This article demonstrates how researchers from both the sciences and the humanities can learn from Charles Darwin’s mixed methodology. We identify two basic challenges that face emotion research in the sciences, namely a mismatch between experiment design and the complexity of life that we aim to explain, and problematic efforts to bridge the gap, including invalid inferences from constrained study designs, and equivocal use of terms like “sympathy” and “empathy” that poorly reflect such methodological constraints. We argue that Darwin’s mixed (...) methodology is a model for addressing these challenges even in laboratory work on emotion, because it shows how close observation of emotional phenomena makes sense only within broader historical contexts. The article concludes with 5 practical research recommendations. (shrink)

Human instructors often refer to objects and actions involved in a task description using both linguistic and non-linguistic means of communication. Hence, for robots to engage in natural human-robot interactions, we need to better understand the various relevant aspects of human multi-modal task descriptions. We analyse reference resolution to objects in a data collection comprising two object manipulation tasks and find that 78.76% of all referring expressions to the objects relevant in Task 1 are verbally underspecified and 88.64% of all (...) referring expressions are verbally underspecified in Task 2. The data strongly suggests that a language processing module for robots must be genuinely multi-modal, allowing for seamless integration of information transmitted in the verbal and the visual channel, whereby tracking the speaker’s eye gaze and gestures as well as object recognition are necessary preconditions. (shrink)

Trust is a critical component of research: trust in the work of co-workers and colleagues within the scientific community; trust in the work of research scientists by the non-research community. A wide range of factors, including internally and externally generated pressures and practical and personal limitations, affect the research process. The extent to which these factors are understood and appreciated influence the development of trust in scientific research findings.

Humans are powerful and clever, and also more ignorant than they know. As a result, they too often fail to acknowledge or even recognize their limitations, and are more arrogant than humble regarding their capabilities. Education that explicitly recognizes and addresses the context of science and technology, their inherent values and ethical implications and concerns, and their problematic as well as beneficial impacts can potentially rescue the human species from itself.

Humans are powerful and clever, and also more ignorant than they know. As a result, they too often fail to acknowledge or even recognize their limitations, and are more arrogant than humble regarding their capabilities. Education that explicitly recognizes and addresses the context of science and technology, their inherent values and ethical implications and concerns, and their problematic as well as beneficial impacts can potentially rescue the human species from itself.

Trust is a critical component of research: trust in the work of co-workers and colleagues within the scientific community; trust in the work of research scientists by the non-research community. A wide range of factors, including internally and externally generated pressures and practical and personal limitations, affect the research process. The extent to which these factors are understood and appreciated influence the development of trust in scientific research findings.

L’article fournit un exemple concret des possibilités qu’ouvre l’exploration des données numérisées, et notamment de la Toile, en matière de morphologie dérivationnelle. Il y a une soixantaine d’années, en se fondant sur un exemple unique (silvio-pelliqueste), Edouard Pichon avançait l’hypothèse qu’en contexte vélaire, le suffixe –esque pouvait, par un phénomène de dissimilation préventive, se voir remplacé par la finale –este. Depuis, aucun argument n’était venu étayer cette hypothèse, sinon peut-être des remarques hésitantes de Zwanenburg (1975) et de Björkman (1984) sur (...) la difficulté de trouver des dérivés en –esque après vélaire. Les données réunies confirment que l’adjonction de –esque à une base dont la dernière syllabe comporte une vélaire engendre des tensions dissimi-latives. Lorsque le contexte s’y prête, ces tensions se manifestent tantôt par l’effacement de certaines vélaires finales, tantôt par le maintien inattendu d’une voyelle finale précédée d’une vélaire. Elles se manifestent aussi, comme l’avaient entrevu nos prédécesseurs, par une moindre productivité de cette suffixation après les radicaux en vélaire. Dans l’établissement de ces résultats, l’utilisation d’un outil permettant de récupérer automatiquement sur la Toile des néologismes en fonction de leur terminaison, s’est révélée déterminante. Les recherches automatisées ont joué aussi un rôle capital quand il s’est agi de trouver des dérivés en ‑este et de montrer que ce suffixe n’était utilisé productivement qu’après vélaire, conformément à la conjecture de Pichon. (shrink)

