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  1.  57
    The roots of critical rationalism.John Wettersten (ed.) - 1992 - Atlanta, GA: Rodopi.
    Foreword I. Critical rationalism is a genuinely new philosophical perspective. It is not, however, one systematic view. The development of it by Popper and ...
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  2.  34
    The fleck affair: Fashionsv.heritage.John Wettersten - 1991 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):475-498.
    The problem of how to handle interesting but ignored thinkers of the past is discussed through an analysis of the case of Ludwik Fleck. Fleck was totally ignored in the ?30s and declared an important thinker in the 70s and ?80s. In the first case fashion ignored him and in the second it praised him. The praise has been as poor as the silence was unjust. We may do such thinkers more justice if we recognize that intellectual society is fickle, (...)
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  3. Learning from Error, Karl Popper's Psychology of Learning.William Berkson & John Wettersten - 1989 - Synthese 78 (3):357-358.
     
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  4. New Insights on Young Popper.John Wettersten - 2005 - Journal of the History of Ideas 66 (4):603-631.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:New Insights on Young PopperJohn R. WetterstenSeven essays that Popper wrote from 1925 to 1932–33 show Popper's transition from a fresh student of pedagogy into a serious philosopher of science ten years later. His first essay was published in 1925, and in 1934–35 he presented a revolutionary philosophy. These essays led first to Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie (written between 1930 and 1933 but first published in 1979) and (...)
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  5.  3
    How Do Institutions Steer Events?: An Inquiry Into the Limits and Possibilities of Rational Thought and Action.John Wettersten - 2006 - Routledge.
    Theories of explanation in the social sciences vacillate between holism and individualism. This book contends that this has been a consequence of theories of rationality which assume that rationality requires coherent theories to be shown to be true. It claims that traditional explanations place unrealistic demands on individuals and institutions.
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  6.  22
    The road through würzburg, vienna and göttingen.John Wettersten - 1985 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 15 (4):487-505.
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  7.  42
    The philosophy of common sense.Joseph Agassi & John Wettersten - 1987 - Philosophia 17 (4):421-438.
    Philosophers wanted commonsense to fight skepticism. They hypostasized and destroyed it. Commonsense is skeptical--Bound by a sense of proportion and of limitation. A scarce commodity, At times supported, At times transcended by science, Commonsense has to be taken account of by the critical-Realistic theory of science. James clerk maxwell's view of today's science as tomorrow's commonsense is the point of departure. It is wonderful but overlooks the value of the sense of proportion.
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  8.  8
    Reply to Tuomela.John Wettersten - 2010 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (3):518-522.
    Raimo Tuomola has complained that my critical review of his The Philosophy of Sociality is superficial, that I have not presented, even that I have misrepresented his work, and that I have neglected its virtues, which others have praised. I reject his complaint about the content of my review as unwarranted in an open society, as he demands that I take his work on his own terms. I defend my view of the place of his work in the analytic tradition, (...)
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  9.  20
    Methods in psychology; a critical case study of Pavlov.John R. Wettersten - 1974 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 4 (1):17-34.
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  10.  39
    William Whewell: Problems of induction vs. problems of rationality.John Wettersten - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):716-742.
    The question whether attempts to vindicate induction should be abandoned in favor of (other) problems of rationality is pressing and difficult. How may we decide rationally when standards for rationality are at issue? It may be useful to first know how we have decided in the past. Whewell's philosophy of science and the reaction to it are discussed. Whewell's contemporaries mistakenly thought that only an inductivist research program could produce an adequate theory of rationality. But this very move violated their (...)
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  11.  31
    Stegmüller squared.Joseph Agassi & John R. Wettersten - 1980 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 11 (1):86-94.
    Wolfgang Stegmüller, the leading German philosopher of science, considers the status of scientific revolutions the central issue in the field ever since "the famous Popper-Lakatos-Kuhn discussion" of a decade and a half ago, comments on "almost all contributions to this problem", and offers his alternative solutions in a series of papers culminating with, and summarized in, his recent "A Combined Approach to Dynamics of Theories. How To Improve Historical Interpretations of Theory Change By Applying Set Theoretical Structures", published in Gerard (...)
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  12.  10
    The choice of problems and the limits of reason.John R. Wettersten & Joseph Agassi - 1987 - In Joseph Agassi & I. C. Jarvie (eds.), Rationality: The Critical View. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 281--296.
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  13.  38
    Review symposium on Searle : III. The analytical study of social ontology: Breakthrough or cul-de-sac?John Wettersten - 1998 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 28 (1):132-151.
  14.  49
    Styles of rationality.John Wettersten - 1995 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 25 (1):69-98.
