According to Popper's rationality principle, agents act in the most adequate way according to the objective situation. I propose a new interpretation of the rationality principle as consisting of an idealization and two abstractions. Based on this new interpretation, I critically discuss the privileged status that Popper ascribes to it as an integral part of all social scientific models. I argue that as an idealization, the rationality principle may play an important role in the (...) social sciences, but it also has inherent limitations that inhibit it from having the privileged status that Popper ascribes to it in all cases. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The status and role of Popper’s ‘Rationality Principle’ (RP) is still the subject of disputes. The ‘prevailing view’ among Popper’s commentators seems to be that RP is better interpreted as a methodological principle. Yet, this view is challenged in a recent study where RP is interpreted as an‘idealization’. We critically review these two accounts of RP and propose a novel one according to which RP is, first and foremost, the scientific version of a heuristic that ordinary (...) people unconsciously use when they seek to explain and predict other people’s behavior. However, we recognize that, to the extent RP is part of a methodological strategy whereby, in the wake of adverse empirical results, social scientists place the ‘onus of proof’ on their situational model it is legitimate to claim that RP is adopted, at least partly, for methodological reasons. Further, to the extent that the adoption of RP implies suppressing those mental processes that may affect actors’ reasoning and willpower it is also legitimate to claim that RP is, at least partly, an ‘idealization’. We conclude that the status and role of RP is multi-faceted and that the three accounts of RP complement each other. (shrink)

It is frequently repeated that the rationality principle is the fundamental principle of economics and it is so much so that the same principle is equivalently designated as the «economic principle»1. However, it is often the doom of fundamental principles that they are so intimately associated with the science itself that those who practice this science rarely take notice of their presence and of their role. Consequently, it is not surprising not to find any entry (...) for "rationality" or for "rationality principle" in virtually any treaties on economy. If rational behaviour is the object of economics like living organism is the object of biology, specific references could hardly be expected in either of these sciences to what is nothing but the affirmation of the very existence of their subject matter. (shrink)

Popper's short essay about the rationality principle has been the target of many criticisms which have raised serious doubts about its consistency. How could the well-known promoter of falsificationism suggest that we not reject a principle that he himself describes as false? Nonetheless, the essay can be read in a way that makes it appear much more consistent. Better sense can be made of Popper's own examples (the flustered driver, the pedestrian, etc.), by taking seriously his view (...) that the rationality principle might be "approximately true" and falsified only in very rare cases, while also giving proper attention to his four rather elliptical arguments. (shrink)

Many methodologists are firmly convinced that Popper's arguments concerning the status of the rationality principle (RP) are incoherent or incompatible with the essentials of falsificationism. The present essay first shows that the accusation of incompatibility of situational logic with falsificationism does not hold up to scrutiny but then shows that Popper's arguments are nonetheless flimsy if not indefensible. For it seems that one can distinguish between two different versions of the RP in Popper's writings. If the first version (...) is plainly "objectivist" and can be characterized with Popper as empirically false, the second one is rather "subjectivist" and is not falsifiable as such. The essay shows that this second reading of the RP is the one that Popper finally adopts but that, unfortunately enough, this formulation of the RP looks more like a metaphysical statement than like an empirical law. It could then be held to be a priori valid as such, by analogy with Popper's line of argument concerning the principle of causality. If this is correct, then Popper's thesis on the empirical status of the RP is confuted. (shrink)

Since the early days of economics, the rationality principle has been a core element of economic theorizing. It is part of almost any theoretical framework that economists use to generate knowledge. Despite its central role, the principle’s epistemic status and function continue to be debated between empiricists and rationalists, and a clear winner is yet to emerge. One point of contention is that we cannot explain the principle’s special status in light of clear evidence against its (...) empirical validity and the continuous conceptual changes it undergoes. In this paper, I argue that we should think of the rationality principle as a functional a priori principle along the lines of a pragmatic theory of constitutive elements recently put forward by David Stump. Such an approach would explain the principle’s persistence and changing status. More generally, the pragmatic theory of constitutive elements in science offers a viable alternative to rationalism and empiricism that allows for approaching the debate about the status and function of the rationality principle in economics. It provides a new framework and starting point to think about the usefulness of a central first principle in economics in a constructive way. (shrink)

Reconstructing Popper's research programme for the Human Sciences, Noretta Koertge (Inquiry, Vol. 18 [1975]) has given a deductive?nomological account of explanations of actions by means of a Rationality Principle. It is argued here that such a Rationality Principle is fundamentally redundant. Neither is it logically necessary in order to deduce a cognitive action?explanandum, nor can it be given a semantic non?empty interpretation, at least not within Koertge's own syllogism. Any attempt to save the Rationality (...) class='Hi'>Principle as unfalsifiablc but nevertheless indispensable for action explanations is rejected in the light of possible alternative action explanations by empirical and therefore in principle falsifiable psychological laws. (shrink)