L’article fournit un exemple concret des possibilités qu’ouvre l’exploration des données numérisées, et notamment de la Toile, en matière de morphologie dérivationnelle. Il y a une soixantaine d’années, en se fondant sur un exemple unique (silvio-pelliqueste), Edouard Pichon avançait l’hypothèse qu’en contexte vélaire, le suffixe –esque pouvait, par un phénomène de dissimilation préventive, se voir remplacé par la finale –este. Depuis, aucun argument n’était venu étayer cette hypothèse, sinon peut-être des remarques hésitantes de Zwanenburg (1975) et de Björkman (1984) sur (...) la difficulté de trouver des dérivés en –esque après vélaire. Les données réunies confirment que l’adjonction de –esque à une base dont la dernière syllabe comporte une vélaire engendre des tensions dissimi-latives. Lorsque le contexte s’y prête, ces tensions se manifestent tantôt par l’effacement de certaines vélaires finales, tantôt par le maintien inattendu d’une voyelle finale précédée d’une vélaire. Elles se manifestent aussi, comme l’avaient entrevu nos prédécesseurs, par une moindre productivité de cette suffixation après les radicaux en vélaire. Dans l’établissement de ces résultats, l’utilisation d’un outil permettant de récupérer automatiquement sur la Toile des néologismes en fonction de leur terminaison, s’est révélée déterminante. Les recherches automatisées ont joué aussi un rôle capital quand il s’est agi de trouver des dérivés en ‑este et de montrer que ce suffixe n’était utilisé productivement qu’après vélaire, conformément à la conjecture de Pichon. (shrink)

Humans are powerful and clever, and also more ignorant than they know. As a result, they too often fail to acknowledge or even recognize their limitations, and are more arrogant than humble regarding their capabilities. Education that explicitly recognizes and addresses the context of science and technology, their inherent values and ethical implications and concerns, and their problematic as well as beneficial impacts can potentially rescue the human species from itself.

We are often told that we are morally obligated to produce equal opportunity for all. Therefore, it seems we should examine what power we have to produce that desirable state. For it would be nonsense to say we are required to provide what is beyond our power to provide. When we examine this question, we find our power limited by two sets of constraints. One set comprises formal constraints upon the idea itself of equal opportunity. We cannot do the logically (...) impossible. The other set comprises limits upon our ability to produce the directed socio-economic change, getting known outputs for known inputs. I illustrate the formal constraints by outlining the work of Douglas Rae. The constraints upon our abilities I illustrate with evidence from sociology and politics. At the end, we shall discover that our power to make opportunities equal is sharply though not unbearably limited. A critical but unbaised survey will reveal that in the past fifty years we have gone remarkably far towards doing all that we are presently capable of doing to equalize opportunities. Perhaps we shall go even farther when we learn how. The word ‘real’ in the title is opposed to ‘ideal’ or even ‘chimerical'. It may seem an interesting question what equality of opportunity should consist in were we able to produce directed socio-economic change at will. But we are not. Therefore, a more interesting and more important question is what equality of opportunity consists in given the very large number of constraints within which we must work to achieve it. (shrink)

Alternative splicing is a critical post‐transcriptional event leading to an increase in the transcriptome diversity. Recent bioinformatics studies revealed a high frequency of alternative splicing. Although the extent of AS conservation among mammals is still being discussed, it has been argued that major forms of alternatively spliced transcripts are much better conserved than minor forms.1 It suggests that alternative splicing plays a major role in genome evolution allowing new exons to evolve with less constraint. BioEssays 25:1031–1034, 2003. © 2003 Wiley (...) Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

