"Le philosophe chilien Javier Agüero Águila a consacré ses recherches à la psychanalyse, à la philosophie française contemporaine - avec une attention toute particulière à la pensée de Jacques Derrida -, à la « philosophie politique » : la violence, la démocratie et les droits de l'homme, l'hospitalité, la communauté et l'extranéité, la marginalité mais encore l'héritage, la mémoire, l'oubli, le pardon, etc. C'est autour du pardon que ce livre s'organise, engageant un débat sur le processus chilien de (...) transition et de démocratisation mis en oeuvre après la dictature militaire de Pinochet" (4ème de couv.). (shrink)

An engaging history of the philosophy of pardons, this volume offers special insight into presidential pardons, revealing how, over and over again, controveries about pardons have arisen at times when circumstance prevented people from thinking dispassionately about them.

Why does someone, S, deserve blame or reproach for an action or event? One part of a standard answer since Aristotle: the event was caused, at least in part, by S’s bad will. But recently there’s been some insightful discussion of cases where the event’s causes do not include any bad will from S and yet it seems that S is not off the hook for the event. Cheshire Calhoun, Miranda Fricker, Elinor Mason, David Enoch, Randolph Clarke, and others include (...) in this category some cases of glitches, forgetfulness, inattentiveness, the actions of one’s children or one’s country, and certain instances of explicit bias and implicit bias. Enoch and Mason argue that in these cases S should extend the realm of S’s responsibility. Drawing on Aristotle’s emphases on retrospective attitudes and the non-voluntary, this paper attempts to clarify the relation between quality of will and blameworthiness. I analyze cases where (1) S is clearly not morally responsible for an action or event, E, yet (2) S deserves reproach for E unless S has the appropriate retrospective attitudes (such as regret) or the absence of inappropriate attitudes toward E. (shrink)

Pardon powers are common but difficult to justify. A pardon power is, roughly, a power that is (a) possessed by a non-judicial official, (b) used to cancel legal liability to a criminal sanction in a particular case without thereby altering the law, and (c) unconstrained by law. So defined, pardon powers seem to be at odds with two constitutional principles. Contrary to the separation of powers, the pardon power gives to someone other than a judge a (...) decisive role in determining criminal liability in particular cases. Contrary to the rule of law, the pardon power is neither constrained nor ruled by law. -/- Here I provide a novel defence of pardon powers, in three steps. First, even an optimal legal code requires suboptimal results in some cases. In such cases there is a “gap” between what is required by the code we should have and what we should do absent that code. Adhering to the code in every gap case is undesirable: while it would avoid suboptimal results, it would create too much unpredictability. Deviating from the code in every gap case is also undesirable: while it would ensure predictability, it would produce too many suboptimal results. The best strategy is to adhere in some cases and to deviate in others, that is, to selectively deviate. The most important thing about selective deviation is that it leads to like cases being treated differently. This is the second step in the argument. Third, pardon powers are an appropriate vehicle for selective deviation. Selective deviation calls for a power that can be used to set aside the code without changing it. It calls for a power that can be used inconsistently. Moreover, it calls for a power that is not in the hands of a body institutionally disposed towards consistency in decision-making, such as the judiciary. That is, it requires a power with features (a)-(c) – a pardon power. -/- This argument overcomes the various objections to pardon powers. Contrary to the objection from the separation of powers, selective deviation is a task better carried out by non-judicial officials. Contrary to the objection from the rule of law, a power of selective deviation must be unconstrained to preserve the law’s guiding function. Overall, the features of pardon powers that seemed to be in tension with the separation of powers and the rule of law turn out to be favoured by those same principles. (shrink)

This article will examine the religious phenomenology of Max Scheler as it is found in his essay on repentance. In outlining Scheler’s understanding of repentance, I shall note his attempt at defining the phenomenon, as well as the presuppositions to and outcomes of this religious act. With this foundation laid, I shall then offer two critiques. First, Scheler’s rendering of repentance limps in not accounting for the cyclical and repeatable nature of repentance, to which human experience and Scheler’s own broader (...) philosophy attest. Second, Scheler’s essay does not consider the role of other persons both in leading one to repentance and in completing the process. As with the first critique, both human experience and Scheler’s own personalist philosophy testify to the necessary role of other persons. These lacunae detract from the otherwise rich phenomenological account. (shrink)

