Underscoring the economic significance of the Knightian distinction between risk and uncertainty, Don Katzner forcefully challenges the continued dominance of the expected utility model based on subjective probability in macroeconomic analysis and offers in its place a simple yet elegant model of decision making inspired by the pioneering work of G.L.S. Shackle. In doing so, Katzner lends support to a research program to identify a more coherent and empirically grounded theory of decision making under uncertainty. Our paper makes three contributions (...) to this program. First, we argue that the appropriate choice of a model of individual behavior under uncertainty cannot be adjudicated merely on logical, a priori grounds, but must ultimately be based on consistency with observed behavior. There are many internally consistent models and their external conditions of validity hardly ever rely on inconceivable scenarios. Second, while Katzner’s model certainly provides a plausible foundation for understanding choice under uncertainty, we suggest that it is somewhat underdetermined. It requires further theoretical articulation to yield testable predictions which differentiate it from competing approaches. Third, we discuss recent experimental findings that may need to be addressed by any satisfactory theoretical account of decision making under uncertainty. (shrink)

The article reviews the recent debate about workplace democracy. It first presents and critically discusses arguments in favor of democratizing the firm that are based on the analogy with states, meaningful work, the avoidance of unjustified hierarchies, and beneficial effects on political democracy. The second part presents and critically discusses arguments against workplace democracy that are based on considerations of efficiency, the difficulties of a transition towards democratic firms, and liberal commitments such as the rights of employees and owners to (...) work for or invest in nondemocratic firms. The conclusion summarizes the debate and argues that experiments with democratic workplaces as what Erik Olin Wright calls “real utopias” could deliver new insights and thus move the discussion forward. (shrink)

This paper presents a semantical analysis of the Weak Kleene Logics Kw3 and PWK from the tradition of Bochvar and Halldén. These are three-valued logics in which a formula takes the third value if at least one of its components does. The paper establishes two main results: a characterisation result for the relation of logical con- sequence in PWK – that is, we individuate necessary and sufficient conditions for a set.

ABSTRACTThe ability of providing an adequate supervenience base for tensed truths may seem to be one of the main theoretical advantages of both the growing-block and the moving-spotlight theory of time over presentism. However, in this paper I will argue that some propositions appear to be as problematic for growing-block theorists as past-directed propositions are for presentists, namely propositions stating that nothing will be the case in the future. Furthermore, I will show that the moving-spotlight theory can adequately address all (...) the main supervenience challenges that can be levelled against A-theories of time. I will, thus, conclude that, at least as far as the supervenience principle is concerned, the moving-spotlight theory should be preferred over both presentism and the growing-block theory. (shrink)

In this paper I address two important objections to the theory called ‘ Composition as Identity’ : the ‘wall-bricks-and-atoms problem’, and the claim that CAI entails mereological nihilism. I aim to argue that the best version of CAI capable of addressing both problems is the theory I will call ‘Atomic Composition as Identity’ which consists in taking the plural quantifier to range only over proper pluralities of mereological atoms and every non-atomic entity to be identical to the plurality of atoms (...) it fuses. I will proceed in three main steps. First, I will defend Sider’s Composition as identity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 211–221, 2014) idea of weakening the comprehension principle for pluralities and I will show that :219–235, 2016a) it can ward off both the WaBrA problem and the threat of mereological nihilism. Second, I will argue that CAI-theorists should uphold an ‘atomic comprehension principle’ which, jointly with CAI, entails that there are only proper pluralities of mereological atoms. Finally, I will present a novel reading of the ‘one of’ relation that not only avoids the problems presented by Yi Composition as identity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 169–191, 2014) and Calosi :429–443, 2016b, Am Philos Q 55:281–292, 2018) but can also help ACAI-theorists to make sense of the idea that a composite entity is both one and many. (shrink)

The duality theory established by Halmos in [2] for boolean hemimorphism applies of course to the diagonalizable algebra, because ντν is an hemimorphism. For commodity in working on diagonalizable algebras we recall the basic facts and give the characteristic conditions on the dual of ντν.

