For over three decades, the capability approach proposed and developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum has had a distinct impact on development theories and approaches because it goes beyond an economic conception of development and engages with the normative aspects of development. This book explores the new frontiers of the capability approach and its links to human development in three main areas. First, it delves into the philosophical foundations of the approach, re-examining its links to concepts of common good, (...) collective agency and epistemic diversity. Secondly, it addresses its 'operational frontier', aiming to give inclusive explanations of some of the most advanced methods available for capability researchers. Thirdly, it offers a wide range of the applications of this approach, as carried out by a mix of renowned capability scholars and researchers from different disciplines. This broad interdisciplinary range includes the areas of human and sustainable development, inequalities, labour markets, education, special needs, cities, urban planning, housing, social capital and happiness studies, among others. (shrink)

This collection by some of the leading scholars of Strauss's work is the first devoted to Strauss's thought regarding education. It seeks to address his conception of education as it applies to a range of his most important concepts, such as his views on the importance of revelation, his critique of modern democracy and the importance of modern classical education.

Contributed papers chiefly with reference to India; presented at the conference held on Dec. 3-5, 2009, at KLS Institute of Management Education and Research, Belgum, India.

Las críticas a la velocidad, al cambio continuo o al crecimiento han formado parte de muchos debates sobre la deslegitimación del turismo de los últimos tiempos. De manera más o menos explícita, a muchos de ellos les subyace una dimensión ética cuando sugieren que podría o debería desarrollarse de otra forma. Por lo tanto, es tarea de la ética del turismo reflexionar sobre ellas. No obstante, aunque esta ha ido adquiriendo una gran relevancia en los últimos tiempos, aún se trata (...) de una disciplina relativamente joven. Una de las tareas pendientes es la de superar las concepciones tradicionales y estáticas del turismo, porque, a diferencia de muchas actividades, es extraordinariamente heterogéneo, escurridizo y difícilmente controlable. Para avanzar hacia esa dirección, este número plantea un espacio de reflexión sobre la ética del turismo que toma en consideración una perspectiva analítica concreta: la aceleración social. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A commitment to receive input from stakeholders is often obligatory in the crafting of environmental policies. This requirement is presumed to satisfy certain conditions of democracy. In this article, by drawing from pragmatism, we examine the logic of participation and prerequisites of the meaningful game of asking for and giving reasons. We elaborate the nature and significance of three components—the game, the pleadings, and the reasons. We conclude by offering the conditions under which the stakeholder game might be considered (...) legitimate. (shrink)

Corporations, which in the past have been hesitant to contribute to conversations regarding political and social issues, are increasingly speaking out on current issues such as race, sexual orientation, gender, immigration, and environmental issues. Despite this trend, limited academic research has focused on how corporate sociopolitical activism (CSA) efforts impact firm value. In addition, extant studies have not fully identified the extent to which the firm and their message influence the outcomes of this approach. The current study explores how sociopolitical (...) stances communicated on Twitter affect firms’ stock prices. Results from an event study of 260 incidents of CSA show that CSA efforts decrease firm value by an average of 0.22%, indicating that wading into social or political issues is a risky strategy. However, further analysis highlights the importance of clearly articulating stances on social issues that align with the firm’s core values. (shrink)

This paper defends the thesis that meaning is intrinsically normative. Recent anti‐normativist objectors have distinguished two versions of the thesis – correctness and prescriptivity – and have attacked both. In the first two sections, I defend the thesis against each of these attacks; in the third section, I address two further, closely related, anti‐normativist arguments against the normativity thesis and, in the process, clarify its sense by distinguishing a universalist and a contextualist reading of it. I argue that the anti‐normativist (...) position is successful only against the universalist reading but point out that normativists do not require this reading of the thesis; the contextualist one is both possible and desirable for them. Furthermore, I argue that anti‐normativists require the contextualist reading of the normativity thesis to make their case, as well as to avoid meaning relativism. In the final two sections of the paper, I explain how a contextualist understanding of the normativity thesis is compatible with Quine's elimination of analyticity, thus undermining a key underlying reason for anti‐normativism, and I respond to the objection that a contextualist reading of the normativity thesis is either self‐contradictory or else trivial. (shrink)

Not only do the writings of Nietzsche – early and late – fail to support the pedagogy of self-reformulation, this doctrine embodies what for him is worst in man and would destroy that which is higher. The pedagogy of self-reformulation is also incoherent. In contrast, Nietzsche offers a fruitful and comprehensive theory of education that, while non-democratic and contemptuous of egalitarian aspirations, emerges consistently from his metaphysics and philosophical anthropology. Whatever, then, we might think of his premises, Nietzsche’s philosophy of (...) education represents an attractive model for those who would develop a meaningful, distinctive, and persuasive educational theory. It defines a domain of the possible and then straightforwardly states what is and is not to be done within it – and why. (shrink)

