Understanding inductive reasoning is a problem that has engaged mankind for thousands of years. This problem is relevant to a wide range of fields and is integral to the philosophy of science. It has been tackled by many great minds ranging from philosophers to scientists to mathematicians, and more recently computer scientists. In this article we argue the case for Solomonoff Induction, a formal inductive framework which combines algorithmic information theory with the Bayesian framework. Although it achieves excellent theoretical results (...) and is based on solid philosophical foundations, the requisite technical knowledge necessary for understanding this framework has caused it to remain largely unknown and unappreciated in the wider scientific community. The main contribution of this article is to convey Solomonoff induction and its related concepts in a generally accessible form with the aim of bridging this current technical gap. In the process we examine the major historical contributions that have led to the formulation of Solomonoff Induction as well as criticisms of Solomonoff and induction in general. In particular we examine how Solomonoff induction addresses many issues that have plagued other inductive systems, such as the black ravens paradox and the confirmation problem, and compare this approach with other recent approaches. (shrink)

In Metaphysics Λ, Aristotle appeals to the prime mover: an unmoved mover that is the first moving cause of the world. Elsewhere, he calls the science concerned with the prime mover ‘theology’ (Meta. E.1, 1026a19). But what is the point of this science? On a common view, its purpose is to give an account of the prime mover itself, and especially to prove its existence. By contrast, I argue that Aristotle’s theology in Metaphysics Λ is ‘nature-bound’: it ultimately aims at (...) explaining facts about the perceptible world, in particular the motion of heavenly bodies and the cycle of generation of perishable substances. (shrink)

Lists of personified virtues in ancient Jewish and Christian texts offer remote intellectual anticipations of names and structural configurations of later kabbalistic sefirot. These parallels indicate that various Jewish-oriented Christian sources preserved and mediated some traditions that later came to circulate in Jewish kabbalistic circles.

The Semantic Descent account is extended to realistically complex examples, both in terms of syntactic complexity and vividness. A detailed treatment of a wide range of examples is followed by discussions of phenomena such as dead metaphor, simile, metonymy, synecdoche, mixed and extended metaphor, as well as observations about the relationship between synaesthesia and metaphor, the robustness of metaphor as a theoretical kind, the so-called ‘cognitive’ account of metaphor and visual metaphor.

Few characters in Western popular culture are as iconic as the Creature from Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, even if most who can sketch the image of Boris Karloff’s bolts and scars would be able to o...

I am writing on moral knowledge in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. There are two basic parts. In the first part, I articulate and attack a predominant interpretation of the Essay . This interpretation attributes to Locke the view that he did not write in the Essay anything that would be inconsistent with his early views in the Questions Concerning the Laws of Nature that there exists a single, ultimate, moral standard, i.e., the Law of Nature. For example, John Colman, (...) in his book John Locke's Moral Philosophy , argues that even though Locke explains in the Essay that we arbitrarily create our moral notions, they are still objective since they are bound together with the Law of Nature. Colman explains that the features of human nature relevant to the derivation of the Law of Nature are universally shared needs and concerns . I argue that this presupposes a view of Locke which assumes that there are essences of species independent of our beliefs about them. However, I attempt to show from the text of the Essay that this view cannot be supported. ;In the second part, I argue that the text of the Essay supports two alternative theses. The first is that given the kind of metaphysical world-view presupposed by the corpuscular method of science employed within the Essay, coupled with Locke's commitment to the possibility of moral knowledge, he was left with only one option with reference to ethics, viz., to make moral goodness or evil a mind-dependent relation between a rule and an action, instead of a property of an action or person which exists independently of our moral beliefs. This view is logically inconsistent with the existence of the Law of Nature. The second is that Locke has a semantical view of moral claims which is consistent with his relational view of moral goodness, viz., the primary function of moral judgments is to recommend behavior for ourselves and others. I described. However, Locke explains in the Essay that the opposite takes place with respect to our moral notions: events and persons must conform to the moral notion. ;On the account that I offer, Locke's views on moral epistemology are much closer to David Hume's than many have supposed, and correspondingly, anticipate the more skeptical views of moral epistemology in the twentieth century. (shrink)

The chapter, which examines the views of seventeenth-century British philosophers on the notion of will and motivation, explains the answers of philosophers on questions concerning the relation among will, freedom of action, motivation, and causal determination. These philosophers include John Bramhall, Thomas Hobbes, Ralph Cudworth, and John Locke. The chapter concludes that the history of British thought on the issue of will and motivation is complex one.

