A filosofia social se ocupa fundamentalmente de três tarefas: pelo conceito sobre uma instituição, como ela funciona e como ela se efetiva. Nesse sentido, um desafio que se apresenta para a filosofia social, sob o ponto de vista da pesquisa crítico-normativa, é pensar a instituição social não só como espinha-dorsal da sociedade, mas, sobretudo, em pensar sua possibilidade vinculativa ao argumento social-ontológico com orientação à emancipação; ou seja, de que maneira a instituição social ocupa sua tarefa crítica em promover os (...) bens sociais e direitos sociais na urdidura social. Pretendo nessa pesquisa explicitar a exigência filosófica-social do argumento social-ontológico na tratativa da pesquisa crítico-normativa tomando em consideração que, primeiramente, a instituição social se autocompreende enquanto medium à emancipação e, em segundo, que a referida instituição provém de uma concepção destranscendental da razão o que remete como corolário de pesquisa a uma forma de pensar a filosofia social inserida desde a sua gênese constitutiva nos contextos históricos das comunidades sociais. (shrink)

Sob o ponto de vista da teoria crítica e de uma crítica social, e mais recentemente, a ideia do progresso parece se estabelecer em uma ambivalência: de um lado, os postulados de Amy Allen encetaram uma _“Aufklärung”_ da concepção de progresso (ao qual eu chamo de concepção “negativa”) e os seus possíveis desdobramentos para a teoria crítica bem como para a crítica social; por outro, a concepção de progresso pode ser compreendida como uma “forma positiva” na qual se orienta junto (...) ao escopo constitutivo de uma teoria crítica ao corporificar, por exemplo, a justiça social enquanto mediação socionormativa ao processo de emancipação. Levando em consideração as assertivas supracitadas, revisitarei, nesta pesquisa, a centralidade da concepção de progresso em Amy Allen _(1) _para daí interpor uma ideia “positiva”. Nesse sentido, tomarei por referência socioinstitucional e empírica a política pública do programa social ‘Mais IDH’ ao qual se constitui tanto como uma resposta ao conceito de progresso em Amy Allen quanto uma condição possível de efetivação à justiça social (entendida basicamente pelas condições mínimas de existência) _(2)_. (shrink)

A filosofia social ocupa um lugar de destaque no âmbito da teoria crítica: em primeiro lugar, ela possui a tarefa de pensar o “Social” explicitando as contradições em uma determinada realidade; em segundo, ao encetar a reflexão sobre o “Social”, – entendido pelas práticas, relações e instituições sociais enquanto condições constitutivas para o exercício da liberdade –, a pesquisa crítica, sob a perspectiva sociofilosófica, se endereça para a identificação, análise e solução dos problemas sociais. Nesse sentido, a educação passa a (...) ser considerada enquanto uma mediação fundamental para o processo transformador da sociedade constituindo-se, portanto, enquanto esfera copartícipe desse mesmo “Social” na medida em que numa determinada ação pedagógica pode ser compreendida tanto por uma prática social quanto pelo estabelecimento de relações sociais mediadas por instituições sociais.Sob o fito de uma leitura crítica, própria dos pressupostos da filosofia social e da teoria crítica, pretendo explicitar, nesta pesquisa de caráter work in progress, que o programa educacional maranhense possui, no espírito de sua ação social, a orientação à práxis transformadora na medida em que intenta em efetivar aos assistidos pelo referido programa as condições mínimas de existência social nas quais são entendidas preliminarmente como a busca pela efetivação dos bens e direitos sociais. (shrink)

A gênese constitutiva da pesquisa crítica tem como base a análise da realidade social bem como a orientação à emancipação mediante o diagnóstico das patologias sociais ocorridas no interior de uma determinada realidade. Mesmo diante de tal tarefa e tomando por consideração o “Zeitgeist” hodierno de uma sociedade eivada de contradições, o pensamento crítico não está imune a constantes revisões em seus pressupostos. A exigência de tal posicionamento revisor passa a se constituir como um repto para a própria pesquisa crítica. (...) Nesse sentido, a filosofia social, ancorando-se tanto na ideia da ontologia social quanto no conceito do “Social”, se apresenta enquanto esteio para um programa socionormativo de pesquisa crítica na medida em que, por exemplo, busca pensar a justiça social como base de ação socioemancipatória. Levando em consideração tais pressupostos, pretendo explicitar, nesta pesquisa, que o programa social “Mais IDH” pode se constituir nessa referência socioemancipatória – uma forma de vida socioinstitucional – na medida em que se orienta pela efetivação dos bens sociais como condição mínima de existência social para as pessoas residentes naquelas comunidades assistidas pelo “Mais IDH”. (shrink)

Habla sobre la mirada, abunda sobre la atención que se presta a lo que nos rodea y sobre la resistencia que lo mirado nos opone.

