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Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disorders
Mind and Language 16 (5):457-493 (2001)
Abstract
Psychiatric treatment and diagnosis rests upon a richer conception of normativity than, for example, cognitive neuropsychology. This paper explores the role that considerations of rationality can play in defining this richer conception of normativity. It distinguishes two types of rationality and considers how each type can break down in different ways in delusional psychiatric disordersAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Making Sense of the Cotard Syndrome: Insights from the Study of Depersonalisation.Alexandre Billon - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (3):356-391.
In defence of the doxastic conception of delusions.Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.
Distinguishing the reflective, algorithmic, and autonomous minds: Is it time for a tri-process theory.Keith E. Stanovich - 2009 - In Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press. pp. 55--88.
Unusual experiences, reality testing and delusions of alien control.Jakob Hohwy & Raben Rosenberg - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):141-162.
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