We extend first-order logic to include variadic function symbols, and prove a substitution lemma. Two applications are given: one to bounded quantifier elimination and one to the definability of certain Borel sets.

There are many writers and critics who regard what they call ‘individualist-liberalism’ as the root of many of the evils of the modern world; and the emphasis of their attack is on the individualist half of the term. Those who take this line nowadays often call them-selves ‘communitarians’. I would prefer to call them collectivists, as that brings out their dangerous tendency to regard the group as more important than the individuals of whom it is composed. But in what follows (...) I shall concede on labels and most often refer to them as communitarians. (shrink)

Georges Didi-Huberman, Uprisings (Paris: Gallimard, 2016), 232 pp, ISBN 9782072697296 Georges Didi-Huberman's Uprisings is at once heavy and light. It weaves complex (and sometimes burdensome) political traditions and histories of thought concerned with uprising, rebellion and revolution, with bursts of poetry which, it seems, are meant to take flight off the page like the butterfly tracts that Didi-Huberman so admires. It is also vast in its scale and depth, tracing histories of uprising and rebellion from Atlas, Prometheus and Eve, through (...) to future uprisings which are as yet unknown and, as the author reminds us, endless: 'the uprising is a gesture without end' (p. 17). (shrink)

The general argument of the previous chapter is here supplemented by a fuller discussion of the relationship between the moral assessment of action and agents’ deliberations about what to do. Scheffler begins by distinguishing between five different ways in which overtly moral considerations may impinge on an agent's deliberations, and he observes that no general rule tells us when moral considerations should function in these different ways. In light of this discussion, he rejects the idea that, in formulating a moral (...) assessment of a person's action, we commit ourselves to thinking that the person himself should deliberate in explicitly moral terms. Accordingly, he argues, we need not worry that the pervasiveness of morality implies an overmoralized conception of deliberation or of the self.For similar reasons, Scheffler rejects a family of views that object to the very idea of a moral theory, understood as a system of general principles that can be combined with information about specific circumstances to yield moral verdicts. (shrink)

What everything is about -- Why understanding cycles matters and how to recognize a cycle when you're in one -- A new science in the making -- How cycles study became a science that can explain the universe or predict your future -- Follow the money -- Cycles students got profitable early warnings of the 2008/9 financial crisis, did you? -- Nature on the move -- Will it rain on your parade? Will a rising tide flood your basement? : try (...) asking cycles -- Heeding nature's clock -- Do you doze after lunch? : it isn't food, are you bright at dawn? : it's not sun, it's cycles -- Making the most of moods -- For the curse in woman or just the blues in anyone, cycles can be a saving grace -- Cycles as history -- How did China get so rich? Why the war in Afghanistan? -- It could be star-born cycles -- Looking to the heavens -- Is the universe a giant musical instrument? : scientists and poets can hear it singing -- Thinking out of the box -- Independent thinkers are allied with cycles students in learning from nature's rich text. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 25, Issue 1, pp 72 - 94 Politics has never been considered Martin Buber’s forte. This paper considers the range of Buber’s reception as a political thinker by considering it in the form of three “moments,” each from a different point in his career, and each through the eyes of a different figure who either read or worked with Buber politically: Theodor Herzl, Gustav Landauer, and Hans Kohn. The three moments are structured around a discussion of the (...) classic criticism that Buber’s politics are naïve or utopian; the paper seeks to respond, as Buber did, in a way that raises questions about the borders of politics itself. (shrink)