This paper defends the thesis that meaning is intrinsically normative. Recent anti‐normativist objectors have distinguished two versions of the thesis – correctness and prescriptivity – and have attacked both. In the first two sections, I defend the thesis against each of these attacks; in the third section, I address two further, closely related, anti‐normativist arguments against the normativity thesis and, in the process, clarify its sense by distinguishing a universalist and a contextualist reading of it. I argue that the anti‐normativist (...) position is successful only against the universalist reading but point out that normativists do not require this reading of the thesis; the contextualist one is both possible and desirable for them. Furthermore, I argue that anti‐normativists require the contextualist reading of the normativity thesis to make their case, as well as to avoid meaning relativism. In the final two sections of the paper, I explain how a contextualist understanding of the normativity thesis is compatible with Quine's elimination of analyticity, thus undermining a key underlying reason for anti‐normativism, and I respond to the objection that a contextualist reading of the normativity thesis is either self‐contradictory or else trivial. (shrink)

This paper concerns Quine's stance on the issue of meaning normativity. I argue that three distinct and not obviously compatible positions on meaning normativity can be extracted from his philosophy of language - eliminative ]naturalism (Quine I), deflationary pragmatism (Quine II), and (restricted) strong normativism (Quine III) - which result from Quine's failure to separate adequately four different questions that surround the issue: the reality, source, sense, and scope of the normative dimension. In addition to the incompatibility of the views (...) taken together, I argue on the basis of considerations due to Wittgenstein, Dummett, and Davidson that each view taken separately has self-standing problems. The first two fail to appreciate the ineliminability of the strong normativity of logic and so face a dilemma: they either smuggle it in illicitly, or insofar as they do not, fail to give an account of anything like a language. The third position's mixture of a universalism about logical concepts with a thorough-going relativism about non-logical concepts can be challenged once a distinction is drawn between the universalist and contextualist readings of strong normativity, a distinction inspired by Wittgenstein's distinction between grammatical and empirical judgements. (shrink)

This paper contests the standard reading, due to Bilgrami and Glüer, that Davidson is an anti-normativist about word-meaning. Their case for his anti-normativism rests on his avowed anti-conventionalism about word-meaning. While not denying Davidson’s anti-conventionalism, I argue in the central part of the paper devoted to Bilgrami that the constitutive role that charity must play in interpretation for Davidson puts pressure on his anti-conventionalism, ultimately forcing a more tempered anti-conventionalism than Bilgrami allows. Simply put, my argument is that two central (...) doctrines of Davidson’s—constitutive charity and anti-conventionalism—do not sit easily together in the project of interpreting speakers of our home language and that if they are to be made compatible, it is his anti-conventionalism that gets weakened. This ushers a certain meaning normativism into Davidson’s view. To strengthen my case for reading Davidson as a normativist about word-meaning, I respond to two important arguments against his alleged normativism: first, that meaning normativity is incompatible with the truism that the relation between a word and its meaning is arbitrary and, second, that constitutive charity far from ushering in meaning normativity is incompatible with it. (shrink)

This paper critically analyzes Sherrilyn Roush’s definition of evidence and especially her powerful defence that in the ideal, a claim should be probable to be evidence for anything. We suggest that Roush treats not one sense of ‘evidence’ but three: relevance, leveraging and grounds for knowledge; and that different parts of her argument fare differently with respect to different senses. For relevance, we argue that probable evidence is sufficient but not necessary for Roush’s own two criteria of evidence to be (...) met. With respect to grounds for knowledge, we agree that high probability evidence is indeed ideal for the central reason Roush gives: When believing a hypothesis on the basis of e it is desirable that e be probable. But we maintain that her further argument that Bayesians need probable evidence to warrant the method they recommend for belief revision rests on a mistaken interpretation of Bayesian conditionalization. Moreover, we show that attempts to reconcile Roush’s arguments with Bayesianism fail. For leveraging, which we agree is a matter of great importance, the requirement that evidence be probable suffices for leveraging to the probability of the hypothesis if either one of Roush’s two criteria for evidence are met. Insisting on both then seems excessive. To finish, we show how evidence, as Roush defines it, can fail to track the hypothesis. This can remedied by adding a requirement that evidence be probable, suggesting another rationale for taking probable evidence as ideal – but only for a grounds-for-knowledge sense of evidence. (shrink)

Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy creates an unlikely partnership, between the ancient tradition of mindfulness meditation rooted in Buddhist thought, and the much more recent and essentially western tradition of cognitive and clinical science. This article investigates points of congruence and difference between the two traditions and concludes that, despite first appearances, this is a fruitful partnership which may well endure.