This article refines a foundational tenet of rational choice theory known as the principle of description invariance. Attempts to apply this principle to human agents with imperfect knowledge have paid insufficient attention to two aspects: first, agents’ epistemic situations, i.e. whether and when they recognize alternative descriptions of an object to be equivalent; and second, the individuation of objects of description, i.e. whether and when objects count as the same or different. An important consequence is that many apparent (...) ‘framing effects’ may not violate the principle of description invariance, and the subjects of these effects may not be irrational. (shrink)

‘Situational Analysis’ constitutes Popper's methodological proposal for the social sciences. There is an apparent inconsistency in the fact that, on the one hand, Popper maintains that we lear...

The justification of Bayes' rule by cognitive rationality principles is undertaken by extending the propositional axiom systems usually proposed in two contexts of belief change: revising and updating. Probabilistic belief change axioms are introduced, either by direct transcription of the set-theoretic ones, or in a stronger way but nevertheless in the spirit of the underlying propositional principles. Weak revising axioms are shown to be satisfied by a General Conditioning rule, extending Bayes' rule but also compatible with others, and weak (...) updating axioms by a General Imaging rule, extending Lewis' rule. Strong axioms (equivalent to the Miller–Popper axiom system) are necessary to justify Bayes' rule in a revising context, and justify in fact an extended Bayes' rule which applies, even if the message has zero probability. (shrink)

The justification of Bayes' rule by cognitive rationality principles is undertaken by extending the propositional axiom systems usually proposed in two contexts of belief change: revising and updating. Probabilistic belief change axioms are introduced, either by direct transcription of the set-theoretic ones, or in a stronger way but nevertheless in the spirit of the underlying propositional principles. Weak revising axioms are shown to be satisfied by a General Conditioning rule, extending Bayes' rule but also compatible with others, and weak (...) updating axioms by a General Imaging rule, extending Lewis' rule. Strong axioms (equivalent to the Miller–Popper axiom system) are necessary to justify Bayes' rule in a revising context, and justify in fact an extended Bayes' rule which applies, even if the message has zero probability. (shrink)

In this paper I criticize Popper's conception of the rationality principle in the social sciences. First, I survey Popper's outlook on the role of a principle of rationality in theorizing in the social sciences. Then, I critically examine his view on the status of the principle of rationality concluding that the arguments supporting it are quite weak. Finally, I contrast his standpoint with an alternative conception. This, I show, helps us understand better Popper's reasons (...) for adopting his perspective on rationality. (shrink)

Economic research is often isolated from social and political deliberations. Politicians put distinct results together in ad hoc ways. This state of affairs is explained as a result of equating rationality with coherence, system, and justification; the rationality principle, according to which social facts are to be explained as the result of coherent and/or justified plans of individuals, is singled out as the prime source of the isolation. A revised version is proposed which dispenses with the need (...) for justification and/or coherence for rational action of individuals. Partially rational actions are attempts to solve problems within given institutional contexts; individual rationality is a social activity whose value depends on the quality of social standards which individuals use to guide their thought. This revision removes barriers between economic, social, and political theories, without blocking social scientific explanation. Indeed, it opens up possibilities now blocked. (shrink)

Why do learners fail to seek help, when doing so would be beneficial? Principles of rational decision suggest that seeking help is not an optimal action if its costs are greater than its expected b...

This paper compares and contrasts three different substantive principles of justice for making health care priority-setting or “rationing” decisions: need principles, maximising principles and egalitarian principles. The principles are compared by tracing out their implications for a hypothetical rationing decision involving four identified patients. This decision has been the subject of an empirical study of public opinion based on small-group discussions, which found that the public seem to support a pluralistic combination of all three kinds of rationing principle. In (...) conclusion, it is suggested that there is room for further work by philosophers and others on the development of a coherent and pluralistic theory of health care rationing which accords with public opinions. (shrink)