The volume offers an overview of current research in ontology, distinguishing basic conceptual issues, domain applications, general frameworks, and mathematical ...

In this paper, I propose a new nonconceptual reading of the B-Deduction. As Hanna correctly remarks :399–415, 2011: 405), the word “cognition” has in both editions of the first Critique a wide sense, meaning nonconceptual cognition, and a narrow meaning, in Kant’s own words “an objective perception”. To be sure, Kant assumes the first meaning to account for why the Deduction is unavoidable. And if we take this meaning as a premise of the B-Deduction, then there is a gap in (...) the argument since the categories are certainly not conditions for non-conceptual cognition. Still, I believe it is not this wide meaning but rather the narrow one that figures in any premise of the B-Deduction. Thus, in the reading that I am proposing, categories are not conditions for representing something, or even conditions for representing something objectively. Instead, they are conditions for the recognition that what we represent through the senses exists mind-independently. In the first step of the B-Deduction, this cognition in the narrow sense takes the form of the propositional thinking that the nonconceptually represented object of the sensible intuition exists objectively. In contrast, in the second step of the B-Deduction, this cognition in the narrow sense takes the form of the apprehension of what our human senses represent nonconceptually as existing objectively. (shrink)

I reject the widely held view that Duhem's 1906 book La Théorie physique is a statement of instrumentalistic conventionalism, motivated by the scientific crisis at the end of the nineteenth century. By considering Duhem's historical context I show that his epistemological views were already formed before the crisis occured; that he consistently supported general thermodynamics against the new atomism; and that he rejected the epistemological views of the latter's philosophical supporters. In particular I show that Duhem rejected Poincaré's account of (...) scientific language, Le Roy's view that laws are definitions, and the conventionalist's use of simplicity as the criterion of theory choice. Duhem regarded most theory choices as decidable on empirical grounds, but made historical context the main determining factor in scientific change. (shrink)

This paper offers an account of the social foundations of a theory of democracy. It purports to show that a social ontology of democracy is the necessary counterpart of a political theory of democracy. It notably contends that decisions concerning basic social ontological assumptions are relevant not only for empirical research, but bear a significant impact also on normative theorizing. The paper then explains why interactionist rather than substantialist social ontologies provide the most promising starting point for building a social (...) ontology of democracy. It then introduces and examines the three notions of habits, patterns of interaction, and forms of social organization, conceived as the main pillars of an interactionist social ontology of democracy and briefly discusses some major implications of this approach for democratic theory. (shrink)

Simplicius reports that Xenocrates and Andronicus reproached Aristotle for positing an excessive number of categories, which can conveniently be reduced to two: τὰ καθ᾽αὑτά and τὰ πρός τι. Simplicius, followed by several modern commentators, interprets this move as being equivalent to a division into substance and accidents. I aim to show that, as far as Xenocrates is concerned, this interpretation is untenable and that the substance-accidents contrast cannot be equivalent to Xenocrates’ per se-relative one. Rather, Xenocrates aimed to stress the (...) primacy of Plato’s binary distinction of beings, as presented at Sophist 255c13–4, over Aristotle’s list of the categories. (shrink)