In discussions of professional standards and ethical values it is reasonable to consider who will develop the codes of conduct and guidelines for behavior that will reflect the standards and values of the community. Also worthy of consideration is whether the standards or guidelines are enforceable, and how and to what extent they will be enforced. The development of guidelines or professional codes of conduct is a responsibility that has been adopted by many professional societies. Useful to this discussion is (...) an examination of the rationale behind the development of ethical codes by professional societies. The Ethics in Science Committee of the Council of Scientific Society Presidents (CSSP) has examined the codes of some of its member societies and some observations regarding them are pertinent. The nature and uses of ethical statements, codes and guidelines developed by professional societies are multiple and diverse. Their enforcement raises both practical and ethical concerns. (shrink)

Responsible research and good science are concepts with various meanings depending on one’s perspective and assumptions. Fellow researchers, research participants, policy makers and the general public also have differing expectations of the benefits of research ranging from accurate and reliable data that extend the body of knowledge, to solutions to societal concerns. Unless these differing constituencies articulate their differing views they may fail to communicate and undermine the value of research to society.

“Responsible research” and “good science” are concepts with various meanings depending on one’s perspective and assumptions. Fellow researchers, research participants, policy makers and the general public also have differing expectations of the benefits of research ranging from accurate and reliable data that extend the body of knowledge, to solutions to societal concerns. Unless these differing constituencies articulate their differing views they may fail to communicate and undermine the value of research to society.

De Marco et al 1 argue that the standard account of medical ‘invasiveness’ (as ‘incision’ or ‘insertion’) fails to capture three aspects of its existing use, namely that invasiveness can come in degrees, often depends on features of alternative medical interventions and can be non-physical. They propose a new schematic account that suggests that medical interventions can possess ‘basic invasiveness’ (which can come in degrees and of which they suggest at least two types: physical and mental), and ‘threshold invasiveness’ which (...) can depend on the alternatives a specific intervention is being compared with. While we agree that the standard account of invasiveness fails to capture existing use and are supportive of their aim, here we express scepticism about the practical utility of De Marco et al ’s revised account. Our scepticism concerns the application of De Marco et al’s revised account in the narrow context of clinician–patient communication and deliberation about medical interventions within clinical practice, which we see as a crucial context for its use. While De Marco et al do not specify the contexts in which their revised account could be used, we assume from their discussion of treatment interventions (e.g. non-invasive prenatal testing, ventilation) and their comparison to ‘more or less invasive’ options, that at least one of the purposes in mind for …. (shrink)

Les remarques des jeunes Marx et Engels relatives à la Révolution française sont bien connues et ont été largement commentées. Mais on oublie souvent qu’ils appartiennent à une génération d’intellectuels contestataires allemands qui, dans les années 1830-1840, ne cesse de se référer au XVIIIe siècle français dans le but de le comparer à la philosophie et à la vie politique allemandes de leur temps. L’article propose une analyse de deux positions divergentes sur ces questions, formulées par deux représentants de cette (...) génération : celle de Ludwig Börne, qui ressortit à ce que l’on peut considérer comme une version allemande du jacobinisme, et celle de Bruno Bauer, Jeune hégélien promoteur d’une révolution philosophique allemande susceptible de surpasser la Révolution française en radicalité et en profondeur spirituelle. Ainsi, le rapport des intellectuels allemands à la Révolution française pendant le Vormärz apparaît dans toute l’ambiguïté relevée par Lucien Calvié : tel le renard aux raisins de la fable de La Fontaine, partagés entre attirance et frustration, les Allemands de gauche ont les yeux rivés sur une France révolutionnaire à la fois enviée et décriée. (shrink)

There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cognitive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mechanism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors that are crucial for the reproductive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model, (...) together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature. It can also predict a variety of empathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels of empathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding of empathy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels of empathy across individuals, species, stages of development, and situations. Key Words: altruism; cognitive empathy ; comparative; emotion; emotional contagion; empathy ; evolution; human; perception-action; perspective taking. (shrink)

