The discipline of psychology has been poorly represented in critical realist texts to date. This is despite Bhaskar’s use of psychoanalytical concepts to underpin his concept of the dialectic. By comparison, other aspects of social science, such as sociology and economics, have a well-established body of critical realist texts. The original approach to psychoanalysis was analogous to the critical realist ontological-axiological chain. It moved from an ontological problem to an axiological solution. Freud’s eagerness to reframe psychoanalysis within a scientistic, (...) objective framework was perhaps due in part to the difficulties that he faced as European Jew in the fin-de-siècle. The application of the critical realist explanatory critique can contribute to our understanding of how and why the fragmentation of Freud’s legacies emerged. Critical realists should avoid the assumption that psychoanalysis is a unitary body of knowledge; as such, they should consider its various legacies separately. (shrink)

This paper argues for psychological realism in the conception of psychiatric disorders. We review the following contemporary ways of understanding the future of psychiatry: (1) psychiatric classification cannot be successfully reduced to neurobiology, and thus psychiatric disorders should not be conceived of as biological kinds; (2) psychiatric classification can be successfully reduced to neurobiology, and thus psychiatric disorders should be conceived of as biological kinds. Position (1) can lead either to instrumentalism or to eliminativism about psychiatry, depending on (...) whether psychiatric classification is regarded as useful. Position (2), which is inspired by the growing interest in neuroscience within scientific psychiatry, leads to biological realism or essentialism. In this paper we endorse a different realist position, which we label psychological realism. Psychiatric disorders are identified and addressed on the basis of their psychological manifestations which are often described as violations of epistemic, moral or social norms. A couple of examples are proposed by reference to the pathological aspects of delusions, and the factors contributing to their formation. (shrink)

Wilfrid Sellars, Idealism, and Realism is the first study of its kind to address a range of realist and idealist views inspired by psychological nominalism. Bringing together premier analytic realists and distinguished defenders of German idealism, it reveals why psychological nominalism is one of the most important theories of the mind to come out the 20th century. The theory, first put forward by Wilfrid Sellars, argues that language is the only means by which humans can learn the (...) types of socially shared practices that permit rationality. Although wedded to important aspects of German idealism, Sellars' theory is couched in bold realist terms of the analytic tradition. Those who are sympathetic to German idealism find this realist's appropriation of German idealism problematic. Wilfrid Sellars, Idealism and Realism thus creates a rare venue for realists and idealists to debate the epistemic outcome of the mental processes they both claim are essential to experience. Their resulting discussion bridges the gap between analytic and continental philosophy. In providing original and accessible chapters on psychological nominalism, this volume raises themes that intersect with numerous disciplines: the philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, epistemology, and metaphysics. It also provides clarity on arguably the best available account of why humans can reason, be self-aware, know, and act as agents. (shrink)

The most puzzling and intriguing aspect of intuitionism as a philosophy of mathematics is its claim that classical deductive reasoning in mathematics is illegitimate. The two most well-known proponents of this position are L. E. J. Brouwer and Michael Dummett. Both of their criticisms of the use of classical logic in mathematics have, by and large, been taken to depend on the thesis that the principle of bivalence does not apply to mathematical statements; and the difference between these criticisms is (...) taken to consist in their grounds for this thesis. Brouwer bases this thesis on an account of the nature of mathematics: it is an activity of mental construction essentially independent of language. Dummett, in contrast, bases the thesis on his anti-realist view of the nature of meaning. ;My first principal argument in this essay shows that the conception of anti-realism just outlined is problematic as a reading of Dummett. To begin with, Dummett explicitly rejects, not only the evidentiary restrictions of this conception, but also, more seriously, the use of specific epistemological theses in a philosophical account of meaning. Moreover, I give an alternative account of anti-realism, consisting of alternative interpretations of the manifestation requirement and of the rejection of realist truth conditions, that do not rely on an epistemology of meaning, and hence, a fortiori, not on evidential restrictions. ;My second principal argument in this essay consists of drawing a consequence of this conception of anti-realism, namely, that the failure of bivalence cannot, by itself, support a cogent criticism of classical logic. The basic reason is that, given my view of anti-realism, the claim that the legitimacy of applying classical reasoning to a class of statements depends on whether bivalence applies to that class already implies that the system of deductive reasoning applying to these statements is non-classical. Hence an argument against classical logic based on this claim is question-begging. ;Finally, I conclude by showing that Dummett's criticism of classical reasoning, as reconstructed by my third argument, fails. (shrink)

In 1927, the Scottish philosopher John Anderson arrived in Australia to take up the chair of Philosophy at the University of Sydney. By the late 1930s, the ‘macrostructure’ of his realist system was in place. It includes a theory of process and a substantial metaphysics, one that opposes positivism, linguistic philosophy and all forms of idealism. However, beyond Australia it remains largely unknown, despite its bearing on a number of current issues in psychology and the social sciences generally. This article (...) outlines Anderson’s transition from Hegelian idealism to realism, describes aspects of his ontology and epistemology, compares some of Anderson’s ideas with Dewey’s pragmatism and explains their relevance to present-day psychology. (shrink)

One of the perennial themes in philosophy is the problem of our access to the world around us; do our perceptual systems bring us into contact with the world as it is or does perception depend upon our individual conceptual frameworks? This volume of new essays examines reference as it relates to perception, action and realism, and the questions which arise if there is no neutral perspective or independent way to know the world. The essays discuss the nature of (...) referring, concentrating on the way perceptual reference links us with the observable world, and go on to examine the implications of theories of perceptual reference for realism and the way in which scientific theories refer and thus connect us with the world. They will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of psychology, cognitive science and action theory. (shrink)