n the philosophy of language, there are many ongoing controversies that stem from relying too heavily on an utterance-based framework. The traditional approach of rigidly partitioning the utterance’s meaning into what is grammatically determined from what is not may not fully capture the complexity of human language in real-world communicative contexts. To address this issue, we suggest shifting focus toward a broader analysis level encompassing conversations and discourses. From this broader perspective, it is possible to obtain a more integrated view (...) of how linguistic and extra-linguistic aspects dynamically interact and thus reconsider semantics/pragmatics dichotomy as complementary dimensions. Meaning is not confined to linguistic structures alone but emerges from the dynamic interplay of words, sociocultural knowledge, discursive situations, and psychological dispositions of speakers. Substantiating this perspective calls for embracing an interdisciplinary approach that synthesizes research from various domains, including linguistics, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of language. This paper focuses on a particularly compelling case study: aphasia. Speeches produced by individuals with aphasia represent complex scenarios where the balance between linguistic and extra-linguistic aspects is notably compromised, often to the former’s detriment. Aphasics’ productions represent a vivid example of how the interpretation of speeches can be far from involving fixed and static operations. Instead, it entails continuously reallocating cognitive resources toward the most readily available and accessible sources for the speakers. This case study ultimately demonstrates that the influence of semantic and pragmatic processes in shaping and conveying meanings displays remarkable adaptability, continuously adjusting to the ever changing demands placed upon speakers. -/- . (shrink)

In Metaphysics B 3 Aristotle sets out a famous argument for the thesis that being is not a genus. In his commentary on Metaphysics B, Syrianus criticizes this argument and explains in what sense being is to be regarded as a genus. I reconstruct both Syrianus’ criticisms and his own view. I bring out ways in which they can help us rethink key assumptions of Aristotle’s ontology and shed light both on Syrianus’ critical attitude towards Aristotle and on some of (...) Syrianus’ main views in metaphysics. (shrink)

At De Principiis II, p. 75.10-11 Westerink, Damascius states that ‘Being will be that which provides being itself to each thing, καὶ καθ’ ὅ τι ὄν ἐστι’. The modern reference translation of the De Principiis, that of Joseph Combès for the Collection des Universités de France, renders the phrase left here in Greek as ‘et selon ce qu’elle est comme être’. Combès interprets it by stating that being is here conceived of as the constitutive unity of each form, at once (...) responsible for both its essence and existence. I argue that both a translation and an interpretation of καθ’ ὅ τι ὄν ἐστι of the type suggested by Combès are untenable and I defend an alternative construal. The two other main modern translations, those of Ahbel-Rappe and Galpérine, are also critically assessed. The translation of the relevant phrase I propose is: ‘and in virtue of which something is a being’. I argue that being – that is the property bestowed by the Kind or Form of Being, a notion that Damascius draws from Plato’s Sophist – is here conceived of as that which is metaphysically responsible only for the fact that something is (or is a being), not also for what something is. This construal does justice to the grammar of Damascius’ text and fits better with the argument of De Principiis II, pp. 56-99 Westerink. (shrink)

It has become common, following Stephen Darwall’s “Two Kinds of Respect”, to distinguish between “appraisal respect” and “recognition respect.” I propose, rather, to distinguish between hierarchical and egalitarian respect. The way the two meanings interact and the way they either support or contrast with each other have yet to be made clear. The meanings gathered under the broad rubric of respect can be highlighted by a genealogy that convincingly shows that the hierarchical notion is fundamental and that the definition of (...) an egalitarian meaning is a decisive shift made mainly by the Enlightenment movement, particularly by Kant. Furthermore, the notion of respect is currently being extended beyond persons—to animals, other living beings, and the environment. I argue that we can justifiably do so on the basis of the interaction between the hierarchical and egalitarian notions of respect. (shrink)

El artículo analiza el vínculo entre derecho y violencia en Walter Benjamin y Franz Rosenzweig. Primero, se estudia la relación entre Benjamin, Rosenzweig y Carl Schmitt, y, a continuación, la proximidad entre las concepciones benjaminiana y rosenzweiguiana de la historia y de la temporalidad mesiánica, así como la relación entre justicia, derecho y eternidad. Finalmente, se presenta la propuesta derridiana de una deconstrucción de la crítica benjaminiana de la violencia y su antecedente en _La estrella de la redención_.