    This article discusses the following: (i) The acceptability of diverse styles of rationality suggests replacing concern for uniqueness with that for coordination, (ii) Popper's lowering of the standard of rationality increases its scope insufficiently, (iii) Bartley's making the standard comprehensive increases its scope excessively, (iv) the pluralist view of rationality as partial (i.e., of Jarvie and Agassi) is better, but its ranking of all rationality eliminates choice of styles, (v) styles diversify the standards of rationality, (viii) rationality is not merely (...)
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  15.  13
    Whewell's Critics: Have They Prevented Him from Doing Good?John Wettersten - 2005 - Rodopi.
    William Whewell's views on the philosophy of science were dismissed as incoherent and eclectic when he introduced them in the middle of the 19th century, though some leading contemporaries engaged and even incorporated them. When his ideas were resurrected a century later, they were dismissed as poor induction rather than original thinking. Wettersten (philosophy of science, Mannheim U., Germany) explores why Whewell's impact continues to be felt, and why almost all theorists have had to come to terms with his ideas. (...)
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  16.  53
    Reply to Tuomela’s Reply to My Reply.John Wettersten - 2012 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1):124-125.
  17.  28
    The Rationality of Extremists: A Talmonist Insight We Need to Respond to.John Wettersten - 2012 - Social Epistemology 26 (1):31-53.
    Extremists who have been well educated in science are quite common, but nevertheless puzzling. How can individuals with high levels of scientific education fall prey to irrationalist ideologies? Implicit assumptions about rationality may lead to tremendous and conspicuous developments. When correction of social deficits is seen as a pressing problem, it is quite common that individuals conclude that some religious or political system contains the all-encompassing answer, if only it is applied with sufficiently high standards. Implicit assumptions about rationally high (...)
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  18.  30
    Rationality, problems choice.John R. Wettersten & Joseph Agassi - 1978 - Philosophica 22.
  19.  58
    How Do We Learn from Argument?: Toward an Account of the Logic of Problems.Terry M. Goode & John R. Wettersten - 1982 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (4):673-689.
    From the pre-Socratics to the present, one primary aim of philosophy has been to learn from arguments. Philosophers have debated whether we could indeed do this, but they have by and large agreed on how we would use arguments if learning from argument was at all possible. They have agreed that we could learn from arguments either by starting with true premises and validly deducing further statements which must also be true and therefore constitute new knowledge, or that we could (...)
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  20.  26
    Integrating psychology and methodology.John Wettersten - 1990 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 21 (2):293-308.
    Summary The importance of the problem of how to integrate psychology and methodology was rediscovered by Oswald Külpe. He noted that Wundt's psychology was inadequate and that a new methodology was needed to construct an alternative. Külpe made real progress but his program turned out to be quite difficult: he had no appropriate method for integrating the two fields. August Messer tried to fill the gap but failed. The problem was largely dropped due to poor methods at hand for studying (...)
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  21.  37
    On conservative and adventurous styles of scientific research.John Wettersten - 1985 - Minerva 23 (4):443-463.
  22.  43
    Problems and meaning today: What can we learn from Hattiangadi's failed attempt to explain them together?John Wettersten - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (4):487-536.
    Philosophers have tried to explain how science finds the truth by using new developments in logic to study scientific language and inference. R. G. Collingwood argued that only a logic of problems could take context into account. He was ignored, but the need to reconcile secure meanings with changes in context and meanings was seen by Karl Popper, W. v. O. Quine, and Mario Bunge. Jagdish Hattiangadi uses problems to reconcile the need for security with that for growth. But he (...)
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  23.  43
    Rethinking Whewell.John Wettersten - 1993 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 23 (4):481-515.
    The nineteenth-century appraisal of Whewell's philosophy as confused, eclectic, and metaphysical is still dominant today. Yet he keeps reappearing on the agenda of the historians and philosophers of science. Why? Whewell continues to be a puzzle. Historians evade the puzzle by deeming him to have had no serious philosophy but some interesting ideas and/or to have been socially important. Menachim Fisch's recent study offers promise of a new appraisal. But Fisch's account leads back to the puzzle. Fisch poses the question (...)
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  24. The Philosophy Of Science And The History Of Science: Separate Domains Versus Separate Aspects.John R. Wettersten - 1982 - Philosophical Forum 14 (1):59.
     
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  25.  37
    The death of heuristic?Peggy Marchi, Joseph Agassi & John R. Wettersten - 1982 - Philosophia 11 (3-4):249-276.
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  26.  42
    Editorial introduction.Terry M. Goode, Barry M. Loewer, Roger D. Rosenkrantz & John R. Wettersten - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):1-1.
