The volume offers an overview of current research in ontology, distinguishing basic conceptual issues, domain applications, general frameworks, and mathematical ...

Contents: List of Contributors VII; Roberto Poli: Foreword IX-X; Roberto Poli: The Brentano puzzle: an introduction 1; Dallas Willard: Who needs Brentano? The wasteland of philosophy without its past 15; Claire Ortiz Hill: Introduction to Paul Linke's 'Gottlob Frege as philosopher' 45; Paul F. Linke: Gottlob Frege as philosopher 49; John Blackmore: Franz Brentano and the University of Vienna Philosophical Society 1888-1938 73; Alf Zimmer: On agents and objects: some remarks on Brentanian perception 93; Liliana Albertazzi: Perceptual saliences and nuclei (...) of meaning 113; Jan Srzednicki: Brentano and the thinkable 139; Claire Ortiz Hill: From empirical psychology to phenomenology. Edmund Husserl on the 'Brentano puzzle' 151; Serena Cattaruzza: Brentano and Boltzmann: the Schubladenexperiment 169; Karl Schuhmann: Johannes Daubert's theory of judgement 179; Evelyn Dölling: On Alexius Meinong's theory of signs 199; Robin Rollinger: Linguistic expressions and acts of meaning: comments on Marty's philosophy of language 215-225. (shrink)

This volume presents a selection of the Proceedings of the Workshop on Anticipation, Agency and Complexity held in Trento on April 2017. The contributions contained in the book brilliantly revolve around three core concepts: agency, complexity and anticipation, giving precious insights to further define the discipline of anticipation. In a world that moves increasingly fast, constantly on the verge of disruptive events, more and more scholars and practitioners in any field feel in need of new approaches to make sense of (...) the complexity and uncertainty that the future seems to bear. The theory of anticipation tries to describe how possible futures are intrinsically intertwined with the present. (shrink)

This book presents an historical and conceptual reconstruction of the theories developed by Meinong and a group of philosophers and experimental psychologists in Graz at the turn of the 19th century. Adhering closely to original texts, the contributors explore Meinong's roots in the school of Brentano, complex theories such as the theory of intentional reference and direct reference, and ways of developing philosophy which are closely bound up with the sciences, particularly psychology. Providing a faithful reconstruction of both Meinong's contributions (...) to science and the school that arose from his thought, this book shows how the theories of the Graz school raise the possibility of engaging in the scientific metaphysics and ontology that for so long have been considered off limits. (shrink)

One can often encounter an opinion that Polish scientific philosophy deserves to be much better known than actually is. This book is thought as a response to such a claim. The papers collected in this volume are divided into two parts: Background and Influence and History and Systematics. However, there is no sharp borderline between themes which are touched in both parts. Generally speaking, all papers of the first part relate the Lvov-Warsaw School to some philosophical movements external to it (...) whereas the papers collected in the second one focus on internal issues connected with the school . Since the Polish school of mathematical logic is much better known than the Polish analytic philosophy we decided to omit here any treatment of the former. Thus, this collection centers on purely philosophical matters. We projected this volume not as an exhaustive panorama of Polish analytic philosophy but rather as a series of essays on particular persons or topic. As a result one can find here papers on Twardowski. Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbinski, Tarski and Lukasiewicz as well as on ethics on science, nominalism, and the methodology of psychology. We hope that this book will contribute to a better knowledge and evaluation of Polish achievements in analytic philosophy. We would like to express our gratitude to Professor Leszek Nowak, the editor-in-chief of Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, who initiated the idea of the collection and helped in its preparation. (shrink)

Nicolai Hartmann was one of the most prolific and original, yet sober, clear and rigorous, 20th century German philosophers. Hartmann was brought up as a Neo-Kantian, but soon turned his back on Kantianism to become one of the most important proponents of ontological realism. He developed what he calls the “new ontology”, on which relies a systematic opus dealing with all the main areas of philosophy. His work had major influences both in philosophy and in various scientific disciplines. The contributions (...) collected in this volume from an international group of Hartmann scholars and philosophers explore subjects such as Hartmann's philosophical development from Neo-Kantianism to ontological realism, the difference between the way he and Heidegger overcame Neo-Kantianism, his Platonism concerning eternal objects and his interpretation of Plato, his Aristotelianism, his theoretical relation to Wolff's ontology and Meinong's theory of objects, his treatment and use of the aporematic method, his metaphysics, his ethics and theory of values, his philosophy of mind, his philosophy of mathematics, as well as the influence he had on 20th century philosophical anthropology and biology. (shrink)