Dans cette étude je poursuis deux objectifs : d�une part, je tente d�établir d�un point de vue théorique les tenants et aboutissants de la question de savoir si le pardon entre deux communautés est possible ; d�autre part, j�examine les obstacles et les dangers d�un tel pardon. En ce qui concerne le premier objectif, je fais appel à Hannah Arendt qui nous a donné dans La condition de l�homme moderne une définition du pardon que j�applique aux relations (...) entre communautés. Afin d�examiner les problèmes d�un pardon inter-communautaire, je fais usage du roman de J. M. Coetzee, Disgrâce, qui offre à mon sens une illustration de ce qu�un tel pardon entraînerait. La situation que décrit Coetzee, et à laquelle je me réfère egalement, est celle de l�Afrique du Sud après l�apartheid. (shrink)

Spinoza shares with almost all apologists for forgiveness the idea that laying down one’s resentment of a wrong, contempt for a wrongdoer, and overcoming “bondage” to hatred, must be a primary ethical aim. Yet he denies that doing so authorizes pardoning a penitent wrongdoer. He argues that in civil society, it is actually a matter of charity and piety to collude in punishing a wrongdoer—dragging the wrongdoer before a judge, but not “judging” him oneself. I argue that Spinoza offers no (...) warrant to pardon whatever for those not authorized under civil law to punish. But I argue that the response to others’ hatred and deceit that Spinoza urges his reader to cultivate in Ethics 5p10, along with his argument that one may ‘turn the other cheek’ under conditions of oppression, where no sovereign power prosecutes claims of justice, mandates a broader emergent and reparative view of forgiveness. (shrink)

While acknowledging the difficulties, both pragmatic and moral, involved in the efforts to try to punish those involved in atrocious crimes, I try to block the quick move to a policy of pardon and oblivion by interposing a moral commitment to the past that stems from a reflection about the nature of moral deliberation and moral identity. I argue in favor of a policy that is both compatible with such commitment, and practically feasible, one centered around forms of remembrance.

The clemency power of the U.S. President is limited to pardoning federal offences and expressly excludes federal impeachment from the pardon power. There is no explicit prohibition upon who might be the recipient of a presidential pardon. The U.S. Constitution does not expressly prohibit the President from issuing a self-pardon. If the American Framers placed only the one exception for impeachment, then arguably they meant to exclude all other conceivable exceptions. Yet, the very notion of such presidential (...) self-forgiveness raises arguments criticizing the possibility. Would not a selfpardon place the President above the law? In the process of investigating the various arguments denying and supporting the possibility, the parameters and the goals of issuing and accepting or rejecting a presidential pardon are developed along with alternative methods of achieving the same result as a self-pardon without actually issuing a self-pardon. Hence, the puzzle. The essay’s narrow and guarded conclusions are arrived at defeasibly. That is, the essay is driven by the force of the arguments over this paradoxical constitutional dilemma. The essay is intended as the beginning rather than a completion of the inquiry. (shrink)

[Omslag] La question du mal résonne à travers toute l'œuvre de Paul Ricoeur comme une énigme et un scandale : très présente dès les premières œuvres, dans Finitude et culpabilité ou dans Le conflit des interprétations, elle est également au centre de l'inédit Logique, éthique et tragique du mal chez saint Augustin et elle resurgit avec force dans l'essai, Le mal. Un défi à la philosophie et à la théologie. Il n'en est pas de même de la thématique du (...) class='Hi'>pardon, qui n'est vraiment développée que dans les dernières œuvres, en particulier dans l'épilogue de La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli. Et pourtant, si, comme le dit Ricoeur, « la compassion vient briser le cercle vicieux de la culpabilité », n'est-ce pas à la lumière du pardon qu'il importe de revisiter la question de la faute et même l'excès du mal? C'est l'hypothèse que suggère cet ouvrage consacré à l'œuvre de Paul Ricoeur. Fruit d'une journée d'étude organisée conjointement par le Centre Sèvres - Facultés jésuites de Paris et le Fonds Ricoeur, à l'occasion du centenaire de la naissance de Paul Ricoeur, ce volume offre en outre un long inédit de Paul Ricoeur, qui éclaire la manière dont il a travaillé Augustin, mais aussi la genèse et l'évolution de sa pensée sur la question du mal. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:This article argues for an interpretation of doctrine 7 of universal faith in Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise—that God pardons the sins of those who repent—that renders it true in the terms set by Spinoza's Ethics. Though categorized in the Ethics as a vice, repentance nevertheless has a positive political function as the lesser of two evils, supplanting the greater evils of unrepentant pride and shamelessness. The philosopher can understand God's pardon as the natural advantage conferred by repentance itself insofar as (...) it supplants those greater evils. This pardon arises through the laws of Nature (God's mercy and grace), which are equally responsible for that very repentance. The philosophical truth of the doctrines of universal faith ensures that freedom of philosophizing can be granted without harm to the peace or piety of the Republic and cannot be denied without destroying the same. (shrink)