The term “synthetic biology” is a popular label of an emerging biotechnological field with strong claims to robustness, modularity, and controlled construction, finally enabling the creation of new organisms. Although the research community is heterogeneous, it advocates a common denominator that seems to define this field: the principles of rational engineering. However, it still remains unclear to what extent rational engineering—rather than “tinkering” or the usage of random based or non-rational processes—actually constitutes the basis for the techniques of synthetic biology. (...) In this article, we present the results of a quantitative bibliometric analysis of the realized extent of rational engineering in synthetic biology. In our analysis, we examine three issues: (1) We evaluate whether work at three levels of synthetic biology (parts, devices, and systems) is consistent with the principles of rational engineering. (2) We estimate the extent of rational engineering in synthetic biology laboratory practice by an evaluation of publications in synthetic biology. (3) We examine the methodological specialization in rational engineering of authors in synthetic biology. Our analysis demonstrates that rational engineering is prevalent in about half of the articles related to synthetic biology. Interestingly, in recent years the relative number of respective publications has decreased. Despite its prominent role among the claims of synthetic biology, rational engineering has not yet entirely replaced biotechnological methods based on “tinkering” and non-rational principles. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the enkratic principle in its classic formulation may not be a requirement of rationality. The investigation of whether it is leads to some important methodological insights into the study of rationality. I also consider the possibility that we should consider rational requirements as a subset of a broader category of agential requirements.

Ludwig deals with the relations between language, thought, and rationality, and, especially, the role and status of assumptions about rationality in interpreting another’s speech and assigning contents to her psychological attitudes—her beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on. The chapter is organized around three questions: What is the relation between rationality and thought? What is the relation between rationality and language? What is the relation between thought and language? Ludwig argues that some large degree of rationality (...) is required for thought and consequently that same degree of rationality at least is required for language since language requires thought. Thought, however, does not require language. In answering questions and, Ludwig gives particular attention to Davidson’s arguments for the Principle of Charity, according to which it is constitutive of speakers that they are largely rational and largely right about the world, and to Davidson’s arguments for the thesis that without the power of speech we lack the power of thought. (shrink)

A common objection to the precautionary principle is that it is irrational. I argue that this objection goes beyond the often-discussed claim that the principle is incoherent. Instead, I argue, exp...

The paper presents, in the synthetic way, the issue of the rationality of the tax system and taxation principles in relation to the clearly visible fiscal crisis in the 21st century caused by, among others, COVID-19 pandemic. The analysis which is theoretical (descriptive, comparative) was carried out by using tools indicated in the area of New Institutional Economics (NIE). Attention was devoted primarily to the importance of specific institutional arrangements, broadly understood as the “rules of the game” applicable in (...) the political and economic spheres, and related to the problems of public finances. Research has shown that the appropriate design of tax rules may contribute, to some extent, to limiting the fiscal crisis. Tax policy, and even more broadly, fiscal policy, may determine the formula in which the economic achievements regarding compliance with tax principles and fiscal rules can be implemented. What is primarily important is the legal framework (one of the most important formal institutions) within which state policy in the field of public finances should be implemented. (shrink)

This paper addresses an argument from Richard Double to the effect that any libertarian account of free will must attribute to human action a kind of rationality that is impossible. Double's argument relies on an alleged principle of rational explanation. Here it is argued that the proposed principle is false, and hence that Double has failed to show that libertarianism has any problem with rationality. The paper concludes with a suggestion as to how the sort of (...) rationality in question is made possible. (shrink)

According to Humean theories of objective chance, the chances reduce to patterns in the history of occurrent events, such as frequencies. According to non-Humean accounts, the chances are metaphysically fundamental, existing independently of the "Humean Mosaic" of actually-occurring events. It is therefore possible, by the lights of non-Humeanism, for the chances and the frequencies to diverge wildly. Humeans often allege that this undermines the ability of non-Humean accounts of chance to rationalize adherence to David Lewis' Principal Principle (PP), which (...) states that an agent's degrees of belief should match what they take to be the objective chances. In this paper, I propose two approaches to justifying (PP) for non-Humean chance, hence defusing the Humean objection. The first approach justifies (PP) via the role it plays in informing outright beliefs about long-run frequencies. The second approach justifies (PP) by showing that adherence to (PP), even for non-Humean chance, maximizes expected epistemic utility according to the actual objective chance function. I then address an objection to this approach, concerning the alleged circularity of the derivations. (shrink)

In Making Sense of Free Will and Moral Responsibility Dana Nelkin defends the “rational abilities view.” According to this view, agents are responsible for their behavior if and only if they act with the ability to recognize and act for good reasons. It follows that agents who act well are open to praise regardless of whether they could have acted differently, but agents who act badly are open to blame only if they could have acted on the moral reasons that (...) counted against their behavior. I summarize the main themes of Nelkin’s theory of responsibility and offer reasons for rejecting the claim that agents are blameworthy only if they could have responded to moral considerations. It is true that wrongdoers who could not have responded appropriately to moral considerations are often excused from blame, but I argue that not all the forms that such incapacity can take will furnish grounds for excuse. In other words, some circumstances that entail that a wrongdoer cannot respond to moral considerations are compatible with that agent fulfilling conditions that are sufficient for moral responsibility. (shrink)

