This volume brings together a collection of essays on the philosophy of love by leading contributors to the discussion. Particular emphasis is placed upon the relation between love, its character and appropriateness and the objects towards which it is directed: romantic and erotic partners, persons, ourselves, strangers, non-human animals and art. It includes contributions by Aaron Ben Ze’ev (‘Ain’t Love Nothing but Sex Misspelled?’), by Angelika Krebs (‘Between I and Thou – On the Dialogical Nature of Love’), Aaron Smuts (‘Is (...) it Better to Love Better Things?’) and Jan Bransen (‘Loving a Stranger’). By focusing upon the different objects of love, and how the lover enters into a relation with them, the collection pushes beyond the recent debates on reasons for love and breaks new and important ground. (shrink)

The present article is an edition of the Pathologia (1706), a Latin manuscript on the passions by Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713). There are two parts, i) an introduction with commentary (http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01916599.2012.679795), and ii) an edition of the Latin text with an English translation (http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01916599.2012.679796) . The Pathologia treats of a series of topics concerning moral psychology, ethics and philology, presenting a reconstruction of the Stoic theory of the emotions that is closely modelled on Cicero and (...) Diogenes Lærtius. It contains a most detailed typology of the passions and affections as well as an analysis of a series of psychological connections, for example between admiration and pride. On the basis of his reconstruction of Stoic moral psychology and ethics, Shaftesbury argues that in one of his phases, Horace should be interpreted as a Stoic rather than as an Epicurean. The translation and the commentary draw attention to the relations between the Pathologia and Shaftesbury's English writings, most importantly Miscellaneous Reflections and the Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit, which sheds light on several features of Shaftesbury's relation to Stoicism. (shrink)

AT FIRST SIGHT IT WOULD SEEM INCONGRUOUS, even an oxymoron, to juxtapose the names of Charles Darwin and Thomas Aquinas. Darwin was a biologist of the nineteenth century whose theory of evolution demanded the mutability of natural species. Thomas Aquinas, the father of Thomism, was a theologian and philosopher of the thirteenth century who held that forms in themselves and the species they constitute are immutable. Six centuries separated Darwin and Aquinas, centuries that witnessed the decline of Thomism and scholasticism (...) in general, with Descartes’s rejection of substantial forms and the advent of English empiricism and the positivism of Auguste Comte. Living in an antischolastic environment and convinced of the mutability of species, it would seem unlikely that Darwin would have any connection with Aquinas. (shrink)

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Today, sustainable relations with a broad range of key stakeholders are not only important from a normative business ethics perspective, but also from an entrepreneurial viewpoint to allow and support the long-term survival of a firm. We will argue that the traditional conception of a firm’s corporate social responsibility does not reflect this view and that a comprehensive and dynamic conception of a firm’s responsibilities is necessary to map the reality of business practice and to manage the challenges implied by (...) sustainability. We think that distributive justice, that is the way in which firms involve their stakeholders in their wealth creation and dissemination processes, provides a comprehensive understanding of corporate responsibilities. Concerning procedural justice, we will discuss how firms involve stakeholders in their strategic processes according to their contribution to wealth creation. In the course of the article, we will propose a framework along with three design principles that can be used for shaping dynamic and comprehensive corporate responsibilities, and which thereby allow a sustainable procedure for changing business and non-business environments. (shrink)

Hilary Putnam has recently observed that the fact/value distinction has acquired a strength and pervasiveness in our culture that make it akin to an institution. 1 I take it he meant an institution in the sense that Taboo is an institution in some cultures, not in the sense that the Church is an institution in ours. Invoking the distinction is a widespread conversational gambit in social life, not only in academic discussions. ‘That's a value judgment’ and ‘That's emotive’ are to (...) be heard at dinner parties more often than ‘Pass the salt’. (shrink)

The final section of the book considers two features of the world which transcend the categories, existence and negation.

A study of Jim Jones and the Peoples Temple. It features a prologue that considers the meaning of the tragedy for a post-Waco, post-9/11 world.