This Handbook presents the state of the art overview of current research on anticipation studies. It develops anticipation from both the theoretical and applied points of view. Via this comprehensive overview of the research on anticipation, this Handbook makes clear that anticipation is a serious topic of research that can and should be connected to Futures Studies research, perspectives and orientation. The Handbook uses the anticipatory viewpoint as a unifying framework able both to stop the progressive fragmentation of the human (...) and social sciences and begin a process aimed at progressively closer integration, mutual knowledge and dialogue among the human and social sciences. It sets the agenda for the field, helps futures studies to come of age, and contributes to changing the orientation of the human and social sciences from their dominant past-orientation to a new future-orientation. The Handbook presents research from a variety of fields such as: Biology, ecology, psychology, social sciences, humanities, engineering, and computer science. The editorial board consists of scholars from various sciences, such as futurists, sociologists, economists, statisticians, computer scientists, designers and game builders. (shrink)

Aristotle’s presentation of ontology advanced at the beginning of the fourth book of Metaphysics is universally known: “there is a science which studies being qua being...”. Needless to say, this is a familiar sentence: unfortunately, it is also quite an odd one. Why Aristotle does not simply say that ontology is the theory of being? Is there any difference between ‘theory of being’ and ‘theory of being qua being’? In brief, the problem is to decide whether the two expressions ‘the (...) study of being’ and ‘the study of being qua being’ are equivalent. If they are, the ‘qua’ does not play any interesting role. On the contrary, if the two expressions are different, that is to say, if there is a difference between the study of being (simpliciter) and the study of being qua being, we should study the role played by the (operator) ‘qua’. (shrink)

Ontology, in its philosophical meaning, is the discipline investigating the structure of reality. Its findings can be relevant to knowledge organization, as well as models of knowledge can in turn offer relevant ontological suggestions. Several philosophers in time have pointed out that reality is structured into a series of integrative levels, like the physical, the biological, the mental, and the cultural one, and that each level plays as a base for the emergence of more complex ones. Among them, more detailed (...) theories of levels have been developed by Nicolai Hartmann and James K. Feibleman, and these have been considered as a source for structuring principles in bibliographic classification by both the Classification Research Group (CRG) and Ingetraut Dahlberg. CRG's analysis of levels and of their possible application to a new general classification scheme based on phenomena instead of disciplines, as it was formulated by Derek Austin in 1969, is examined in detail. Both benefits and open problems in applying integrative levels to bibliographic classification are pointed out. (shrink)

The thesis is defended that the theories of causation, time and space, and levels of reality are mutually interrelated in such a way that the difficulties internal to theories of causation and to theories of space and time can be understood better, and perhaps dealt with, in the categorial context furnished by the theory of the levels of reality. The structural condition for this development to be possible is that the first two theories be opportunely generalized.

The concept of formal ontology was first developed by Husserl. It concerns problems relating to the notions of object, substance, property, part, whole, predication, nominalization, etc. The idea of formal ontology is present in many of Husserl?s works, with minor changes. This paper provides a reconstruction of such an idea. Husserl?s proposal is faced with contemporary logical orthodoxy and it is presented also an interpretative hypothesis, namely that the original difference between the general perspective of usual model theory and formal (...) ontology is grounded in the fact that this latter starts from an intended interpretation and not from the set of all the possible interpretations. (shrink)

An anticipatory system is a system with the capacity to anticipate its own evolution. This paper generalizes the idea of anticipatory systems from its original biological setting to the fields of cognitive and social sciences, and it shows that anticipatory systems are a generalization of autopoietic systems. Anticipatory systems, almost by definition, escape the possibilities of rote iteration. This argument shows that the complexity of an anticipatory system extends well beyond mainstream complexity theory. For this reason, the idea of systems (...) of higher-order complexity has been introduced. These types of systems come in at least two forms: impredicative or self-referential systems, and living systems. It follows that anticipation does not necessarily require life. (shrink)

Ontological categories form a network of ties of dependence. In this regard, the richest source of distinctions consists in the medieval discussion on the divisions of being. After a preliminary examination of some of those divisions, the paper pays attention to Roman Ingarden’s criteria for classifying the various types of ontological dependence. The following are the main conclusions that can be drawn from this exercise. Ingarden suggests that (1) the most general principles framing the categories of particulars are based on (...) couples of mutually opposed principles; (2) the most general among these couples of principles appear to be based on three different types of modalities; (3) subsequent couples of opposed principles do not seem to require the introduction of further types of modalities, and (4) the overall typology shows that there are three spheres of being, respectively composed of ideal entities, real entities and intentional entities as contents of psychological acts. (shrink)