The central questions raised by Allan Bloom's The Closing of theAmerican Mind are often overlooked. Among the most important ofBloom's themes is the impact of nihilism upon education. Bloom condemnsnihilism. Interestingly, we find among his critics two alternativejudgments. Richard Schacht, citing Nietzsche, asserts that nihilism,while fruitless in and of itself, is a necessary prerequisite tosomething higher. Harry Neumann, affirming the accuracy of nihilism,declares that both Bloom and Nietzsche reject nihilism out of ignoranceborn of weakness. All three philosophers understand that the (...) purpose ofeducation emerges from one's position on nihilism. If nihilism is true,then it is senseless and cowardly to teach one's students that there aregrounds for moral judgments. On the other hand, if one believes thatthere is an objective higher and lower in moral matters, then one cannotat the same time consistently endorse nihilism or the atheism upon whichit rests. There is reason to believe that a consistent nihilism isimpossible and hence that the concept is bankrupt. But then something istrue, and there are grounds for moral judgment. Education must respondaccordingly. But even Bloom with his emphasis on the Great Books fallsshort of what is required. An education which aims to defeat nihilismmust, at the very least, hold out the promise that through thecultivation of reason one may indeed arrive at the truth. (shrink)

This paper critically analyzes Sherrilyn Roush's (Tracking truth: knowledge, evidence and science, 2005) definition of evidence and especially her powerful defence that in the ideal, a claim should be probable to be evidence for anything. We suggest that Roush treats not one sense of 'evidence' but three: relevance, leveraging and grounds for knowledge; and that different parts of her argument fare differently with respect to different senses. For relevance, we argue that probable evidence is sufficient but not necessary for Roush's (...) own two criteria of evidence to be met. With respect to grounds for knowledge, we agree that high probability evidence is indeed ideal for the central reason Roush gives: When believing a hypothesis on the basis of e it is desirable that e be probable. But we maintain that her further argument that Bayesians need probable evidence to warrant the method they recommend for belief revision rests on a mistaken interpretation of Bayesian conditionalization. Moreover, we argue that attempts to reconcile Roush's arguments with Bayesianism fail. For leveraging, which we agree is a matter of great importance, the requirement that evidence be probable suffices for leveraging to the probability of the hypothesis if either one of Roush's two criteria for evidence are met. Insisting on both then seems excessive. To finish, we show how evidence, as Roush defines it, can fail to track the hypothesis. This can remedied by adding a requirement that evidence be probable, suggesting another rationale for taking probable evidence as ideal—but only for a grounds-for-knowledge sense of evidence. (shrink)

A Critical Introduction to Philosophy of Language is a historically oriented introduction to the central themes in philosophy of language. Its narrative arc covers Locke's 'idea' theory, Mill's empiricist account of math and logic, Frege and Russell's development of modern logic and its subsequent deployment in their pioneering program of 'logical analysis', Ayer and Carnap's logical positivism, Quine's critique of logical positivism and elaboration of a naturalist-behaviorist approach to meaning, and later-Wittgenstein's 'ordinary language philosophy'-inspired rejection of the project of logical (...) analysis. Thus, it historically situates the two central programs in early twentieth-century English-speaking philosophy -- logical analysis and logical positivism -- and discusses the central critiques they face later in the century in the works of Quine and the later-Wittgenstein. Unlike other secondary studies in philosophy of language, A Critical Introduction to Philosophy of Language is not just a 'greatest hits album', i.e., a discontinuous compilation in which classics in the field are presented together with their standard criticisms one after the other. Instead, Fennell develops a particular, historical-thematic narrative in which the figures and ideas he treats are introduced in highly intentional ways. And by cross-referencing them throughout his discussions, he highlights the contributions they make to the narrative they comprise. (shrink)

This paper argues that econometricians' explicit adoption of identification conditions in structural equation modelling commits them to read the functional form of their equations in a strong, nonmathematical way. This content, which is implicitly attributed to the functional form of structural equations, is part of what makes equation structural. Unfortunately, econometricians are not explicit about the role functional form plays in signifying structural content. In order to remedy this, the second part of this paper presents an interpretation of the functional (...) form based on Herbert Simon 's definition of causal order. This begins to set out just what the functional form of structural equations represents. ‡I would like to thank Nancy Cartwright and attendants at UCSD Graduate Seminar 2006 for helpful comments. I also want to thank the AHRC for supporting the research for this paper. †To contact the author, please write to: Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom; e-mail: d.j.fennell@lse.ac.uk. (shrink)