In this work we present some reflections about the interaction of preschool children (between 3 and 5 years old) with sound-producing objects. We implemented the phenomenological approach of Alfred Schutz, who under the influence of Edmund Husserl, elaborated his own notions concerning the Lebenswelt or life-world. We present some situations of interaction with musical instruments by children that have been documented in different research on musical education in early childhood, the same ones we use to exemplify possible analyses from the (...) perspective of the phenomenology of the social world. We conclude with some remarks that conceive of Schutz’s theory as a relevant perspective for the analysis of children’s experiences with sound-producing objects. (shrink)

Based on published works and unpublished materials, this article analyses how cybernetics was received by two Spanish thinkers exiled in Mexico: José Gaos (1900–1969) and Eduardo Nicol (1907–1990). This reception is particularly intriguing especially when considering the substantial presence and social impact that Norbert Wiener had in Mexican society because of his friendship with Arturo Rosenblueth. Gaos and Nicol are the first philosophers to develop a complex and original diagnosis of cybernetics in Mexico. It will be shown how the exiled (...) thinkers take on the philosophical implications of this science in the light of their respective theoretical projects, and finally, it will be defended how the critical perspective they develop is particularly significant for Mexico’s political and academic context since it illuminates some negative aspects of cybernetics that Wiener did not foresee and that had not been reported there until then. (shrink)

Background The Regional Committee for Africa of the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2001 expressed concern that some health-related studies undertaken in the Region were not subjected to any form of ethics review. In 2003, the study reported in this paper was conducted to determine which Member country did not have a national research ethics committee (REC) with a view to guiding the WHO Regional Office in developing practical strategies for supporting those countries. Methods This is a descriptive study. The (...) questionnaire was prepared and sent by diplomatic pouch to all the 46 Member States in the WHO African Region, through the WHO country representatives, for facilitation and follow up. The data were entered in Excel spreadsheet and subsequently exported to STATA for analysis. A Chi-Squared test (χ 2) for independence was undertaken to test the relationship between presence/absence of Research Ethics Committee (REC) and selected individual socioeconomic and health variables. Results The main findings were as follows: the response rate was 61% (28/46); 64% (18/28) confirmed the existence of RECs; 36% (10/28) of the respondent countries did not have a REC (although 80% of them reported that they had in place an ad hoc ethical review mechanism); 85% (22/26) of the countries that responded to this question indicated that ethical approval of research proposals was, in principle, required; and although 59% of the countries that had a REC expected it to meet every month, only 44% of them reported that the REC actually met on a monthly basis. In the Chi-Squared test, only the average population in the group of countries with a REC was statistically different (at 5% level of significance) from that of the group of countries without a REC. Conclusion In the current era of globalized biomedical research, good ethics stewardship demands that every country, irrespective of its level of economic development, should have in place a functional research ethics review system in order to protect the dignity, integrity and safety of its citizens who participate in research. (shrink)

This article argues that bodily awareness is a basic form of self-consciousness through which perceiving agents are directly conscious of the bodily self. It clarifies the nature of bodily awareness, categorises the different types of body-relative information, and rejects the claim that we can have a sense of ownership of our own bodies. It explores how bodily awareness functions as a form of self-consciousness and highlights the importance of certain forms of bodily awareness that share an important epistemological property with (...) canonical forms of self-consciousness such as introspection. (shrink)

