Students of the history of ethics sometimes find themselves tempted by moderate or extreme versions of an approach that might roughly be called ‘historicist’. This temptation may result from the difficulties of approaching historical texts from a ‘narrowly philosophical’ point of view. We may begin, for instance, by wanting to know what Aristotle has to say about ‘the problems of ethics’, so that we can compare his views with those of Aquinas, Hume, Kant, Sidgwick, and Rawls, and then decide what (...) is true or false in each theorist's position. But this narrowly philosophical attitude soon runs into difficulties, and writers on the history of ethics often warn us against it. (shrink)

Etymology might encourage us to begin a discussion of Aristotle on philanthropy with a discussion of philanthropia ; and it is instructive to see why this is not quite the right place to look. The Greek term initially refers to a generalized attitude of kindness and consideration for a human being. The gods accuse Prometheus of being a ‘human-lover’, intending the term in an unfavorable sense, when he confers on human beings the benefits that should have been confined to the (...) gods. Aristotle uses the abstract noun only once, to refer to sympathetic fellow-feeling ; and he mentions our feeling of kinship with other human beings to explain our approval of the philanthropos person. Philanthropia is the attitude of a kind and considerate person, even if she lacks material resources, and it can be displayed without the transfer of material resources. (shrink)

In a recent case in Great Britain, a couple described as “white” underwent in vitro fertilisation and gave birth to twins described as “black”. In the sense of a fair adjudication of this particular case, serving justice requires a thick description and a sensitive understanding of the relevant facts. We have only a few facts, but they may be sufficient to serve justice in this first sense.We are told that the couple wants to keep the twins. We are told further (...) that British law holds that the woman giving birth is to be regarded as the legal mother . Finally, we are told that DNA testing has established that the gestational mother is also the genetic mother of these infants. Her husband, whose sperm were supposed to be used to fertilise his wife’s eggs, is not the genetic father. A black couple was also undergoing IVF at the same clinic; it may be that this man’s sperm were used by mistake.We know enough to reach a defensible decision in the case. The couple caring for these children has contributed a half share of the children’s genes, and the woman was also the gestational mother, so they have at least an equal argument from biology. Their intention was to have these children and they also wish to raise them; they went through the rigours of IVF, and are willing to take on the responsibility of parenthood. Since the children were born, furthermore, they have shouldered the hard work of parenthood. We don’t know their particular circumstances; perhaps they’ve had help from family or others; but in all likelihood they’ve had an ample share of sleep deprived nights, soiled nappies, and exhausted days. …. (shrink)

To compare a novel to a work of philosophy is, admittedly, a risky exercise in analogy. When the novelist is Lawrence and the philosophical text is the ponderous and dialectical Being and Nothingness, such a comparison may seem willfully perverse and peculiarly open, insofar as it deals with Lawrence's great theme of sexuality, to his anathema of "sex in the head." Furthermore, modern criticism, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, has tended to be wary of critical approaches that lean on notions (...) that are not derived from literature itself - a tendency that is being reinforced these days by the structuralist insistence on the "literariness" of the Text. Now, despite its metaphorical statement as a form of dramatic "gesture," Sartre's book is very definitely not a work of literature. T.H. Adamowski, associate professor of English at Erindale College, the University of Toronto, has written articles on English, American, and French literature. This essay is part of a larger study on progress on Lawrence's "sexual poetics.". (shrink)

T H McLaughlin; Parental Rights and the Religious Upbringing of Children, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 75–83, http.

T H McLaughlin; Parental Rights and the Religious Upbringing of Children, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 75–83, http.

T H McLaughlin; Religion, Upbringing and Liberal Values: a rejoinder to Eamonn Callan, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Page.

T H McLaughlin; Religion, Upbringing and Liberal Values: a rejoinder to Eamonn Callan, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Page.

T H Mclaughlin; Peter Gardner on Religious Upbringing and the Liberal Ideal of Religious Autonomy, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 1, 30 Ma.