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  27.  19
    Rezensionen.Verloren van Themaat & John R. Wettersten - 1982 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 13 (1):75-75.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft Jahrgang: 21 Heft: 2 Seiten: i-ii.
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  28.  26
    Achievement and autonomy in intellectual society.John Wettersten - 1987 - Philosophia 17 (1):55-75.
  29.  32
    Autonomy or heteronomy? That is the question.John Wettersten - 2003 - Social Epistemology 17 (2-3):317-320.
  30. Braucht die Wissenschaft methodologische Regeln?John Wettersten - 1995 - Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 28 (73):255-270.
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  31.  2
    Bühler und Gomperz: Zwei wichtige Denker im Hintergrund von Poppers früher Forschung.John Wettersten - 2019 - In Giuseppe Franco (ed.), Handbuch Karl Popper. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. pp. 177-188.
    Karl Bühler hat zur Entwicklung von Karl Poppers Forschungsgebieten drei wichtige Beiträge geleistet. Erstens hat er Popper in die laufende Forschung der Mitglieder der Würzburger Schule eingeführt, und die Richtung dieser Forschung hat in wichtigen Punkten Popper ein Leben lang beeinflusst. Dabei hatte er sich zunächst die nicht-assoziative Psychologie der Schule zu eigen gemacht. Dann griff er auf die Denkpsychologie von Otto Selz zurück und entwickelte davon ausgehend sein eigenes Forschungsgebiet der Methodologie. Zweitens betrafen die damals behandelten Probleme auch methodologische (...)
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  32.  26
    Can the Mentally Ill be Autonomous?John R. Wettersten - 1987 - Philosophica 40.
  33.  47
    Do fallibilist accounts of the growth of knowledge underestimate and endanger science?John Wettersten - 2007 - Ratio 20 (2):219–235.
    All fallibilist theories may appear to be defective, because they allegedly underestimate the security of at least some scientific knowledge and thereby leave science less defensible than it otherwise might be. When they call all scientific knowledge conjectural they may seem at first blush to underestimate the superiority of science vis a vis pseudo‐science. Fallibilists apparently fail to account for the fact that science turns theory into facts, because even “facts” are held only provisionally. This impression is false: the relatively (...)
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  34.  7
    Ein Amerikaner an einer deutschen Universität: vielfältige Forschung, ausgezeichnete Kontakte und keine Stelle.John Wettersten - 2018 - In Giuseppe Franco (ed.), Begegnungen Mit Hans Albert: Eine Hommage. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. pp. 359-363.
    In den 1980er-Jahren war Hans Alberts Lehrstuhl der Ausgangspunkt für meine Versuche, meine Forschung voranzutreiben und eine annehmbare Stelle zu finden. Mit seiner Unterstützung ist es mir gelungen, mein erstes Ziel zu erreichen; denn bis heute habe ich über hundert Veröffentlichungen gemacht, darunter vier Bücher und über siebzig Artikel. Der zweite Wunsch ist nie in Erfüllung gegangen.
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  35.  13
    Ernest Gellner: A Wittgensteinian rationalist.John Wettersten - 1979 - Philosophia 8 (4):741-769.
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  36.  33
    Good's compromise: Comments on I. J. good.John R. Wettersten - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):79 - 82.
  37.  24
    How Can We Increase the Fruitfulness of Popper’s Methodological Individualism?John Wettersten - 1999 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 29 (4):517-526.
  38.  2
    How to Integrate Economic, Social, and Political Theory: Revise the Rationality Principle.John Wettersten - 2019 - In Raphael Sassower & Nathaniel Laor (eds.), The Impact of Critical Rationalism: Expanding the Popperian Legacy Through the Works of Ian C. Jarvie. Springer Verlag. pp. 81-94.
    Economic research is often isolated from social and political deliberations. Politicians put distinct results together in ad hoc ways. This state of affairs is explained as a result of equating rationality with coherence, system, and justification; the rationality principle, according to which social facts are to be explained as the result of coherent and/or justified plans of individuals, is singled out as the prime source of the isolation. A revised version is proposed which dispenses with the need for justification and/or (...)
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  39.  3
    One Step Forward From Agassi’s Inquiries on Logic: A Fallibilist Logic for Critical Rationalism.John Wettersten - 2022 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 52 (6):380-387.
    Critical rationalists cannot reconcile their falibilism with the demand of logic for universality. Popper tried, but failed, to achieve universality in logic without proof. Attempts to find a limited approach to logic as ‘logics of’ have failed to find a coherent critical rationalist alternative. Critical rationalists take Tarski’s logic to be the best of logic today. But Tarski renders logic as close to justification, and thereby universality, as possible. A fallibilist version of Tarskian logic can yield a critical rationalist alternative: (...)