It is now 25 years since Gareth Evans introduced the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content in The Varieties of Reference. This is a fitting time to take stock of what has become a complex and extended debate both within philosophy and at the interface between philosophy and psychology. Unfortunately, the debate has become increasingly murky as it has become increasingly ramified. Much of the contemporary discussion does not do full justice to the powerful theoretical tool originally proposed by Evans (...) and subsequently refined by theorists in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s – most effectively, I think, by Christopher Peacocke (particularly in his 1992). Even worse, significant parts of the discussion are somewhat confused. This paper makes a start on clarifying what I think ought to be the central issues in debates about nonconceptual content. I begin in §1 by pointing out how narrowly focused contemporary discussion is relative to Evans’s original discussion. We are not making as much use as we should of nonconceptual content as a tool for understanding subpersonal information processing and the complexities of its status relative to perception and thought at the personal level. In §2 I turn to what is the central focus of contemporary discussion, namely, the content of perception and identify a “master argument” for nonconceptualism based on the relation between conceptual capacities and capacities for perceptual discrimination. The aim of §3 is to clarify the relation between the claim that perception has nonconceptual content and some superficially similar claims discussed by philosophers of perception. Finally, in §4 I explain why the attention recently focused on what is sometimes called the state version of the nonconceptualist thesis seems to me to be misdirected. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts of self-deception can be divided into two broad groups – the intentionalist and the anti-intentionalist. On intentionalist models what happens in the central cases of self-deception is parallel to what happens when one person intentionally deceives another, except that deceiver and deceived are the same person. This paper offers a positive argument for intentionalism about self-deception and defends the view against standard objections.

José L. Zalabardo defends a pragmatist account of what grounds the meaning of central semantic discourses--ascriptions of truth, of propositional attitudes, and of meanings. He argues that it is the procedures that regulate acceptance and rejection that give the sentences of these discourses their meanings, and explores the application of the pragmatist template to ethical discourse. The pragmatist approach is presented as an alternative to representationalist accounts of the meaning grounds of declarative sentences, according to which a sentence has the (...) meaning it has as a result of links with the bits of the world that it purports to represent. Zalabardo develops a version of the open-question argument to support the claim that the meaning grounds of the discourses he focuses on cannot receive representationalist accounts. It is generally assumed that a declarative sentence cannot perform the function of representing the world unless it has a representationalist meaning ground. Zalabardo rejects this assumption, arguing that sentences with pragmatist meaning grounds can represent the world in exactly the same sense that sentences with representationalist meaning grounds do. This requires that there are states of affairs that the target sentences represent as obtaining, and Zalabardo develops an account of the nature of the states of affairs that can play this role for sentences with pragmatist meaning grounds. Pragmatist Semantics concludes by developing the suggestion that the meaning grounds of all our representational discourses might be ultimately pragmatist. (shrink)

Table of Contents Acknowledgments 1 Self-Consciousness and the Body: An Interdisciplinary Introduction by Naomi Eiland, Anthony Marcel and José Luis Bermúdez 2 The Body Image and Self-Consciousness by John Campbell 3 Infants’ Understanding of People and Things: From Body Imitation to Folk Psychology by Andrew N. Meltzoff and M. Keith Moore 4 Persons, Animals, and Bodies by Paul F. Snowdon 5 An Ecological Perspective on the Origins of Self by George Butterworth 6 Objectivity, Causality, and Agency by Thomas Baldwin 7 (...) At Two with Nature: Agency and the Development of Self-World Dualism by James Russell 8 Ecological Perception and the Notion of a Nonconceptual Point of View by José Luis Bermúdez 9 Proprioception and the Body Image by Brian O’Shaughnessy 10 Awareness of One’s Own Body: An Attentional Theory of Its Nature, Development, and Brain Basis by Marcel Kinsbourne 11 Body Schema and Intentionality by Shaun Gallagher 12 Living without Touch and Peripheral Information about Body Position and Movement: Studies with Deafferented Subjects by Jonathan Cole and Jacques Paillard 13 Bodily Awareness: A Sense of Ownership by M. G. F. Martin 14 Bodily Awareness and the Self by Bill Brewer 15 Introspection and Bodily Self-Ascription by Quassim Cassam 16 Consciousness and the Self by Naomi Eilan Contributors Index. (shrink)

Frames and framing make one dimension of a decision problem particularly salient. In the simplest case, framesprimeresponses (as in, e.g., the Asian disease paradigm, where the gain frame primes risk-aversion and the loss frame primes risk-seeking). But in more complicated situations frames can function reflectively, by making salient particular reason-giving aspects of a thing, outcome, or action. For Shakespeare's Macbeth, for example, his feudal commitments are salient in one frame, while downplayed in another in favor of his personal ambition. The (...) role of frames in reasoning can give rise torational framing effects. Macbeth can prefer fulfilling his feudal duty to murdering the king, while also preferring bravely taking the throne to fulfilling his feudal duty, knowing full well that bravely taking the throne just is murdering the king. Such patterns ofquasi-cyclicalpreferences can be correct and appropriate from the normative perspective of how one ought to reason. The paper explores three less dramatic types of rational framing effects: (1) Consciously framing and reframing long-term goals and short-term temptations can be important tools for self-control. (2) In the prototypical social interactions modeled by game theory, allowing for rational framing effects solves longstanding problems, such as the equilibrium selection problem and explaining the appeal of non-equilibrium solutions (e.g., the cooperative solution in the Prisoner's Dilemma). (3) Processes for resolving interpersonal conflicts and breaking discursive deadlock, because they involve internalizing multiple and incompatible ways of framing actions and outcomes, in effect create rational framing effects. (shrink)