This paper addresses some apparent philosophical tensions between realism and enactivism by means of Charles Peirce’s pragmatism. Enactivism’s Mind-Life Continuity thesis has been taken to commit it to some form of anti-realist ‘world-construction’ which has been considered controversial. Accordingly, a new realist enactivism is proposed by Zahidi (_Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences,_ _13_(3), 461–475, 2014 ), drawing on Ian Hacking’s ‘entity realism’, which places subjects in worlds comprised of the things that they can successfully manipulate. We review this (...) attempt, and argue that whilst Zahidi rightly urges enactivists towards ‘internal realism’, he cannot sustain a non-negotiable aspect of realism that is crucial for scientific progress – the claim that multiple subjects inhabit _the same world_. We explore Peirce’s pragmatism as an alternative solution, foregrounding his distinction between existence and reality, and his inquiry-based account of cognition. These theoretical innovations, we argue, fruitfully generalize Zahidi’s _manipulation-based_ enactivist realism to a richer, _inquiry-based_ enactivist realism. We explore how this realism’s pan-species monism about truth encourages and supports the investigation of non-human animal cognition, and conclude by considering some implications of our discussion for long-standing realism debates within pragmatism. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for the superiority of a critical realist understanding of interdisciplinarity over a mainstream understanding of it. I begin by exploring the reasons for the failure of mainstream researchers to achieve interdisciplinarity. My main argument is that mainstream interdisciplinary researchers tend to hypostatize facts, fetishize constant conjunctions of events and apply to open systems an epistemology designed for closed systems. I also explain how mainstream interdisciplinarity supports oppression and gross inequality. I argue that mainstream interdisciplinarity is (...) not true interdisciplinarity and refer to it accordingly as ‘condisciplinarity’. By way of example, I examine the condisciplinarity of the World Health Organization’s ecological model applied to the issue of men’s violence against women. Specifically, I argue that critical realist interdisciplinarity is preferable because it acknowledges inter alia the empirical, actual and real layers of reality, which allows it to develop depth-explanations of phenomena. In practice, this means that critical realist interdisciplinarity can potentially provide explanations that, compared to condisciplinarity, are broader (include more of the human and non-human context) and deeper (include for example individuals’ conscious and unconscious psychological motivations). In the World Health Organization’s example of the causes of men’s violence against women, condisciplinarity resulted in the absence of historical, global and unconscious aspects of the problem. It is also restricted the analysis to reductive, constant-conjunction based theories of the causes of the problem, specifically ‘risk factors’, thereby providing a relatively shallow explanation for the problem. (shrink)

Part One of this volume consists of the articles collected in On the Psychology of Society in which Bogdanov criticises the philosophy of Russia's neo-Kantian revisionists and rebuts their critique of historical materialism. Part Two consists of the collection, New World, which envisions the development of humankind in socialist society. Part Three consists of Bogdanov's contributions to the collection, Studies in the Realist Worldview, which defend the labour theory of value and criticise neo-Kantian sociology. In all these writings Bogdanov uses (...) the fundamental principles of his empiriomonist philosophy to show how labour technology determines social development in all its aspects. (shrink)

This essay is a long one. It is not meant to be read in a single sitting. Its structure is as follows. In section I, I explicate perceptual anti-individualism. Section II centers on the two aspects of the representational content of perceptual states. Sections III and IV concern the nature of the empirical psychology of vision, and its bearing on the individuation of perceptual states. Section V shows how what is known from empirical psychology undermines disjunctivism and hence certain (...) further views that entail it, including naive realism. In Section VI, I raise a further point against disjunctivism. Section VII indicates how general reflection on perceptual perspective and epistemic ability supports the constraints from empirical psychology. It also explains how reflection on veridicality conditions, psychological explanation, and cognitive ability conspire to force recognition of the two kinds of representation mentioned in the preceding paragraph. In the Appendix, I criticize attempts to support disjunctivism. (shrink)

Whitehead’s cosmology centers on the self-creation of actual occasions that perish as they come to be, but somehow do combine to constitute societies that are persistent agents and/or patients. “Instance Ontology” developed by D.W. Mertz concerns unification of relata into facts of relatedness by specific intensions. These two conceptual systems are similar in that they both avoid the substance-property distinction: they differ in their understanding of how basic units combine to constitute complex unities. “Process Structural Realism” (PSR) draws from (...) both of these approaches in developing an account of how combinations of processes may produce ontologically significant coherences. When a group of processes achieves such closure that a set of states recurs continually, the effects of that coherence differ from what would occur in the absence of that closure. Such altered effectiveness is an attribute of the system as a whole, and would have consequences. This indicates that the network of processes, as a unit, has ontological significance. The closed network of processes, together with the conditions that prevail, constitute the form of definiteness of the coherence. That form continues to obtain as long as the coherence persists. Constituents contribute to, rather than share, that characteristic. Aspects of some recent research in systems biology, microeconomics, and social psychology illustrate the application of PSR. (shrink)

Psychometrics is one of the main approaches to social scientific measurement. It is relied upon in drug testing, economic policymaking, recruitment, and other decision-making contexts. The first aim of this article is to introduce philosophers to key aspects of psychometrics, namely, classical test theory, item response theory, and construct validity. The second aim is to show how a debate on the nature of psychological attributes manifests in psychometrics. In this debate, realists claim that psychometric measures are indicators of (...) independently existing qualities, while operationalists argue that a measure defines its target attribute. The third and final aim is to argue that despite its poor reputation among philosophers, operationalism is a viable approach to psychometrics. (shrink)

