Philosophical Topics 33 (1):1-78 (2005)

Authors
Tyler Burge
University of California, Los Angeles
Abstract
This essay is a long one. It is not meant to be read in a single sitting. Its structure is as follows. In section I, I explicate perceptual anti-individualism. Section II centers on the two aspects of the representational content of perceptual states. Sections III and IV concern the nature of the empirical psychology of vision, and its bearing on the individuation of perceptual states. Section V shows how what is known from empirical psychology undermines disjunctivism and hence certain further views that entail it, including naive realism. In Section VI, I raise a further point against disjunctivism. Section VII indicates how general reflection on perceptual perspective and epistemic ability supports the constraints from empirical psychology. It also explains how reflection on veridicality conditions, psychological explanation, and cognitive ability conspire to force recognition of the two kinds of representation mentioned in the preceding paragraph. In the Appendix, I criticize attempts to support disjunctivism.
Keywords disjunctivism
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ISBN(s) 0276-2080
DOI 10.5840/philtopics20053311
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The Two Faces of Mental Imagery.Margherita Arcangeli - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):304-322.
Competence to Know.Lisa Miracchi - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):29-56.
Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.
Why Naive Realism?Heather Logue - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):211-237.
Attention and Mental Paint1.Ned Block - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.

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