Cognitive Science combines the interdisciplinary streams of cognitive science into a unified narrative in an all-encompassing introduction to the field. This text presents cognitive science as a discipline in its own right, and teaches students to apply the techniques and theories of the cognitive scientist's 'toolkit' - the vast range of methods and tools that cognitive scientists use to study the mind. Thematically organized, rather than by separate disciplines, Cognitive Science underscores the problems and solutions of cognitive science, rather than (...) those of the subjects that contribute to it - psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, etc. The generous use of examples, illustrations, and applications demonstrates how theory is applied to unlock the mysteries of the human mind. Drawing upon cutting-edge research, the text has been updated and enhanced to incorporate new studies and key experiments since the first edition. A new chapter on consciousness has also been added. (shrink)

Decision Theory and Rationality offers a challenging new interpretation of a key theoretical tool in the human and social sciences. This accessible book argues, contrary to orthodoxy in politics, economics, and management science, that decision theory cannot provide a theory of rationality.

My topic in this paper is social understanding. By this I mean the cognitive skills underlying social behaviour and social coordination. Normal, encultured, non-autistic and non-brain-damaged human beings are capable of an impressive degree of social coordination. We navigate the social world with a level of skill and dexterity fully comparable to that which we manifest in navigating the physical world. In neither sphere, one might think, would it be a trivial matter to identify the various competences which underly this (...) impressive level of performance. Nonetheless, at least as far as interpersonal interactions are concerned, philosophers show a rare degree of unanimity. What grounds our success in these interactions is supposed to be our common mastery of folk psychology. (shrink)

In Thinking without Words I develop a philosophical framework for treating some animals and human infants as genuine thinkers. This paper outlines the aspects of this account that are most relevant to those working in animal ethics. There is a range of different levels of cognitive sophistication in different animal species, in addition to limits to the types of thought available to non-linguistic creatures, and it may be important for animal ethicists to take this into account in exploring issues of (...) moral significance and the obligations that we might or might not have to non-human animals. (shrink)

Reliabilist accounts of knowledge are widely seen as having the resources for blocking sceptical arguments, since these arguments appear to rely on assumptions about the nature of knowledge that are rendered illegitimate by reliabilist accounts. The goal of this book is to assess the main arguments against the possibility of knowledge, and its conclusions challenge this consensus. The book articulates and defends a theory of knowledge that belongs firmly in the truth-tracking tradition, and argues that although the theory has the (...) resources for blocking the main standard lines of sceptical reasoning, there is a sceptical argument against which the theory offers no defence, as it doesn’t rely on any assumptions that the theory would render illegitimate. The book ends with the suggestion that the problem might have a metaphysical solution—that although the sceptical argument may make no illegitimate epistemological assumptions, it does rest on a questionable account of the nature of cognition. (shrink)

In their recent book The Inessential Indexical Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever take issue with what has become close to philosophical orthodoxy – the view, most often associated with John Perry and David Lewis, that psychological explanations are essentially indexical. Cappelen and Dever claim that claims of essential indexicality are typically driven by intuitions rather than supported by arguments. They issue a challenge to supporters of essential indexicality: Produce an argument to back up the intuitions. This paper answers their challenge.