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  40.  3
    One Step Forward From Agassi’s Inquiries on Logic: A Fallibilist Logic for Critical Rationalism.John Wettersten - 2022 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 52 (6):380-387.
    Critical rationalists cannot reconcile their falibilism with the demand of logic for universality. Popper tried, but failed, to achieve universality in logic without proof. Attempts to find a limited approach to logic as ‘logics of’ have failed to find a coherent critical rationalist alternative. Critical rationalists take Tarski’s logic to be the best of logic today. But Tarski renders logic as close to justification, and thereby universality, as possible. A fallibilist version of Tarskian logic can yield a critical rationalist alternative: (...)
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  41.  3
    One Step Forward From Agassi’s Inquiries on Logic: A Fallibilist Logic for Critical Rationalism.John Wettersten - 2022 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 52 (6):380-387.
    Critical rationalists cannot reconcile their falibilism with the demand of logic for universality. Popper tried, but failed, to achieve universality in logic without proof. Attempts to find a limited approach to logic as ‘logics of’ have failed to find a coherent critical rationalist alternative. Critical rationalists take Tarski’s logic to be the best of logic today. But Tarski renders logic as close to justification, and thereby universality, as possible. A fallibilist version of Tarskian logic can yield a critical rationalist alternative: (...)
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  42.  5
    One Step Forward From Agassi’s Inquiries on Logic: A Fallibilist Logic for Critical Rationalism.John Wettersten - 2022 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 52 (6):380-387.
    Critical rationalists cannot reconcile their falibilism with the demand of logic for universality. Popper tried, but failed, to achieve universality in logic without proof. Attempts to find a limited approach to logic as ‘logics of’ have failed to find a coherent critical rationalist alternative. Critical rationalists take Tarski’s logic to be the best of logic today. But Tarski renders logic as close to justification, and thereby universality, as possible. A fallibilist version of Tarskian logic can yield a critical rationalist alternative: (...)
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  43.  28
    On two non-justificationist moves.John Wettersten - 1981 - Synthese 49 (3):419 - 421.
  44.  3
    On Two Non-Justificationist Theories.John Wettersten - 1987 - In Joseph Agassi & I. C. Jarvie (eds.), Rationality: The Critical View. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 339--341.
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  45.  44
    Philosophical anthropology can help social scientists learn from empirical tests.John Wettersten - 2007 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37 (3):295–318.
    Popper's theory of demarcation has set the standard of falsifiability for all sciences. But not all falsifiable theories are part of science and some tests of scientific theories are better than others. Popper's theory has led to the banning of metaphysical and/or philosophical anthropological theories from science. But Joseph Agassi has supplemented Popper's theory to explain how such theories are useful as research programs within science. This theory can also be used to explain how interesting tests may be found. Theories (...)
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  46.  36
    Popper and Sen on Rationality and Economics: Two (Independent) Wrong Turns Can Be Remedied with the Same Program.John Wettersten - 2009 - In Zuzana Parusniková & R. S. Cohen (eds.), Rethinking Popper. Springer. pp. 369--378.
  47. Procrustean Beds of Scientific Style.John R. Wettersten - 1980 - Diálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 15 (36):97.
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  48.  1
    Popper’s Historical Role: Innovative Dissident.John Wettersten - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (1):119-133.
    Whether Popper's philosophy will be used widely enough to shape the philosophy of science in the future will determine what his role in the history of the philosophy of science will be. The choice is that between the quest for deeper understanding of science and society, on the one hand, and the maintenance of old and comfortable views, on the other. Although in the past comfort has normally won out, progress has been made by dissidents such as Maimon and Whewell. (...)
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  49.  23
    Put tenure in today's social context.John Wettersten - 2006 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (6):585-586.
    Tenure should not be judged on its ability to promote whistle-blowing. Because the process of getting tenure may weed out those who might later need it, reform is called for. Reform of tenure must take into account not only the Salieri-effect, but also Thomas Kuhn's popular philosophical attack on independent thought and the tendency towards the use of minimal standards, resulting from the professionalization of research, to block work which is more than minimal. Reform of various institutions to encourage autonomy (...)
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  50.  39
    Popper's theory of the closed society conflicts with his theory of research.John Wettersten - 2007 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (2):185-209.
    Popper's theory of the attraction of closed societies conflicts with his theory of research: the former sees rational thought as contrary to man's nature, whereas the latter sees it as an innate psychological process. This conflict arose because Popper developed a theory of the movement from the closed society—Heimat—to civilized society, which sees civilized society as a burden, before he adapted Selz's view of directed thought processes as problem solving, which sees rationality as natural. Rejecting the earlier view and retaining (...)
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