Debates over egalitarianism for the most part are not concerned with constraints on achieving an egalitarian society, beyond discussions of the deficiencies of egalitarian theory itself. This paper looks beyond objections to egalitarianism as such and investigates the relevant psychological processes motivating people to resist various aspects of egalitarianism. I argue for two theses, one normative and one descriptive. The normative thesis holds that egalitarians must take psychological constraints into account when constructing egalitarian ideals. I draw from (...) non-ideal theories in political philosophy, which aim to construct moral goals with current social and political constraints in mind, to argue that human psychology must be part of a non-ideal theory of egalitarianism. The descriptive thesis holds that the most fundamental psychological challenge to egalitarian ideals comes from what are called Just World Beliefs. A troubling result of Just World Beliefs, one that poses a prima facie obstacle to egalitarianism, is that people tend to dismiss or explain away any threats to their belief that the world is fundamentally just. The pervasiveness and severity of Just World Beliefs predicts that people will be resistant to egalitarian policies. My aim is to show how research on Just World Beliefs can help diagnose common problems for egalitarianism and assist in making realistic recommendations for bringing current societies closer to egalitarian ideals. (shrink)

The article explicates psychological and ontological aspects of Inference to the Best Explanation . IBE is a psychological theory, because cognitive science studies support IBE as descriptively true and psychologically adequate theory, i.e., people perceive best explanations as true and follow the rule of IBE in their reasoning. Moreover, different features of IBE imply that conclusions of IBE can be true only in a world with a very particular ontological constitution. Realism about the external world, the (...) uniformity of nature, the truth of background knowledge and the truth-conduciveness of explanatory virtues are necessary and sufficient for IBE to be truth-conducive. Therefore, IBE is an epistemic theory only because at the same time it is committed to a particular ontology. Keywords: inference to the best explanation, abduction, psychology, ontology, explanatory virtues. (shrink)

We propose that human reasoning relies on an inherence heuristic, an implicit cognitive process that leads people to explain observed patterns (e.g., girls wear pink) in terms of the inherent features of their constituents (e.g., pink is an inherently feminine color). We then demonstrate how this proposed heuristic can provide a unified account for a broad set of findings spanning areas of research that might at first appear unrelated (e.g., system justification, nominal realism, is–ought errors in moral reasoning). By (...) revealing the deep commonalities among the diverse phenomena that fall under its scope, our account is able to generate new insights into these phenomena, as well as new empirical predictions. A second main goal of this paper, aside from introducing the inherence heuristic, is to articulate the proposal that the heuristic serves as a foundation for the development of psychological essentialism. More specifically, we propose that essentialism—which is the common belief that natural and social categories are underlain by hidden, causally powerful “essences”—emerges over the first few years of life as an elaboration of the earlier, and more open-ended, intuitions supplied by the inherence heuristic. In the final part of the paper, we distinguish our proposal from competing accounts (e.g., Strevens' K-laws) and clarify the relationship between the inherence heuristic and related cognitive tendencies (e.g., the correspondence bias). In sum, this paper illuminates a basic cognitive process that emerges early in life and is likely to have profound effects on many aspects of human psychology. (shrink)

Some consequences of direct realism and William James’s philosophy of mind are considered in terms of American naturalism as seen in the debate between John Dewey and Roy Wood Sellars. Sellars’s critical realism and evolutionary naturalism is compared and contrasted with Dewey’s pragmatic realism and emphatically evolutionary naturalism. Though these naturalisms are similar, there are significant differences between methodology, their critiques of James’s reflex arc concept in his Principles of Psychology, and the mind-body problem. Sellars’s critical (...) class='Hi'>realism and naturalism retains a priori commitments to fixed categories and concepts, whereas Dewey’s emphatically evolutionary pragmatic naturalism is empirical and sees continuities where Sellars insists on discontinuities. One significant difference is Sellars’s maintaining a place for introspection as methodologically appropriate and Dewey’s’ rejection of it. These differences are illustrated through Sellars’s modification of the reflex arc to include an organic but interpretative step, and Dewey’s radical criticism of approaches like James’s and Sellars’s as recapitulating the Cartesian dualism that such views intended to overcome. These differences are finally contrasted in Sellars’s maintaining a privacy of mind by constraining it to the brain in a dual-aspect theory, while Dewey advocates mind as sociocultural, expanding mind into body and world. (shrink)

In this paper I challenge the pernicious aspects of Milton Friedman's methodological outlook that continues to hold sway over mainstream neoclassical economists. I do this by showing how Friedman's own methodological dicta could have been used against him when he famously advanced the expectations critique of the Phillips curve at his presidential address to the American Economic Association. I use this case study to further suggest that psychological and neurophysiological data should not be deemed irrelevant to economic science.

It has been suggested that moods are higher order-dispositions. This proposal is considered, and various shortcomings uncovered. The notion of a higher-order disposition is replaced by the more general notion of a higher-order functional state. An account is given in which moods are higher-order functional states, and the overall system of moods is a higher-order functional description of the mind. This proposal is defended in two ways. First, it is shown to capture some central features of our pre-scientific conception of (...) moods. Secondly, it is argued that the account is more likely to be psychologically realistic (in a sense to be defined) than accounts which are behaviourally equivalent, but which do not employ a hierarchy of functional descriptions. It is suggested that the hierarchical structure of the model mirrors a feature of the physical states that realise moods and emotions. (shrink)

Defending a form of naïve realism about visual experiences is quite popular these days. Those naïve realists who I will be concerned with in this paper make a central claim about the subjective aspects of perceptual experiences. They argue that how it is with the perceiver subjectively when she sees worldly objects is literally determined by those objects. This way of thinking leads them to endorse a form of disjunctivism, according to which the fundamental psychological nature of (...) seeings and hallucinations is distinct. I will oppose their central claim by defending a version of the so-called ‘causal argument’, which dwells on ideas about causation and explanation in perception. The aim of this discussion is to highlight that the subjective aspects of perceptual experiences cannot be explained in naïve realist terms. Instead, it will be argued that one needs to appeal to a mental factor which does not involve worldly objects as constituents, and which is common to seeings and hallucinations. (shrink)