In a recent paper, Fredérique de Vignemont has argued that there is a positive quale of bodily ownership . She thinks that tactile and other forms of somatosensory phenomenology incorporate a distinctive feeling of myness and takes issue with my defense in Bermúdez of a deflationary approach to bodily ownership. That paper proposed an argument deriving from Elizabeth Anscombe’s various discussions of what she terms knowledge without observation . De Vignemont is not convinced and appeals to the Rubber Hand Illusion (...) to undercut my appeal to Anscombe. Section 1 of this article restates the case against the putative quale of ownership. Section 2 explains why de Vignemonts’ objections miss the mark. Section 3 discusses in more detail how to draw a principled distinction between bodily awareness and ordinary perceptual awareness. (shrink)

Debates about bodily ownership and psychological ownership have typically proceeded independently of each other. This paper explores the relation between them, with particular reference to how each is illuminated by psychopathology. I propose a general framework for studying ownership that is applicable both to bodily ownership and psychological ownership. The framework proposes studying ownership by starting with explicit judgments of ownership and then exploring the bases for those judgments. Section 3 discusses John Campbell’s account of ψ-ownership in the light of (...) that general framework, emphasizing in particular his fractionation of ψ-ownership into two dissociable components. Section 4 briefly presents an account of φ-ownership that I have developed in more detail elsewhere. Section 5 explores the suggestion, originating with Alexandre Billon, that there needs to be an integrated account of φ-ownership and ψ-ownership because depersonalization disorders typically involve breakdowns of both φ-ownership and ψ-ownership. The argument from depersonalization is not compelling, but Section 6 proposes a different way of reaching the same conclusion. Section 7 shows how reflecting on agency and practical reasoning offers a common thread between the models of φ-ownership and ψ-ownership discussed earlier in the paper. (shrink)

In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke rejects some of the most popular accounts of what meaning facts consist in on the grounds that they fail to accommodate the normative character of meaning. I argue that a widespread interpretation of Kripke's argument is incorrect. I contend that the argument does not rest on the contrast between descriptive and normative facts, but on the thought that speakers' uses of linguistic expressions have to be justified. I suggest that the line (...) of reasoning that I attribute to Kripke can be seen as putting pressure on the idea that predicate satisfaction is to be explained in terms of a relation between predicates and properties. (shrink)

O livro Infocracia. Digitalização e a crise da democracia, do filósofo sul-coreano Byung-Chul Han, traduzido por Gabriel Salvi Philipson e publicado pela Editora Vozes em 2022, retoma e aprofunda alguns dos problemas característicos do pensamento do autor tratados em obras anteriores, particularmente ligados à crítica das novas configurações da vida e da subjetividade na sociedade da informação. Suas publicações podem ser lidas como uma radiografia da contemporaneidade, um dos motivos, associado ao seu estilo de escrita, para a celebridade do autor (...) e o sucesso de venda dos seus livros [...]. (shrink)

This commentary defends intentionalist accounts of self-deception against Mele by arguing that: (1) viewing self-deception on the model of other-deception is not as paradoxical as Mele makes out; (2) the paradoxes are not entailed by the view that self-deception is intentional; and (3) there are two problems for Mele's theory that only an intentionalist theory can solve.

My topic in this paper is social understanding. By this I mean the cognitive skills underlying social behaviour and social coordination. Normal, encultured, non-autistic and non-brain-damaged human beings are capable of an impressive degree of social coordination. We navigate the social world with a level of skill and dexterity fully comparable to that which we manifest in navigating the physical world. In neither sphere, one might think, would it be a trivial matter to identify the various competences which underly this (...) impressive level of performance. Nonetheless, at least as far as interpersonal interactions are concerned, philosophers show a rare degree of unanimity. What grounds our success in these interactions is supposed to be our common mastery of folk psychology. (shrink)

This paper argues that, while there is a difference between personal and sub-personal explanation, claims of autonomy should be treated with scepticism. It distinguishes between horizontal and vertical explanatory relations that might hold between facts at the personal and facts at the sub-personal level. Noting that many philosophers are prepared to accept vertical explanatory relations between the two levels, I argue for the stronger claim that, in the case of at least three central personal level phenomena, the demands of explanatory (...) adequacy require postulating horizontal explanatory relations. (shrink)

Psychiatric treatment and diagnosis rests upon a richer conception of normativity than, for example, cognitive neuropsychology. This paper explores the role that considerations of rationality can play in defining this richer conception of normativity. It distinguishes two types of rationality and considers how each type can break down in different ways in delusional psychiatric disorders.

The subject matter of this paper is the view that it is correct, in an absolute sense, to believe a proposition just in case the proposition is true. I take issue with arguments in support of this view put forward by Nishi Shah and David Velleman.