This paper aims to identify several interpretive problems posed by the final part of DA II.11, where Aristotle intertwines the thesis that a sense is like a ‘mean’ and an explanation for the existence of a ‘blind spot’ related to the sense of touch, adding the further contention that we are capable of discriminating because the mean ‘becomes the other opposite’ in relation to the perceptible property being perceived. To solve those problems, the paper explores a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s (...) claims, arguing that they describe a homeostatic physiological reaction by which the sensory apparatus responds to perceptible stimuli. According to the proposed interpretation, such homeostatic reaction constitutes a necessary condition for perceiving what Aristotle refers to as ‘proper’ perceptible features, which include properties like ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ as well as colors and sounds. (shrink)

L'articolo affronta il rapporto tra Henry Miller e Il tramonto dell'Occidente di OSwald Spengler, oggetto di una lettura approfondita e appassionata. Temi centrali sono quelli della decadenza della civiltà e delle vie d'uscita in chiave vitalistica e letteraria, da questo declino.

"a book about religion and a religious work in its own right, it proposes the content of a religion that can survive faith in a transcendent God and in life after death. According to this religion—the religion of the future—human beings can be more human by becoming more godlike, not just later, in another life or another time, but right now, on Earth and in their own lives."--Publishers website.

This article seeks to locate Louis Althusser’s late preoccupation with the status of Marxists in philosophy through a survey of archival and marginal texts written on and amid struggles within the French education system. This material evidences that Althusser held a long-term ambition to reconcile the demands of being a Marxist in his professional life with the demands of being a philosopher in his political life. On this basis, this article offers an expanded contextualisation of the stakes that weighed upon (...) Althusser’s shifting understanding and inhabitation of a Marxist position in philosophy. It aims to show that Althusser’s involvement with, and changing attitudes towards, the educational institution (and in particular the teaching of philosophy) played a significant role in forging the discontinuities in his conceptualisation of Marxist philosophy. The article additionally traces the afterlife of this practice in the work of Jacques Derrida and the Groupe de recherches sur l’enseignement de a philosophe (GREPH). (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that qualitative theories (Q-theories) can be used to describe the statistical structure of cross classified populations and that the notion of verisimilitude provides an appropriate tool for measuring the statistical adequacy of Q-theories. First of all, a short outline of the post-Popperian approaches to verisimilitude and of the related verisimilitudinarian non-falsificationist methodologies (VNF-methodologies) is given. Secondly, the notion of Q-theory is explicated, and the qualitative verisimilitude of Q-theories is defined. Afterwards, appropriate measures for the (...) statistical verisimilitude of Q-theories are introduced, so to obtain a clear formulation of the intuitive idea that the statistical truth about cross classified populations can be approached by falsified Q-theories. Finally, it is argued that some basic intuitions underlying VNF-methodologies are shared by the so-called prediction logic, developed by the statisticians and social scientists David K. Hildebrand, James D. Laing and Howard Rosenthal. (shrink)

The book addresses the question of the alleged Heracliteanism of the Sceptic philosopher Aenesidemus of Cnossus.

Argle claimed that holes supervene on their material hosts, and that every truth about holes boils down to a truth about perforated things. This may well be right, assuming holes are perforations. But we still need an explicit theory of holes to do justice to the ordinary way of counting holes--or so says Cargle.

Aristotle’s presentation of ontology advanced at the beginning of the fourth book of Metaphysics is universally known: “there is a science which studies being qua being...”. Needless to say, this is a familiar sentence: unfortunately, it is also quite an odd one. Why Aristotle does not simply say that ontology is the theory of being? Is there any difference between ‘theory of being’ and ‘theory of being qua being’? In brief, the problem is to decide whether the two expressions ‘the (...) study of being’ and ‘the study of being qua being’ are equivalent. If they are, the ‘qua’ does not play any interesting role. On the contrary, if the two expressions are different, that is to say, if there is a difference between the study of being (simpliciter) and the study of being qua being, we should study the role played by the (operator) ‘qua’. (shrink)

The thesis is defended that the theories of causation, time and space, and levels of reality are mutually interrelated in such a way that the difficulties internal to theories of causation and to theories of space and time can be understood better, and perhaps dealt with, in the categorial context furnished by the theory of the levels of reality. The structural condition for this development to be possible is that the first two theories be opportunely generalized.