Presidential pardon has always existed in criminal law and continues to constitute a very important competence of the head of state in many modern day countries. In the past, the clemency given by the sovereign represented an act which showed his/her mercy upon their subjects. It was often used as a tool to show the arbitrary will of the sovereign that constituted the law, rather than the law itself. Therefore, the classical school of criminal law that appeared in the (...) 18th century and emphasized the importance of the principle of legality, opposed harshly every kind of arbitrary deciding that excluded the law at the interest of the sovereign. This school is among the only interpretations of criminal law that engages for a complete abandonment of institutes such as pardon or amnesty. The revolutionary French Penal Code of 1791, which was strongly influenced by the classical school, excluded clemency for the proved wrongs that were severely punished. However, due to imperfections of the criminal justice system, amnesty and pardon or clemency, continue to exist and to be used in modern day criminal law. They are no longer considered acts of arbitrary decisions of the sovereign, instead they should represent important instruments of criminal law, used rarely and wisely with specifically designed goals that aim to bring justice rather than deny it. However, there are many cases when these institutes have been inappropriately used in a very arrogant way which shows that the ancient regime is not yet over for some countries in which the highest institutions continue to act as old and middle age despots. This article will analyze the legal reasoning of the institution of presidential pardon. It will try to establish why the classical school was so strictly opposed to this institute making use of the studies and interpretations found in the writings of Cesare Beccaria. It will explain the philosophy of modern day institutions of amnesty and pardon and the way in which they are regulated in the legal theory and practice. The article will explain the recent developments in Macedonia in regard to the use of presidential pardon. The methods to be used consist of desk research, historical and comparative methods and analysis of legal texts, laws and judicial decisions. (shrink)

Deontologists often assume that ethical constraints hold ‘come what may’ but that violations of the constraints can be excused or pardoned. Vinit Haksar has argued for pardon as deontologically appropriate mitigation for the violation of deontological constraints. However, the reasons he adduces against excuse are inconclusive. In this paper, I show how complex the question of excuse versus pardon for deontological transgressions is. Liability for the development of character traits and the assumption of agent-centered responsibility have to be (...) taken into account before the possibility of pardon can be identified as appropriate deontological softener for strict constraints. (shrink)

Situating narrative: philosophical and theological context -- Ethical being: the storied self as moral agent -- Reconciled being: narrative and pardon -- Pedagogies of pardon in praxis -- Towards a narrative pedagogy of reconciliation -- Ricoeur's legacy: A Praxis of Peace.

The aim of this article is to analyse Kant's views on the ruler's right of pardon. This particular theme in the Rechtslehre has remained on the margins of Kant research. The few existing commentaries have taken as their starting-point to interpret Kant's conception of the ruler's right of pardon chiefly against the background of his legal philosophy and its criminal law theory in particular. However, it is argued in this article that Kant's conception of the right of (...) class='Hi'>pardon cannot be fully grasped without knowledge of the intellectual history of pardoning and the contemporary Prussian law code, Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preussischen Staaten, of 1794. It is claimed that in Kant's mind the right of pardon came close to the ruler's personal forgiveness. (shrink)

The presidential pardon as it currently exists is a violation of the separation of powers, checks and balances, and rule of law. With the exception of impeachment, the pardon power of the president is not subject to judicial review. The court has no rights to deny a pardon even though it may violate many explicit laws and implicit values of the constitution. It seems clear that the current form of the presidential power is a usurpation of the (...) role of the judiciary making the president judge and jury combining as it does the legislative and judicial function in the presidency. This unilateral and essentially unchecked power of the presidency threatens the consistency and unity of the government for it is independent and beyond the scope of legal restraint of the other branches of government. (shrink)

Pourquoi le mal est-il toujours perçu comme singulier et scandaleux? Pourquoi éveille-t-il autant d'émotion? Doit-on pardonner à ceux qui ne reconnaissent pas leur tort? Et comment pardonner si personne ne demande pardon? Autant de questions qui, par une approche à la fois philosophique et théologique, s'appuient sur Paul Ricoeur. Dans sa philosophie de l'homme capable, le philosophe montre que le pardon est pensé en lien avec les conditions de son effectuation. Il faut donc un homme capable de répondre (...) de ses actes, d'assumer la sanction. (shrink)