Julián Marías es uno de los pensadores humanistas más completos del siglo XX y uno de los intelectuales más grandes de la España contemporánea. La presente obra pretende fijar de un modo muy detallado su aportación personal y filosófica al pensamiento universal. El resultado ha sido un riguroso trabajo pluridisciplinar que, desde un planteamiento divulgativo, reúne por primera vez a los mejores conocedores de su vida y su obra.

A filosofia prática de Kant, ou seja, o nuclear da sua ética, juntamente com o "primado da razão prática sobre a especulativa" e a "religião nos limites da simples razão", com seu acento no "mal radical", têm inegáveis afinidades com a - e em certos casos influxo da - tradição cristã. O próprio Kant terá em alguns momentos reconhecido isso mesmo. Segundo o autor do presente texto, subsistem, contudo, inegáveis divergências. O artigo, escrito a partir de uma declarada 'simpatia metódica, (...) pretende precisar no possível o alcance de umas e de outras, fazendo sobre o tema um balanço positivo. O autor propõe ainda uma hipótese de leitura do Opus Postumum, reconhecendo aqui uma tentativa por parte de Kant no sentido de purificar o seu "teísmo moral" numa direcção que tão pouco é alheia a importantes intuições cristãs. /// Aim of the article is to show that the practical philosophy of Kant, or, in other terms, the core of his ethics, as is the case with the "primacy of the practical reason over the speculative one" and the "religion within the limits of pure reason", with its accent set upon the idea of "radical evil", have undeniable affinities with -and in certain cases influxes from - the Christian tradition. Kant himself seems to have recognized that much at certain moments. For the author of the article, however, there are a few divergences to be reckoned with. In fact, the article, which is clearly written from the standpoint of a declared methodic sympathy, does whatever is possible in order to determine the reach of the ones and of the others, but in the end concludes that the result is a positive one. The author also suggests a reading hypothesis for the Opus Postumum, acknowledging here an attempt on the part of Kant directed towards a purification of his "moral theism" in a direction that as such is no less close to some very important Christian intuitions. (shrink)

As religiões podem ser consideradas como sistemas simbólicos mediante os quais os seres humanos ao longo da sua história sempre procuraram encontrar sabedoria em ordem a enfrentar o mal Um olhar pela história das religiões oferece-nos dados que podem ser compreendidos a partir de três tipos ideais de atitude básica em relação ao problema: Ascese, Gnose, Praxis. O Budismo originário, o Maniqueísmo e a religião bí-blico-cristã são exemplificações disso mesmo. Mais do que uma opção pela exclusão, os membros da nossa (...) cultura ocidental iluminada demonstram uma preferência pela atitude práxica. É a partir dela que nos cabe recuperar os valores das outras. Isso é também o que em muitos significa a presença de uma certa nostalgia pela "espiritualidade oriental". Ou ainda, como modesta gnose, a "teodiceia" (porquê tanto mal?): tão pouco prometedora enquanto resposta (teórica), como inevitável enquanto pergunta. /// Religions can be viewed as symbolic systems with which human beings have throughout history sought the wisdom which enables them to face evil. A survey through the history of religions exhibits features which may be brought to three ideal types of basic attitudes: the ascetic, the gnostic and the 'praxical'. Original Buddhism, Manichaeism and the biblical-Christian Religion exemplify them. Men and women of our occidental, enlightened culture need not to take an exclusive option thereabout. They show a preference for the praxical trend, even though at the same time they also retrieve some of the values of the other ones. Signs of this can be seen in the interest of many for 'oriental spirituality' as well as in that sort of modest gnosis which is "theodicee "(Why so much evil?): always unpromising as a theoretical answer and unavoidable as a question. /// Las religiones pueden ser consideradas como sistemas simbólicos con los que los seres humanos hemos buscado en nuestra historia una sabiduría para afrontar el mal. Un recorrido por la historia de las religiones ofrece datos que pueden comprenderse desde tres tipos ideales de actitud básica de afrontamiento: Ascesis, Gnosis, Praxis. El Budismo originário, el Maniqueísmo y la Religión bíblico-cristiana los ejemplifican. Más que una opción excluyente, los humanos de nuestra cultura occidental ilustrada tendrán una preferencia por la actitud práxica. Cabe desde ella recuperar valores de las otras. Eso hace en muchos la añoranza por la "espiritualidad oriental". Y, como modesta gnosis, la "teódicea" (¿por qué tanto mal?): tan poco prometedora como respuesta (teórica), cuanto insoslayable como pregunta. (shrink)