Opponents of cosmopolitanism often dismiss the position on the grounds that cosmopolitan proposals are completely unrealistic and that they fly in the face of our human nature. We have deep psychological needs that are satisfied by national identification and so all cosmopolitan projects are doomed, or so it is argued. In this essay we examine the psychological grounds claimed to support the importance of nationalism to our wellbeing. We argue that the alleged human needs that nationalism is said (...) to satisfy are: (i) either more complex than initially one might think or (ii) do not necessarily provide very strong grounds for the theses advocated by nationalists or (iii) can be well met in alternate ways than through national identification. Moreover, commitment to cosmopolitanism is not antithetical to meeting these needs: rather, more cosmopolitan worldviews can do quite well in meeting the needs of interest. Moreover, we argue that since nationalism is a fluid and socially constructed phenomenon, quite open to the influence of other factors, the current evidence suggests that central aspects of cosmopolitanism are quite feasible and realistic. (shrink)

Despite the remarkable progress made in consciousness research during recent decades, there is still no sign of a general agreement about the location of its object. According to internalists, consciousness resides inside the brain. According to externalists, consciousness is partly constituted by elements or aspects of the environment. Internalism comports better with the existence of dreams, hallucinations and sensory imaging. Externalism seems to provide a more promising basis for understanding how we can experience the world and refer to the (...) content of our consciousness. I argue that the framework of structural realism supports internalism and helps to reveal the reasons behind the apparent explanatory success of the externalist approach. More specifically, structural realism supports the view that the structure of our consciousness is always present in our neural processes and only sometimes in an extended system that includes elements of the environment. (shrink)

Intentionalism must be distinguished from computational psychology. The former is a mentalist-realist metatheoretical stance vis-a-vis the latter, which is a research programme devoted to the construction of informationally-characterized simulation models for human behavior, perception, cognition, etc. Intentionalism has its attractive aspects, but unfortunately it is plagued by severe conceptual difficulties. Recent attempts to justify the intentionalist interpretation of computational models, by J.A. Fodor and by C. Graves, J.J. Katz et al., fail to secure a conceptually adequate and genuinely intentional (...) sense for the intentional idiom they employ. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to analyze the convergences and divergences between two conceptions of realism: Markus Gabriel’s “new realism” and Evandro Agazzi’s realism. Firstly, the main theses behind “new realism” will be presented, drawing on Gabriel’s text ‘_Why the World Does Not Exist’_ (2015), originally published in German as _Warum es die Welt nicht gibt_ in 2013. Secondly, the constitutive aspects of realism developed by Agazzi will be explored, primarily in works such (...) as ‘_Temas y problemas de filosofía de la física’_ (1978), ‘_Filosofia, scienza e verità’_, Rusconi, Milano (1989), ‘_El bien el mal y la ciencia_’ (1996), and ‘_Filosofía de la Naturaleza. Ciencia y Cosmología’_ (2000), among others. Finally, the convergences and divergences between these two conceptions of realism will be analyzed, allowing for an inference, based on sound reasoning, about the potential novelty of the so-called “new realism”. (shrink)

Reason is the object of understanding. Cause is the object of explanation. The original aspect of this study, which argues that reasons are in some sense causes, is that it discusses the distinction between reason and cause in the context of agency. It first explains the logical arguments that reasons cannot be causes and that reasons must be causes, and then presents an ontological argument concerning the pre-linguistic and irreducible continuity of phenomenal existence, in which critical realism and phenomenology (...) work together. In discussing the manifestation of reasons in the form of beliefs, memories, and dream interpretations, the focus is on the irreducible phenomenological-psychological level between humans as an organic set of molecules and humans as beings emerging from a social network of meanings. Finally, non-human agency is discussed and the thesis is made that the capacity for agency is not a social gift. (shrink)

Intentionalism must be distinguished from computational psychology. The former is a mentalist-realist metatheoretical stance vis-a-vis the latter, which is a research programme devoted to the construction of informationally-characterized simulation models for human behavior, perception, cognition, etc. Intentionalism has its attractive aspects, but unfortunately it is plagued by severe conceptual difficulties. Recent attempts to justify the intentionalist interpretation of computational models, by J.A. Fodor and by C. Graves, J.J. Katz et al., fail to secure a conceptually adequate and genuinely intentional (...) sense for the intentional idiom they employ. (shrink)

Attempts to introduce phenomenology to the English-speaking world have often been hampered by the specialist's tendency to substitute a part for the whole--thereby threatening the delicate balance guaranteed by the transcendental turn and so carefully maintained by Husserl throughout his-philosophical career. Thus some, in their concern to place Husserl in the context of the realism-idealism issue, have stressed the contrast between Ideen and some aspects of Krisis. Others, relying on the illuminating power of the notion of human roles, (...) have devoted themselves exclusively to the working out of a mundane phenomenology with or without ontological pretensions. While there is value to be found in this branching out of the research, it nevertheless needs to be integrated. Because of the character of the phenomenological synthesis, moreover, such integration cannot be achieved simply by generalists. Hence the value of scholars like Kockelmans whose experience in more than one type of reduction permits them to move readily from one level of intentionality to another. As the book amply demonstrates, Kockelmans has acquired this multiple capability by following in detail Husserl's philosophical development as it progressively opens the way to the exploration of all these levels. In commenting upon this development, he is also rendering an invaluable service by bringing to light many of Husserl's writings which otherwise might remain unknown to the interested student. The work is concise, a model of balance between exposition of the doctrine and clarification of the issues; in short, an excellent and welcome addition to the phenomenological literature.-A. M. (shrink)