1. „Schwache“ oder „freie Menschen“? „Weil es aber doch einem nachdenkenden und forschenden Wesen anständig ist, gewisse Zeiten lediglich der Prüfung seiner eigenen Vernunft zu widmen, hierbei aber alle Parteilichkeit gänzlich auszuziehen, und so seine Bemerkungen anderen zur Beurteilung öffentlich mitzuteilen; so kann es niemanden verargt, noch weniger verwehrt werden, die Sätze und Gegensätze, so wie sie sich, durch keine Drohung geschreckt, vor Geschworenen von seinem eigenen Stande verteidigen können, auftreten zu lassen.“ These: Wer diesen Text kritisch liest, stutzt – (...) was sollen die „schwachen Menschen“ hier? Ist nicht das bizarre „schwacher“ durch „freier“ zu ersetzen? Kant verbindet mit der Gerichtshofmetapher die gegen die Politik der Machtsprüche des Absolutismus, aber auch gegen die Gesetzlosigkeit des „status naturalis“ gerichtete Freiheit der Richter und Geschworenen, nicht aber deren Schwäche. Erst im Staat unter Freiheitsgesetzen könne ein Gerichtshof eingerichtet werden – „Zu dieser Freiheit gehört denn auch, seine Gedanken, seine Zweifel, die man sich nicht selbst auflösen kann, öffentlich zur Beurteilung auszustellen, ohne darüber für einen unruhigen oder gefährlichen Bürger verschrieen zu werden [„durch keine Drohung geschreckt“] Das liegt schon in dem ursprünglichen Rechte der menschlichen Vernunft, welche keinen anderen Richter erkennt, als selbst wiederum die allgemeine Menschenvernunft, worin ein jeder seine Stimme hat.“ Die Freiheit bezieht sich auf den Bürgerstand der Menschen und ihre Freiheitsgesetze. Wir befinden uns im Bereich einer Rechtsinstitution – was soll da der Appell an die Schwäche? Gibt es einen bürgerlichen Stand der Schwachen? Nein. Das Ergebnis der Gerichtsverhandlung wird sein, dass weder Satz noch Gegensatz gilt oder dass beide gelten könnten. Nun kommt hinzu, dass Kant zuvor den Menschen charakterisiert, der zwischen These und Antithese hin- und herschwankt – ein schwacher Mensch, dem der nachdenkende und forschende Mensch entgegengesetzt wird, der nun entschlossen vor dem Gerichtshof erfahren will, wie es um die Ansprüche der beiden Parteien steht. Auch im nachfolgenden Text wird emphatisch dafür argumentiert, dass der Mensch das Problem der Antinomie und seine Auflösung in seiner eigenen Vernunft findet und daher „die Verantwortung [Beantwortung?] nicht von sich abweisen und auf den unbekannten Gegenstand schieben kann“. (shrink)

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.

In Plato's Meno , there is a famous discussion of desire and evil. This paper is not a contribution to Platonic scholarship, but a direct taking up of the issue whether someone can desire evil. One stock interpretation of the putative impossibility of desiring what is evil or bad is the interpretation which emphasizes an internal or conceptual tie between desire and good. This interpretation compares pairs of terms such as ‘fear—danger’, ‘belief—truth’ and ‘desire—good’. To fear something is to regard (...) it as, or believe that it is, dangerous ; to believe something is to regard it as, or believe it to be, true ; to desire something is to regard it as, to believe it to be, good. Since it is obvious that people believe things which are false, it is maintained that it is equally obvious that people may desire what is bad and fear what is harmless or of no danger. Let us call this interpretation of the doctrine that it is impossible to desire evil the weak thesis. The weak thesis allows what seems a plain fact of human reality, that people believe falsehoods, fear things that cannot harm them and desire things which are not good. Equally obviously, it allows that people fail to believe truths, fail to desire goods, and fail to fear things that are dangerous. On this weak interpretation, the manner in which wickedness to others and self-destructiveness are due to ignorance is that people are ignorant about the nature of things and ways of acting, ignorant about what it would be like to possess something or ignorant about what it would be like to do something or other. (shrink)

D. M. Armstrong is an eminent Australian philosopher whose work over many years has dealt with such subjects as: the nature of possibility, concepts of the particular and the general, causes and laws of nature, and the nature of human consciousness. This collection of essays explores the many facets of Armstrong's work, concentrating on his more recent interests. There are four sections to the book: possibility and identity, universals, laws and causality, and philosophy of mind. The contributors comprise an international (...) group of philosophers from the United States, England and Australia. An interesting feature of the volume is that Armstrong himself has written responses to each of the essays. There is also a complete bibliography of Armstrong's writings. (shrink)

What would it look like for researchers to take non-human animal rights seriously? Recent discussions foster the impression that scientific practice needs to be reformed to make animal research ethical: just as there is ethically rigorous human research, so there can be ethically rigorous animal research. We argue that practically little existing animal research would be ethical and that ethical animal research is not scalable. Since animal research is integral to the existing scientific paradigm, taking animal rights seriously requires a (...) radical, wholesale reimagining of science.Trial registration: ClinicalTrials.gov identifier: NCT05340426. (shrink)

Do people only act out of self-interest? Or is there a less pessimistic explanation for human behaviour? Maurer delves into early-Enlightenment debates on self-love from both famous and lesser known authors, including Lord Shaftesbury, Bernard Mandeville, Francis Hutcheson, Joseph Butler, Archibald Campbell, David Hume and Adam Smith.