The concept of formal ontology was first developed by Husserl. It concerns problems relating to the notions of object, substance, property, part, whole, predication, nominalization, etc. The idea of formal ontology is present in many of Husserl?s works, with minor changes. This paper provides a reconstruction of such an idea. Husserl?s proposal is faced with contemporary logical orthodoxy and it is presented also an interpretative hypothesis, namely that the original difference between the general perspective of usual model theory and formal (...) ontology is grounded in the fact that this latter starts from an intended interpretation and not from the set of all the possible interpretations. (shrink)

Technoscientific progress brings into question both anthropocentric epistemology and anthropocentric/humanistic ontology, which considers the human being as a self-constructing and self-sufficient entity. Even though, Darwinism recomposes the humanistic disjunction between reality and representation: by defining the human being as the result of an adaptive reflection, it reveals the idealistic character of post-Cartesian thought, which is the backbone of philosophical anthropocentrism. The non-human can be a dialogic entity if and only if it is considered not as “animal-by” but “animal-with”, that is, (...) free to express its authenticity in terms of subjectivity, diversity and uniqueness. Whilst the post-human laboratory celebrates the power of human beings, the post-humanistic perspective emphasizes the conjugation with the non-human. (shrink)

I re-examine the starting point of the Philebus’ description of the ‘divine method’ and argue that the vexed phrase τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι at 16c9 refers to sensibles only. In doing so, I especially stress the significance of the phrase τούτων οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων at 16d1. The proposed interpretation fits the rest of the description of the ‘divine method’, preserves the Forms’ unmixed nature and the consistency of the Philebus.

In this paper I take a sceptical view of the standard cosmological model and its variants, mainly on the following grounds: (i) The method of mathematical modelling that characterises modern natural philosophy-as opposed to Aristotle's-goes well with the analytic, piecemeal approach to physical phenomena adopted by Galileo, Newton and their followers, but it is hardly suited for application to the whole world. (ii) Einstein's first cosmological model (1917) was not prompted by the intimations of experience but by a desire to (...) satisfy Mach's Principle. (iii) The standard cosmological model-a Friedmann-Lematre-Robertson-Walker spacetime expanding with or without end from an initial singularity-is supported by the phenomena of redshifted light from distant sources and very nearly isotropic thermal background radiation provided that two mutually inconsistent physical theories are jointly brought to bear on these phenomena, viz the quantum theory of elementary particles and Einstein's theory of gravity. (iv) While the former is certainly corroborated by high-energy experiments conducted under conditions allegedly similar to those prevailing in the early world, precise tests of the latter involve applications of the Schwarzschild solution or the PPN formalism for which there is no room in a Friedmann-Lematre-Robertson-Walker spacetime. (shrink)

In this paper, we extend the expressive power of the logics K3, LP and FDE with anormality operator, which is able to express whether a for-mula is assigned a classical truth value or not. We then establish classical recapture theorems for the resulting logics. Finally, we compare the approach via normality operator with the classical collapse approach devisedby Jc Beall.