In recent years, some authors have shown a renewed interest in interpretivist theories of folk psychological ascription [Hutto 2013. “Fictionalism About Folk Psychology.” The Monist 96 (4): 582–604.; Mölder 2010. Mind Ascribed: An Elaboration and Defence of Interpretivism. Amsterdam: John Benjamins; Sanchez-Curry 2020. “Interpretivism and Norms.” Philosophical Studies 177 (4): 905–930.; Mölder 2021. “Interpretivism Without Judgement-Dependence.” Philosophia 49 (2): 611–615.; Slors 2015. "Interpretivism and the Meaning of Mental State Ascriptions." Studia Philosophica Estonica, 10 (2): 18–27.]. Part of the virtue (...) of interpretivism lies in its ability to provide an answer to elminativist arguments without falling into the assumptions and problems of intentional realism. However, some recent developments in semantic expressivism applied to normative expressions could help to build an alternative theory to interpretivism that would enjoy the same virtues. The aim of this paper is to present and defend an expressivist approach to the status of folk psychological ascriptions. According to this view, mental states ascriptions are evaluative and non-descriptive statement that express or reflect certain normative standards or values of the attributor. After presenting the view and contrasting it with interpretivist positions, with which expressivism shares important motivations and claims, I present two arguments to favor the expressivist analysis. In line with the first argument, expressivism can account for fundamental aspects of disagreements regarding mental attributions while the second highlights the capacity of the view to explain the widespread justificatory and exculpatory uses of mental states ascriptions. (shrink)

This paper continues the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of ontic structural realism, which begun in the first part of the paper. Non-eliminative versions of this approach are considered, which try to find a compromise between the ontology of structures and the ontology of objects. It is shown that the semirealism of A. Chakravartti and the constructive structural realism of T. Cao have a number of limitations caused by the authors’ desire to strictly distinguish between the nature (...) of the existence of objects and structures. Then the version of the relationship between structures and entities is presented. Firstly, two concepts are divided according to their content: “object” and “entity”. Second, to solve the problem of causality, I suggest that the nature of entities and structures lie in their ability to act. It is this ability that I propose to use instead of the popular concepts of “causal powers”, “causal properties” or “dispositions”. Third, instead of a rigid alternative to ontological primitives – either essence, or causal relations, or structures – the concept of ontological pluralism and inherited existence is proposed. There each entity is represented as a derivative of another structure and, in turn, creates other entities and structures. Thus, both structures and entities at each level of the complexity hierarchy partially inherit the ability to act and a certain degree of existence from the structures and entities of the previous levels. Finally, I am trying to clarify the modal aspects of the ontic structural realism. Following the popular interpretations of quantum theory, the ability to act, and hence the existence of structures and entities, are considered separately in two worlds – potential and actual ones. The potential world is associated with a set of possible objects and structures of quantum theory, and the actual world is associated with a set of real (observable) objects and structures of classical physical theories. The transition from the potential to the actual world is proposed to be considered as a primitive metaphysical event. The proposed concept partially overcomes the objections to ontic structural realism, thereby strengthening its position in the discussion about the reality of quantum objects. (shrink)

What are the main learning difficulties or advantages encountered by students with learning disabilities within e-environments? As a result of the Covid-19 emergency, e-learning is being increasingly used to support students’ learning processes. A number of countries closed their schools altogether, so face-to-face lessons were and have been replaced by distance lessons. A search of current literature via Scopus, Eric and Google Scholar electronic databases was conducted according to Prisma Guidelines. Other sources of literature were also considered, starting from the (...) references in the full text of the articles consulted. We used the following search keywords: “LDs” combined with the “AND/OR” Boolean operator and “e-learning platforms,” “well-being,” “psychological factors,” “emotional distress,” and “self-regulation.” One body of literature highlights the lack of inclusive accessibility standards and a lack of attention to specific tools for addressing LDs, which causes students to develop high levels of stress/anxiety and emotional distress, in addition to low levels of well-being, self-esteem and self-efficacy. Another area of literature looks at how students can develop high levels of self-regulation and emotional awareness, as well as high levels of inclusion. Results are discussed in terms of the promotion of e-learning that focuses on the psychological well-being of students and teachers use of technological tools. (shrink)

The changes that have affected all spheres of society have also affected the existing stereotypes of gender behaviour, so the issue of the place and role of men and women in society focuses on research on the aspirations, interests and preferences of both sexes. Gender issues are studied in an interdisciplinary aspect, so recently there have been many studies in which the subject of discussion concerns different fields of science - psychology, philosophy, linguistics, journalism, sociology, political science and many others. (...) To study the gender sphere of concept of contemporary periodicals for women and men, the following scientific methods are considered: descriptive method, analysis, content analysis, questionnaire, comparative method and induction. However, an attempt has been made to analyze different approaches to the study of concepts. There are many different definitions of the concept, which indicates the complexity and ambiguity of the “concept” meaning, but there is a limit to the scientific description and understanding of the concept. The gender sphere of concept is a system of interactions of maximum concepts of man and woman, as well as their derivatives, which are called gender and social roles in society performed by man and woman. Concepts, sphere of concept include gender features, which allow a gender approach to study the gender sphere of concept of contemporary periodicals for women and men. The study of the gender sphere of concept within the framework of contemporary gender-labelled publications allows to identify and correlate metagender and gender concepts that appear in society. (shrink)