Mally succeeded in developing two theories of properties, passing from the distinction between Sein and Sosein (1904) to the theory of nuclear and extranuclear properties (1912). According to the first one, the Sein of an object depends on the Sosein of the object, whereas the Sein of the Sosein of an object does not depend on the Sein of the object. These Principles allow the distinction between possible and impossible objects (in respect to Sosein) and between real and ideal objects (...) (in respect to Sein). In his second theory, Mally distinguishes between first order properties that determine the object, and higher order properties, like difference or simplicity, ending with the distinction between impossible objects and non-satisfiable objects. (shrink)

Due to the current availability of the English translation of almost all of Lesniewski's works it is now possible to give a clear and detailed picture of his ideas. Lesniewski's system of the foundation of mathematics is discussed. In abrief ouüine of his three systems Mereology, Ontology and Protothetics his positions conceming the problems of the forms of expression, proper names, synonymity, analytic and synthetic propositions, existential propositions, the concept of logic, and his views of theory of science and metaphysics (...) are sketched. The influence of Mill, Lukasiewicz, Austrian philosophy and especially Petrazycki on his thinking is evaluated and an interpretation is suggested setting him squarely in a tradition of classical Aristotelian logic. (shrink)

Due to the current availability of the English translation of almost all of Lesniewski's works it is now possible to give a clear and detailed picture of his ideas. Lesniewski's system of the foundation of mathematics is discussed. In abrief ouüine of his three systems Mereology, Ontology and Protothetics his positions conceming the problems of the forms of expression, proper names, synonymity, analytic and synthetic propositions, existential propositions, the concept of logic, and his views of theory of science and metaphysics (...) are sketched. The influence of Mill, Lukasiewicz, Austrian philosophy and especially Petrazycki on his thinking is evaluated and an interpretation is suggested setting him squarely in a tradition of classical Aristotelian logic. (shrink)

A reconstruction of Johnson's main contributions to philosophy is provided. Johnson's theories are grounded on his distinction between "substantives" and "adjectives", which governs the oppositions between (1) particular and universal, (2) determinandum and determinans in thought, (3) acts of separation and discrimination, (4) subject and predicate, (5) thing and quality, (6) substance and determination, (7) proposition and fact, (8) external and internal relations, (9) extension and intension. While substantives divide between continuants and occurrents, adjectives are fundamentally distinguishable into determinables and (...) determinates. The immediate (Stout, Broad) and later (Prior, Carnap, Searle, Armstrong, Hautamäki and Johansson) reception of Johnson's distinction between determinables and determinates is also discussed. (shrink)

Mally succeeded in developing two theories of properties, passing from the distinction between Sein and Sosein to the theory of nuclear and extranuclear properties. According to the first one, the Sein of an object depends on the Sosein of the object, whereas the Sein of the Sosein of an object does not depend on the Sein of the object. These Principles allow the distinction between possible and impossible objects and between real and ideal objects. In his second theory, Mally distinguishes (...) between first order properties that determine the object, and higher order properties, like difference or simplicity, ending with the distinction between impossible objects and non-satisfiable objects. (shrink)

Twentieth Century philosophical thought has expressed itself for the most part through two great Movements: the phenomenological and the analytical. Each movement originated in reaction against idealistic—or at least antirealistic—views of "the world". And each has collapsed back into an idealism not different in effect from that which it initially rejected. Both movements began with an appeal to meanings or concepts, regarded as objective realities capable of entering the flow of experience without loss of their objective status or of their (...) power to reveal to us an objective world as it would be if there were no subjective apprehensions of it. Both movements ended with a surrender of the objectivity of meanings and concepts in this strong sense, coming to treat them as at most more-or-less shareable components of a somehow communalized experience, but in any case incapable of revealing how things are irrespective of actual human experience. For the old Egocentric Predicament, with its "ideas" etc., is substituted a Lingocentric or Histrocentric Predicament of "language" and its elements. Hilary Putnam speaks for the current consensus: 'Internal realism says that we don't know what we are talking about when we talk about "things in themselves"' ( The Many Faces of Realism , p. 36). (shrink)