This intervention concerns the different statute of abstraction in Marx's work. By means of a critical confrontation with Chris Arthur's work, Finelli presents his thesis of the presence of a double theory and fuction of abstraction in Marx's work. In the early Marx, until the German Ideology, abstraction is, in accordance with the traditional meaning of this term, a product of the mind, an unreal spectre. More exactly, it consists in negating the common essence belonging to labouring humanity and projecting (...) it, as alienated universal, into the idea of philosophy, into the state of politics and into the money of the market. In the later Marx, the nature of abstraction is, rather than mental, practical. It is directly related to the quantity without quality of capitalist labour, and it is the product of the systemic connection of machines to labour-power. In contrast to Arthur, Finelli maintains that practical abstraction in the Marx of Capital is not located in the zone of exchange and the market, where there is the mediation of money. On the contrary, it is located in the zone of production, which, for Marx, is a social ensemble not mediated by money but by relations of technological domination. (shrink)

Most discussions of Rawls’s philosophy tend to neglect the strong communitarian strand of his theory: so much so that in the debate between liberals and communitarians Rawls’s account of community has been for the most part intriguingly absent. This article is an attempt to fill in the gap by offering a discussion of the Rawlsian understanding of community as it was presented in A Theory of Justice and its possible implications for a pluralist society. At the same time, I want (...) to take issue with one of the most influential critiques leveled against Rawls’s conception of the self: namely, Sandel’s critique of the ‘individuated subject’ that, in his view, underlies justice as fairness. Rawls’s constructions, so Sandel argues, rest on an unencumbered self that is individuated in advance and whose identity is fixed once and for all. (shrink)

Behavioral economics has potential to offer novel solutions to some of today's most pressing public health problems: How do we persuade people to eat healthy and lose weight? How can health professionals communicate health risks in a way that is heeded? How can food labeling be modified to inform healthy food choices? Behavioral Economics and Public Health is the first book to apply the groundbreaking insights of behavioral economics to the persisting problems of health behaviors and behavior change. In addition (...) to providing a primer on the behavioral economics principles that are most relevant to public health, this book offers details on how these principles can be employed to mitigating the world's greatest health threats, including obesity, smoking, risky sexual behavior, and excessive drinking. With contributions from an international team of scholars from psychology, economics, marketing, public health, and medicine, this book is a trailblazing new approach to the most difficult and important problems of our time. (shrink)

Despite the differences, there is some convergence between Adam Smith's and Immanuel Kant's theories of moral motivation. Both rely on a peculiar feeling, respect, as the proper source of motive in moral matters. An analysis of Smith's and Kant's conception of respect shows that both recognize that it has a specific normative import and plays a decisive role in morality. This convergence offers some support to the idea that Smith's sentimentalism and Kant's rationalism are compatible, at least as far as (...) moral motivation is at issue. (shrink)

Panentheism, a frequently discussed view in recent theological debate, claims that the world is ‘in God’ but that God is ‘more than’ the world. Different theories of the structure of the world produce distinct panentheist views. According to the hunky structure, the world is composed of an infinite number of layers and lacks an ungrounded level. To depict this model, I employ the concepts of ‘grounding’ and ‘emergence.’ The outcome is that if the world is hunky and material reality emerges (...) from such a structure, the world can be in God, but the model of God the Creator is dismissed. (shrink)

Speciesism is a concept that was derived to name forms of discrimination and oppression against nonhuman animals that could be compared to racism and sexism. The concept was formulated in strong terms by Richard Ryder, Peter Singer, and Tom Regan that made it a powerful tool for social and political movements. The discourse on speciesism has been amplified and changed by a set of newer writings in the last few decades that take a more ethological, critical theory, and deconstructive bent. (...) This paper outlines some of the conditions for an antispeciesism based on posthumanism. As humanism itself is the most virulent form of speciesism, no robust antispeciesism can be developed without continued challenge to humanism. (shrink)

This paper is a new defense of the view that visual hallucinations lack content. The claim is that visual hallucinations are illusory not because their content is nonveridical, but rather because they seem to represent when they fail to represent anything in the first place. What accounts for the phenomenal character of visual experiences is not the content itself, but rather the vehicle of content, that is, not the properties represented by visual experience, but rather the relational properties of experience (...) of representing singular contents, namely particular instantiations of properties. I argue that the Russellian particular-involving proposition is the only appropriate model for the representational content of visual experience and hence that visual hallucinations are just like failed demonstrations. (shrink)

