Psychology and Psychotherapy describes Nietzsche as an unacknowledged critic of psychology and mental health, bringing out and integrating his teachings about wise living, coping with pain and suffering, and effecting self-change and self-cultivation.

Assuming the existence of a supercompact cardinal and a weakly compact cardinal above it, we provide a generic extension where there are no Aronszajn trees of height ω 2 or ω 3 . On the other hand we show that some large cardinal assumptions are necessary for such a consistency result.

The paper identifies a distinctive feature of friendship. Friendship, it is argued, is a relationship between two people in which each participant values the other and successfully communicates this fact to the other. This feature of friendship, it is claimed, explains why friendship plays a key role in human happiness, why it is praised by philosophers, poets, and novelists, and why we all seek friends. Although the characterization of friendship proposed here differs from other views in the literature, it is (...) shown that it accommodates key insights of other writers on the topic. Thus, in accordance with the Aristotelian strategy the paper employs, it is shown that the account on offer preserves the received opinions on friendship. (shrink)

In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge. First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood as the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a wide range of situations—is superior to a particularist, non-principle-based account. I contend that both arguments are unsuccessful. Then, I propose a particularist-friendly explanation of knowledge of particular moral facts. I argue that when we are (...) careful to keep separate the various explanatory tasks at hand we can see that a particularist-friendly explanation of the fact that Jane knows that A is morally right might not be so difficult to come by. Moreover, I suggest that a particularist approach to explaining knowledge of particular moral facts may go some way towards discharging the challenge of moral scepticism. (shrink)

We discuss the problem of finding forcing posets which introduce closed unbounded subsets to a given stationary set.

We present some techniques in c.c.c. forcing, and apply them to prove consistency results concerning the isomorphism and embeddability relations on the family of ℵ 1 -dense sets of real numbers. In this direction we continue the work of Baumgartner [2] who proved the axiom BA stating that every two ℵ 1 -dense subsets of R are isomorphic, is consistent. We e.g. prove Con). Let K H, be the set of order types of ℵ 1 -dense homogeneous subsets of R (...) with the relation of embeddability. We prove that for every finite model L, : Con iff L is a distributive lattice. We prove that it is consistent that the Magidor-Malitz language is not countably compact. We deal with the consistency of certain topological partition theorems. E.g. We prove that MA is consistent with the axiom OCA which says: “If X is a second countable space of power ℵ 1, and { U 0,\h.;, U n−1 } is a cover of D ▪ X x X -} x,x> ¦ x ϵ X } consisting of symmetric open sets, then X can be partitioned into { X i \brvbar; i ϵ ω } such that for every i ϵ ω there is l such that D ⊇ U l ”. We also prove that MA+OCA [xrArr] 2 ℵ 0 = ℵ 2. (shrink)

The methodology of physics is discussed. The limitations of the empirical method are exposed, and it is argued that these limitations are related to our sensory input. The limitations of mathematics and of the representation of physical theories by mathematical models are also examined. An alternative methodology, the establishing of physical models on neuropsychology, is suggested and demonstrated. A cognitive psychological model of the genesis and the termination of time is explored.

Until recent times, the collection of Salomon Maimons early works written in Hebrew, Hesheq Shelomo, was not included into the scientific circulation. An article of professor Gideon Freudenthal on the formation of the young Maimon, filled this lacuna, proving the importance of the analysis of philosophers early works for the comprehension of his literary heritage in general. Freudenthal had studied and published Maimons introduction to Hesheq Shelomo, and then one of the collections treatises, Maаse Livnat ha-Sаppir, consecrated to the ideas (...) and notions of kabbalah. In his analysis Freudenthal had focused on Maimons rational interpretation of kabbalah. The present article represents an attempt to expand Freudenthals research, adding an analysis of another aspect of young Maimons thought. We will try to show that kabbalah, generally understood by early Maimon as ancient Jewish knowledge, had, according to the thinker, to complete philosophy and mitigate arising in it problems. In his early works Maimon was not only criticizing widely occurring profane kabbalah, but also Maimonides philosophy. According to Maimon, it is not possible to understand the true kabbalah without philosophy, but philosophical knowledge is not complete and often erroneous without kabbalah: the true kabbalah rectifies and adjusts it. The critic of Aristotelianism and its derivate, proposed by Maimon in his early works, can add clarity to the understanding of the development of his philosophical thought in the late period. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza las numerosas versiones de un Apocalipsis islámico que predice la aparición de 12 soberanos entre los musulmanes. Mantiene que las primeras versiones de este apocalipsis fueron puestas en circulación durante el período omeya, alrededor del año 100 H, cuando el número de califas se acercaba al duodécimo. La coincidencia entre los dos números simbólicos, 12 y 100, alimentó una atmósfera apocalíptica que favoreció la circulación de las primeras versiones del apocalipsis. Estas versiones hacen uso del modelo bíblico (...) de los doce príncipes de Israel que se han identificado con los doce soberanos musulmanes. El artículo continúa examinando varias versiones de este apocalipsis básico, versiones que reflejan circunstancias políticas posteriores, surgidas durante el final del período omeya y el comienzo del ‛abbāsī En estas versiones revisadas, el modelo bíblico ha sido reemplazado por el coránico y por un modelo árabe. El artículo examina también la función de este apocalipsis en el šī‛īsmo Duodecimano. (shrink)