Michael Polanyi articulates two arguments against the view that moral judgment has no proper place in the conduct of political science: Non-judgmental political science cannot understand what it studies; and non-judgmental political science cannot understand the political scientist himself. Evaluation of these arguments not only clarifies important dimensions of Polanyi’s conceptions of understanding and tacit inference, it prompts a reconsideration of the nature of both moral deliberation and moral truth. The encounter with Polanyi demonstrates that non-judgmental political science does indeed (...) fall short of its stated objective. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Recent developments allow for the creation of human stem cells without the creation of human embryos, a process called alternate nuclear transfer (‘ANT’). Pursuing this method of stem cell research makes sense for pro‐lifers if arguments for the sanctity of the human embryo do not apply to ANT. However, the technology that makes ANT possible undermines the erstwhile technical barrier between human embryos and somatic cell DNA. These advances bring home the force of hypothetical arguments about the potential of (...) the DNA in somatic cells, showing that there is not a morally relevant difference between the potential of an embryo and the potential of the DNA in a somatic cell. Therefore, the supposed distinction between entities that are potential human life and entities that are human life does not give any support to arguments for the sanctity of the human embryo because those arguments extend value to too many entities. (shrink)

This paper considers the role of the concept of best interests in the treatment of mental disorder. It considers the Mental Capacity Act 2005 where treatment of an incapacitated person’s mental disorder is authorized if treatment is in the patient’s own best interests. It also examines the Mental Health Act 1983 as amended by the Mental Health Act 2007 where treatment without consent of a detained patient is allowed where necessary for the patient’s health or safety or for the protection (...) of others. Under both statutory regimes treatment must be in the best interests of the patient. This paper argues that ‘best interests’ is open to interpretation to include treatment interventions carried out primarily to protect other people. (shrink)

This paper argues that Davidson’s position in the philosophy of mind undergoes a change from his early writings to his later ones. Whereas the early Davidson emphasizes how anomalous monism expresses a token-identity form of physicalism, his later writings instead suggest that anomalous monism articulates an “a-ontological” position. I aim to show both how the later a-ontological position results from Davidson’s particular form of naturalism, which in his philosophy of mind gets expressed in the way he configures the mental/physical distinction (...) as a conceptual as opposed to an ontological distinction, as well as how it provides him with new avenues of response to two influential criticisms anomalous monism has faced. I finish by explaining the Kantian significance that mental vocabulary has for Davidson in this a-ontological landscape. (shrink)

This paper critically analyzes Sherrilyn Roush’s (2005) definition of evidence and especially her powerful defence that in the ideal, a claim should be probable to be evidence for anything. We suggest that Roush treats not one sense of ‘evidence’ but three: relevance, leveraging and grounds for knowledge; and that different parts of her argument fare differently with respect to different senses. For relevance, we argue that probable evidence is sufficient but not necessary for Roush’s own two criteria of evidence to (...) be met. With respect to grounds for knowledge, we agree that high probability evidence is indeed ideal for the central reason Roush gives: When believing a hypothesis on the basis of e it is desirable that e be probable. But we maintain that her further argument that Bayesians need probable evidence to warrant the method they recommend for belief revision rests on a mistaken interpretation of Bayesian conditionalization. Moreover, we show that attempts to reconcile Roush’s arguments with Bayesianism fail. For leveraging, which we agree is a matter of great importance, the requirement that evidence be probable suffices for leveraging to the probability of the hypothesis if either one of Roush’s two criteria for evidence are met. Insisting on both then seems excessive. To finish, we show how evidence, as Roush defines it, can fail to track the hypothesis. This can remedied by adding a requirement that evidence be probable, suggesting another rationale for taking probable evidence as ideal – but only for a grounds-for-knowledge sense of evidence. (shrink)

Drawing upon Jonathan Bennett’s article “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn,” a work which claims to show the role that emotions play in moral argument, this paper more closely considers the contextual clues of "Huck Finn" to determine the moral commitments that truly guide Huck’s thinking about moral principles. In opposition to Bennett’s reading of Twain, the paper argues that it is Huck’s application of his morality (a system of moral reasoning based on principles) that is bad, and so his moral (...) behavior cannot be explained by acting purely out of sympathy. In addition, to arguing for this alternative reading of Twain’s work, the paper points out how Huck’s reasoning about moral principles can be used to fend off ethical nihilism and is analogous to Galileo’s thought experiment concerning motion. (shrink)

The most popular form of reversible contraception in the United States is the female-controlled hormonal birth control pill. Consequently, scholars and lay people have typically assumed that women take primary responsibility for contraceptive decision making in relationships. Although many studies have shown that men exert strong influence in couple’s contraceptive decisions in developing countries, very few studies have considered the gendered dynamic of contraceptive decision making in developed societies. This study uses in-depth interviews with 30 American opposite-sex couples to show (...) that contraceptive responsibility in long-term relationships in the United States often conforms to a gendered division of labor, with women primarily in charge. A substantial minority of men in this study were highly committed contraceptors. However, the social framing of contraception as being primarily in women’s “sphere,” and the technological constraints on their participation, made even these men reluctant to discuss contraception with their women partners. (shrink)