Defending intentionalist accounts of self-deception

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):107-108 (1997)
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Abstract

This commentary defends intentionalist accounts of self-deception against Mele by arguing that: (1) viewing self-deception on the model of other-deception is not as paradoxical as Mele makes out; (2) the paradoxes are not entailed by the view that self-deception is intentional; and (3) there are two problems for Mele's theory that only an intentionalist theory can solve.

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Jose Luis Bermudez
Texas A&M University

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