Este artículo intenta demostrar que, al contrario de lo que mantienen varios estudiosos modernos, el término coránico al-Masyid al-Aqs.à denomina a la Jerusalén terrestre. La Jerusalén a la que se refiere es la ciudad santa cristiana, una ¿Nueva Jerusalén¿ que reemplazaba a aquella que había sido destruida por los pecados de los judíos. El viaje nocturno de Muhammad a este lugar constituye una visión semejante a la que experimentó Ezequiel. Las fuentes de tafsir más tempranas son unánimes en equiparar este (...) al-Masyid al-Aqsà del Corán con Jerusalén (Bayt al-Maqdis). Sólo algunas fuentes si'íes mantienen que al-Masyid al-Aqsà está en los cielos, lo que implica que Muhammad nunca estuvo en Jerusalén. Esta interpretación refleja la actitud si'í antiomeya, y tenía el objetivo de privar a Jerusalén de su carácter sagrado como centro de peregrinación. Esta interpretación se apoya en tradiciones que describen el viaje nocturno de Muh.ammad desde la Meca directamente a los cielos. Estas tradiciones, más tardías, pertenecen al ciclo de historias en torno a la primera revelación de Muhammad y no tienen nada que ver con su viaje nocturno a Jerusalén. (shrink)

Monists, pluralists, and particularists disagree about the structure of the best explanation of the rightness (wrongness) of actions. In this paper I argue that the availability of good moral advice gives us reason to prefer particularist theories and pluralist theories to monist theories. First, I identify two distinct roles of moral theorizing—explaining the rightness (wrongness) of actions, and providing moral advice—and I explain how these two roles are related. Next, I explain what monists, pluralists, and particularists disagree about. Finally, I (...) argue that particularists and pluralists are better situated than monists to explain why it is a good idea to think before we act, and that this gives us reason to favor particularism and pluralism over monism. (shrink)

Many of us read Peter Singer ’ s work on our obligations to those in desperate need with our students. Famously, Singer argues that we have a moral obligation to give a significant portion of our assets to famine relief. If my own experience is not atypical, it is quite common for students, upon grasping the implications of Singer ’ s argument, to ask whether Singer gives to famine relief. In response it might be tempting to remind students of the (...) ad hominem fallacy of attacking the person advancing an argument rather than the argument itself. In this paper I argue that the “ ad hominem reply ” to students ’ request for information about Singer is misguided. First I show that biographical facts about the person advancing an argument can constitute indirect evidence for the soundness / unsoundness of the argument. Second, I argue that such facts are relevant because they may reveal that one can discard the argument without thereby incurring moral responsibility for failing to act on its conclusion even if the argument is sound. (shrink)

Descartes claimed that the Cogito is ‘so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were incapable of shaking it’. This paper aims to demonstrate that this claim is false by presenting a sceptical scenario for the Cogito. It is argued that the story ‘The Circular Ruins’ by J. L. Borges illustrates that one can doubt one’s own existence and that pace Descartes (and many others) the claim ‘I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it (...) is put forward by me or conceived in my mind’ is false. (shrink)

The current study aims to examine how the intense emotions experienced by different Israeli groups during the 2006 Second Lebanon War affected their perceptions of risk. Two weeks after the end of the war, a questionnaire was distributed among 205 people. Some were from the north and had been directly affected by the rocket attacks; others were from the center of Israel. The questionnaires, based on Lerner et al., measured emotions and perceived risk. The results show significant differences between those (...) living in the north and those in the center of Israel. As expected, people living in the north reported more emotional difficulties during the war, greater perceived risk, and more pessimism in comparison to the center group. Moreover, the results point to significant differences between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs regarding emotions and perceived risk. In addition, the study results show a positive relation between anger and perceived risk. (shrink)

This study investigates the ontological status of some physical and cosmological theories that are not based on empirical observation and probably cannot be tested empirically. It is suggested that these theories exist only in our consciousness and are no more than Kantian ideas. Indeed, these theories imply paradoxes as was predicted by Kant regarding ideas of pure reason.