Compared to evidence-based public health, evidence-based medicine is a more familiar phrase. Evidence-based medicine has become increasingly popular in the past decade, due in large part to the emergence of computerized database search technology and advanced statistical tools which allow researchers to quickly identify and summarize vast amounts of scientific information.Today, the concept of evidence-based public health is gaining momentum and has grown in popularity. However, the term “evidence-based” lacks clarification and is subject to a variety of interpretations. The evidence (...) that supports evidence-based medicine or public health may include individual experience, anecdotal information, the content of a single scientific article, or the results of a sophisticated systematic review of scientific literature. The imprecise language used to describe evidence leads to confusion over what types of evidence are most appropriate in answering different types of questions. (shrink)

Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) stress the importance of social interaction for social understanding, but focus on the adult-child relationship. In the present commentary, we discuss the development of social understanding within early peer relationships. We argue that peer interaction stretches the limits of early social understanding, thereby providing both unique challenges and unique opportunities for constructing an understanding of others' minds.

O cérebro ocupa um lugar central na epistemologia de Schopenhauer. Ele remete à visão empírica das faculdades de conhecimento e é o responsável pela realização da representação intuitiva da realidade material e empírica do mundo através das formas puras de tempo e espaço e a aplicação da lei a priori de causalidade, esta que é o fundamento e a possibilidade da representação intuitiva. Se o cérebro é a visão empírica das faculdades de conhecimento, por sua vez, é somente através dele (...) e para ele que existe esta realidade empírica. A realidade empírica é, para Schopenhauer, sempre ideal, pois dependente do cérebro que conhece; e por tal, possui uma existência real, porém relativa, sempre como uma representação que remete às formas a priori do sujeito que conhece. Este artigo expõe o lugar do cérebro na epistemologia de Schopenhauer e o seu papel enquanto uma concepção chave para compreender a idealidade transcendental da realidade empírica e o estatuto de realidade da representação intuitiva. (shrink)

Zenon Pylyshyn argues that cognitively driven attentional effects do not amount to cognitive penetration of early vision because such effects occur either before or after early vision. Critics object that in fact such effects occur at all levels of perceptual processing. We argue that Pylyshyn’s claim is correct—but not for the reason he emphasizes. Even if his critics are correct that attentional effects are not external to early vision, these effects do not satisfy Pylyshyn’s requirements that the effects be direct (...) and exhibit semantic coherence. In addition, we distinguish our defense from those found in recent work by Raftopoulos and by Firestone and Scholl, argue that attention should not be assimilated to expectation, and discuss alternative characterizations of cognitive penetrability, advocating a kind of pluralism. (shrink)

Only a broad theory that looks across levels of analysis can encompass the many perspectives on the phenomenon of empathy. We address the major points of our commentators by emphasizing that the basic perception-action process, while automatic, is subject to control and modulation, and is greatly affected by experience and context because of the role of representations. The model can explain why empathy seems phenomenologically more effortful than reflexive, and why there are different levels of empathy across individuals, ages, and (...) species. (shrink)

Many meta-ethicists are alethists: they claim that practical considerations can constitute normative reasons for action, but not for belief. But the alethist owes us an account of the relevant difference between action and belief, which thereby explains this normative difference. Here, I argue that two salient strategies for discharging this burden fail. According to the first strategy, the relevant difference between action and belief is that truth is the constitutive standard of correctness for belief, but not for action, while according (...) to the second strategy, it is that practical considerations can constitute motivating reasons for action, but not for belief. But the former claim only shifts the alethist's explanatory burden, and the latter claim is wrong—we can believe for practical reasons. Until the alethist can offer a better account, then, I argue that we should accept that there are practical reasons for belief. (shrink)

A surfeit of research confirms that people activate personal, affective, and conceptual representations when perceiving the states of others. However, researchers continue to debate the role of self–other overlap in empathy due to a failure to dissociate neural overlap, subjective resonance, and personal distress. A perception–action view posits that neural-level overlap is necessary during early processing for all social understanding, but need not be conscious or aversive. This neural overlap can subsequently produce a variety of states depending on the context (...) and degree of common experience and emotionality. We outline a framework for understanding the interrelationship between neural and subjective overlap, and among empathic states, through a dynamic-systems view of how information is processed in the brain and body. (shrink)