The problem of necessary evil is a sub-class of the problem of moral dilemmas. In cases of genuine moral dilemmas the agent cannot avoid doing evil whatever he does. In some cases of genuine moral dilemmas, the options facing the agent are incommensurable. But in some other cases of genuine moral dilemmas, though wrong doing is inescapable, there is a rationally best course of action. These are cases of necessary evil. There are several views regarding the doing of necessary evil. (...) On the closure view it is never necessary to do what is evil. This is the view of some utilitarians and of Kant. Then there are people who believe that it is sometimes necessary to do evil. Of these some (like John Gardner) believe that evil in such cases is justified even though it remains an evil; while there are others (like Gandhi) who believe that evil in such cases can never be justified but it can at best be excused or pardoned. Some even think that in some extreme cases the individual who does evil (even if it is the lesser evil) should be punished even though the individual could not avoid doing evil whatever he chose. The paper stresses the significance of the distinction between justified wrong doing, pardonable wrong doing, and excusable wrong doing. (shrink)

Face à la violence, que peut la philosophie? Cette question se pose avec une terrible acuité après les attentats de janvier contre Charlie Hebdo et l'hyper-cacher. Le présent ouvrage prétend y apporter une réponse en prenant du recul et à travers la philo française contemporaine de Sartre à Levinas en passant par Camus, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Simone Weil, Canguilhem, Cavaillès, Lévi-Strauss, Deleuze, Foucault, Jankélévitch et Derrida. Sartre, c'est à la fois l'être et le néant et toutes les questions politiques de l'après-guerre (...) ; Camus, l'absurde et la révolte avec le refus de la violence ; Merleau-Ponty, la justification du communisme et donc d'une certaine forme de totalitarisme ; Simone Weil, Canguilhem et Cavaillès mettent le pacifisme à l'épreuve et en avant l'expérience de la nécessité ; Lévi-Strauss pose le problème de la violence face à la diversité humaine repensée ; Deleuze confronte la métaphysique à la politique. Foucault souligne l'enfermement intolérable ; Jankélévitch Derrida et Levinas pose le problème de l'éthique et de la métaphysique et de l'impossible pardon face au génocide juif. Ici c'est toute la philosophie c'est-à-dire, l'action et la pensée les oeuvres et les relations, l'histoire et l'actualité qui tentent de répondre à une certaine folie du monde. (shrink)

Vie, conatus, vertu.--Philosophie et théologie chez Spinoza.--Spinoza et le langage.--Spinoza et la théorie des attributs de Dieu de Maïmonide.--Allégorie et prophétie.--Société et communion chez Spinoza.--État et nature chez Spinoza.--Spinoza et l'État des Hébreux.--Durée et histoire chez Spinoza.--L'idée de loi.--Le chapitre XVI du Traité théologico-politique.--Le péché et le pardon d'après Spinoza.--Le Spinoza de Martial Guéroult I.--Le Spinoza de Martial Guéroult.

This article begins by posing the question: how can we understand the ‘terror’ of 11 September? First, a brief discussion of the reactions, both psychological and political, provides a background for establishing the particular character of this act of terror as being both inside and outside, simultaneously. The pairing of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in inextricable struggle reminds us of the role monsters have always played in putting a face on the radical alterity of the Other. Second, the experience of terror (...) is examined from three distinct philosophical positions: the fatalism of Baudrillard, the sublime of Kant, and the political of Arendt. Third, a discussion of the media and the role of the viewer of the Event of 11 September ends the discussion. In conclusion, it is suggested that the three ways of responding to the monstrous - practical understanding, working through and pardoning - may provide the best ways to help us empathize with our fellow human beings, which ultimately may move us to a fuller imaginative understanding. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce qu'un point névralgique en philosophie? C'est une question ou une position particulière, locale, mais autour de laquelle une pensée se joue dans sa totalité. Autrement dit, c'est un lieu de décision philosophique qui n'engage pas seulement sa cohérence, mais aussi et surtout sa spécificité et sa teneur. Un point névralgique est donc un lieu de décision philosophique dont aucune philosophie marquante ne fait l'économie. Dans cet ouvrage sont analysés les principaux points névralgiques de nombres des plus grands philosophes contemporains. (...) Il en va ainsi, par exemple, de la question du sujet chez Foucault, ou de celle du pardon chez Derrida, ou encore de celle de la légitimation postmoderne chez Lyotard, etc. Ces points névralgiques ne sont pas les seuls chez ces penseurs, mais ils ont au moins une importance toute particulière et tous ont joué un rôle majeur dans la construction de la pensée occidentale. (shrink)

The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy is an excellent successor to an excellent book : It is a fine an example of the necromantic style in the history of philosophy where the object of the exercise is to resurrect the mighty dead in order to get into an argument with them, either because we think them importantly right or instructively wrong. However what was a pardonable a simplification and a reasonable omission in the earlier book has now metamorphosed into a sin (...) of omission and an oversimplification in its successor—the book lacks is an adequate discussion of the Ramified Theory of Types and Russell’s reasons for adopting it. I conclude with a brief meditation on Open Question Arguments and the threats that they pose to some of the analyses proposed by Russell and Moore themselves. (shrink)

Quarterly publication discussing various topics in environmental ethics, including features, discussion papers, book reviews, editorial commentaries, and other text related to environmental philosophies. Some issues also include announcements and other news related to the environmental studies community.