Despite the success of artificial intelligence, we are still far away from AI that model the world as humans do. This study focuses for explaining human behavior from intuitive mental models’ perspectives. We describe how behavior arises in biological systems and how the better understanding of this biological system can lead to advances in the development of human-like AI. Human can build intuitive models from physical, social, and cultural situations. In addition, we follow Bayesian inference to combine intuitive models and (...) new information to make decisions. We should build similar intuitive models and Bayesian algorithms for the new AI. We suggest that the probability calculation in Bayesian sense is sensitive to semantic properties of the objects’ combination formed by observation and prior experience. We call this brain process as computational meaningfulness and it is closer to the Bayesian ideal, when the occurrence of probabilities of these objects are believable. How does the human brain form models of the world and apply these models in its behavior? We outline the answers from three perspectives. First, intuitive models support an individual to use information meaningful ways in a current context. Second, neuroeconomics proposes that the valuation network in the brain has essential role in human decision making. It combines psychological, economical, and neuroscientific approaches to reveal the biological mechanisms by which decisions are made. Then, the brain is an over-parameterized modeling organ and produces optimal behavior in a complex word. Finally, a progress in data analysis techniques in AI has allowed us to decipher how the human brain valuates different options in complex situations. By combining big datasets with machine learning models, it is possible to gain insight from complex neural data beyond what was possible before. We describe these solutions by reviewing the current research from this perspective. In this study, we outline the basic aspects for human-like AI and we discuss on how science can benefit from AI. The better we understand human’s brain mechanisms, the better we can apply this understanding for building new AI. Both development of AI and understanding of human behavior go hand in hand. (shrink)

_Despite advances in standard of living of the population, the condition of widows and divorced women remains deplorable in society. The situation is worse in developing nations with their unique social, cultural and economic milieu, which at times ignores the basic human rights of this vulnerable section of society. A gap exists in life expectancies of men and women in both developing and developed nations. This, coupled with greater remarriage rates in men, ensures that the number of widows continues to (...) exceed that of widowers. Moreover, with women becoming more educated, economically independent and aware of their rights, divorce rates are increasing along with associated psychological ramifications. The fact that widowed/divorced women suffer from varying psychological stressors is often ignored. It has been concluded in various studies that such stressors could be harbingers of psychiatric illnesses (e.g., depression, anxiety, substance dependence), and hence should be taken into account by treating physicians, social workers and others who come to the aid of such women. A change in mindset of the society is required before these women get their rightful place, for which a strong will is needed in the minds of the people, and in law-governing bodies._. (shrink)

In recent years, some authors have shown a renewed interest in interpretivist theories of folk psychological ascription [Hutto 2013. “Fictionalism About Folk Psychology.” The Monist 96 (4): 582–604.; Mölder 2010. Mind Ascribed: An Elaboration and Defence of Interpretivism. Amsterdam: John Benjamins; Sanchez-Curry 2020. “Interpretivism and Norms.” Philosophical Studies 177 (4): 905– 930.; Mölder 2021. “Interpretivism Without Judgement- Dependence.” Philosophia 49 (2): 611–615.; Slors 2015. "Interpretivism and the Meaning of Mental State Ascriptions." Studia Philosophica Estonica, 10 (2): 18–27.]. Part of (...) the virtue of interpretivism lies in its ability to provide an answer to elminativist arguments without falling into the assumptions and problems of intentional realism. However, some recent developments in semantic expressivism applied to normative expressions could help to build an alternative theory to interpretivism that would enjoy the same virtues. The aim of this paper is to present and defend an expressivist approach to the status of folk psychological ascriptions. According to this view, mental states ascriptions are evaluative and non-descriptive statement that express or reflect certain normative standards or values of the attributor. After presenting the view and contrasting it with interpretivist positions, with which expressivism shares important motivations and claims, I present two arguments to favor the expressivist analysis. In line with the first argument, expressivism can account for fundamental aspects of disagreements regarding mental attributions while the second highlights the capacity of the view to explain the widespread justificatory and exculpatory uses of mental states ascriptions. (shrink)

This volume publishes the papers which were offered and discussed by a group of philosophers and psychologists during a conference "designed to explore the interrelations between philosophical analyses of the family of concepts relating to the self... and empirical studies in psychology of the development and manifestations of self-control, self-knowledge, and the like," held in Chicago in 1975. The late editor arranged the papers "in terms of four topics" indicating the major themes they address. After his introduction, "Conceptual Issues in (...) the Psychology of the Self", written after the conference and intended as an harmonization of opposing views expressed in the discussions, he presents three papers concerned with psychological and philosophical aspects of "Self-Control and the Concept of Agency." In "Self-Control and the Self," Walter and Harriet N. Mischel start with "an overview of some of the main types of self-control that psychologists have researched". Such psychological studies reveal the human being as "an active, self-aware problem-solver, capable of changing himself and achieving substantial self-control through the application of rational principles to a much greater degree than has usually been supposed in psychology". William P. Alston intends to determine in what ways the self has to be taken into account in the psychology of motivation in "Self-Intervention and the Structure of Motivation". That "there is an agent that does the integrating... and so on," is to be recognized as a fact. The understanding of this self-intervention, however, demands the admission of at least two motivational systems of higher-level-wants and of lower-level-wants, differing in structure and in the mode of acquisition. Charles Taylor explores "what is involved in the notion of self, of a responsible human agent" in his paper, "What is Human Agency". A person is found to be essentially characterized by the capacity for reflective self-evaluation. "Self-Knowledge" is discussed in the following two articles. Kenneth J. Gergen defends "The Social Construction of Self-Knowledge" in line with ideas of George Herbert Mead. Self-knowledge is "primarily a socially mediated and essentially arbitrary construction of experience". In its case "there is virtually nothing to know". This socio-cognitive conception of the self is emphatically rejected by David W. Hamlyn in his "Self-Knowledge". Knowledge about oneself as studied in psychology and sociology is essentially different from self-knowledge in the full sense, "connected with some kind of commitment to oneself". Different scientific views of certain aspects of human existence are presented in "Self-Development and Its Failures". Freud’s conception of the human person finds a realistic correction in the theoretical and practical work of contemporary psychoanalysts insisting upon the need of the concept of a "cohesive self," as described in Ernest S. Wolf’s "'Irrationality’ in a Psychoanalytic Psychology of the Self". This need is denied in behavioristic psychology, as Willard F. Day, Jr. shows in "On the Behavioral Analysis of Self-Deception and Self-Development". "To a behaviorist, there is no such thing" as the self. Consequently, there cannot be a genuine self-development as distinguished from a progress toward creating a desirable environment. Self-deception means fighting the environment. "A Critique of the Behavioral Paradigm and an Alternative Conceptualization" is offered by Paul F. Secord in an analysis of "Making Oneself Behave". Meaning and deficiencies of the understanding of the self in sociological social psychology are outlined by George J. McCall in "The Social Looking-Glass: A Sociological Perspective on Self-Development". The self is seen as essentially a social self or looking-glass self. Problems with regard to an explanation of the personal choice of behavior of a determined social role, however, seem to demand impulses as well as institutions as a locus of self-appraisal. "The Meaning of ’self’ and the Multiplicity of Selves" is the title of the last section of the book. Various uses of the term ’self’ are distinguished by Stephen E. Toulmin in "Self-Knowledge of the Self". The author is primarily concerned with establishing the relations of even the sophisticated psychological and psychiatric uses of the term to the everyday experience and language of reflective conduct. Rom Harré finally hopes to interpret "the syntax of much of the talk of ‘I’ and ‘me', ‘thou’ and ‘we'... as monodramatic performances" in "The Self in Monodrama". (shrink)