Riassunto : Il presente articolo intende lumeggiare l’esito tanto fecondo quanto problematico a cui conduce l’originale opera laskiana di risemantizzazione del concetto di soggettività. Al centro di tale opera si staglia la progressiva elaborazione di ciò che il filosofo rubrica, al termine del suo Denkweg, sotto il titolo di soggetto ricettivo. Con tale concetto, a cui è intimamente legato quello di “dedizione”, Lask individua in una mera ricettività intuitiva il momento sorgivo e originario di ogni processo cognitivo; il solo momento (...) che rende possibile un accesso diretto all’oggetto trascendente. Ma come si realizza questo accesso? Qual è lo statuto di ciò che il filosofo nomina “dedizione”? L’insufficiente risposta a tali quesiti conduce il pensiero laskiano ad un esito aporetico, ossia alla riduzione della dedizione a momento ideale e alla conseguente riattivazione, in ambito conoscitivo, dell’inaggirabile distanza tra soggetto e oggetto. Ma, se in tale aporia è riconosciuto il limite del modello della conoscenza elaborato da Lask nel suo sistema maturo, non è comunque possibile occultare il decisivo contributo offerto dalla sua riflessione al problema gnoseologico: il superamento del coscienzialismo attraverso l’elaborazione di un soggetto concreto-ricettivo e, accanto a esso, di un peculiare realismo. Parole chiave : Emil Lask; Soggettività; Ricettività; Coscienza; Concreto/astratto Emil Lask. Subjectivity and Receptiveness: This paper intends to illuminate the problematic outcome of Lask’s redefinition of the concept of subjectivity. The main result of this operation is the elaboration of the notion of receptive subject. With this concept, strictly linked to the notion of Hingabe, Lask identifies the original element of every cognitive process in simple intuitive receptivity. Intuitive receptivity alone provides direct access to the transcendent object. But how is this access possible? What is the relation between the receptive-intuitive element of knowledge and predicative activity? What is the status of Hingabe? The insufficient answers to these questions lead the Lask’s thought to an aporetic outcome, namely, the reduction of Hingabe to an exclusively abstract and ideal receptivity, and consequently to the reactivation, in the theory of knowledge, of the distance between subject and object. However, while this distance marks the limit of the model of knowledge developed by Lask, the main contribuition of his thought remains valid: the overcoming of trascendental subjectivism through the elaboration of a concrete-receptive subject and of an original form of realism. Keywords : Emil Lask; Subjectivity; Receptivity; Consciousness; Concreteness/Abstractness. (shrink)

El debate de la reciente filosofía de la imagen está estructurado en la oposición entre enfoques semióticos y perceptualistas. Entre estos últimos, los especialistas suelen incluir a la fenomenología. Ahora bien, ¿es correcto caracterizar a la fenomenología como una posición perceptualista acerca de la imagen? Defenderé la tesis de que la fenomenología representa un perceptualismo indirecto o débil. Con todo, el lugar que pueda ocupar la fenomenología en el debate no se restringe a su cercanía con el perceptualismo. Intentaré mostrar (...) que la fenomenología plantea temáticas puntuales, tales como la relación entre sentido y presencia, las cuales puede conducir hacia un análisis crítico de los supuestos en los que se apoya el encuadre actual de la discusión. The debate of the recent philosophy of the image is organized in the opposition between semiotic and perceptualistic approaches. Scholars often include the phenomenology into the perceptualistic view. Yet, ¿is it right to characterize the phenomenology as a kind of perceptualism about the image? The first goal of the paper is to demonstrate that phenomenology represents an indirect or weak perceptualism. Anyway, the place of the phenomenology in the debate does not consist only in being a kind of perceptualism. The second goal of the paper is to show that phenomenology raises certain questions, like the relationship between sense and presence, which can lead us to criticize the assumptions the current articulation of the debate is based on. (shrink)