Quarterly publication discussing various topics in environmental ethics, including features, discussion papers, book reviews, editorial commentaries, and other text related to environmental philosophies. Some issues also include announcements and other news related to the environmental studies community.

Le jour du Grand Pardon, présence du blanc, mon taleth immaculé, le seul taleth vierge de la famille,Comme les plumes des coqs et poules que Haim Aimé veut blanches pour le sacrifice d’avant Kippour,Le rabbin les égorge dans le jardin après les avoir tâtées sous l’aile en tenant le couteau entre les dents,puis passées au-dessus de nos têtes en prononçant nos noms, inoubliables bêtes blanches ensanglantées...

It is a brave scholar who ventures into the murky world of Late Antique medicine in search of information on earlier theories. Not only may the opinions of a Herophilus or a Galen be distorted by their distant interpreters, but frequently the texts themselves present serious challenges to understanding. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Latin versions made from Greek philosophical and medical commentaries, which interpose an additional linguistic barrier before one can make sense of sometimes complex arguments. (...) Yet as R. J. Hankinson has shown in his recent note on John of Alexandria, there is much to be gained from these forbidding works. But while he has succeeded in elucidating much of the technical terminology and argument that lies behind one of these translations, his lack of familiarity with the textual basis of the relevant commentary has both led him into error and prevented him from resolving still more of its difficulties. His ignorance is easily pardonable, for, as will be shown, modern editors have unwittingly conspired to block the way to the truth, and the essential secondary literature has been published in journals and theses rarely accessible to the classicist. (shrink)

Le rire est un phénomène qui touche aussi bien le corps que l’âme de l’homme. Helmuth Plessner l’interprète comme le signe d’une existence contradictoire propre à la condition humaine, une existence à la frontière, marquée par l’ambivalence de la relation corps-âme. Quant au comique, un des déclencheurs principaux du rire, la plupart des philosophes le décrivent aussi comme l’apparition d’une contradiction et d’une incongruité. Dans l’histoire de la théologie, le rire a souvent été critiqué ou même interdit. Par contre, le (...) Moyen-Age connaît une culture du comique et même une valorisation théologique du rire. Le rire du chrétien ne peut-il être compris comme expression de son existence contradictoire de pécheur et de justifié ? Placé « à l’extérieur de lui-même », en tant que pécheur gracié, le chrétien est désormais capable de rire. Laughter is a phenomenon that affects man’s body as well as his soul. Helmuth Plessner interprets it as the sign of the contradictory existence which is peculiar to the human condition, a border existence, marked by the ambivalence of the body-soul relationship. The person who is most successful in triggering laughter is the comic; most philosophers describe him also as the appearance of contradiction and incongruity. In the history of theology laughter has often been criticized or even forbidden. In the Middle Ages, however, there was a culture of the jester and even a theological esteem of laughter. Could not the Christian’s laughter be understood as the expression of his contradictory existence of being sinner and justified? Placed « outside himself » as a sinner who has been pardoned, the Christian is henceforth able to laugh. (shrink)

Avicenna : Logic Avicenna is one of the most important philosophers and logicians in the Arabic world. His logical works are presented in several treatises. Some of them are commentaries on Aristotle's Organon, and are presented in al-Shifa al-Mantiq, the logical part of … Continue reading Avicenna : Logic →.

Explores some steps toward non-assimilative encounters in the "global village.".

Comparative political theory is at best an embryonic and marginalized endeavor. As practiced in most Western universities, the study of political theory generally involves a rehearsal of the canon of Western political thought from Plato to Marx. Only rarely are practitioners of political thought willing (and professionally encouraged) to transgress the canon and thereby the cultural boundaries of North America and Europe in the direction of genuine comparative investigation. Border Crossings presents an effort to remedy this situation, fully launching a (...) new era in political theory. Thirteen scholars from around the world examine the various political traditions of West, South, and East Asia and engage in a reflective cross-cultural discussion that belies the assumptions of an Asian "essence" and of an unbridgeable gulf between West and non-West. The denial of essential differences does not, however, amount to an endorsement of essential sameness. As viewed and as practiced by contributors to this ground-breaking volume, comparative political theorizing must steer a course between uniformity and radical separation--this is the path of "border crossings.". (shrink)