It is with these words that Alan Gewirth opened his 1972 Lindley Lecture at the University of Kansas. And he immediately followed up his opening words with a more or less blanket indictment of almost the entire group of contemporary writers on meta-ethics, who, he would aver, while claiming to be "rationalists" in the matter of the rational justification of moral principles, and while making much of how far they have distanced themselves from the old-line emotivists in this very regard, (...) have nevertheless just not brought it off, so far as their own provision for any such rational justification is concerned. Thus while the emotivists had tended to hold that such reasons as a person might give in support of moral principles could not really function as reasons, but only as causes that might impel or compel acceptance of such principles, the latter-day "rationalists," as Gewirth calls them, insist that good reasons are always in order and logically relevant, so far as any moral or even evaluative judgment is concerned. Indeed, merely to call a thing good, or to judge an action right or wrong, already implies that such a judgment is put forward as one that is universalizable and for which good reasons can be given. Unfortunately, however,—Gewirth goes on to insist—reasons and justifications of this sort turn out, even on the admission of the rationalists themselves, to be valid only on the prior assumption of what might be called "the moral point of view.". (shrink)

The author singles out various conceptions of rationality used in practical legal discourse: formal and substantive rationality, instrumental goal‐ and means‐rationality, communicative rationality. Practical rationality is expressed in decisions justified by epistemic and axiological premises according to the rules of justificatory reasoning. Five levels of analysis of this justification are identified. Rules, principles and evaluations are used as justifying arguments and their characteristics determine the dimensions of rationality of decision depending on the features of (...) rules, various conceptions of principles, and kinds of relativisation of evaluations. The dimensions of legal rationality depend mainly on three singled out conceptions of rationality, i.e., formal rationality dealing with the deep structure of justification, instrumentally oriented rationality as content of justifiability, and communicative rationality linked with the pragmatics of human interaction. Legitimacy, according to the presented analysis, appears as a subclass of external justification dealing with axiological premisses in terms of instrumental rationality and/or communicative rationality. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes' method of deriving some moral principles from a social contract has inspired some contemporary moral philosophers to combine the contractarian approach with the model of rational behavior familiar to economists, in order to derive substantive principles of right from essentially formal constraints on the choice of principles. They argue that the device of a hypothetical social contract could serve to generate intuitively plausible moral principles even when the contractors are assumed to be self-interested maximizers of expected utility . (...) Since economic rationality, as defined here, is a relatively pliable model of rational deliberation, the hope is that this approach will provide a systematic tool for the derivation and justification of moral principles. ;Given this conception of rationality, a hypothetical social contract may be interpreted as any of several formal models of rational choice, each of which I examine, as exhibited in the work of some contemporary contract theorists: John Rawls' early work represents the view that choosing the social contract involves an individual decision under certainty; in his later work , Rawls presents the social contract as an individual decision made under ignorance; John Harsanyi defends the case for an individual decision under risk; and David Gauthier's recent work treats the social contract as the product of a rational collective bargain. ;I argue that, if the model of economic rationality is taken seriously, none of these conceptions of the social contract produce principles which conform to our considered moral judgments, and most of them will fail to produce a contractual agreement of any sort. Consequently, I conclude that the combination of economic rationality and procedural constraints on the deliberations of such contractors is an inadequate substitute for other-regarding sentiments usually considered necessary for the justification of moral principles. (shrink)

This paper presents a new solution to the problem of peer disagreement that distinguishes two principles of rational belief, here called probability and autonomy. When we discover that we disagree with peers, there is one sense in which we rationally ought to suspend belief, and another in which we rationally ought to retain our original belief. In the first sense, we aim to believe what is most probably true according to our total evidence, including testimony from peers and authorities. In (...) the second, we aim to base our beliefs only on objective evidence and argumentation, even if that lowers the probability of their being true. The first principle of rational belief tends to serve the short-term epistemic interests of individuals, while the second tends to serve the long-term epistemic interests of both individuals and groups. The best way to reconcile these principles in cases of peer disagreement is to associate them with two corresponding species of belief, here called perception and opinion. (shrink)

According to the received view in metaethics, a Neo-Humean theory of rationality entails that there cannot be any objective moral reasons, i.e. moral reasons that are independent of actual desires. In this paper, I argue that there is a version of this theory that is compatible with the existence of objective moral reasons. The key is to distinguish between (i) the process of rational deliberation that starts off in an agent's actual desires, and (ii) the rational principle that (...) an agent employs in such a process. I maintain that it is the latter which explains why it is rational for an agent to have a certain desire, not the former. As a result, there might be two types of principles. The second type of principle leaves room for objective moral reasons. (shrink)