When the “realism of assumptions” mattered: Milton Friedman's critique of the Phillips curve

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 94 (C):8-16 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper I challenge the pernicious aspects of Milton Friedman's methodological outlook that continues to hold sway over mainstream neoclassical economists. I do this by showing how Friedman's own methodological dicta could have been used against him when he famously advanced the expectations critique of the Phillips curve at his presidential address to the American Economic Association. I use this case study to further suggest that psychological and neurophysiological data should not be deemed irrelevant to economic science.

Other Versions

No versions found

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-05-21

Downloads
1,944 (#6,589)

6 months
354 (#5,095)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Marcos Picchio
National Institutes of Health

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Conjectures and Refutations.K. Popper - 1963 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. V. O. Quine - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 202-220.

View all 17 references / Add more references