ObjectiveGonadotoxicity is considered one of the most distressing side effects of cancer treatment. Although fertility preservation can be a valid solution, it also involves a challenging process. A clear understanding of the features of women who decide to pursue fertility preservation after cancer diagnosis is missing. The purpose of the present study was therefore to analyze the personality profile of female patients referred to oncofertility prior to gonadotoxic treatment.MethodsFifty-two female cancer patients took part in the study. The Temperament and Character (...) Inventory-Revised, the Response Evaluation Measure-71, the Beck Depression Inventory, and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Y Form were administered to examine personality characteristics, defense mechanisms, depression and anxiety symptoms.ResultsCompared with reference data of the Italian population, our sample reported significantly lower scores in Harm Avoidance and trait anxiety, and significantly higher levels of mature defense mechanisms. Most of the patients reported low scores in immature defense mechanisms, depression, and trait anxiety, and medium scores in state anxiety.ConclusionsOur findings suggest that these women display functional personality traits and defensive style, in association with low levels of depression and trait anxiety. These features may enable a proactive attitude to cancer and the ability to make long-term plans. This may favor psychological adjustment to cancer and a projection toward the future. (shrink)

Psychological Aspects of Risk and Aggression among Motorcyclists - "Mad Max" Syndrome The primary objective of this study was the psychological examination of a group of Polish motorcyclists against a group of students and graduates of Technical Universities. This work poses a question regarding the differences in temperament, aggression and the level of risk between motorcyclists and the control group. The second question was whether it was possible to create a typology of Polish motorcyclists taking into account (...) the variables describing risk, temperament and aggression. This study used the Pavlovian Temperamental Scale, Stimulating-Instrumental Risk Inventory, SIRI 2001, Multifactor Risky Behavior Scale, Unhealthy behavior Inventory and the Buss and Perry Aggression Questionnaire. The tests were performed on 267 motorcyclists and 188 students and graduates of Technical Universities. A number of important differences was observed between the motorcyclists and the control group. Motorcyclists had a higher level of mobility of nervous processes and higher degree of excitation at the lower level of inhibitory processes. In terms of the measured level of risk they also had a higher level of stimulating, instrumental and unhealthy risk, at the lower levels of physical, social, ethical and financial risk in relation to the control group. Cluster and confirmation analyses showed the existence of three sub-groups of motorcyclists: prevaricators, ones with a Mad Max syndrome, and adventurers. The confirmation analysis was carried out on an additional group of 243 motorcyclists. (shrink)

Probably the main purpose of reproductive technologies is to enable people who choose to do so to avoid the birth of a baby with a disabling condition. However the conditions women want information about and the ‘price’ they are willing to pay for obtaining that information vary enormously. Individual women have to arrive at their own prenatal testing choices by ‘trading off’ means and ends in order to resolve the dilemmas facing them. We know very little about how individuals make (...) these trade-offs, so it is difficult to predict how new technologies will affect their choices and preferences. Uptake decisions can be expected to change, especially in the group of women who now are put off by some aspect of the current screening approach, where the avoidance of miscarriage risk may have provided a kind of ‘psychological shelter’, protecting a lot of people from having to make other decisions. Technologies such as Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis may remove a second ‘psychological shelter’ because they offer the means of avoiding the birth of an affected child without terminating a pregnancy. Even if new technologies will make some decisions easier in terms of their cognitive demands, they will also create new dilemmas and decision making will not necessarily become less stressful in emotional terms. Key challenges concern information and decision-making. (shrink)

Excerpt from The Psychological Aspects of Christian Experience Continued observation of the various methods of religious instruction has brought upon me a conviction that grows stronger as the years go by, that there must be, as Francis Peabody says, a new expansion of the range of studies appropri ate to the teachers of religion. There ought to be a far deeper study of the psychology of reli gion. The appeal to the impulses and emotions, so prevalent in the (...) methods of some teachers, is far behind twentieth century enlightenment. It was foreign to the methods of our Saviour. He taught men. He did not frighten them into ao tion, neither entice them. He instructed their minds in truth. Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

The relevance of the study of the problem of Christian axiology is due to the growing interest in religion and the associated change in world outlook and values ​​in contemporary Ukrainian society. The study of religious values ​​is caused by the urgent problem of finding universal moral values ​​of social development and clarifying the content, structure and nature of their functioning. However, all the basic principles of Christian doctrine acquire character of value only in the presence of subjective attitude, their (...) personal importance for the believing individual. Only in this way can religious values ​​influence the motivation of actions and determine human behavior. (shrink)