T H Mclaughlin; Peter Gardner on Religious Upbringing and the Liberal Ideal of Religious Autonomy, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 1, 30 Ma.

Intent and mitigating circumstances play a central role in moral and legal assessments in large-scale industrialized societies. Al- though these features of moral assessment are widely assumed to be universal, to date, they have only been studied in a narrow range of societies. We show that there is substantial cross-cultural variation among eight traditional small-scale societies (ranging from hunter-gatherer to pastoralist to horticulturalist) and two Western societies (one urban, one rural) in the extent to which intent and mitigating circumstances influence (...) moral judgments. Although participants in all societies took such factors into account to some degree, they did so to very different extents, varying in both the types of considerations taken into account and the types of violations to which such considerations were applied. The particular patterns of assessment characteristic of large-scale industrialized societies may thus reflect relatively recently culturally evolved norms rather than inherent features of human moral judgment. (shrink)

Some time ago, Joel Katzav and Brian Ellis debated the compatibility of dispositional essentialism with the principle of least action. Surprisingly, very little has been said on the matter since, even by the most naturalistically inclined metaphysicians. Here, we revisit the Katzav–Ellis arguments of 2004–05. We outline the two problems for the dispositionalist identified Katzav in his 2004 , and claim they are not as problematic for the dispositional essentialist at it first seems – but not for the reasons espoused (...) by Ellis. (shrink)

Many Greek moralists are eudaemonists; they assume that happiness is the ultimate end of rational human action. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and most of their successors treat this assumption as the basis of their ethical argument. But not all Greek moralists agree; and since the eudaemonist assumption may not seem as obviously correct to us as it seems to many Greek moralists, it is worth considering the views of those Greeks who dissent from it.

Why should Aristotle reject his own criteria for a science to admit this puzzling science of being? Or does he really reject them? Perhaps the science of being is not intended to be a universal science of the type rejected elsewhere. The Metaphysics and the Organon are not concerned with exactly the same questions; and verbal differences may not reflect real or important doctrinal conflicts.

A discussion of the neo‐Hegelian metaphysics of T. H. Green. In particular, the author emphasizes Green's criticism of empiricism and of his Hegelian reading of Kant, which is opposed to the Kantian dualism of sensibility and understanding.

Both Plato and Aristotle have something to say about admiration. But in order to know where to look, and in order to appreciate the force of their remarks, we need to sketch a little of the ethical background that they presuppose. I begin, therefore, with ancient Greek ethics in the wider sense, and discuss the treatment of admiration and related attitudes by Homer, Herodotus, and other pre-Platonic sources. Then I turn to the views of Plato, Adam Smith, Aristotle and Cicero. (...) This order of discussion allows us to see why admiration is both morally significant and, in some respects, morally unreliable. (shrink)

Philosophy of Medicine has for a long time been preoccupied with analyzing the concepts of health, disease and illness. Relatively speaking, the concept of medicine itself has received very little attention. This paper is a contribution to the relatively neglected debate about the nature of medicine. Building on the work of Alex Broadbent (Broadbent, 2018a, b), Chadwin Harris (Harris, 2018) and Thaddeus Metz (Metz, 2018), in this paper I question the persuasiveness of Broadbent’s account of the “core business” of medicine, (...) The Inquiry Thesis, and propose an alternative: a revised version of The Curative Thesis, which I coin The Best Available Intervention Thesis. Crudely, this suggests that Medicine is the sustained and organised effort to determine and prescribe the best available treatment (curative or preventative) for patients. (shrink)

Transformations of the Confucian Way. John H. Berthrong. Westview, Boulder, Colorado, and Oxford 1998. xiv, 250 pp. Cloth £53.95, pbk £15.95. ISBN 0-8133-28055/2804-7.

Focuses on the traditional view of Greek ethics. Response to articles by Julia Annas and Nicholas White about the interpretation of Greek ethics; Plato's concept of happiness based on his book `Republic'; Issues about prudential and moral reasoning.