Augustine’s insights into the will and its free decision have long been a focus of controversy since his lifetime. Nonetheless, in modern scholarship, little effort has been made to clarify the actual function of the will as a psychological force in the life of mind. It has often been taken for granted that the will is an independent faculty which underlies our moral responsibility by its free choice. Accordingly, much ink has been spilled over issues such as necessity and (...) freedom, grace and free will, sin and evil will etc. This philosophical inquiry distinguishes itself from its antecedents by adopting a psychological focus on the function of the will. It attempts to explicate why uoluntas, and not other psychological activities, is the locus of moral responsibility in Augustine’s philosophical psychology. The work is thus split into two parts, each consisting of four chapters: the first part devoted to the will’s operation as a psychological dynamism, and the second to the traditional consideration of the will as a moral faculty. In the first part, the dissertation systematically investigates the psychological phenomenon of the will in its relationship to other psychological activities, from irrational affection to intellectual cognition. This phenomenological approach starts with Augustine’s unusual conception of concupiscentia carnis in his debates with Julian of Eclanum. According to Augustine’s philosophical interpretation of this biblical term, concupiscentia carnis as an uncontrollable tendency defines the essential infirmity of the will and forms the starting-point of further affective expressions of the soul. Then, the analysis advances to the role of the will in the formation of affection. It reveals the implicit approval that is entailed in the unvoluntary pre-volitional movements of the soul. This explains the superficial discrepancy between Augustine’s accounts of affection as can be found in Books IX and XIV of De ciuitate Dei. This general account of Augustine’s theory of emotion is followed by an in-depth examination of the feeling of shame so as to display the will’s actual contribution in a reflective affection. Augustine convincingly proves that shame reflects the powerlessness of the will in confrontation with concupiscentia carnis as well as the will’s effort to regain its dignity. To complete the foray into Augustine’s philosophy of the soul, his reflections on intellect and will in the process of moral decision are called into question. By reconsidering Augustine’s account of his own conversion and his reflections on our journey to the happy life, my analyses show that neither intellectualitic nor voluntaristic interpretations do justice to his understanding of moral decision. The voluntaristic interpretation overlooks the intellectual perspective of happy life and Augustine’s emphasis on the necessity of a knowledge of the good for our moral behaviour. On the other hand, the intellectualistic account unjustly ignores Augustine’s insights into the severe destructiveness of the failure of the will and the dilemma of two wills at war. To summarize, the phenomenological approach in Part I reveals the omnipresent feature of the will in mental life. The implications of this psychological feature of the will are twofold. It indicates the independence of the will as well as the limitations of the will by its actual conditions. The second part of this work investigates the moral significance of Augustine’s psychological insights into the function of the will. What bridges the gap between uoluntas as a psychological power and uoluntas as a moral faculty is Augustine’s most controversial conception of freedom. The dissertation first scrutinizes Augustine’s arguments for the independence of the will as reconstructed and assumed in the first part. By metaphysical arguments, Augustine reveals that nothing external, neither inferior nor superior being, can force the will to attain a particular disposition. For this cannot happen in a world governed by the divine order. In his analyses of the phenomenon of two contradictory wills, Augustine shows that the will is conditioned but not compelled by other internal forces. However, this merely represents the negative aspect of the will’s freedom, or libertas a coactione. At the same time, the positive aspect of Augustinian uoluntas has frequently been misinterpreted as a faculty of choice, or libertas indifferentiae. A careful reading shows that the free decision of the will is essentially a capacity to pursue one’s own happiness. In accord with this eudemonistic emphasis, the genuine freedom is the freedom to will and to accomplish the good, which alone guarantees the happy life. This original interpretation of freedom offers powerful support to Augustine’s account of moral agency. One is not only held responsible for his voluntary evildoings which he could have avoided, but also for the necessary conditions of life, i.e., ignorantia and difficultas as effects of original sin. For as argued earlier, even the presence of concupiscentia carnis as the inherent infirmity of the will contains the least assent of the will. This assent establishes the moral agency in evil willing. To account for our agency in the good will, the dissertation addresses the problem of compatibility between divine grace and freedom of will. My analysis shows that Augustine’s rigid position in the last years of his life is also philosophically defensible. An internal function of the grace upon the faculty of the will will not destroy its freedom to attain its own disposition. This philosophical analysis concludes by highlightling the close affiliation between the will and the self in Augustinian uoluntas. “I know nothing I could call my own if the will by which I’m willing or unwilling is not my own.”. By consent or dissent of the will, we identify ourselves with mental images, affective movements, practical reasoning and other psychological activities, either implicitly or explicitly. Augustine’s realistic conceptions of the will and its conditioned freedom provide a subtle and rich picture of human nature, which is still relevant to our own theoretical reflections on the self. 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Translation science is going through a preliminary stage of self-definition. Jakobson’s essay “On linguistic aspects of translation”, whose title is re-echoed in the title of this article, despite the linguistic approach suggested, opened, in 1959, the study of translation to disciplines other than linguistics, semiotics to start with. Many developments in the semiotics of translation — particularly Torop’s theory of total translation — take their cue from the celebrated category “intersemiotic translation or transmutation” outlined in that 1959 article. I (...) intend to outline here the contributions that the science of translation — following a semiotic perspective opened by Peirce and continued by Torop — can gather from another discipline: psychology. The “totalistic” approach to translation provided by Torop can be more deeply enforced by applying to it the consequences deriving from the psychological insight offered by the concept of “interpretant” as mental sign; the perceptual interpretation of the prototext; reading and writing as intersemiotic translation processes; unlimited semiosis as interminable analysis; primary and secondary process in dreams and in other kinds of translation; metaphor and disambiguation as mental processes; the defenses activated when translation criticism (review) and self-criticism (revision) are made. (shrink)